The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

16 October 1986, the following members being present:

                      MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                          J. A. FROWEIN

                          E. BUSUTTIL

                          G. JÖRUNDSSON

                          G. TENEKIDES

                          S. TRECHSEL

                          B. KIERNAN

                          A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                          A. WEITZEL

                          J. C. SOYER

                          H. G. SCHERMERS

                          H. DANELIUS

                          G. BATLINER

                          H. VANDENBERGHE

                      Mrs G. H. THUNE

                      Sir Basil HALL

                      Mr. F. MARTINEZ

                      Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 13 March 1983 by M.

P. against Sweden and registered on 10 December 1984 under file

No. 11306/84;

Having regard to:

-       the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure

of the Commission;

-       the Commission's decision of 8 October 1986 to give notice of

the application to the Government and to invite them to present

written observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaints

concerning the length of the proceedings and the lack of an effective

remedy;

-       the Government's observations dated 5 February 1986;

-       the applicant's observations dated 19 April 1986;

-       the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as they appear from the parties' submissions,

may be summarised as follows:

The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1898.  She was formerly a

forester but is now retired and resides at Ramsele, Sweden. In the

proceedings before the Commission she is represented by her son Mr.

Lennart Persson.  He is a road engineer (vägmästare) by profession and

resides at Märsta, Sweden.

The applicant is the former owner of the forestry estate at which she

now resides and which is situated at the river Fjällsjöälven.  The

applicant's two sons are now owners of the estate. The estate has an

area of 13 hectares.

In 1939, the Royal Water Power Board (Kungliga Vattenfallsstyrelsen,

subsequently replaced by the present National Water Power Board,

Statens Vattenfallsverk), which was planning to construct a water

power station in the area where the applicant lives, concluded an

easement contract (servitut) with the applicant to the effect that the

Board had the right to use the river water which formed a part of the

applicant's estate.  The applicant received 360 Swedish Crowns in

compensation for this.  Subsequently the applicant has received

compensation in the amount of 2000 Swedish Crowns for the effects of

the draining of the river.  In case damage was caused to the

applicant's property as a result of actions by the Royal Water Power

Board, it was stated that the applicant should be afforded

compensation at an amount which could either be agreed between the

parties or decided by the Water Court (Vattendomstolen).

In a partial judgment of 30 June 1949 the Water Court of Östersund

granted the Royal Water Power Board a building permit for the

construction of a water power station between the two rivers

Ångermanälven and Fjällsjöälven.

By judgment of 28 February 1950 the Water Court ordered that the Royal

Water Power Board should prepare storage areas (avläggsplatser) for

the timber during the construction of the power station.

The power station (Kilforsens kraftverk), which was put into operation

in 1953, had as a result that a distance of 20 kilometres of

Fjällsjöälven was drained.  The applicant's property was situated in

this area.  This caused a number of foresters in the area, including

the applicant, some inconveniences, consisting mainly of increased

expenses for the operation of the timber business.  The applicant was

entitled to compensation under the 1918 Water Act (vattenlagen) as

well as the subsequent 1953 Water Act and this compensation was to be

decided by the Water Court.

By a partial judgment of 10 April 1953, the Water Court granted the

Royal Water Power Board permission to take the power station into

operation.  The Court also ruled on compensation claims related to the

project.  Moreover, the Court decided, for a probationary period of 10

years, to adjourn the final examination of the effects of the power

station on the timber business in the area. The Court appointed an

expert to investigate the matter further and issued certain

regulations which were to apply during the probationary period.

In a judgment of 9 September 1953, the Water Court dealt with, inter

alia, the effect on fishing in the area.  Compensation for losses was

awarded to the applicant.

On 30 December 1958 the Court awarded the applicant compensation for

the deterioration of washing and bathing facilities etc.

In a judgment of 1 March 1965 the Water Court decided to adjourn

further the issue relating to the timber business until the effects of

the power station on the timber business had been appropriately

investigated.  The Court also issued similar provisional regulations

as in the judgment of 10 April 1953.

On 28 April 1965, the Water Court awarded compensation to the

applicant for detrimental effects on boat traffic and washing.

During the period until August 1970 a number of the affected foresters

and the Royal Water Power Board agreed on the terms of compensation

for the increased costs for the timber business.  The Water Court

confirmed these settlements between the parties in a judgment

of 21 August 1970.

In October 1970, the National Water Power Board offered the applicant,

through her lawyer, a sum of 1,930 Swedish Crowns as compensation for

the increased costs for her timber business.

On 18 October 1971 the National Water Power Board submitted to the

Water Court a proposal for a final settlement of the remaining issues

concerning the effects of the power station on the timber business at

the drained part of the river.  A preliminary hearing was held before

the Water Court on 14 April 1972.

Subsequently a comprehensive exchange of correspondence between the

parties took place.

At the request of the Water Court, the National Water Power Board on

12 January 1973 submitted inter alia a memorandum containing two

alternative methods of calculating the compensation.

A further preliminary hearing before the Water Court took place on

14 February 1974.

In the spring of 1974, the applicant through her lawyer was offered

6,947 Swedish Crowns as compensation by the National Water Power

Board.  However, in July 1974 the Board informed the applicant's

lawyer that they were now offering a sum of only 1,780 Swedish Crowns.

In March 1975 the expert who had been appointed by the Water Court on

10 April 1953 died.  The Water Court decided after having heard the

parties that there was no need to appoint a new expert.

On 30 December 1976 the National Water Power Board submitted a final

proposal for the settlement of the outstanding compensation issues.

The applicant submitted observations on this proposal in a letter of

8 August 1977.

On 12 August 1977 the National Water Power Board submitted for

confirmation certain contracts which had been concluded with some

foresters, and requested that the Water Court should terminate the

probationary period and, taking the submitted contracts into account,

finally settle the matter adjourned from 1953.

