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CHAPPELL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 12587/86 • ECHR ID: 001-481

Document date: July 14, 1987

  • Inbound citations: 4
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 2

CHAPPELL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 12587/86 • ECHR ID: 001-481

Document date: July 14, 1987

Cited paragraphs only



AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY

Application No. 12587/86

by A.R.M. CHAPPELL

against the United Kingdom

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

14 July 1987, the following members being present:

                MM.  C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                     J.A. FROWEIN

                     S. TRECHSEL

                     F. ERMACORA

                     E. BUSUTTIL

                     A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                     A. WEITZEL

                     J.C. SOYER

                     H.G. SCHERMERS

                     H. DANELIUS

                     G. BATLINER

                     H. VANDENBERGHE

                Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

                Sir  Basil HALL

                MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                     C.L. ROZAKIS

                Mrs.  J. LIDDY

                 Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 23 June 1986

by A.R.M. CHAPPELL against the United Kingdom and registered on

27 November 1986 under file No. 12587/86;

        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case as submitted by the first applicant may

be summarised as follows:

        The first applicant is a British citizen born in 1948

residing in Somerset, England.  He is the Brother Assistant Director

of Ceremonies for the Secular Order of Druids and is a Druid by

religion.  He brings this matter before the Commission in his own

right and as the authorised representative of the Secular Order of

Druids ("the Druids"), the second applicant.

        The application concerns the prevention of a Druidic religious

ceremony at an ancient monument or temple known as Stonehenge.  It is

believed that for many thousands of years the religious group known,

and recorded by the Romans, as the Druids performed a religious

ceremony, the midsummer solstice, at the time of the rising of the

sun on the longest day of the year at Stonehenge.  It is thought by

some that Stonehenge was built by the Druids over 4,500 years ago.

        The first applicant states that in 1917 Stonehenge was gifted

to the nation by a Druid, who in the deed of gift included a clause

that it should always be open to the public.  He states that for

eighty years up until 1985 the religious ceremony known as the

midsummer solstice took place without interference by any public or

private body.  In recent years the religious ceremony however

attracted a large gathering of on-lookers which developed over

successive years, into an event known as the Stonehenge free festival.

This event was not sanctioned or encouraged by the Druids and formed

no part of the Druids' ritual or ceremony.

        In 1984 it was estimated that 30,000 people attended the

Stonehenge free festival.  The authorities entrusted with looking

after Stonehenge and the surrounding area, the Historic Building and

Monuments Commission for England and Wales ("English Heritage") and

the National Trust, considered the festival to be fairly harmless in

the early years, but by 1983 and 1984 there was a group of people

known as "the peace convoy" who introduced an unruly element who were

disruptive and disrespectful of the law.  In 1985 various injunctions

were granted for the protection of the property of the National Trust.

As a result of the problems experienced by the National Trust, the

Druids agreed not to hold their midsummer solstice ceremonies in 1985

on the understanding that further consultation take place in order to

consider the basis on which solstice ceremonies might be held in

subsequent years.  The first applicant states that it was the Druids'

understanding that after 1985 there would be a speedy resumption of

those ceremonies for all the future years.

        During the 1985 summer period there was a great deal of

trouble between the police and members of the peace convoy.  In

consequence of these problems English Heritage in conjunction with

the National Trust held meetings in the latter part of 1985 and early

1986 with many individuals and organisations interested in Stonehenge

and the festival.  The aim of these meetings was to attempt to find

an alternative site for the festival and allow a limited celebration

of the solstice by the Druids at Stonehenge.  The first applicant

states that he attended one such meeting and that it was chaotic due

to the presence of members of the peace convoy who he claims were

noisy and obstructive and prevented anything from being achieved.

