AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                 Application No. 20471/92

                 by KUSTANNUS OY VAPAA AJATTELIJA AB,

                 VAPAA-AJATTELIJAIN LIITTO - FRITÄNKARNAS

                 FÖRBUND r.y. and Kimmo SUNDSTRÖM

                 against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

15 April 1996, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 J.-C. SOYER

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 D. SVÁBY

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 14 June 1992 by

KUSTANNUS OY VAPAA AJATTELIJA AB, VAPAA-AJATTELIJAIN LIITTO -

FRITÄNKARNAS FÖRBUND r.y. and Kimmo SUNDSTRÖM against Finland and

registered on 11 August 1992 under file No. 20471/92;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 17 March and 25 June 1995 as well as 15 February 1996 and

the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 15 May 1995;

      Having regard to the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on

15 April 1996;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant (in English "Publishing Company Freethinker

Ltd.") is a limited liability company registered in Helsinki. The

second applicant ("The Freethinkers' Association") is the registered

umbrella association for the Finnish freethinkers. The third applicant

is a Finnish citizen, born in 1957 and resident in Helsinki. He is the

manager of the applicant company as well as a member of one of the

branches of the applicant association. All applicants are represented

by Mr. Martin Scheinin, a law professor at the University of Helsinki.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant company is owned by the applicant association and

its local branches. The applicant association is its majority

shareholder. According to the applicants, the company was founded in

1982 with the primary aim of publishing and selling books reflecting

and promoting the aims of the freethinkers' movement. It was seen as

useful and practical to transfer the commercial activities of the

association to the company, although this arrangement did not affect

the respective tax burden of the two.

      According to the company's statutes, its activities consist of:

      "... the publishing of books, magazines, audiovisual

      products, audio records and tapes as well as the importing,

      exporting and selling of the above-mentioned products..."

      (article 2; translation from Finnish).

      The company statutes include a clause affording the applicant

association and its member associations a right to redeem at their

nominal price any shares sold to a non-shareholder.

      According to the applicant association's statutes, it functions

as:

      "... the contact link between - and umbrella organisation

      for - the registered associations of freethinkers, atheists

      and humanists [and as] the defender of [their] interests,

      legal rights and culture.

      The aim of the association is to promote a scientific view

      of the world as well as to further the activity of its

      member associations in their work ... towards the

      separation of the two State Churches from the State and the

      abolition of their position in public law.

      In order to achieve its aim the association ... carries out

      publishing activities in its field.

      ..." (article 2; translation from Finnish).

      Finland recognises two State Churches, the Evangelical-Lutheran

Church and the Orthodox Church of Finland. Approximately 86 per cent

of the population belong to the Evangelical-Lutheran Church and about

1 per cent belong to the Orthodox Church of Finland. A physical person

who is not a member of any of the two State Churches is registered in

the civil population register, since the State Churches administer

their own population registers. None of the applicants are members of

any of the State Churches.

      On 19 October 1989 the applicant company was ordered to pay

church tax (kirkollisvero, kyrkoskatt) for the year of 1988 in the

amount of 14,80 FIM (approximately the same in FF). The applicant

company paid the tax, but nevertheless lodged a rectification request

with the Tax Board (verolautakunta, skattenämnden) of Helsinki.

      On 10 May 1990 the Convention and, inter alia, Protocol No. 1 to

the Convention entered into force with regard to Finland. On

23 May 1990 the Convention was incorporated into Finnish law (Act

no. 439/90).

      On 10 March 1991 the applicant company was ordered to pay church

tax for 1989 in the amount of 7,60 FIM. All applicants appealed to the

County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) of Helsinki.

      On 26 March 1991 the Tax Board rectified the church tax collected

from the company for 1988. However, considering the minor amount

collected and in pursuance of the 1978 Decree on Tax Collection

(veronkantoasetus, skatteuppbördsförordning 903/78), the tax was not

reimbursed. The representative of the City of Helsinki appealed against

the decision.

      On 20 October 1992 the County Administrative Court found that the

applicant company was liable to pay the church tax for 1988. All

applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein

hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen).

      On 4 January 1992 the applicant company was ordered to pay church

tax for 1990 in the amount of 5,04 FIM. All applicants appealed to the

County Administrative Court which, on 29 April 1993, considered that

the applicant association and Mr. Sundström lacked legal standing as

appellants. It furthermore found that the company was liable to pay

church tax for the years 1989-90. All applicants appealed to the

Supreme Administrative Court.