On 23 and 24 August 1977 the Water Court held the main hearing and in

that context it visited the area concerned.  In these proceedings, the

applicant claimed a lump sum of 20,000 Swedish Crowns as compensation,

a larger storage space for the timber and an improved transport road

from the storage space.

In a final judgment of 8 March 1978, the Water Court confirmed the

various contracts and awarded the sum of 8,909 Swedish Crowns to the

applicant as compensation.  The remaining claims by the applicant were

rejected.

The applicant and some other foresters appealed to the Water Court of

Appeal (vattenöverdomstolen).

In a judgment of 26 May 1981 the Water Court of Appeal confirmed the

judgment in all but one part: the issue regarding the applicant's

request for a larger storage space was referred back to the Water

Court for reconsideration.

The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Court

(högsta domstolen).  Before the Supreme Court the applicant modified

her claims and she requested compensation in the amount of 14,303

Swedish Crowns.  On 15 December 1982, the Supreme Court refused to

grant leave to appeal.

The issue which was referred back to the Water Court is still pending

before the Court.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1)that she has not received full compensation for the increased

costs for the timber business as a result of the inconveniences from

the construction and running of the water power station.  She also

alleges that in determining the compensation due account has not been

taken of the inflation.

The applicant also alleges that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) has

been breached as a result of the protracted proceedings.

Furthermore, it is alleged that by the judgment of 10 April 1953 the

applicant acquired a right as a result of the obligation imposed on

the Royal Water Power Board to let a sufficient amount of water

through to permit log-floating.  This right ceased in 1958, when the

Board entered into agreements with the foresters that the logs should

be transported in other ways.  The applicant alleges that she has

hereby been deprived of a right in breach of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

2. The applicant also complains that she has not been afforded a

determination within a reasonable time of the question of compensation

for increased costs for the timber business.  She also submits that

the length of the proceedings constitutes an unlawful interference in

the exercise of her civil rights.  The applicant submits that

Article 6, para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention has been violated.

The applicant also alleges a breach of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in

that the Water Court judge has, for instance at the preliminary

hearings which preceded the judgment of 8 March 1978, acted as a

special authority separate from the Water Court, and did not act on

behalf of the Water Court in its special composition.

The applicant also alleges that there was inequality between the

parties in the procedure since the opposite party, the Royal Water

Power Board, was a state organ with resources exceeding those of the

applicant.

3. Furthermore, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 4

(Art. 4) of the Convention claiming that the compensation paid did not

cover certain costs for future work with the timber and she therefore

is subjected to forced or compulsory labour.

4. Moreover, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention in that the compensation granted to the

various foresters differs in an unjustifiable way.  The applicant

refers mainly to one forester who in spite of having a smaller forest

obtained a higher compensation than the applicant.

5. The applicant also claims that she had no effective remedy

available to her and that there has therefore been a violation of

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

The applicant also requests that the Commission examine whether the

organs for which the State is responsible have to apply the provisions

of the Convention directly which the applicant considers to follow

from inter alia Articles 13 and 26 (Art. 13, art. 26) of the

Convention.

6. The applicant furthermore states that the public interest was

provided for in the building permit granted in 1949 and that the

various acts - or omissions - of the National Water Power Board which

took advantage of the two suspension judgments aimed at the

destruction of her rights as set forth in the Convention.  In this

respect, the applicant invokes Articles 17 and 18 (Art. 17, art. 18)

of the Convention.

7. Finally, the applicant's sons allege that the question which

was referred back to the Water Court by the judgment of the Water

Court of Appeal of 26 May 1981 has not been dealt with within a

reasonable time.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 13 March 1983 and registered

on 10 December 1984.

        On 8 October 1985 the Commission decided to give notice of the

application to the Government and to invite them to present their

written observations on the admissibility and merits of the

application limited to the complaints concerning length of proceedings

and the lack of an effective remedy.

        The Government's observations were received by a letter of 5

February 1986 and the applicant's observations in reply were dated 19

April 1986.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. The Government

1. Legislation relevant to the complaint

The Swedish legislation governing the erection of constructions in

water is based on the principle that water is to be used as a natural

resource, but that opposing interests are to be taken into

consideration in the matter of exploitation.  The most significant

consequences of the requirement that opposing interests should be

taken into consideration are that a permission is required for all

exploitation of water, and that property owners are to be compensated

for damages and encroachments caused by the exploitation.

In view of the facts of the applicant's case and the position taken by

the Government, only a few remarks need to be made as regards the

procedure by which determination of compensation claims are made.

The legislation governing the applicant's case is basically

the 1918 Water Act, which is now replaced by the 1983 Water Act.

Applications for permission to build in water, as well as questions

concerning compensation for damages and encroachments resulting from a

project, are considered and decided upon by six special courts, called

water courts, each of which serves a certain geographical area.  These

courts constitute an integral part of the corresponding number of

general district courts of first instance, although, when serving in

the capacity of water courts, they are composed so as to include

technical experts (Chapter 11, Section 21 of the 1918 Act).  Like the

chairman of a general court, the chairman of a water court, in his

capacity of water rights judge, is empowered to take decisions on

certain, mainly procedural, questions explicitly specified in the

Water Act.

        Decisions and judgments by a water court or a water rights

judge may, with a few exceptions that are not relevant to the

applicant's case, be appealed to the Water Court of Appeal.  This

court forms an integral part of a general Court of Appeal, the Svea

Court of Appeal, although composed so as to include technical experts.

Decisions and judgments of the Water Court of Appeal may ultimately,

subject to rules requiring leave of appeal, be brought before the

Supreme Court.

The procedure in the courts is only partly regulated in the Water Act.

As regards procedural questions that are not dealt with in this Act,

Chapter 11, Section 1 of the Act provides that the rules governing the

procedure in the courts of general jurisdiction shall be applied.

According to Chapter 49, Section 6 of the 1942 Code of Judicial

Procedure (rättegångsbalken), which governs the procedure in the

latter courts, a party may appeal from a decision by a court of first

instance if, in the party's opinion, the decision results in an

unnecessary delay in the final determination of the case.  This right

to appeal is, according to Chapter 52, Section 1 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure, not subject to any time limit.