        English Heritage and the National Trust considered that

there was no way in which an orderly solstice event could be held

without an alternative festival site, which could not be found.  The

County Council and the Chief Constable supported this view and in the

minutes of one of the meetings it is recorded that the Chief Constable

stated that "in his experience the convoy was an unavoidable

ingredient in the free festival circuit and that wherever they went,

trouble occurred.  Whilst sympathising with the genuine wishes of the

Druids and others to hold solstice celebrations, he was fearful that

whatever plans might be made to have an orderly event, the convoy

would arrive and be influential and disruptive.  If the stones

(Stonehenge) were opened for the solstice he would be unable to take

any action to stop the convoy".

        In February 1986 the decision was made by English Heritage to

close the Stonehenge site over the immediate period of the midsummer

solstice.  The relevant legislative provisions empowering English

Heritage to take this step are found in the Ancient Monuments and

Archaeological Areas Act 1979 and the National Heritage Act 1983.

        Section 19 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas

Act 1979 provides, so far as is material, under subsection (1), that

the public shall have access to any monument under the ownership or

guardianship of the Secretary of State.  Subsection (2) provides that

the Secretary of State or, in certain circumstances, the local

authority, may control the times of normal public access to a monument

such as Stonehenge and " ... if they consider it necessary or

expedient to do so in the interests of safety or for the maintenance

or preservation of the monument, entirely exclude the public from

access to any such monument or to any part of it, for such period as

they think fit".

        Subsection (3) provides that "The Secretary of State ... may

by regulations ... regulate public access to any monument, or to all

or any of the monuments, under [his] ownership or guardianship by

virtue of this Act and any such regulations made by the Secretary of

State may also apply to any monument, or to all or any of the

monuments, under his control or management for any other reason".

        Subsection (7) provides that "If any person contravenes or

fails to comply with any provision of any regulations under this

section, he shall be liable on ... conviction" to a financial penalty.

        Regulations were made by the Secretary of State which included

provisions prohibiting certain acts within the monument site and also,

as in the case of Stonehenge, prohibiting certain acts within the

monument site unless the prior consent in writing of the Secretary of

State had been obtained.  Such acts include the organising or taking

part in any assembly, ceremony or ritual.

        Under Section 34 of the National Heritage Act 1983, the

Secretary of State has power to delegate his management functions,

exercisable by him under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological

Areas Act, 1979 and such other legislation as is appropriate.  The

power was delegated to English Heritage.

        These two Acts, combined with the Stonehenge Regulations 1983,

allowed English Heritage to ban the Druids and the festival, and

pursue criminal sanctions if the site was approached at the time of

the midsummer solstice.

        The first applicant on 14 May 1986 applied for leave to move

for judicial review to compel the Secretary of State and/or the

Commissioner of English Heritage to allow a Druidic religious ceremony

at Stonehenge on the midsummer solstice day.  This application,

together with later appeals, was brought by the first applicant

in his own right and as the authorised representative of the second

applicant.  The first applicant contended that the Druids had had a

reasonable expectation of consultation with the Commissioner of

English Heritage before the making of any decision, but that there had

ultimately not been any or any sufficient consultation.  The judge,

however, found that the opportunity for consultation had been given

more than once by the Commissioner and that the Commissioner could not

be faulted for not offering further opportunities for consultation.

The judge stated that "the Commissioners have done their best to

accommodate the (Druids) in an attempt to see how the ancient ceremony

could be continued if possible ... the Commissioners are gravely and

seriously immersed by obstacles of allowing anyone, even the Druids as

they stand at the moment to have access to Stonehenge for the summer

solstice.  I suspect that if they had been able to give their consent

to the Druids without the risk of the sort of disturbance that has

happened, they would have been glad to do so".  The first applicant

further argued that the celebrations of the summer solstice is of

considerable importance to the Druids' religion and that to exclude

the Druids from holding these celebrations infringes their rights

under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights which

guarantees the right to freedom of religion.

