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KAREEM v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 32025/96 • ECHR ID: 001-3366

Document date: October 25, 1996

  • Inbound citations: 3
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 6

KAREEM v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 32025/96 • ECHR ID: 001-3366

Document date: October 25, 1996

Cited paragraphs only



                  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                    Application No. 32025/96

                    by Falah Mahdi KAREEM

                    against Sweden

     The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

25 October 1996, the following members being present:

          Mr.  S. TRECHSEL, President

          Mrs. G.H. THUNE

          Mrs. J. LIDDY

          MM.  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

               A. WEITZEL

               J.-C. SOYER

               H. DANELIUS

               F. MARTINEZ

               L. LOUCAIDES

               J.-C. GEUS

               M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

               M.A. NOWICKI

               I. CABRAL BARRETO

               B. CONFORTI

               N. BRATZA

               I. BÉKÉS

               J. MUCHA

               D. SVÁBY

               G. RESS

               A. PERENIC

               C. BÎRSAN

               P. LORENZEN

               K. HERNDL

               E. BIELIUNAS

               E.A. ALKEMA

               M. VILA AMIGÓ

          Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 18 June 1996 by

Falah Mahdi KAREEM against Sweden and registered on 25 June 1996 under

file No. 32025/96;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 19 July 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicant on 30 August and 18 September 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant, an Iraqi citizen, was born in 1963.  He is

presently detained for deportation purposes in Härnösand, Sweden.

Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Anders Bengtsson, a

lawyer practising in Sundsvall, Sweden.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

     Upon arrival at Arlanda airport, Stockholm on 7 December 1991,

the applicant applied for political asylum.  Interrogated by the police

the same day, he stated that, although he was not a political activist,

he took part in the Intifada, the 1991 rebellion against Saddam

Hussein.  Some friends, who were arrested and tortured following the

Intifada, told the Iraqi authorities about the applicant's

participation.  He therefore fled to the north of Iraq.  A week later,

he passed the border to Turkey where he stayed for two or three days.

On 6 December he took the plane from Istanbul to Vienna and the next

day he flew to Stockholm.  He also mentioned that his elder brother had

been living in Sweden for the past four years.

     During a further police interview on 10 February 1992 the

applicant stated that, after disregarding a call-up for active military

service in the beginning of 1990, he had been in hiding in Iraq for

almost two years.  As a consequence, he probably would be executed if

returned to Iraq.  However, neither he nor his relatives had been

subjected to any form of persecution or harassment by the Iraqi

authorities.  Furthermore, he had not been arrested, convicted or

imprisoned.  With regard to his flight from Iraq, the applicant gave

the following details.  In November 1991 he went by bus from his

hometown Babel to Erbil in the north of Iraq.  The trip took seven

hours.  In Erbil, he stayed with a friend for three weeks before the

two of them made a four hour bus journey to a Turkish border town.

They passed the Turkish border by foot at a place where there was no

control post.  After having spent three nights at an hotel, the

applicant and his friend left the border town by bus in the morning of

6 December.  Later the same day, they arrived at the airport in

Istanbul where they met an unknown smuggler who supplied the applicant

with a false passport.  After the passport, plane ticket and luggage

had been checked and the applicant had received a boarding card, the

smuggler reclaimed the passport and left.  The applicant travelled

alone to Vienna.  At Vienna airport, the applicant passed the passport

control by showing his boarding card.  He stayed overnight at a transit

hotel.  The next day, 7 December, he took the plane to Stockholm.  The

applicant was unable to name the Turkish border town, any of the hotels

and airlines and the airports in Istanbul and Vienna.  Furthermore, he

did not know in which name his plane tickets had been issued.

     When the recording of the interview was played back for him, the

applicant added that he took part in the Intifada while he was in

hiding.  He further handed over his international driving permit,

issued by the Iraq Automobile & Touring Association in Bagdad on

10 October 1991.

     In a memorandum to the National Immigration Board (Statens

invandrarverk), dated 2 March 1992, the Swedish security police

(Säkerhetspolisen; "SÄPO") stated that there were reasons to believe

that the applicant and two other Iraqi citizens were acting on behalf

of the Iraqi Government.  Referring to their conduct in Sweden, SÄPO

considered that they had shown an unreasonable interest in other asylum

seekers' situation.  SÄPO considered therefore that they did not meet

the requirements for asylum status and that they could be expected to

engage in criminal activities in Sweden.