2. The Facts

Since the case primarily turns on the question whether this claim for

compensation has been determined "within a reasonable time", the

Government draw attention to the following circumstances for the

purpose of indicating the considerable proportions, as regards the

quantity as well as the quality, of the issues involved in a project

like in the present case.

2.1 General description of the power plant

The Kilforsen power plant is one of the largest hydro-electric power

stations in Sweden.  It is situated between the rivers of

Fjällsjöälven and Ångermanälven.  The volume of discharge is 350 cubic

metres per second and the height of the fall is 99 metres.  The power

plant came into operation in 1953.  It was constructed by the National

Water Power Board, which also operates the station.

The Fjällsjöälven is a tributary to the Ångermanälven.  Before

joining, the two rivers run more or less parallel for a distance of 6

- 8 kilometres in a generally north to south direction, the

Fjällsjöälven running west of the Ångermanälven.  At Imnäs in the

Fjällsjöälven, about 20 kilometres upstream from where it joins the

Ångermanälven, the Imnäs dam was built.  Water from the Fjällsjöälven

is brought from this dam to the power plant via a two kilometre long

canal and a 3.7 kilometre long tunnel.  Upstream from the power plant,

an artificial lake has been constructed for use as a supply reservoir.

A discharge tunnel, 2.7 kilometres long, leads from the power plant to

the Ångermanälven.  A dry channel, almost 20 kilometres long and

formed by the damming, leads from a point below the Imnäs dam to the

point where the Fjällsjöälven previously joined the Ångermanälven.

This dry channel is one of the longest in the country and definitely

the longest to be found in fertile agricultural and forest land.

Several artificial pools have been built in the dry channel.

The power plant has been so designed as to make timber floating

possible from the Imnäs dam to the Ångermanälven via an inlet tunnel,

the above mentioned canal and supply reservoir, and a log flume.

Moreover, the artificial pools are so designed as to allow floating in

the dry channel when water is released for this purpose from the Imnäs

dam.

The damming area of the Imnäs dam, i.e. the stretch of the river and

its tributaries upstream from the dam which are affected by the

damming, is 40-50 kilometres long.  For better utilisation of the

water, the National Water Power Board has also requested, and been

granted, permission to regulate the level of the water in the river

system and in some lakes of the damming area both on a 24-hour basis

and throughout the year.  As a result of these regulations, a

continuous change in the water level adversely affects the

surroundings.

Downstream from the Kilforsen power plant is another power plant,

Nämnforsen.  The damming area of the Nämnforsen power plant extends

past the point where the above mentioned discharge tunnel from the

Kilforsen power plant runs into the Ångermanälven.  Claims relating to

damage caused to properties in the Kilforsen area by the erection and

operation of the Nämnforsen power plant have been merged with the

claims settlement process related to the Kilforsen power plant.

Several hundreds of property owners have been affected by the erection

and operation of the Kilforsen power plant.  The extent of the damages

and encroachments caused by the project varies from property to

property.  Practically all properties have been affected in several

respects.  Examples of damages and encroachments incurred are

detrimental effects on fertile agricultural and forest land or other

land of particular value, such as gravel-pits, on timber business and

timber floating, on buildings, fences and basis, on fishing, boat

traffic, bathing and washing facilities, and on winter routes on the

ice.

It has not been possible to deal with all the damages and

encroachments caused to the different properties in one context.  The

reason for this is not only the large number of claims, but also, and

mainly, the difficulty or impossibility of judging in advance the

extent of damages and encroachments which may ultimately be caused to

property.  Varying weather conditions, precipitation and flows must be

observed for a long time, often for several years, to make an

assessment of both normal and extreme situations.  In addition, an

evaluation must be made of the results of various preventive measures.

Owing to all these factors, the settlement of claims must of necessity

be a rather long-drawn-out matter when it comes to a project of the

size and character of the Kilforsen power plant.

After the National Water Power Board received permission on

30 June 1949 to erect the Kilforsen power plant, the Water Court has

passed about 25 judgments pertaining to the effects of the project on

various properties.  The Court has in the course of the proceedings

held a number of preliminary hearings and also, as regards several

issues, in accordance with the desire of the parties and under a

provision of the Water Act ordered special expert investigations for

the purpose of assessing the damages and encroachments resulting from

the project. As will be further developed below, continuous claims

proceedings have in fact been in progress until the judgment passed by

the Water Court on 3 August 1978.  During this period, i.e. from 1949

to 1978, claim after claim has been settled either by voluntary

agreement between the parties, subsequently confirmed by the Court, or

by a decision of the Court.

2.2     Chronological list of judgments in the Kilsforsen Case

For the purpose of giving an idea of the extensive activity which has

taken place over the years in order to adjudicate the claims related

to this power plant project, the Government refer to a chronological

list, briefly presenting the judgments rendered in the Kilforsen case.

As appears from this list, the Water Court has during the years

following the granting of the permission to erect the power plant been

continuously engaged in adjudicating claims related to the project.

It is emphasised that most of these claims naturally have been of a

complicated nature and, therefore, extremely time consuming. Due to

the time that has elapsed since the permission was granted and the

considerable number of different claims that have been adjudicated

over the years, the Government point out that there might have been

judgments or decisions in addition to those here listed which have not

been brought to the Government's knowledge.

2.3     Judgment of particular interest to the applicant's case

In the judgment of the Water Court of 10 April 1953, by which the

National Water Power Board was granted permission to take the power

plant into operation, the Water Court also ruled on compensation

claims related to the project, among them those concerning the timber

business.  As to the latter claims, the Court found, in accordance

with the view expressed by an expert, previously appointed by the

court, and the parties concerned, that they were closely related to

the question of the effects of the project on timber floating and that

these effects could not be estimated at this time.  In view of this,

the Court decided to postpone the final determination of the claims

related to timber business pending the outcome of the investigations

and deliberations necessary as regards timber floating.  As to the

claims related to timber floating the Court postponed the final

determination for a period of ten years.