        The judge in the proceedings, however, concluded that the

grounds for judicial review and consequential relief had not been made

out and dismissed the application.  In giving judgment Mr.  Justice

McNeill stated that he dealt with the case on the basis of the

fundamental rights of individuals which included the right enshrined

in Article 9 of the Convention, to which he referred.  The judge noted

the steps which had been taken by English Heritage in order to seek to

accommodate the second applicant's desire to have access to Stonehenge

for the solstice.  He also took account of the difficulties which had

arisen in previous years as a result of access by the general public

to the monument and noted the second applicant's decision in 1985 to

forgo the ceremony in view of the escalating problems experienced in

previous years and the attendant risk to the monument and the

surrounding area.  In view of these factors he concluded that the

decision of English Heritage should not be quashed.

        The first applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal which

dismissed his application on 19 June 1986.  In addition to the

arguments raised before the High Court, the first applicant argued

that limited access could have been granted by English Heritage to

the Druids, and that entry to the site could have been controlled and

limited by ticket to one hundred people.  The first applicant

states that at the very least one Druid could have been allowed to

stand within the centre of the monument or temple at the rising of the

sun for the purpose of reciting the necessary incantation to maintain

the continuity of the beliefs of the Druid religion, practice and

ceremony.  The first applicant further stated that a petition had

been signed by all the hippies of the convoy saying "please let the

Druids perform their ceremony and if you do we promise not to cause

trouble".  The Court of Appeal however found that the decision to

close Stonehenge at the time of the midsummer solstice was a decision

that a reasonable body of persons could have come to and therefore

dismissed the application for judicial review.  Leave to appeal to

the House of Lords was refused by the Court of Appeal and this refusal

was confirmed by the Judicial Office of the House of Lords on

29 October 1986.

COMPLAINTS

        The applicants complain that the decision to close Stonehenge

and the surrounding area during the summer solstice and not to allow

the Druids to practise the midsummer solstice ceremony infringes their

right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the

Convention.

        Additionally the applicants allege that their rights under

Article 11 of the Convention have been infringed as they have not been

allowed freedom of peaceful assembly or freedom of association with

others.

        The applicants further submit that there was no effective

remedy available to them, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.

        The applicants, whilst basing their application on Articles 9,

11 and 13, do not exclude the applicability of any of the other

provisions of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.      The applicants complain that the decision to close Stonehenge

and the surrounding area during the midsummer solstice and not to

allow the Druids to practise the midsummer solstice ceremony infringes

their freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 (Art. 9) of the

Convention.  Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention provides as follows:

        "1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,

        conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to

        change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or

        in community with others and in public or private, to

        manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

        practice and observance.

        2.      Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall

        be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law

        and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests

        of public safety, for the protection of public order, health

        or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms

        of others."

        The Commission recalls with regard to the second applicant

that a church body, or an association with religious and philosophical

objects, is capable of possessing and exercising the rights contained

in Article 9 (Art. 9) (No. 7805/77, Dec. 5.5.79, D.R. 16 p. 68 (70);

No. 8118/77, Dec. 19.3.81, D.R. 25, 105 (117)).

        The Commission has not found it necessary to decide whether or

not Druidism can be classified as a religion within the meaning of

Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1).  It has assumed, for the purpose of this

application, that it is a religion or belief as it finds the complaint

anyway manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons:

        The Commission notes the applicants' submissions concerning

the history of Stonehenge and the Druids' involvement in ceremonies

over the years.  Assuming druidism to be a religion, the Commission

considers that the closing of Stonehenge and the surrounding area

during the summer solstice period amounts to an interference with the

applicants' rights under paragraph 1 of Article 9 (Art. 9-1) of the

Convention. The next question to be determined, therefore, is whether

that interference can be said to be justified under paragaraph 2 of

Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention.

