Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 24483/94

by Fred SÖDERSTRÖM

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 28 February 1996, the following members being present:

Mrs. G.H. THUNE, Acting President

MM. H. DANELIUS

G. JÖRUNDSSON

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

F. MARTINEZ

L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

J. MUCHA

D. SVÁBY

P. LORENZEN

Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 7 March 1994 by

Fred Söderström against Sweden and registered on 28 June 1994 under

file No. 24483/94;

Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 24 March 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicant on 24 April 1995;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1929 and residing at

Lindesberg, is a pensioner.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

In letters to the National Judicial Board for Public Lands and

Funds (Kammarkollegiet) dated 18 April and 24 October 1982 and 17 March

and 13 May 1984 the applicant claimed to be the rightful owner of a

piece of property, Grimsö, in Lindesberg. He referred to his

relationship with an earlier owner of the property and claimed that,

when rights to the property later had been transferred to the State,

the State had not acquired the right of ownership.

After an investigation of the matter, the National Judicial Board

replied to the applicant on 6 September 1982 and 7 June 1984. The Board

concluded that the applicant could not, with any prospect of success,

claim ownership rights to the property in question.

After having received a further letter from the applicant on

6 August 1984, the National Judicial Board reiterated its position in

a decision of 8 May 1985.

The applicant later contacted the Ministry of Finance concerning

the applicability of certain laws and regulations on hereditary tenancy

rights (åborätt). On 7 May 1986 he was informed by the Ministry that

if he claimed such a right to a piece of property he should file an

application with the County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen). If,

on the other hand, he claimed ownership to the property, he should

apply to the District Court.

In a letter dated 12 May 1986, which was received by the County

Administrative Board of the County of Örebro on 14 May 1986, the

applicant, claiming that his family had a hereditary tenancy right to

the above property due to the relationship with the earlier owner,

requested the Board to grant him possession of the property. The

applicant maintained that, according to a Royal Prohibition (Kungligt

förbud) of 11 December 1766 which was still in force, the property

could not have been legally sold to anybody outside his family.

On 22 May 1986 the County Administrative Board referred the case

for investigation to its Land Surveying Department (Lantmäterienheten).

On 23 March 1987 the Board reminded the Department that it should

submit its opinion. The Department replied on 14 April, stating that

the matter called for a thorough investigation and might take some time

but that it would make an effort to submit the opinion during the

spring of 1987.

On 24 August 1987 the applicant requested that the Government

take over the case. By decision of 10 September 1987, the Government

rejected the request, stating that it lacked competence to deal with

the case.

On 25 April 1988 the applicant reminded the County Administrative

Board of the case and on 14 June 1988 he again suggested that the Board

should hand over the case to the Government.

On 6 October 1988 the Land Surveying Department drew up a draft

opinion which was later submitted for comments to the County

Administrative Board. On 13 December 1988 the Board presented its

comments to the Department.

A further request by the applicant that the case be determined

by the Government was forwarded by the County Administrative Board on

13 December 1988 and rejected by the Government on 10 February 1989.

In a memorandum dated 10 April 1989 the Land Surveying Department

gave its opinion on the applicant's request. It reached the following

conclusions. At the time of the enactment of the 1766 Royal Prohibition

and for many years thereafter, property of the Crown could be bought

by, inter alia, an ironworks owner for the purpose of being used in the

running of the industrial activities. If the property had been bought

for this purpose, the hereditary right of any tenant (Ã¥bo) remained

unchanged. There were also other possibilities of buying Crown

property, to which such hereditary rights did not apply. The Department

found that the property to which the applicant claimed a hereditary

right had been bought from the Crown at the end of the eighteenth or

at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the applicant's

relative had been the registered owner of the property in 1839 and that

it had later been sold to another private person and, in 1912, to the

State. After an examination of several different sources, the

Department concluded that the property had not been bought from the

Crown for the purpose of being used in the activities of the ironworks

and that, for this reason, the applicant could not claim any hereditary

right to it.

The Land Surveying Department further stated that the case was

of a very complex nature, that some documents were missing and that

reference was made to very old legislation. The Department noted that

it could be regarded as being primarily responsible for the delay in

the case and pointed out that the efforts it had made to provide a

basis for a decision clearly exceeded what was normal in cases such as

the present one. The Department had examined, inter alia, much

unconfirmed information supplied by the applicant.