As regards the compensation claims related to the timber business, the

Court also ordered a number of provisional measures pending the final

determination.  Of particular relevance to the applicant's case is

that the Court ordered the National Water Power Board to provide for

satisfactory timber collecting facilities and to compensate, on an

annual basis, the increased costs, including accrued interest, on the

timber business resulting from the project.  The Court furthermore

observed that in case the parties could not agree on the annual amount

due, the question could be referred to the Court for determination.

No appeal was made against the judgment.

In a judgment of 9 September 1953, the Water Court dealt with, inter

alia, the effect of the project on fishing in the drained area.

Compensation for losses was awarded, among others, to the applicant.

By the judgment of the Water Court of 30 October 1958, the applicant

was awarded compensation for the deterioration in washing and bathing

facilities, for fences, and for inconvenience suffered during the

construction period.  In the same judgment the court dismissed her

claims for compensation for general encroachment as well as certain

claims concerning, inter alia, alleged damage to her land and

buildings.

In the judgment of 1 March 1965, the Water Court reconsidered the

claims related to the timber business.  The court again observed that,

due to the close relationship between these claims and questions

concerning timber floating, the claims could not be finally determined

without taking into consideration the possible outcome of the

deliberations that were still being made as regards floating.  The

Court also noted that these deliberations were being made, and crucial

decisions might be taken, outside the scope of the court proceedings.

In view of this, and while observing that no objection on this point

had been made by any party concerned, the Water Court decided to

further postpone the final determination of the compensation claims

related to the timber business.  The Court also accordingly prolonged

the provisional measures ordered in its judgment of 10 April 1953. No

appeal was made against the judgment.

In the judgment of the Water Court of 28 April 1965, the applicant was

awarded compensation for detrimental effects on boat traffic and

washing, including interest accruing since 1953.  In the same

judgment, claims concerning fences and an infiltration well were

dismissed or rejected.

The final judgment of the Water Court was rendered on 8 March 1978.

Prior to this judgment, the National Water Power Board had, on 18

October 1971, made a proposal concerning compensation for the claims

related to the timber business.  The proposal caused objections from

some of the counterparties.  A preliminary hearing was held before the

Water Court on 14 April 1972.  The National Water Power Board

submitted complementary material on 28 April of the same year and on

12 January 1973.  Further objections were raised by the counterparties

and there were also written communications directly between the

parties.  A preliminary hearing was, again, held on 14 February 1974,

subsequent to which a number of voluntary agreements on the claims

were concluded.

On 30 December 1976, the National Water Power Board clarified its

final position and requested the Water Court to finally determine the

claims.  Objections as regards the position taken by the Board were

made by the applicant in a petition dated 8 August 1977.  Having

considered the issues involved, the Water Court rendered its final

judgment on 8 March 1978.

The judgment was appealed to the Water Court of Appeal by, among

others, the applicant.  In an account of the litigation costs as

regards the proceedings in the court below, the counsel for, among

others, the applicant made some statements that, in the Government's

view, appear to throw some light on the proceedings as far as the

group of claimants represented by this counsel is concerned.  Thus, in

respect of the time during which the claims were pending before the

Water Court, the work performed by the counsel was said to have been

aimed at a settlement of the claims outside the court.  It was also

pointed out that these claimants, a rather limited group in relation

to the total number of claimants originally involved, had been at

variance with the vast majority of claimants, which seems to have

complicated the handling of these claims.

Furthermore, as regards the said counsel's claim for compensation for

litigation costs in the Water Court of Appeal, the Government draw

attention to the following passage of the Court's reasoning concerning

this claim: " ...  The bills of costs include 70 items, of which 19

refer to requests for, or receipt of notification concerning,

adjournments for taking measures.  The Water Court of Appeal is of the

opinion that the great number of adjournments which have contributed

to the length of the proceedings before the Water Court of Appeal,

should be taken into account as a factor leading to a reduction of the

fee ... ".

In its judgment of 26 May 1981, the Water Court of Appeal, while

confirming the remaining parts of the judgment of the Water Court,

referred to the latter court for further consideration the issues

concerning one of the disputed timber collecting facilities.

As regards the claims thus referred to, and still pending before, the

Water Court, the Government submit the following information from the

said court.  In 1984, none of the parties having petitioned the Court

to have the claim determined, the Water Court notified the parties

that the claim was still pending.  In September 1984, the National

Water Board petitioned the Court and requested that a final decision

be taken.  In December 1984, the applicant, when responding to the

petition of the Board, presented a number of claims relating to

questions that had already been finally determined in judgments that

had gained legal force.  After the applicant had changed her counsel

and restricted her claims to come within the scope of the proceedings,

a main hearing was held in July 1985.  Subsequent to the hearing, the

parties concerned have notified the Court that discussions are in

progress as regards a new timber collecting facility on a more

favourable location.  It appears as if this notification is the only

reason why the Court is still withholding its final determination of

the claim.

The applicant, among others, appealed against the judgment of the

Water Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.  In the first petition to

this Court of 13 June 1981, the complainants requested an adjournment

for stating the grounds for the complaint until 30 September 1981.  In

a petition of 30 November 1981, the complaint was limited to the

question of increased costs as regards the timber business.  In this

petition, a request was also made for another adjournment, until

31 January 1982, for further clarifying the complaint as regards one

of the complainants.  On 21 November 1982, one of the complainants

withdrew his complaint, and the remaining ones stated their final

positions as regards the complaint.  In a decision of 15 December of

the same year, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave of appeal.