      According to the 1992 Act on Income Tax (tuloverolaki, inkomst-

skattelag 1535/92) which entered into force on 1 January 1993, legal

persons and associations became liable to pay 25 per cent in tax on

their income (later increased to 28 per cent). 0,84 per cent of these

tax revenues were to be passed on to the Evangelical-Lutheran and the

Orthodox parishes (0,76 and 0,08 per cent respectively). Part of the

remaining revenues was to be retained by the State and a further part

was to be passed on to the relevant municipality (section 124,

subsections 2 and 5).

      On 15 November 1994 the applicant company was ordered to pay

income tax in the total amount of 457 FIM for 1993. Due to the 1992 Act

the amount which was to be passed on to the parishes was no longer

specified in the tax assessment. However, in pursuance of that Act the

part to be received by the Church amounted to 15,36 FIM. The company

requested a rectification of the tax assessment, arguing that the part

of the income tax which was to be passed on to the Church should not

have been imposed.    On 8 December 1994 the applicant association was

ordered to pay income tax in the total amount of 556 FIM for 1993. Out

of that sum the tax to be passed on to the parishes under the 1992 Act

amounted to 18,71 FIM.

      In two decisions of 30 December 1994 the Supreme Administrative

Court considered that the applicant association and Mr. Sundström

lacked legal standing to appeal against the levying of church tax on

the applicant company for the years 1988-90. The Court considered that

the church tax did not directly affect the association's or

Mr. Sundström's own taxation nor had any of them been shown to be

responsible for its payment.

      The Supreme Administrative Court furthermore rejected the

applicant company's appeals. It noted that the company was not a

religious community, nor had it been argued that it was a public

utility organisation. In the tax returns submitted by the company it

had referred to its commercial activities which consisted of the

publishing and printing of books. The Court recalled that the 1919

Constitution Act (Suomen Hallitusmuoto, Regeringsform för Finland

94/19) only protected physical persons' freedom of religion. Rendering

legal persons liable to pay church tax could not be considered as

violating that freedom. Moreover, the levying of church tax on the

applicant company neither directly nor indirectly restricted the right

under Article 18 para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In any

case, as regards the church tax levied for the years 1988-89, the

Supreme Administrative Court noted that the domestic legislation

incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights ("the

Convention") into Finnish law had entered into force only on

23 May 1990. Finally, in regard to the church tax levied for 1990, the

Supreme Administrative Court found that the freedom of thought,

conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 para. 1 of the

Convention had not been restricted.

      On 4 January 1995 the applicant association lodged a

rectification request with the Tax Board, arguing that no taxes should

have been imposed for 1993. In the alternative, it argued that the part

of the income tax which was to be passed on to the Church should not

have been imposed. The association stated, inter alia, as follows:

      (translation from Finnish)

      "... The association ... is ... a public utility

      organisation ... . The sales income [at issue; about 2.200

      FIM from the sale of urns] directly serves the

      philosophical goal of the association. In this connection

      it should be mentioned that, for tax reasons, the

      responsibility for the further, much larger sale of

      literature, was previously transferred to an entirely

      separate limited liability company [i.e. the applicant

      company] ..."

      On 24 January 1995 the Tax Board rejected the applicant company's

rectification request concerning that part of the tax imposed for 1993

which was to be passed on to the Church. On the point of principle, the

Board referred to the Supreme Administrative Court's decisions of

30 December 1994.

      In a decision of 16 February 1995 the Tax Board maintained that

the association's sale of urns should be regarded as a commercial

activity subject to taxation, since it had not been shown in what

manner the activity had been carried out nor how it had promoted the

association's goals. Considering the minor character of the  activity,

the Tax Board nevertheless exempted the association from paying any of

the taxes imposed for 1993. The overall amount of wrongly levied tax

was later reimbursed to the applicant association.

      On 13 September 1995 the applicant company was ordered to pay

income tax in the amount of 209 FIM for 1994. Out of that sum the tax

to be passed on to the parishes under the 1992 Act amounted to

17,56 FIM.