     In December 1994 and January 1995 the applicant's lawyer

submitted additional observations to the National Immigration Board.

He stated that the applicant was not called up for military service in

the beginning of 1990, as erroneously indicated in the minutes of the

police interview, but in August 1990.  While hiding from the police and

the army, the applicant received help from friends and family.  He was,

inter alia, able to obtain false leave passes and other military

documents from a friend in the army.  When the Intifada reached his

hometown, the applicant took a very active part and participated in

large, sometimes violent, demonstrations.  After the Iraqi military had

crushed the rebellion, the applicant fled by bus to Bagdad and then by

taxi to Erbil.  After having stayed with his friend in Erbil, the two

of them took a taxi to Zacho, a town on the border between Iraq and

Turkey.  At the border, the applicant's friend talked to some guards

and, in exchange for 500 Iraqi dinars, received instructions on where

and how they should pass the border.  The applicant and his friend

passed the border by foot close to the border station.  After half an

hour's walk, they were given a lift by car to the nearest Turkish

village.  After the Intifada, the applicant's father had allegedly been

questioned about the applicant's whereabouts.

     The lawyer further stated that the applicant feared harsh

treatment in Iraq not only because he had disregarded the call-up and

participated in the Intifada but also because he had left Iraq without

permission.  The applicant claimed that he was entitled to a residence

permit also on account of his family ties and on humanitarian grounds.

He referred to his marriage, on 3 March 1994, with a Swedish woman.

Allegedly, they had met on 20 March 1992 and had lived together for a

year and a half before getting married.  Moreover, he had stayed in

Sweden for three years waiting for his asylum application to be

determined.  The applicant strongly repudiated SÄPO's allegation that

he was active for the Iraqi Government.  Naturally, he had talked to

Iraqis in Sweden.  However, except for some questions on how the asylum

interviews were conducted, the talks had only concerned everyday

matters and not political subjects.

     On 13 January 1995 the Immigration Board referred the applicant's

case to the Government with a recommendation that the application be

rejected.  The Board stated that the applicant, on account of his

marriage, had certain ties to Sweden.  However, these ties were of

minor importance in view of the security reasons for refusing a

residence permit.  The Board further noted that SÄPO, orally on

9 December 1994, had recommended the rejection of the application.

     In letters to the Government of 8 and 13 February 1995, the

applicant's lawyer stated that the delay in examining the application

rather indicated that there were no security reasons for refusing the

applicant a residence permit.  The lawyer further mentioned that the

applicant had met M, one of the Iraqis mentioned in the SÄPO memorandum

of 2 March 1992, upon arrival at Arlanda airport, that they had stayed

for some time at the same centre for asylum seekers and that they had

been in contact only once after M had received a residence permit and

left the centre.  Allegedly, they only had normal social relations.

     In a statement to the Government of 18 May 1995, SÄPO again

recommended the rejection of the application.  For security reasons,

the information in the statement was not communicated to the applicant.

     By decision of 31 August 1995, the Government rejected the

applicant's request for access to SÄPO's statement.

     On 13 June 1996 the Government rejected the applicant's

application for a residence permit.  It further ordered SÄPO to deport

the applicant.  The Government gave the following reasons for its

decision.  The fact that the applicant had disposed of his passport

affected the credibility of his statements.  Moreover, the applicant

had not been able to give a credible account of how he had left Iraq

and travelled to Sweden.  His statements on the events in Iraq and the

reasons for seeking asylum in Sweden were also remarkably vague and

imprecise.  There were discrepancies between statements given on

different occasions.  The Government noted, inter alia, that, at the

first police interview in December 1991, the applicant had failed to

mention that he had disregarded a call-up for military service.  This

vital information was not given until the second interview in February

1992.  Moreover, on the latter occasion, the applicant had mentioned

his participation in the Intifada only after having listened to the

recording of the interview.  Concluding that the applicant's statements

were not credible, the Government found that he did not have, on any

ground, a right to asylum in Sweden.  The Government further accepted

the findings of SÄPO.  There were thus reasons to expel the applicant

under Chapter 4, Section 2, subsections 3 and 4 of the Aliens Act

(Utlänningslagen, 1989:529), according to which a foreigner may be

expelled if it can be assumed that he will engage in criminal

activities, sabotage, espionage or other unlawful intelligence

activities.  In these circumstances, the applicant could not be granted

a residence permit on account of his family ties or his long stay in

Sweden.

