Communicated on 20 November 2019

FIFTH SECTION

Application no. 30543/13 Nedelcho Rusev NEDELCHEV against Bulgaria lodged on 30 April 2013

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Mr Nedelcho Rusev Nedelchev , is a Bulgarian national, who was born in 1965 and lives in Sliven. He is represented before the Court by Mr M. Ekimdzhiev and Ms K. Boncheva , lawyers practising in Plovdiv.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant is a former police officer. He was dismissed from the police on disciplinary grounds in 2010, after it was alleged that he had covered up an accident involving another police officer.

The alleged disciplinary offence was described by a commission set up to investigate the matter in two memorandums dated 13 May and 16 July 2010. Another memorandum was prepared on 13 September 2010 and the applicant was invited to comment on the allegations against him. All materials on the case and the applicant ’ s comments were summarised in a new document, submitted to the Minister of the Interior – the body competent to order a disciplinary punishment – on 29 October 2010. The Minister ordered the applicant ’ s dismissal on 19 November 2010.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing in particular that his disciplinary punishment had been ordered after the expiry of the time-limit under section 225 of the Ministry of the Interior Act (see Relevant domestic law below). He contended that the two-month period had started running on 13 May 2010.

The dismissal order was upheld by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment of 20 February 2012. On the applicant ’ s argument indicated above it stated that the administrative punishment had been imposed “within the time-limits” provided for by section 225 of the Ministry of the Interior Act.

On 8 November 2012 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the three-member panel ’ s judgment. Despite the applicant raising once again in his appeal the question of compliance with Article 225 of the Ministry of the Interior Act, pointing out this time to the memorandum of 16 July 2010, the five-member panel failed to comment on the matter.

In parallel proceedings concerning the officer the applicant was alleged to have covered up, who had also been dismissed on disciplinary grounds on 19 November 2010, a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court found in a final judgment of 18 December 2012 that the time-limit under section 225 had started to run when a memorandum on the accident had been prepared on 13 September 2010. The dismissal had been ordered more than two months later, which rendered it unlawful.

Section 225 of the Ministry of the Interior Act 2006, in force until 2014, provided that a disciplinary punishment could be imposed on a Ministry official within a year (two years in grave cases) after the commission of a disciplinary offence, but not later than two months after the discovery of that offence.

By section 223 of the Regulations on the application of the Act, “discovery” meant the moment where “the body competent to impose a disciplinary punishment establish[ ed ] the offence committed and the identity of the perpetrator”. An offence was “established” when the materials of the disciplinary proceedings were submitted to the competent body.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that in the judicial-review proceedings initiated by him the Supreme Administrative Court failed to respond to the argument that his dismissal on disciplinary grounds had been ordered outside the time-limit provided for under section 225 of the Ministry of the Interior Act 2006.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

In the judicial-review proceedings initiated by the applicant, did the Supreme Administrative Court respond adequately to the argument that the applicant ’ s dismissal on disciplinary grounds had been ordered in breach of section 225 of the Ministry of the Interior Act 2006? Has there been a breach of the applicant ’ s right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that regard?