JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES BOÅ NJAK AND YÃœKSEL

1. We agree with the other members of the Chamber that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) in the present case. In our view, the main shortcoming at the domestic level was that the competent authorities had failed to examine properly the applicant ’ s repeated claims of a violation of her right to be assisted by a lawyer during her interview in police custody. Equally, as the judgment rightly points it out in paragraph 50, it remains unclear whether the applicant was given any explanation, during her police interview, as to the consequences of her waiver, including whether any statement given could subsequently be admitted in evidence in the proceedings against her.

2. In paragraph 54 of the present judgment it is stated that the use of a printed waiver formula may represent a challenge as to ascertaining whether the text actually expressed an accused ’ s free and informed decision to waive his or her right to be assisted by a lawyer. We believe that a printed text of any statement by an accused does not in itself undermine its validity or credibility, as long as it is accompanied by sufficient indications that it indeed reflects the accused ’ s free and informed will (e.g. a signature). Where a suspect or an accused person subsequently casts doubt upon the circumstances in which such a statement has been taken, the competent authorities are under an obligation to thoroughly examine the claim. Therefore, in our opinion, the present judgment should not be interpreted to mean that any statement by an accused which is printed (and not, for example, handwritten or audio-recorded) would necessarily in itself be questionable as to its authenticity.