        The Commission first notes that the limitations placed on the

applicants by the closing of the Stonehenge area and the prevention of

the midsummer solstice ceremony were limitations prescribed by law

under the Archaeological Areas Act 1979 and the National Heritage Act

1983.  Secondly,it is clear from the information provided by the

applicants, and in particular, from the transcripts of the courts'

judgments, that the National Trust and English Heritage were faced

with extreme problems concerning the festival and religious ceremonies

taking place during the midsummer solstice.  The applicants themselves

acknowledged these great difficulties and agreed, in 1985, not to hold

their midsummer solstice ceremony for that year.  Attempts were made

by the National Trust and English Heritage at the end of 1985 and

beginning of 1986 to solve the problem of how the midsummer solstice

ceremonies might be held in future years.  Various meetings were

convened with individuals and organisations interested in Stonehenge.

These meetings failed to provide a solution, and after consultations

with the County Council and the Chief Constable, it was concluded that

it would be dangerous to hold even a limited midsummer solstice

celebration.

        The Commission notes that the relevant authorities were under

a duty to protect Stonehenge and the surrounding area and genuinely

sought a solution for the holding of the midsummer solstice ceremony.

However, in view of the geographical setting of Stonehenge and the

absence of a suitable site in the vicinity where a festival could be

held without threatening the monument and the risk of harm to the

public through disruption, the authorities ultimately found that there

was no practical alternative but to close the area.  This decision

reflected the unique historical and archaeological importance of

Stonehenge.  The Commission concludes that this decision was a

necessary public safety measure, and that any implied interference with the

applicants' rights under Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention was in

accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests

of public safety, for the protection of public order or for the protection of

the rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2

(Art. 9-2) of the Convention.

        This part of the application must therefore be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      The applicants further complain that their rights under Article 11

(Art. 11) of the Convention have been infringed as they have not been allowed

freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others.

        Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention provides as follows:

        "1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful

        assembly and to freedom of association with others,

        including the right to form and to join trade unions for the

        protection of his interests.

        2.      No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of

        these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and

        are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

        national security or public safety, for the prevention of

        disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or

        for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

        This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful

        restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of

        the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of

        the State."

        However, for the reasons elaborated above in the context of Article 9

(Art. 9) of the Convention, the Commission finds that, even assuming there has

been an interference with the applicants' rights under Article 11 para. 1

(Art. 11-1) of the Convention, interference was prescribed by law and

necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder or

crime, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, within

the meaning of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) of the Convention.  It

follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

3.      The applicants further complain that they have been denied an

effective remedy before a national authority in respect of their

complaints, contrary to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

        Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides as follows:

        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

        Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

        before a national authority notwithstanding that the

        violation has been committed by persons acting in an

        official capacity."

        The Commission notes that the first applicant did apply to the

High Court of Justice for an order to quash the decision of English

Heritage to close Stonehenge over the summer solstice of 1986, and

that he appealed to the Court of Appeal against the refusal to make

such an order.

        Mr.  Justice McNeill in giving his judgment stated that he

dealt with the case on the basis of the fundamental rights of

individuals which included the right enshrined in Article 9 (Art. 9) of the

Convention, which he quoted.  He however concluded that while English

Heritage had done its best to accommodate the second applicant, it

could not be said having regard to the circumstances stated above that

the closing was unreasonable and should be quashed.  The Court of

Appeal, having reviewed the troubles over access to Stonehenge over

the summer solstices of 1984 and 1985 (in which year the Druids agreed

not to hold their ceremonies) upheld the decision of Mr.  Justice

McNeill.

        The first applicant was unsuccessful in these proceedings but

the Commission finds that, on the facts of the present case and in the

light of the judgments of the courts concerned, these proceedings

provided a remedy before a national authority as required by Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

        It follows that this aspect of the applicants' complaint is

similarly manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.      The Commission notes that the applicants do not exclude the

applicability of any of the other provisions of the Convention.  The

applicants have not, however, argued, or shown, how they consider any

of the other provisions under the Convention might be in issue.  The

Commission therefore concludes that there are no further questions to

be determined in this case.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  Secretary to the Commission            President of the Commission

        (H.C. KRÜGER)                           (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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