      On request the applicant association has been granted annual

State subsidies as from 1973. For instance, for the years 1988-90 and

1993-94 it received a total of 650.000 FIM.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice

      According to the 1919 Constitution Act, the rights and

obligations of a Finnish citizen shall not depend on whether or not he

or she belongs to a certain religious community, if any (section 9, as

in force at the relevant time). According to the 1922 Act on Religious

Freedom (uskonnonvapauslaki, religionsfrihetslag 267/22), a person who

is not a member of either of the two State Churches shall not be

obliged to pay church tax (section 12).

      According to the 1966 Act on the Official Buildings and Funds of

the Evangelical-Lutheran Parishes (laki evankelisluterilaisten

seurakuntien virkataloista ja rahastoista, lag om de evangelisk-

lutherska församlingarnas boställen och fonder 106/66) and the

interpretation thereof, all legal persons as well as other associations

(yhteisöt, samfund) liable to pay municipal taxes were to pay church

tax despite the fact that none of their members belonged to the

Evangelical-Lutheran Church. Only "persons" who were not members of an

Evangelical-Lutheran parish as well as other religious communities and

their parishes were exempted by law from paying tax to that Church

(section 13 and the Supreme Administrative Court's judgment no. 1970

II 501). With the entry into force of the 1992 Act on Income Tax the

1966 Act in practice lost its applicability.

      The 1958 Taxation Act (verotuslaki, beskattningslag), as in force

at the material time, did not exclude the exemption of a tax imposed

on a person other than a physical one, provided, inter alia, that the

collection of the tax would, for a particular reason, be clearly

unreasonable (section 125, as amended by Act no. 608/82). In a judgment

of 1981 the Supreme Administrative Court held that also a person other

than a physical one could be exempted from paying church tax (no. 1981

II 123). On certain grounds the competent tax board could also rectify

a taxation (section 87 of the Taxation Act, as in force at the material

time).

      According to the 1964 Church Act (kirkkolaki, kyrkolag 635/64),

a Church body could order that a person other than a physical one

should be exempted from church tax, provided that the exemption was

based on grounds applicable to exemption from State or municipal tax

(section 368, subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 1008/82). According

to the 1993 Church Act, the Church Council (kirkkoneuvosto, kyrko-

rådet) may exempt someone from church tax on the same grounds as those

on which that tax payer either has been or could be exempted from State

or municipal tax (section 3). The parishes' assets and income shall

only be used for the purpose of carrying out the duties of the parishes

(chapter 15, section 1).

      According to the 1978 Decree on Tax Collection, a wrongly

collected tax amount which was smaller than 20 FIM could not be

reimbursed (section 9, subsection 2 and section 21, both as amended by

Decree no. 811/88). This amount was subsequently increased to 30 FIM

(Decree no. 224/93).

      The 1989 Act on Associations (yhdistyslaki, föreningslag 503/89)

guarantees to anyone the freedom of association with others

for idealistic purposes provided these do not contravene law or morals

(section 1). The Act is, however, not applicable to an organisation

aiming at producing profit or any other direct economic benefit for its

members or if the purpose or the nature of its activities is mainly

economic (section 2).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicants complain that the church tax levied on the

applicant company for the tax years 1988-1990 violated their right to

freedom of religion, having regard to the fact that none of them were

members of any of the State Churches at the relevant time. In their

submissions of 25 November 1994 the applicants also complain about the

levying of church tax on the applicant company for the tax year 1993.

Article 9 of the Convention is invoked.

      In their submissions of 13 January 1995 the applicant association

and Mr. Sundström furthermore complained about the church tax levied

on the applicant association for 1993. This complaint was withdrawn on

15 May 1995.

      In their submissions of 22 December 1995 the applicants also

complain about the levying of church tax on the applicant company for

1994.

2.    The applicants furthermore complain that the court determination

of the applicant company's "civil rights" following its tax appeals

concerning the tax levied for the years 1988-90 was not concluded

"within a reasonable time". In particular, the proceedings concerning

the tax levied for 1988 were unduly prolonged due to the appeal lodged

by the representative of the City of Helsinki following the Helsinki

Tax Board's decision of 26 March 1991. Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention is invoked.

3.     Finally, the applicants complain that in view of the minor sums

at stake the church tax levied for the years 1988-90 could not have

been reimbursed to the applicant company even if the applicants'

appeals had been successful. In their submissions of 25 November 1994

the applicants extend this complaint to cover also the church tax

levied on the applicant company for 1993. Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention is invoked.