In this context, it should finally be observed that the considerations

concerning timber floating ultimately resulted in a gradual

discontinuation of timber floating in the area concerned, the last

floating season being the summer of 1982, and that the Government on

16 September 1982 closed the river system as a public floatway.

3. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

The domestic remedy rule is founded on the idea that, before a

complaint could be considered by the Commission, the respondent State

should have an opportunity to correct, by its own means and within the

framework of its own legal system, the wrong allegedly suffered by an

applicant.  In the case-law of the Commission, this has consistently

been construed to mean that, for the domestic remedies to be

exhausted, it is not enough to have exhausted these remedies as

regards some aspect of an applicant's case, but the particular

complaint brought before the Commission must have been raised before

the competent domestic courts or authorities.

As regards the present case, the applicant has not at any time during

the lengthy proceedings made any objection indicating that, in her

opinion, the proceedings were being unnecessarily protracted.  On the

contrary, the two judgments of 1953 and 1965 respectively, by which

the Water Court decided to postpone the final determination of the

issues concerning the timber business, seem to have been rendered, as

far as the postponement of the final determination of the compensation

claims is concerned, with the consent of the parties involved.

Furthermore, none of these judgments were appealed against, although

this could have been done.  Moreover, the applicant could, regardless

of these judgments of 1953 and 1965, at any time during the

proceedings have required the Water Court to make a final

determination of her claims and, in case the Water Court had rejected

this request, she could have appealed to the Water Court of Appeal in

accordance with the provision in Chapter 49 Section 6 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure.

In view of the above, the Government submit that, as regards the

allegation that the compensation claims have not been determined

within a reasonable time, the applicant has not exhausted domestic

remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

4. Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention : "Reasonable time"

In the Government's view, there are three different aspects that need

to be examined when considering whether the applicant's compensation

claims were determined within a reasonable time. Firstly, the time has

to be viewed in light of the number and complexity of the issues

involved.

Secondly, the degree of inconvenience suffered by the applicant as a

result of the alleged delay needs to be taken into consideration.

Thirdly, the question whether the length of the proceedings is

reasonable or not necessarily has to be viewed in light of the manner

in which they were conducted by the applicant herself. The Government

will in the following deal with these three aspects one by one.

As to the first aspect, the Government observe that the final

determination of the claims involved in the present project of

necessity has to be viewed as a long-range commission.  This is so

because of the significant proportions of the project and the

considerable number and complexity of the claims involved, a great

deal of which could not be finally determined without considering

future contingencies.  In this context, the Government draw attention

to the fact that the Water Court, during almost thirty years following

the granting of the permission to erect the power plant, was

continuously engaged in the process of adjudicating claims related to

the project.  Although this might seem to be a remarkably long period

of time, in the Government's opinion, there is nothing in the

documents presented to suggest that the process, viewed in its

entirety, has been unduly protracted.

The applicant's claims were particularly complicated by the fact that

they were so closely related to timber floating and that the floating

was subject to a long-range investigation concerning its future

existence.  In view of this, the Water Court in its judgment of

10 April 1953 took the position of principle that the final

determination of these claims should be postponed pending the outcome

of the investigation as regards timber floating, and that in the

meantime the damages and encroachments were to be compensated on an

annual basis. In the Government's opinion, the view thus taken by the

Water Court seems reasonable, and it appears to have been shared by

all parties concerned, including the applicant.

In the judgment of 1 March 1965 the Water Court found that there was

still considerable uncertainty as regards the outcome of the

considerations on timber floating and that, therefore, the final

determination of the compensation claims related to the timber

business should be further postponed.  No other view was expressed by

any of the parties concerned.

It does not appear from the documents presented to the Government at

what time the investigation of timber floating had proceeded so far as

to enable the Court to draw the conclusions necessary for the final

determination of the compensation claims related to the timber

business.  The Government observe, however, that timber floating in

the waters concerned was not terminated until 1982.

In view hereof the Government maintain that there is nothing in the

complaint, or in any other document presented to the Government, to

suggest that the applicant's compensation claims have been at all

unnecessarily protracted.

As to the second aspect, i.e. the degree of inconvenience suffered by

the applicant, the Government draw attention to the following facts.

In its very first judgment of 30 June 1949 the Water Court decided

that, as regards the timber business, the increased costs resulting

from the power plant project were to be compensated on an annual

basis, and that disagreements as to the amount due each year could be

referred to the Water Court.  More elaborate decisions on this

question were taken by the Court in a number of judgments rendered

during the years of 1950-1978, most particularly in the judgments of

10 April 1953 and 1 March 1965.

The practical result of these judgments was that during all years the

applicant was fully compensated on an annual basis for any economic

loss resulting from the power plant project.  In view of this, the

Government submit that the possible inconvenience following from the

uncertainty as regards the final lump sum compensation for estimated

future losses could not have been such as to render the postponement

of its final determination unreasonable.  This is particularly so,

since the possible magnitude of this final compensation was reasonably

foreseeable in view of the court's considerations as regards the

previous annual compensations and its final determinations of a large

number of corresponding claims of others than the applicant.

As regards the third aspect, i.e. the manner in which the proceedings

were conducted by the applicant herself, the Government observe that

the claims for compensation involved were such as to admit their

settlement by the parties themselves outside the Court.  This also

appears to have been the principal strategy of the applicant.  Because

of this, there was no responsibility of the Water Court to take any

steps for the purpose of expediting the proceedings.  On the contrary,

in view of the character of the claims, it might even have been

inappropriate for the Court to do so unless required by a party.

As has already been observed above, there is no indication whatever

that the applicant at any time during the proceedings petitioned the

court to have her claims for compensation finally determined.  There

are, on the other hand, indications that the final determination might

have been considerably protracted for reasons entirely related to the

applicant herself or her counsel.  As has been indicated above, more

than one fourth of the items listed in the counsel's account before

the Water Court of Appeal of the litigation costs, seems to have

referred to measures taken in respect of requests, on behalf of, among

others, the applicant, for adjournments for taking steps necessary to

bring the proceedings forward. Furthermore, when appealing the case to

the Supreme Court, the applicant allowed herself five and a half

months to state the basis for her claims and another year to finally

specify them.  It should also be observed that the Water Court's final

determination of the applicant's compensation claims of 8 March 1978

was made in response to a request, not by the applicant, but by her

counterparty.

