FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 34153/12 Zoran Å UKLEV and Nikola MIRÄŒEVSKI against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 26 September 2017 as a Committee composed of:

Aleš Pejchal, President, Armen Harutyunyan, Jovan Ilievski, judges, and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 June 2012,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicants, Mr Zoran Šuklev (“the first applicant”) and Mr Nikola Mirčevski (“the second applicant”) are Macedonian nationals who were born in 1960 and 1977 respectively and live in Gevgelija. They were represented before the Court by Mr T. Torov, a lawyer practising in Štip.

2. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov.

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. On 11 May 2010 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicants on charges of drug trafficking with the Veles Court of First Instance (“the trial court”).

5. Before the trial court, the applicants were jointly represented by two lawyers, T.T. and B.S.

6. On 19 July 2010 the trial court convicted the applicants and sentenced them to prison sentences: four years and six months in respect of the first applicant, and ten months in respect of the second applicant.

7. The applicants challenged the first-instance judgment on appeal. On 18 January 2011 the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the appellate court”) dismissed their appeals and upheld the first-instance judgment.

8. On 4 April 2011, through both of their representatives, the applicants lodged two requests for extraordinary review of the final judgment ( барање за вонредно преиспитување на правосилна пресуда ) with the Supreme Court .

9. On 20 September 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants ’ requests and confirmed the lower courts ’ judgments.

10. That judgment was served on the first applicant in prison on 15 November 2011, on the second applicant on 14 November 2011, and on B.S., their representative, on 7 November 2011. T.T., who is also the applicants ’ representative before the Court, claims that the judgment was never served on him. As the lawyer representing both applicants before the Court, he submitted that the judgment had been served on the first applicant at some point in December 2011 or March 2012.

B. Relevant domestic law

11. The relevant provisions of the Criminal Proceedings Act of 2005 ( Закон за Кривична Постапка , Official Gazette. no. 15/2005, consolidated version), as applicable at the time, read as follows:

Section 64

“(1) More than one accused can be represented by a common representative [a lawyer], if that does not contradict the interests of their defence.

(2) One accused can be represented by multiple representatives, and the minimum standards of defence are taken as being met when at least one of [the representatives] takes part in the proceedings.”

Section 117

“(4) If the accused is represented [by a lawyer], the indictment ... and all decisions to which an appeal deadline is applicable ... will be delivered to the accused and to his representative.

(5) If [a decision] needs to be delivered to the representative, and the accused has several [representatives], it is considered sufficient to deliver [the decision] to one of the representatives.”

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complained that the criminal proceedings against them had fallen short of the requirements of a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention.

THE LAW

12. Complaining of a breach of their right to a fair trial, the applicants relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads:

“1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal...

...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;”

A. The parties ’ arguments

13. The Government submitted that the final judgment of the Supreme Court had been received by the applicants and their representative in November 2011. In this regard, they submitted signed receipts ( доставници ) indicating that the first applicant had received the judgment on 15 November 2011, the second applicant had received it on 14 November 2011 and their representative B.S. had received it even earlier, on 7 November 2011. For these reasons, the Government argued that the application had been lodged outside the time-limit of six months, and was therefore inadmissible.

14. In response, the applicants submitted that the signature on the receipt which was meant to be that of the first applicant was not actually his signature. Further to this, T.T., as the representative of both applicants before this Court as well as one of the two representatives before the domestic courts, submitted that he had never been served with the judgment of the Supreme Court, and that he had not been allowed to access the court file to verify the receipts submitted by the Government.

B. The Court ’ s assessment

15. The Court reiterates its established case-law pertaining to the requirements of the six-month rule. The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty, ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time, and protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being in a situation of uncertainty for a long period of time (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC] , no. 27396/06 , §§ 40-42, 29 June 2012; see also Shirnova v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 31876/11, 12 November 2011).

16. The Court further reiterates that the six-month period will run from the date on which a decision is actually served (see Worm v. Austria (dec.), no. 22714/93, § 33, 7 November 1995).

17. Furthermore, in a situation where the applicant is represented by a lawyer, the six-month period runs from the date on which the applicant ’ s lawyer became aware of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see Çelik v. Turkey (dec.), no. 52991/99, ECHR 2004 ‑ X, with further references).

18. The Court notes that in the instant case there is no dispute between the parties that the domestic courts served the final judgment on B.S. on 7 November 2011. At the time, B.S. was the representative of both applicants. Accordingly, the six-month period with regard to both applicants started to run on 8 November 2011. However, the applicants lodged their application with the Court on 1 June 2012, more than six months later.

19. In view of its case-law relating to the calculation of the six-month time-period (see paragraph 17 above), the Court finds that this is sufficient to conclude that the applicants ’ complaint is inadmissible for non-compliance with the six ‑ month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 19 October 2017 .

             Renata Degener AleÅ¡ Pejchal              Deputy Registrar President