      In their submissions of 13 January 1995 the applicant association

and Mr. Sundström furthermore complained about the church tax levied

on the applicant association for 1993 which could not have been

reimbursed either. This complaint was withdrawn on 15 May 1995.   In

their submissions of 22 December 1995 the applicants also extend this

complaint to cover the church tax levied on the applicant company for

1994.PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 14 June 1992 and registered on

13 August 1992.

      On 30 November 1994 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to

communicate the application in its then form to the respondent

Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.

On 17 January 1995 the Commission decided to communicate also the

further aspects of the application raised by the applicants on

13 January 1995.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

17 March 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose. The applicants replied on 15 May 1995. Additional observations

were submitted by the Government on 25 June 1995.

      On 16 January 1996 the plenary Commission ordered the transfer

of the application to itself pursuant to Article 20 para. 4 of the

Convention. On 22 January 1996 it decided to communicate also the

further aspects of the application raised by the applicants on

22 December 1995. It furthermore decided to invite the parties to a

hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.

      The Government's additional observations were submitted on

15 February 1996. At the Commission's hearing which was held on

15 April 1996 the parties were represented as follows:

The Government

Mr. Holger Rotkirch              Ambassador, Director General for Legal

                                 Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

                                 Legal Department, Agent

Mr. Arto Kosonen                 Head of Unit, Ministry for Foreign

                                 Affairs, Legal Department, Co-Agent

Mr. Timo Viherkenttä             Director of Business Taxation,

                                 Ministry of Finance, Tax Department,

                                 Adviser

Mr. Matti Halttunen              Director, National Church Board,

                                 Adviser

The applicants

Mr. Martin Scheinin              Dr. iuris, Professor of Law,

                                 University of Helsinki

Ms. Johanna Ojala                Lawyer, Adviser

THE LAW

1.    The company's obligation to pay church taxes or other taxes

      reserved for Church activities

      The applicants complain under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the

Convention that the church tax levied on the applicant company for the

years 1988-90 and 1993-94 violated their right to freedom of religion,

having regard to the fact that none of them were members of any of the

State Churches at the relevant time.

      Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention reads as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,

      conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to

      change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or

      in community with others and in public or in private, to

      manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

      practice and observance.

      2.   Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be

      subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law

      and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of public safety, for the protection of public order,

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      The Government first submit that none of the applicants can claim

to be a "victim" within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1)

of the Convention of a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) on account of

the tax levied on the applicant company. Admittedly, the applicant

association can be considered to have religious and philosophical

goals. However, the applicant company is neither a religious or

philosophical community nor a non-profitmaking body. For instance, in

its tax rectification request of 4 January 1995 the applicant

association admitted that the company aims at generating profit for its

shareholders. Moreover, in its decisions of 30 December 1994 the

Supreme Administrative Court found that the company was functioning on

a commercial basis. At any rate, the religious freedom as guaranteed

by Article 9 (Art. 9) is, as held by the Court, primarily a matter of

individual conscience (Eur. Court H.R., Kokkinakis v. Greece judgment

of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, p. 17, para. 31). In the

Government's view Article 9 (Art. 9) cannot therefore be invoked by a

company functioning on a commercial basis such as the present applicant

company.

      The Government furthermore stress that the company statutes do

not limit its commercial activities to publishing, importing and

exporting material promoting the freethinkers' movement. Moreover, if

the company's commercial activities allegedly promoting the movement

were of secondary importance, as asserted by the applicants, these

activities could legally have been pursued by the applicant

association.

      The Government add that none of the company's shareholders are

responsible for its tax debts or any other obligations. Finally, the

tax levied on the applicant company did not affect the taxation of the

applicant association or Mr. Sundström, since neither of them could be

held responsible for the payment of that tax.     In the alternative,

the Government argue that the conditions for admissibility prescribed

by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention have not been met in regard

to the church tax imposed for the tax years 1988-90. The applicants did

not request an exemption from that tax, although domestic practice

would seem to show that the nature of the company's activities could

have been of relevance to the assessment of whether to grant such an

exemption. The applicants thus failed to exhaust a domestic remedy

which could not be considered ineffective for the purposes of Article

26 (Art. 26).