On 24 April 1989 the County Administrative Board gave the

applicant an opportunity to submit comments on the memorandum, which

he did on 12 May 1989.

On 28 May 1989 the Board submitted the applicant's comments to

the Land Surveying Department.

On 11 August 1989 the Department presented a second memorandum,

in which it answered the applicant's comments but did not change the

conclusions drawn in the first memorandum.

After the applicant, on 24 October 1989, had been given an

opportunity to express his opinion also on the second memorandum, he

informed the County Administrative Board on 6 February 1990 that he

preferred to await the Board's decision before making any further

comments.

On 19 March 1990 the County Administrative Board, relying on the

Land Surveying Department's memoranda, rejected the applicant's

request, as he had not shown that he had any hereditary tenancy right

to the property in question.

On 9 April 1990 the applicant appealed to the National Judicial

Board for Public Lands and Funds. The appeal was, in accordance with

the applicable rules, submitted to the County Administrative Board,

which forwarded it to the National Judicial Board three weeks later.

By decision of 19 December 1991 the National Judicial Board

upheld the County Administrative Board's decision without further

reasoning.

On 2 January 1992 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the

Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten).

By judgment of 1 June 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court,

without stating any reasons of its own, upheld the National Judicial

Board's decision.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant alleges, under Article 6 of the Convention, that

the case was not heard by an impartial tribunal, as the Swedish State,

the present owner of the property in question, was both a party to the

dispute and the deciding authority.

2. The applicant further complains that the case was not heard

within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 of the

Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 7 March 1994 and registered on

28 June 1994.

On 11 January 1995 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to

communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to

Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure. The Government were

asked to deal with the question whether the applicant's case was

determined within a reasonable time.

The Government's written observations were submitted on

24 March 1995. The applicant replied on 24 April 1995.

THE LAW

1. The applicant alleges that the case was not heard by an impartial

tribunal. He invokes Article 6 of the Convention whose first paragraph

(Art. 6-1), in relevant parts, reads as follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is

entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by

an independent and impartial tribunal ..."

The Commission recalls that the applicant's case was determined

in the final resort by the Supreme Administrative Court. There is

nothing to suggest that that Court was not an impartial tribunal within

the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant further complains that the case was not heard

within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention.

The Government submit that this complaint is manifestly

ill-founded. The Government maintain that the right claimed by the

applicant is of very ancient origin, governed by ancient legislation

and utterly seldom claimed today. The County Administrative Board had

to carry out a thorough investigation which involved examinations of

the files of the real estate archives and of ancient documents held by

the authority administering State-owned land. It also had to make

inquiries with other authorities. Furthermore, the applicant's case was

particularly difficult and complex. The applicant referred to facts and

events dating back to the sixteenth century and based his claims on

extensive oral submissions without being able to present any written

evidence to support his statements. He continued to submit additional

information during the Land Surveying Department's investigation. It

was very difficult to make an assessment and separate substantial facts

from all the information submitted by the applicant. The Department

made considerable efforts to investigate the applicant's statements

which clearly exceeded what can be considered as normal in a case of

this character. The Government argue that the thorough investigation

carried out by the Department to a great extent was made in the

applicant's own interest, as he could not himself substantiate his

statements. The Government therefore claim that the delay in the

proceedings before the County Administrative Board to a considerable

extent must be attributed to the applicant's own conduct.

With respect to the proceedings before the National Judicial

Board for Public Lands and Funds and the Supreme Administrative Court,

the Government reiterate that the case involved the application of very

ancient and rarely applied legislation and that the facts and

circumstances were of an extremely complex nature. As concerns the

Supreme Administrative Court, the Government further refer to the

considerable workload of the Court during the relevant years.

The applicant submits that the case could have been determined

within a year. He claims that all the necessary documents are held in

the archives of the National Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds.

The Commission considers, after a preliminary examination of the

present complaint in the light of the parties' submissions, that it

raises questions of fact and law which require an examination of the

merits. This part of the application cannot, therefore, be declared

inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for

inadmissibility have been established.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,

the applicant's complaint that his case was not heard within a

reasonable time;

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary Acting President

to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber

(M.-T. SCHOEPFER) (G.H. THUNE)

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SÖDERSTRÖM v. SWEDEN

SÖDERSTRÖM v. SWEDEN

LEXI