     On 13 June 1996 SÄPO also decided to take the applicant into

custody for deportation purposes, as there was a risk that he would

otherwise go into hiding or commit crimes.  The decision was enforced

the same day.  By judgment of 28 June, the County Administrative Court

(länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm rejected the applicant's

appeal.  On 9 July and 20 August, respectively, the Administrative

Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm and the Supreme

Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) refused the applicant leave to

appeal.

     After the Commission had indicated to the respondent Government

that it was desirable not to deport the applicant until the Commission

had had an opportunity to examine the present application, the National

Immigration Board, by decision of 16 July 1996, stayed the enforcement

of the expulsion order pending the Commission's decision on the

admissibility of the application.

     After having held an oral hearing on 9 August 1996, SÄPO decided

on 12 August that the applicant should remain in custody.  SÄPO found

that there were special reasons (synnerliga skäl) for the continued

detention, as prescribed by Chapter 6, Section 4 of the Aliens Act.

The decision was upheld by the County Administrative Court on 20

August.  Leave to appeal was refused by the Administrative Court of

Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court on 3 and 25 September,

respectively.

     On 30 August 1996 the applicant's lawyer requested permission to

study SÄPO's file on the applicant.  By decision of 9 September, SÄPO

rejected  the request  except  for the minutes of SÄPO's interview with

the applicant on 5 March 1993 which were handed over to the lawyer.

The decision has been appealed against to the Administrative Court of

Appeal.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant claims that his expulsion would violate Articles

2 and 3 of the Convention, as he risks the death penalty, torture and

other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Iraq.

2.   As it would also separate the applicant from his wife, the

expulsion allegedly fails to respect his family life.  In this regard,

he invokes Article 8 of the Convention.

3.   Under Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complains that

he did not receive a fair hearing of his asylum application.

4.   The applicant further claims that he is being detained in

violation of Article 5 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 18 June and registered on

25 June 1996.

     On 25 June 1996 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 36 of

its Rules of Procedure, to indicate to the respondent Government that

it was desirable in the interest of the parties and the proper conduct

of the proceedings not to deport the applicant to Iraq until the

Commission had had an opportunity to examine the application.  The

Commission further decided, in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of

the Rules of Procedure, to communicate the application to the

respondent Government.

     The Government were requested to submit observations on the

applicant's complaints under Articles 2, 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention.

The complaint under Article 5 of the Convention was not introduced

until 18 September 1996 and has not been communicated to the

Government.

     By decision of 12 September 1996, the Commission prolonged the

indication under Rule 36 until 25 October 1996.

     The Government's observations were submitted on 19 July 1996.

The applicant replied on 30 August and 18 September 1996.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant claims that his expulsion would violate Articles

2 and 3 (Art. 2, 3) of the Convention.

     Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention reads, in relevant parts,

as follows:

     "1.  Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.

     No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in

     the execution of a sentence of a court following his

     conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by

     law. ..."

     Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention provides the following:

     "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

     degrading treatment or punishment."

     The respondent Government submit firstly that the alleged risk

of the applicant being sentenced to death should be examined not under

Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention but under Article 1 of Protocol

No. 6 (P6-1) to the Convention, as the latter but not the former

provision prohibits the death penalty.  The Government further submit

that Swedish authorities, for many years, have refrained from expelling

people to Iraq as, due to the conditions prevailing in that country,

it is normally not possible to assess with any degree of certainty the

risks run by Iraqis who have spent time abroad for other purposes than

business or the like.  Iraqi nationals are granted residence permits

as refugees or so-called de facto refugees unless there are objections

from the viewpoint of security.  Thus, had the applicant's case been

a "normal asylum case", the applicant certainly would have been granted

a permit to reside in Sweden.