      Turning to Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention in isolation, the

Government argue that the complaint is incompatible ratione materiae

with the provisions of the Convention as far as relating to the income

tax levied on the applicant company for the years 1993-94. Following

the entry into force of the 1992 Income Tax Act the tax levied on legal

persons and associations was no longer earmarked for any specific

purpose. There was thus no direct link between the taxation of the

applicant company and the State's contributions to religious

communities and activities. The applicants could not derive from

Article 9 (Art. 9) any right to refuse to abide by neutral and general

tax laws.

      In the final alternative, the Government submit that the

complaint as a whole is manifestly ill-founded, since there was no lack

of respect for the right of any of the applicants to freedom of

religion. The company's objections to paying the tax at issue cannot

be considered as an exercise of its religious freedom. The Government

furthermore recall that the Commission has not objected to a State

Church system as such (Darby v. Sweden, Comm. Report 9.5.89, para. 45,

Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 187, pp. 17-18). In Finland various tax

revenues cover 75 per cent of the parishes' expenses. The parishes are

responsible for carrying out many tasks which benefit the Finnish

society as a whole, including persons who do not belong to a State

Church. They are, for instance, responsible for the burial of

practically every deceased (98 per cent). They maintain most

cemeteries, keep population registers and maintain historically

valuable buildings. Finally, in cooperation with volunteers the

parishes also provide welfare services to any needy person, including

non-members of a State Church.

      In this connection the Government also recall that under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)  the Contracting States are entitled

to enforce such laws as they deem necessary to control the use of

property to secure the payment of taxes. A wide margin of appreciation

is afforded to the States in this respect. It follows that the Finnish

State must be free to make use of tax income for purposes which the

applicants may object to. The fact that non-believers are also required

to participate in covering Church expenses is not uncommon in member

States of the Council of Europe. Finally, the Government stress that

the sums which the applicant company had to contribute to the Church

were insignificant. In any case, during the years of relevance to the

complaint the applicant association received 650.000 FIM in State

subsidies.

      The applicants contend that they may all claim to be victims

within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, since the

church tax levied on the applicant company violated their respective

right to freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 para. 1

(Art. 9-1). Finnish law does not require that a limited liability

company should be established and run for the purpose of making a

profit or that it should otherwise be of a commercial character. A

corporate body may therefore also serve religious or philosophical

purposes. Although the applicant company carries out certain modest

economic activities, it does not aim at producing profit but at having

the Church separated from the State. It was a form of organisation

chosen for practical reasons, its aim being to further the ideals of

the freethinkers by acting as an integral part of its Finnish movement.

The company's real aim is shown, in particular, by the fact that its

shares cannot be freely acquired by anyone outside the freethinkers'

movement and thus do not have any market value. As a result the shares

cannot become the object of commercial interests. The applicants stress

that the company neither was nor could have been established in order

to avoid church tax.

      Whilst accepting that the rights under Article 9 (Art. 9) are in

principle of a personal nature, the applicants argue that these rights

can be effectively enjoyed only in community with others. Excluding the

applicant company from its entitlement to freedom of religion on

account of its corporate character would exclude the applicants from

protection afforded to them by Article 9 (Art. 9) merely because they

chose to transfer some of their activities to that company. This would

be an excessively formalistic approach.

      The applicants add that the applicant association is undisputedly

working for certain philosophical goals. It also constitutes the

applicant company's majority shareholder and had a direct interest in

the outcome of the taxation proceedings concerning the company.

      As regards Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the applicants

contend that they have exhausted the domestic remedies at their

disposal. There existed no absolute right to an exemption from the tax

imposed on the company and under no circumstances could an exemption

have been granted merely in respect of the church tax. The remedy

referred to by the Government was therefore not an effective one for

the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26).

      As regards Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention in isolation, all

applicants contend that their "negative freedom of religion" has been

violated on account of the church tax levied on the applicant company.

Although the non-believers in Finland largely outnumber the members of

the second State Church, only other religious denominations and their

parishes are exempted from paying church tax. Moreover, this tax is not

used for the benefit of non-members of a State Church. The tax revenues

are not earmarked for the purpose of funding the activities which the

Church claims it is carrying out as a matter of duty to society, for

instance maintaining the cemeteries and the population registration.

The tax is only a means of obtaining income to the Church. Even

assuming that the church tax compensated the Church for services

provided by it, legal persons and associations liable to pay such tax

do not make use of those services and cannot be members of the Church.