In view of this, the Government submit that there has been no

violation of the applicant's right to a determination of her claims

within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

5. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

On the same grounds as those referred to under 4. above, the

Government submit that there has been no violation of the applicant's

right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

6. Article 13 of the Convention (Art. 13)

In accordance with what has been stated above, the judgments of the

Water Court of 10 April 1953 and 1 March 1965, by which the final

determination of the compensation claims was postponed, could have

been appealed to the Water Court of Appeal and, ultimately, to the

Supreme Court.  Furthermore, the applicant could have, regardless of

these judgments, at any time during the proceedings requested a final

determination of her claims, a rejection of which request would have

been subject to appeal in accordance with the provision of Chapter 49

Section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.

In the Government's opinion there is no reason to consider any of

these remedies as not being effective within the meaning of the

Convention.  Consequently, the Government submit that the applicant

had effective remedies as required by Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention.

7. The issue of storage space which is still pending before the

Water Court

The Government submit that the grounds referred to above are equally

relevant in respect of the present question.  The Government emphasise

that none of the parties concerned had taken any steps to bring the

proceedings forward until the applicant's counterparty in

September 1984 petitioned the Court to have the question finally

determined, that the proceedings were then delayed due to negligence

entirely assignable to the applicant or her counsel, and that since

July 1985 the final determination appears to have been withheld only

because the parties jointly are re-negotiating the dispute.  In view

of this, the Government submit that there has been no violation of

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

8. The Admissibility

The Government have no objection to the admissibility as far as the

six months' rule of Article 26 (Art. 26) is concerned.

However, the Government submit that the application should be rejected

on the ground that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies

as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention or,

alternatively, for reasons which will be elaborated below, that it

should be rejected ratione materiae for falling outside the scope of

the Convention or for being manifestly ill-founded.

9. The merits

As regards the parts of the complaint on which the Government has been

invited to submit their observations, the applicant has alleged

violations of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) on the ground that, as a result of

the protracted proceedings, she has been deprived of her rights under

the said Articles, and of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention on

the ground that she has not had an effective remedy in respect of

these alleged violations.

The Government observe that the claims concerning damages and

encroachments on the timber business were before the Water Court in

the proceedings resulting in the judgment of 10 April 1953. During the

proceedings, the applicant consented to the principal approach of

having the final determination of the claims postponed pending the

outcome of the investigations as regards timber floating. Judgment was

rendered on 10 April 1953, as far as these claims are concerned, in

accordance with the position thus taken by the applicant before the

Court.  The judgment was not appealed against, and entered into force

on 24 April 1953.  It is not even alleged by the applicant that the

contingencies, on which the final determination of the claims thus was

made dependent, did ever occur prior to the rendering of the final

judgment on 8 March 1978.

In the Government's opinion, it could be questioned whether at all the

Convention, which entered into force on 3 September 1953, could be

construed so as to guarantee any right in respect of court proceedings

pending at the time the Convention entered into force.

Assuming, however, that such a guarantee could be read into the

Convention, the Government, nevertheless, submit that such an

interpretation could by no means be viewed to include any right, which

prior to the Convention's entry into force had been effectively waived

in court proceedings and, although merely as to its principle, ruled

on accordingly by the court in a judgment which had gained legal

force.  In view of this, the Government submits that the complaint in

its entirety falls outside the scope of the Convention.

In case the Commission does not share this view, the Government submit

with reference to their considerations as accounted for above, that as

regards Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P-1) the application is manifestly

ill-founded. The Government also submit that the complaint under

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is manifestly ill-founed.

10. Conclusions

The position of the Government is, concerning admissibility, that the

application should be declared inadmissible on the ground that the

applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies or, alternatively, for

falling outside the scope of the Convention or for being manifestly

ill-founded, and concerning the merits, that there has been no

violation of the Convention or the First Protocol.

B. The Applicant

1. The Facts

The applicant submits that the amount of compensation which was fixed

in the judgment of 10 April 1953 is without interest from many points

of view, in particular since the applicant never received any such

compensation.

The applicant points out that it took until 1971, i.e. 22 years after

the permit was granted, before the National Water Power Board was able

to present an investigation, which was so inadequate that the Water

Court had to order that the Board should improve and complete the

investigation which was done in 1973.

It was only in 1976 that the National Water Power Board adopted its

final position in the case.  This is to be seen in connection with the

fact that at that time only a few persons concerned were still parties

to the proceedings, not having voluntarily made agreements with the

Board.

The applicant submits that she has all through the proceedings made

reasonable demands.  The allegation that the applicant had complicated

the proceedings is a conclusion which cannot be drawn from the factual

circumstances of the case.  It is the National Water Power Board which

has the responsibility for the investigation and which completely

influences the time of the proceedings.  Moreover, the Board should

take measures which prevent future damages.  These must be terminated

before the Court can assess the compensation to be awarded. The

allegation that the applicant and others have complicated the

proceedings rather appears to be derived from the Board's opinion.

The applicant points out that the statements by the Water Court of

Appeal in respect of counsel's claim for costs have nothing to do with

the period from 1949 to 1978, which is the period at which the

applicant is mainly aiming.

As to the decisions on adjournment taken by the Water Court of Appeal,

the applicant observes that it is not a simple task for a private

person to make a technical investigation about the effects and damages

to a property such as the one at issue here.  The applicant needed

eleven months to make the investigation, whereas the Board needed

three months to reply, a reply which only resulted in a statement that

the investigation gave an unreasonable outcome.  In one respect,

however, the applicant's investigation was of significance since it

led to the case being partly referred back to the Water Court.

As regards Swedish law and practice in respect of an issue which has

been referred back to a lower court, the applicant submits the

following.