     The Government contend, however, that the applicant's complaints

with respect to the risks facing him in Iraq are manifestly ill-

founded, as he has not shown substantial grounds for believing that

there exists a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3)

of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (P6-1).  In this

respect, the Government generally refer to their decision of

13 June 1996 in which they found that the applicant had not submitted

a generally coherent and credible account of the events that had taken

place in Iraq, his flight from the country and the reasons for his

asylum request.  Furthermore, the applicant's claim that he was in

hiding from the Iraqi authorities for a considerable time before he

came to Sweden is contradicted by his alleged active participation in

the rebellion against the country's regime and the fact that he applied

for and obtained an international driving permit.  It is also unlikely

that the applicant was able to pass the passport control at the airport

in Vienna with only his boarding card.  The Government further submit

that it is clear that the applicant arrived in Sweden under completely

false pretences.  He was sent as an intelligence officer with an

assignment to gather information about other Iraqi nationals.  Within

months after the applicant's arrival in Sweden, Swedish authorities

were contacted by a considerable number of both Iraqi and Swedish

nationals who, independently of each other, stated that the applicant

and two other Iraqis were collecting information on Iraqi asylum

seekers to be forwarded to the authorities in Bagdad.  Allegedly, they

had inquired in an unusually detailed manner into the reasons for other

Iraqis' requests for asylum.  According to the Government, it is not

uncommon for the Iraqi intelligence service to operate in this manner.

One of the applicant's two compatriots, M, who had been identified as

the applicant's superior, was expelled from Sweden in 1995.  The

Government have further ordered the expulsion of the other colleague,

reported by an Iraqi refugee as being the latter's torturer in Iraq.

     The applicant submits that he might be killed or subjected to

torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Iraq

on account of having disregarded a call-up for military service,

actively participated in the Intifada and left the country without

permission.  The Government's reliance on the applicant's alleged lack

of credibility is difficult to understand in view of the practice of

granting residence permits to Iraqi asylum seekers, irrespective of

their credibility, unless there are objections from the viewpoint of

security.  With regard to his credibility, the applicant states the

following.  He mentioned the military call-up at the first interview

and his participation in the Intifada at the second interview before

listening to the recording of it.  He does not know why these

statements were not noted in the minutes or recorded on the tape, but

states that the first interview was held in an accelerated tempo and

was not conducted in a very careful way and that the chief interrogator

at the second interview might have failed to repeat his answer on the

tape.  Moreover, the interrogators' attitude towards the applicant was

hostile, and so he found it easier to give a more correct and detailed

account to his lawyer.  Furthermore, the applicant was not in hiding

while he participated in the Intifada.  His international driving

permit was obtained by his father in exchange for bribes.  As he had

not travelled abroad before his flight to Sweden, does not understand

any of the languages spoken in the countries he passed through and was

constantly in fear of being sent back to Iraq, it is understandable

that he forgot or did not note names and other details.  He was ordered

by the smuggler to return the passport and maintains that he passed the

passport control at the airport in Vienna without it.

     The applicant denies that he has been sent to Sweden to carry on

espionage or engage in other criminal activities.  He has not asked any

Iraqi nationals about the reasons for their seeking asylum.  He has

already, in his lawyer's letter to the Government of 13 February 1995,

given an account of his contacts with M.  He does not know the identity

of the third Iraqi mentioned in the Government's observations.  In

general, he cannot comment on the credibility and reliability of the

accusations against him, as he has had no access to the information

held by SÄPO.  He suspects, however, that some accusations might be the

result of jealousy and states, in this connection, that his brother and

a friend of his brother accused the applicant of having affairs with

their respective wives.  He also refers to the fact that his brother

fled to Sweden in November 1986 for political reasons and became a

Swedish citizen in November 1991.  It is not likely that he would

engage in activities against, inter alia, his brother.

     The Commission recalls that Contracting States have the right to

control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (cf., e.g., Eur.

Court HR, Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of

30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 102).  However, an

expulsion decision may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3)

of the Convention, and hence engage the responsibility of the State,

where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person

concerned would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or to

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which

he or she is to be expelled (ibid., p. 34, para. 103).  A mere

possibility of ill-treatment is not in itself sufficient (ibid., p. 37,

para. 111).  Moreover, the Commission does not exclude the possibility

that a Contracting State's responsibility might be engaged under

Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 6

(P6-1) where a fugitive is extradited to a country where he is

seriously at risk of being executed, as a result of the imposition of

the death penalty or otherwise (cf. No. 22742/93, Aylor-Davis v.

France, Dec. 20.1.94, D.R. 76 p. 164).

     Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Commission

notes that, with respect to the applicant's statements regarding the

journey from Iraq, there are major discrepancies between the

information given to the police in February 1992 and the observations

submitted to the National Immigration Board in December 1994 and

January 1995.  In 1992 the applicant stated that he had travelled all

the way from Babel to Erbil by bus; in 1994/95 he claimed that he had

changed to a taxi in Bagdad.  In 1992 he asserted that he had travelled

by bus to the Turkish border; in 1994/95 he maintained that he had

taken a taxi.  In 1992 he alleged that there was no control post at the

Turkish border; in 1994/95 he stated that his friend had bribed some

Turkish border guards.  In 1994/95, but not in 1992, he mentioned that

he and his friend had been given a lift on the Turkish side.  Moreover,

the applicant has not been able to name the Turkish town where he

stayed for three days, any of the hotels he stayed at or any of the

airlines he travelled with.  The Commission also notes that the

applicant, according to the minutes of the first police interview in

December 1991, on this occasion failed to mention that he had

disregarded a call-up for military service, although this, as stated

by the applicant at the second interview, was the initial reason why

he went into hiding.

     In view of the above, the Commission considers, notwithstanding

the submissions made by the applicant to the Commission, that there are

strong reasons to call into question the veracity of the applicant's

statements.  The Commission further notes that the applicant has

offered no evidence in support of his claims.  For these reasons, the

Commission finds that it has not been established that there are

substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk

of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention in Iraq.  It follows that there is no possibility of a

violation of Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention and Article 1 of

Protocol No. 6 (P6-1).

     Moreover, the Commission recalls from its previous case-law that

Chapter 8, Section 1 of the Aliens Act imposes an absolute obligation

on the enforcement authority in Sweden to refrain from expelling an

alien should the human rights situation in the receiving country

constitute a firm reason to believe that he or she would be in danger

of being subjected to capital or corporal punishment, or torture, in

that country (cf., e.g., No. 27776/95, A.G. and Others v. Sweden, Dec.

26.10.95, D.R. 83 p. 101).  In this connection, the Commission further

notes the Swedish authorities' present practice of expelling asylum

seekers to Iraq only in exceptional circumstances.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.   The applicant further complains that the decision to expel him

fails to respect his family life.  He invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention, which provides the following:

     "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2. There shall be no interference by a public authority

     with the exercise of this right except such as is in

     accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

     society in the interests of national security, public

     safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

     prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

     health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and

     freedoms of others."

     The Government submit that the applicant's expulsion will entail

no interference with his right to respect for his family life as, at

the time of his marriage, he was well aware that his continued stay in

Sweden was uncertain.  He had not been granted a residence permit and

had prior to the marriage been questioned by SÄPO.  He could thus not

reasonably expect to be able to choose Sweden as his and his wife's

country of matrimonial residence.  Furthermore, the applicant has not

even argued that his wife would not be allowed to live together with

him in his own country or in another country of their mutual choice.

     Should the Commission, however, find that the expulsion entails

an interference under para. 1 of Article 8 (Art. 8-1) of the

Convention, the Government contend that it is justified under the terms

of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).  The Government maintain their

conclusion, referred to under 1 above, that the applicant is an

intelligence officer sent to Sweden to gather information about other

Iraqi nationals.  Thus, his expulsion would serve the purpose of

preventing crime, as unlawful intelligence activities is a criminal

offence under the Swedish Penal Code.  It would further protect the

rights and freedoms of others, including other Iraqi nationals, and be

in the obvious interest of national security.  The State's margin of

appreciation in striking a fair balance between the general interests

of the community and the individual interest of the applicant would not

be exceeded by the enforcement of the expulsion decision.  Being

proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, the enforcement of the

decision is necessary in a democratic society.

     The applicant submits, in addition to what has been referred to

under 1 above, that, as a consequence of his expulsion, he will be

separated from his wife.  They have been together since March 1992.

They both wish to live in Sweden.  He believes that his wife would not

be allowed to settle in Iraq.

     The Commission recalls that the expulsion of a person from a

country in which close members of his family live may amount to an

unjustified interference with his right to respect for his family life

as guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (cf., e.g., Eur.

Court HR, Moustaquim v. Belgium judgment of 18 February 1991, Series

A no. 193, pp. 19-20, paras. 43-46).