      The applicants further contend that the Church does not carry out

functions which cannot otherwise be obtained. For instance, the

freethinkers' cemeteries accept any deceased person. None of these

cemeteries receive any State subsidies. In addition, the Church does

not need the church tax in order to maintain its own cemeteries. In no

parish can a non-member of the Church be buried at the same price as

a member thereof.

      The applicants furthermore point out that on top of the church

tax revenues the Church also obtains State subsidies directly out of

the State's general tax fund. These subsidies go to religious work in

general and cover, for instance, the bishops' salaries and

administrative costs. Church schools and publications as well as the

upkeep and renovation of Church buildings are also being subsidised by

the State.

      The applicants underline that it does not follow from the 1992

tax reform that all income tax revenues stay in the State's general tax

fund, since part of the tax must still be passed on to the Church.

According to the Church legislation, a parish must use its assets and

income exclusively in order to carry out its ecclesiastical duties.

Legal persons and associations liable to pay income tax are thus still

financing religious activities of the Church. How these revenues are

spent is outside the State's control.

      Finally, the applicants point out that the State subsidies to the

applicant association have been granted on a discretionary basis. These

subsidies emanated from the State's general tax fund and cannot be

characterised as tax revenues collected for the purposes of supporting

the freethinkers' movement. They must therefore be distinguished from

the taxes levied on the applicant company which have directly served

the interests of the Church.

      a)   The church taxes imposed for 1988-89

      The Commission recalls that in accordance with the generally

recognised rules of international law the Convention only governs, for

each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry into force with

regard to that Party (see, e.g., No. 9453/81, Dec. 13.12.82, D.R. 31

pp. 204, 208). It entered into force with regard to Finland on

10 May 1990.

      In the present case the tax assessment concerning, inter alia,

the church tax to be levied for the tax year 1988 was made already in

1989. It is true that the tax to be levied for the tax year 1989 was

assessed in 1991, i.e. after the entry into force and the incorporation

of the Convention. Both of these tax assessments were nevertheless

based on an interpretation of the relevant tax legislation as in force

in respect of those two tax years.

      The Government have not objected to admissibility by arguing that

the Commission would lack competence ratione temporis to deal with the

present complaint. The Commission considers, however, that it must

decide the question concerning its competence of its own motion and

regardless of the parties' position. This is so at least in the present

case, where it has not been alleged that the taxation at issue created

a continuing situation connecting the period before the date of the

entry into force of the Convention with the period thereafter (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece judgment of

24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B, p. 69, para. 40).

      The Commission has repeatedly held that, where the facts consist

of a series of legal proceedings, the date of entry into force of the

Convention in respect of the Contracting State in question has the

effect of dividing the period into two, the earlier part escaping the

Commission's jurisdiction ratione temporis, whereas a complaint

relating to the later part cannot be rejected on this ground (see,

e.g., No. 8261/78, Dec. 11.10.79, D.R. 18 p. 150, confirmed in

No. 11306/84, Dec. 16.10.86, D.R. 50 p. 162). On the other hand, where

a court gives judgment after the entry into force of the Convention,

the Commission is competent to ensure that the proceedings leading up

to this judgment were in conformity with the Convention, as the

proceedings before a court are embodied in its final decision which

thus incorporates any defect by which they may have been affected

(ibid.).

      The present complaint does not relate to the taxation proceedings

as such but to their substantive outcome and effects on the applicants.

In these circumstances the Commission considers that it is not

competent ratione temporis to examine it, insofar as it pertains to the

church taxes imposed for 1988-89 (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R.,

Stamoulakatos v. Greece judgment of 26 October 1993, Series A no. 271,

pp. 13-14, paras. 29-33). A different finding would amount to giving

the Convention retroactive effect which it does not have.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint is incompatible

ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

      b)   The taxes imposed for 1990 and 1993-94

(i)   The Commission has next considered if and to what extent the

various applicants may claim status as "victims" within the meaning of

Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention on account of the

taxes imposed on the company for 1990 and 1993-94 and either directly

or indirectly reserved for Church activities. Under this provision the

Commission may receive petitions from any person, non-governmental

organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the "victim" of a

violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set

forth in this Convention. The term "victim" denotes the person directly

affected by the act or omission at issue (see, e.g., Eur. Court H.R.,

Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 30, para. 66).