The question whether the lower court should take up ex officio a case

which has been referred back to it is not regulated in the Code of

Judicial Procedure.  If a decision on referral contains a clause that

the case should be taken up on request of a party such a clause is

valid.  In the commentary to Chapter 50 Section 29 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure it is said that it is appropriate to order the

lower court to take up the case ex officio and to take necessary

measures for the future proceedings.  If nothing is said in the

decision it appears that the position is that the lower court should

ex officio take measures to continue the proceedings.  A decision to

refer a case back to a lower court is binding on the lower court

insofar as it must take a new decision in the case.

In addition to the above, it is a rule that all District Courts should

have internal Rules of Procedure.  In such rules it is normally

provided that cases which have been referred back to the Court should

be dealt with swiftly.  However, the applicant has not been able to

ascertain whether the Water Court of Östersund has such rules.

The Government's statement that, in 1984, no party had requested the

Court to terminate the proceedings is incorrect.  Nor is the statement

that the Court should have notified the parties in 1984 correct.  The

applicant submits that the Court has been contacted over the telephone

on several occasions with a request that the case be dealt with.

During these telephone contacts the applicant has received different

information, on one occasion the case was said to have been terminated

already while on another occasion the intention was to join the case

with another one.

The submission of the Government that the applicant in a letter to the

Water Court has raised issues which have already acquired legal force

is not wholly correct.  The only issue which was raised and which was

finally determined was the question of the road. However, in case the

storage space must be enlarged or if the timber should be transported

by lorry - which will be the case - it will be necessary to reconsider

the issue of the road irrespective of the fact that it has formally

acquired legal force.  The applicant maintains that this explains the

applicant's position before the Water Court.

The applicant questions, however, why the court has not, despite the

applicant's requests, taken up the case again.  The applicant also

submits that the reasons for which the Water Court has issued a notice

to the public (kungörelsedelgivning) in the case, and the manner in

which this was done, are inconsistent with Swedish law.

Moreover, the letter from the applicant of December 1984, to which the

Government refer, has not even been answered by the National Water

Power Board.  it is not even known whether the Water Court has asked

the Board to state its views on the letter.  The Court has been silent

up to the end of June 1985 when it suddenly summoned the applicant to

a main hearing within 14 days.  Thereafter there has been an exchange

of written submissions between the parties.  However the National

Water Power Board has not yet produced the necessary investigations.

2. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

Whether a remedy should have been tried by an applicant must be

determined on the basis of all the circumstances of a case.

Furthermore, it must be a condition that the applicant should have had

a factual possibility to achieve a different decision before he

appealed against the judgments concerning postponement or requested

the termination of the test period.

The applicant maintains that an appeal against the judgments of 1953

and 1965 would not have resulted in any change.  The applicant submits

that the number of postponement judgments in so-called water cases has

been 35 to 50 during the 1960s and 1970s.  Several of these cases

started in the 1940s and 1950s.  More than 75% of the cases were dealt

with by the Water Court of Östersund.  In many cases more than 100

judgments have been delivered and on the spot visits have been held

175 times.  The reasons for the postponements are issues of timber

floating and so-called annexed interests.  In Stockholm, where no such

issues have arisen, there have only been about 10 to 15 judgments

during the whole period of the dealing with a case.  In the

applicant's opinion this shows the existence of a clear practice.

As regards the proposal to ask for the termination of the test period

the applicant submits that such a procedure is only possible where new

facts have arisen, such as that a party enters into an agreement with

the National Water Power Board.

The Water Court must ex officio examine whether the conditions for a

postponement are at hand.  The National Water Power Board has the

complete responsibility for the investigation of the case.  Moreover

the Water Court shall ex officio determine whether the conditions for

terminating a case are at hand.  The measures to prevent damages were

not made in 1965 and they are not yet terminated.  An expert was

appointed by the Court and the postponement was tied with the issues

on floating, which were subject to a special investigation outside the

actual water case proceedings.  Nor did the measures to prevent

damages concern exclusively the applicant.

The applicant cannot accept that the remedies to which the Government

refer are effective.  The basis for the whole water case proceedings

would be taken away if the procedure indicated by the Government was

to be followed.  The Water Courts would be obliged to hold main

hearings 24 hours a day during the whole year without being able to

cut down their backlogs.  The only way to reduce the length of the

proceedings is that the Court put pressure on the National Water Power

Board to see to it that it produces quicker investigations and

implements the measures to prevent damages more quickly.

The applicant submits that the dealing with her case has been such

that the facts on which the final determination was dependent did not

occur until the National Water Power Board primarily implemented the

measures to prevent damages and finally stated its position in the

case.

Finally, if the Government allege that there exists a remedy which is

effective they ought to prove this allegation by referring to case-law

indicating that a party has successfully availed himself of the remedy

in question.

The applicant concludes that there has been a violation of

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1).

THE LAW

1. The applicant alleges violations of the Convention in several

respects in relation to the proceedings as such, and the outcome of

those proceedings, which concerned claims relating to the effects on

the applicant's property of the construction and running of the

Kilforsen power station.

2. The Commission will first examine the complaints relating to

the proceedings as such.  In this respect the applicant complains that

the proceedings have been excessively lengthy and that the requirement

of a determination "within a reasonable time" in Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention has not been respected.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence of the Convention reads:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any

criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public

hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial

tribunal established by law."

The applicant also complains that as a result of the protracted

proceedings there has been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) which guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.

The Government submit that this complaint is inadmissible for failure

to exhaust domestic remedies.

The Commission must first decide on its competence ratione temporis to

consider the applicant's complaints.

In accordance with the generally recognised principles of

international law, the Convention is binding on the Contracting

Parties only in respect of facts occurring after its entry into force.

The Convention entered into force on 3 September 1953.

In previous case-law, the Commission has stated that where the facts

consist of a series of legal proceedings, the date of entry into force

of the Convention has the effect of dividing the period in two, the

earlier escaping the Commission's temporal jurisdiction.  On the other

hand where a court gives judgment after the entry into force of the

Convention, the Commission is competent to ensure that the proceedings

leading up to this judgment were in conformity with the Convention, as

the proceedings before a court are embodied in its final decision

which thus incorporated any defect by which they may have been

affected (see No. 8261/78, Dec. 11.10.79, D.R. 18, p. 150).