     Noting that the applicant and his wife have been living together

for several years and that they got married in March 1994, the

Commission finds that the applicant's expulsion could be considered as

an interference with his right to respect for his family life under

Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1).  It is therefore necessary to ascertain

whether the expulsion would satisfy the conditions of Article 8 para.

2 (Art. 8-2), that is to say whether it is "in accordance with the

law", pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that

paragraph, and is "necessary in a democratic society" for the

achievement of that or those aims (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Boughanemi

v. France judgment of 24 April 1996, para. 36, to be published in the

Reports of Judgments and Decisions for 1996).

     It has not been contested that the expulsion order was issued "in

accordance with the law".  The Commission considers that the

enforcement of the order pursued legitimate aims under Article 8 para.

2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests of national security, the prevention

of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

     The necessity criterion implies the existence of a pressing

social need and, in particular, requires that the measure must be

proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.  It has to be determined

whether with regard to the intended expulsion a fair balance is being

struck between the relevant interests, in the present case the

applicant's right to respect for his family life, on the one hand, and

the interest of national security, the prevention of crime and the

protection of the rights and freedoms of others, on the other.  Regard

should further be had to the margin of appreciation afforded to the

Contracting States (ibid., p. 18, paras. 41-42).

     The Commission recalls the Government's conclusion, based on

information supplied by SÄPO, that the applicant is an Iraqi

intelligence officer.  It is true that the facts on which this

information is based have only partly been communicated to the

applicant and the Commission.  The Commission observes, however, the

need of preserving some degree of confidentiality of this kind of

information in deportation matters.  Having regard to the available

information and the margin of appreciation left to the Swedish

Government, the Commission is satisfied that the decision to expel the

applicant is supported by relevant and sufficient reasons.  The

Commission further notes that there is no evidence that the applicant's

wife would not be able to follow the applicant to Iraq.

     In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the Swedish

authorities have not failed to fulfil their obligation to strike a fair

balance between the relevant interests.  Thus, the interference with

the applicant's right to respect for his family life is justified under

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains that he did not receive a fair

hearing of his asylum application.  He invokes Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

     "1.  In the determination of his civil rights ... or of any

     criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair

     ... hearing within a reasonable time ...

     2.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be

     presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."

     The Government submit that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention

is not applicable and that this complaint is thus incompatible ratione

materiae with the Convention.

     The applicant contends that his rights under Article 6

(Art. 6) were violated as he was not presumed innocent and as the

asylum application was not determined within a reasonable time.

     The Commission recalls its established case-law according to

which procedures followed by public authorities to determine whether

an alien should be allowed to stay in a country or should be expelled

do not involve the determination of civil rights within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf., e.g., No.

13162/87, P. v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54 p. 211).

     Noting furthermore that the procedures followed in the

applicant's case did not determine any criminal charge against him, the

Commission finds that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not

apply to the present complaint.

     It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.   The applicant finally complains that his detention since 13 June

1996 is not justified by special reasons, as required under the

relevant provision of the Aliens Act for a detention exceeding two

months.  Moreover, the courts examining this matter have accepted

SÄPO's decisions without making any independent assessments.  He

invokes Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention which, in relevant parts,

provides the following:

     "1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of

     person.  No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in

     the following cases and in accordance with a procedure

     prescribed by law:

     ...

     f.  the lawful arrest or detention ... of a person against

     whom action is being taken with a view to deportation ..."

     The Commission considers that the applicant has been lawfully

detained under Article 5 para. 1 (f) (Art. 5-1-f) of the Convention as

a "person against whom action is being taken with a view to

deportation".  As to the length of his detention, the issue which

arises is whether it has ceased to be justified because the proceedings

have not been pursued with the requisite speed (cf. Eur. Court HR,

Kolompar v. Belgium judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 235-C,

p. 55, para. 36).  In this connection, the Commission notes that SÄPO

and, on appeal, the County Administrative Court decided that the

applicant should remain in detention after the National Immigration

Board had decided to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order

pending the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the present

application.  In view of this and having regard to the time the

applicant so far has been detained, i.e. almost four and a half months,

the Commission finds that the applicant's detention has not ceased to

be justified.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

        H.C. KRÜGER                          S. TRECHSEL

         Secretary                            President

     to the Commission                    of the Commission

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