       In the present case the taxes at issue were levied exclusively

on the applicant company and appeals against the taxation could only

be brought by the applicant company itself. It is true that the

applicant association is the company's majority shareholder. The

Commission nevertheless finds that neither the association nor the

third applicant was decisively affected by the imposition of the taxes

on the company, also having regard to the minor amounts at stake.

      In these circumstances the Commission considers that the

applicant association and Mr. Sundström cannot claim to be "victims"

within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of a violation of their

rights under Article 9. It follows that, insofar as the complaint has

been lodged by those applicants and insofar as it pertains to the taxes

imposed on the company for 1990 and 1993-94 which were either directly

or indirectly reserved for Church activities, it must be rejected as

being incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

(ii)  Insofar as the applicant company was ordered to pay the taxes

imposed for 1990 and 1993-94 and either directly or indirectly reserved

for Church activities, the Commission recalls that under Article 26

(Art. 26) it may only deal with an application after all domestic

remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised

rules of international law. An applicant must thus make use of remedies

which are effective and adequate. To be effective, a remedy must be

capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs (see, e.g.,

No. 13251/87, Dec. 6.3.91, D.R. 68 pp. 137 et seq., at pp. 163-164).

The burden of proving the existence of available and sufficient

remedies lies upon the State (see, e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Deweer

judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 15, para. 26). An

extraordinary remedy which is dependent on the discretionary power of

a public authority cannot be considered an effective remedy for the

purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) (No. 14545/89, Dec. 9.10.90, D.R. 66

pp. 238 et seq., at p. 245).

      In the present case the Government have argued that the applicant

company should have requested exemption from the taxes imposed for the

tax years 1988-90 and reserved for Church activities. Insofar as the

company's complaint pertains to 1988-89 the Commission has already

found it to be inadmissible for the reasons set out in point a) above.

As far as the complaint concerns the tax imposed for 1990, the

Commission finds no substantiation of the Government's argument that

an exemption request could have afforded the company any reasonable

prospects of success. This remedy was rather of an extraordinary

character. The Commission does not therefore find that the remedy

referred to by the Government was effective for the purposes of

Article 26 (Art. 26). It follows that the Government's objection must

be rejected.

(iii)   Turning to the substance of the complaint, the Commission

recalls that the first limb of Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) guarantees

to "everyone" a general right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion  which cannot be restricted (see, e.g., Darby v. Sweden, Comm.

Report 9.5.89, para. 44, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 187, p. 17). The

freedom enshrined in Article 9 (Art. 9) is one of the foundations of

a "democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention and is,

among other characteristics, a precious asset for atheists, agnostics,

sceptics and the unconcerned (see the above-mentioned Kokkinakis

judgment, p. 17, para. 31).

      The Commission has repeatedly held that a church body or an

association with religious and philosophical objects is capable of

possessing and exercising the right to freedom of religion, since an

application by such a body is in reality lodged on behalf of its

members (see No. 7805/77, Dec. 5.5.79, D.R. 16 pp. 68 et seq., at

p. 70;  No. 8118/77, Dec. 19.3.81, D.R. 25 pp. 105 et seq., at p. 117;

No. 12587/86, Dec. 14.7.87, D.R. 53 pp. 241 et seq., at p. 246). By

contrast, the Commission has held that a limited liability company,

given the fact that it concerns a profit-making corporate body, can

neither enjoy nor rely on the rights referred to in Article 9 para. 1

(Art. 9-1) (see No. 7865/77, Dec. 27.2.79, D.R. 16 p. 85; cf. No.

11921/86, Dec. 12.10.88, D.R. 57 pp. 81 et seq., at p. 88).

      In the present case the Government have argued that the applicant

company is neither a religious nor a philosophical community but a

limited liability company which aims at generating profit for its

shareholders. Domestic law did not prevent the freethinkers from

exercising their allegedly minor commercial activities in the name of

the applicant association. The applicant company, for its part, has

contended that it was created principally in order to publish and sell

books promoting the aims of the freethinkers and not in order to

produce profit. It may therefore enjoy freedom of religion within the

meaning of Article 9 (Art. 9). A finding to the contrary would

effectively limit the freethinkers' possibility of organising

themselves with a view to manifesting their beliefs.

      The Commission recalls that pursuant to the second limb of

Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) the general right to freedom of religion

includes, inter alia, freedom to manifest a religion or "belief" either

alone or "in community with others" whether in public or in private.