It follows that the Commission cannot as such examine under the

Convention the proceedings and judgments delivered prior to the entry

into force of the Convention, i.e. 3 September 1953.  With respect to

the complaint that the procedure did not comply with the condition of

"reasonable time" in Article 6 (Art. 6), the Commission must take as

starting point the date of 3 September 1953 and the state of the

proceedings as they were on that date.

The Commission must next decide whether the applicant, in respect of

the complaint that the proceedings failed to meet the condition of

"reasonable time" in Article 6 (Art. 6), has complied with the

condition in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention as to the

exhaustion of domestic remedies.

The Government have submitted that the applicant has not exhausted

domestic remedies and have referred to the fact that she did not

appeal against the judgments of the Water Court of 1953 and 1965 by

which the Court decided to postpone the final determination of the

issues in the case, and that she did not at any time during the

proceedings request the court to determine the case finally.  If such

a request had been unsuccessful, the applicant could have appealed in

accordance with Chapter 49 Section 6 of the Code of Judicial

Procedure.

Chapter 49 Section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure provides that a

party, who is of the opinion that a decision of a lower court

unnecessarily delays the proceedings, has the right to appeal against

such a decision.  Such an appeal is according to Chapter 52 Section 1

of the Code not limited in time.

It is established in the present case that the applicant has not

brought any such appeal to the Water Court of Appeal.  The Commission

considers that an appeal by the applicant under Chapter 49 Section 6

of the Code of Judicial Procedure would in substance be similar to the

allegation she now makes before the Commission, namely that the

proceedings have not been terminated within a "reasonable time".

The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the remedy provided

for in Chapter 49 Section 6 is a domestic remedy in respect of a

complaint of lengthy proceedings under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

However, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention only requires the

exhaustion of remedies which can be regarded as "effective".  It would

for instance not be necessary to exhaust a remedy in respect of which

it could be clearly said that it would be meaningless to pursue.  The

applicant submits that the remedies referred to by the Government are

not effective.  However, the Commission cannot find from the

submissions of the parties that an appeal under Chapter 49 Section 6

of the Code of Judicial Procedure would have been without any effect

as to the length of the proceedings.

The Commission concludes that the remedy referred to in Chapter 49

Section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure was a remedy which the

applicant was required to exhaust in order to comply with the

conditions in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

It follows that the applicant's complaint in this respect must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention for

failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

3. The applicant also complains of a breach of Article 6 (Art. 6)

of the Convention in that allegedly the Water Court judge, at the

preliminary hearing which preceded the judgment of 8 March 1978, acted

as a special authority distinct from the Court.  She also submits that

there was inequality between the parties since the Royal Water Power

Board was a state organ with resources exceeding those of the

applicant.

The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention in these respects.  It follows that these

complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4. The applicant complains that the compensation awarded was

inadequate inter alia as she did not receive full compensation for

increased costs for the timber business.  She alleges a violation of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).  The applicant also alleges that

since the compensation did not cover certain future work there has

been a breach of Article 4 (Art. 4) of the Convention according to

which no one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

The Commission, after having examined the applicant's submissions,

finds that the applicant has not substantiated that having regard to

the compensation paid there was a real and substantial disproportion

between the burden imposed on the applicant and the public interest

pursued in the construction and running of the power station (cf.

Lithgow and Others, Comm. Report 7.3.84, para. 376).  Accordingly no

issue arises under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Commission

moreover considers that the facts of the case do not raise any issue

under Article 4 (Art. 4) of the Convention.

It follows that in this respect the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

5. The applicant also complains that she acquired a right from

the judgment of 10 April 1953 as a result of the obligation imposed on

the Royal Water Power Board to let a sufficient amount of water

through to permit log-floating.  This right ceased in 1958 when the

Board entered into agreements with the foresters that the logs be

transported in other ways.  The applicant maintains that she has

thereby been deprived of a right in violation of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

The Commission considers that it need not examine the substance of

this particular complaint.  Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

prescribes that the Commission may only deal with a matter after all

domestic remedies have been exhausted and within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken.

The Commission recalls that the alleged deprivation of a right took

place in 1958.  Insofar as legal remedies existed against this

deprivation, the applicant has not shown that she exhausted them.  If

there was no effective remedy, it appears that the six months rule has

not been respected.

It follows that the applicant has not satisfied the conditions of

Article 26 of the Convention and her complaint in this respect must

therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of

the Convention.

6. The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention which reads:

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention

are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national

authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by

persons acting in an official capacity."

The applicant claims that she has had no effective remedy available to

her and she argues that it follows from Articles 13 and 26 (Art. 13,

art. 26) of the Convention that the organs of the Contracting States

have to apply directly the provisions of the Convention.

It is established case-law that neither Article 13 (Art. 13) nor the

Convention in general lays down any given manner for ensuring within

their internal law the effective implementation of the provisions of

the Convention (see Eur.  Court H.R., Swedish Engine Drivers' Union

judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 20, p. 18, para. 56).

In the present case, the applicant had the possibility of submitting

all her complaints against the Water Court to the Water Court of

Appeal and a further appeal was open to the Supreme Court. Moreover,

in relation to the complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that the proceedings were unreasonably lengthy, the

applicant had a separate way of appealing as the Commission has found

under para. 2. The Commission considers that these remedies provided

the applicant with an "effective remedy" within the meaning of

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

It follows that, in this respect, the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

7.    The applicant finally invokes Articles 17 and 18 (Art. 17,

art. 18) of the Convention.  However, in view of its considerations

above, the Commission finds no separate issue under Article 17 or 18

(Art. 17, art. 18).

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER)                      (C. A. NØRGAARD)