The Commission would therefore not exclude that the applicant

association is in principle capable of possessing and exercising rights

under Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1). However, the complaint now before

the Commission merely concerns the obligation of the applicant company

to pay taxes reserved for Church activities. The company form may have

been a deliberate choice on the part of the applicant association and

its branches for the pursuance of part of the freethinkers' activities.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of domestic law this applicant was

registered as a corporate body with limited liability. As such it is

in principle required by domestic law to pay tax as any other corporate

body, regardless of the underlying purpose of its activities on account

of its links with the applicant association and its branches and

irrespective of the final receiver of the tax revenues collected from

it. Finally, it has not been shown that the applicant association would

have been prevented from pursuing the company's commercial activities

in its own name.

      The Commission therefore concludes that in the circumstances of

the present case the applicant company cannot rely on the rights

referred to in Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1). It follows that, insofar

as the complaint has been lodged by the applicant company and insofar

as it pertains to the taxes imposed on the company for 1990 and 1993-94

which were either directly or indirectly reserved for Church

activities, it must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The length of the proceedings

      The applicants furthermore complain that the applicant company's

appeals against the church tax levied for the tax years 1988-90 were

not determined by a court "within a reasonable time". They invoke

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which reads, as far as

relevant, as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a

      reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal established by law."

      The Government submit that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not

applicable to tax assessments.

      The applicants contend that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is

applicable, relying on the Court's judgments in Salesi v. Italy (Eur.

Court H.R., Series A no. 257-E, judgment of 26 February 1993) and

Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland (Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 263,

judgment of 24 June 1993). They submit that the Finnish tax legislation

applied in the case concerns the legally recognised "rights" of tax

payers. These rights are of a pecuniary nature and the tax assessments

may furthermore be challenged before administrative courts. The

proceedings at issue determined the company's "civil rights" within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

      For the reasons elaborated below, the Commission need not

determine whether and, if so, to what extent it would be competent

ratione temporis to examine this complaint. Nor does it need to examine

whether the applicant association and Mr. Sundström may claim to be

victims within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention

of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) on account of the facts

underlying the present complaint.

      The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not

applicable to taxation proceedings as such, since these do not

determine any civil rights or obligations (see No. 11189/84, Dec.

11.12.86, D.R. 50 pp. 121-141, at p. 140, with further references; cf.

also Eur. Court H.R., Schouten and Meldrum judgment of 9 December 1994,

Series A no. 304, pp. 20-21, para. 50).

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

3.    The non-reimbursement rule

      The applicants finally complain that in view of the minor amounts

at stake the church tax levied on the applicant company could not have

been reimbursed to it, even if the applicants' appeals had been

successful. They again invoke Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      For the reasons below, the Commission need not determine whether

and, if so, to what extent it would be competent ratione temporis to

examine this complaint. Nor does it need to examine whether the

applicant association and Mr. Sundström may claim to be victims within

the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention of a violation

of the Convention or any of its Protocols on account of the facts

underlying the present complaint.

      The Commission considers that this complaint falls to be examined

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads

as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      Assuming that the above provision is applicable, the Commission

observes that in view of the minor amounts at stake the applicant

company would have been unable to obtain a reimbursement of wrongly

levied tax even if an appeal had been successful. This situation could

be considered as resulting in a deprivation of the company's

possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of the first

paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1). Such a deprivation would not only

have to pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest, but there would

also have to be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between

the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The required

balance of public and private interests would not be found, if the

company had had to bear an individual and excessive burden (cf., e.g.,

Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p.

50, para. 120).

      In the Commission's opinion the non-reimbursement rule challenged

by the applicants must be assumed to aim at avoiding disproportionate

administrative costs. This is a legitimate aim in the public interest.

Moreover, it has not been shown that the fact that any wrongly levied

tax could not be reimbursed has burdened the applicant company

excessively. In these circumstances there is no appearance of any

improper balancing of interests. The non-reimbursement is, moreover,

based on section 9 of the 1978 Decree on Tax Collection and is thus

subject to general conditions provided for by law. Accordingly, the

Commission finds no appearance that the applicant company's lack of a

possibility of obtaining a reimbursement of any wrongly levied tax is

in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must also be

rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission                 President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                               (S. TRECHSEL)