AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                    Application No. 33770/96

                    by Wanda PARUSZEWSKA

                    against Poland

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:

          MM   J.-C. GEUS, President

               M.A. NOWICKI

               G. JÖRUNDSSON

               A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

               J.-C. SOYER

               H. DANELIUS

          Mrs  G.H. THUNE

          MM   F. MARTINEZ

               I. CABRAL BARRETO

               J. MUCHA

               D. SVÁBY

               P. LORENZEN

               E. BIELIUNAS

               E.A. ALKEMA

               A. ARABADJIEV

          Ms   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 30 October 1996

by Wanda Paruszewska against Poland and registered on 13 November 1996

under file No. 33770/96;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1933, is a retired

engineer and employee of the State administration, residing in Warsaw.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows:

Particular circumstances of the case

     By a letter of 9 December 1992 the applicant's immediate superior

asked the Ombudsman whether Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State

Administration Employees Act was compatible with the provisions of the

Constitution concerning the prohibition of discrimination on the ground

of sex in that it set forth different retirement ages for men and

women.

     In a reply of 9 February 1993 the Ombudsman's office stated that

the impugned provision was not incompatible with the Constitution,

given that it conferred on women a right to retire at sixty, not an

obligation to do so.  Thus, it did not amount to discrimination.

     By a letter of 8 March 1993 the applicant requested the

Constitutional Court (Trybunal Konstytucyjny) to institute, of its own

motion, proceedings in order to examine whether Article 13 para. 1 item

5 of the State Administration Employees Act was compatible with the

provisions of the Constitution concerning the prohibition of

discrimination on the ground of sex and with Poland's relevant

obligations under international law.

     On 17 March 1993 the applicant's employer, the Polish Committee

of Normalisation, Measures and Quality (Polski Komitet Normalizacji,

Miar i Jakosci) served the applicant with notice of termination of her

contract, due to the fact that, in pursuance of Article 13 para. 1

point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act, on 15 March 1993 she

had acquired her retirement entitlements as she had turned sixty.  The

contract was to expire on 30 June 1993.

     The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative

Court (Naczelny S*d Administracyjny). She submitted that the impugned

decision was based on legal provisions which were in breach of the

constitutional principle of equality of men and women in that the age

of retirement for men was fixed at 65 years, whereas for women it was

60 years.  Consequently, she was forced to retire against her will,

which in itself amounted to a non-pecuniary injury.  Further, as the

period in which she had been paying contributions towards her pension

rights was shorter than that of male employees, her retirement pension

would consequently be lower.  Thus, the obligation to retire earlier

was in fact to her detriment, even though technically it was construed

by the legislator as a privilege.  The applicant further argued that

the impugned legal provisions and, in consequence, the decision

concerned, were in breach of the international instruments prohibiting

discrimination on the grounds of gender.  She invoked in particular

Article 2 paras. 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the International Covenant of Social,

Economic and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Convention on

Discrimination Against Women.  The applicant finally requested the

court to stay the proceedings in view of her request to the

Constitutional Court of 8 March 1993.

     On 22 June 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the

applicant's appeal.  The court first found that there were no grounds

on which the proceedings should be stayed as the applicant had not

shown that the Constitutional Court had in fact instituted the

proceedings following her request of 8 March 1993.  The court went on

to state that it had not established any reasons for a finding that the

decision of 17 March 1993 was not in conformity with the applicable

laws.  The applicant had been working for approximately 38 years and

had turned sixty on 15 March 1993.  Pursuant to Article 13 para. 1 item

5 of the State Administration Employees Act, her employer was entitled

to give notice on her contract as she had thereby acquired her

retirement pension rights by virtue of the generally applicable

regulations governing pension rights.  It was true that this provision

left the decision whether or not to give notice to a particular

employee in such circumstances to the discretion of an employer, but

the employer was free to decide whether or not to terminate the

employment of a particular person, who was eligible for retirement, in

accordance with its human resources policy.

     On 7 September 1994 the Constitutional Court instituted, of its

own motion, proceedings in order to examine whether Article 13 para.

1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act was compatible with

the Constitution, and in particular with the constitutional prohibition

of discrimination on the ground of sex.  The Court had regard to the

motion of the President of the Court of 21 June 1994 in which he had

submitted that complex problems were involved in the assessment of

Article 13, in particular as doubts had arisen as to whether the lower

age of retirement for female employees of the State administration,

construed as a privilege, was not in fact to their detriment and

whether it did not amount to de facto discrimination.  The Court

considered that State employees were entitled under the law to special

protection of their employment, whereas the effect of Article 13 was

such that it deprived female employees of this reinforced protection.

Thus, the intended privilege of allowing women to retire at a lower

retirement age turned out to be costly as it effectively diminished for

them the possibility of acquiring entitlement to higher retirement

pensions.

     On 15 November 1994 the Constitutional Court discontinued the

proceedings, having found that the impugned provision of the Employees

of the State Administration Act had entered into force on 8 October

1982.  The court therefore had no jurisdiction to analyse its

compatibility with the Constitution as, pursuant to the provisions on

its competence and procedure, it was only competent to examine laws

which had entered into force less than five years before the date on

which a request for examination of their compatibility with the

Constitution was submitted to the Court.

     On 4 December 1995 the First President of the Supreme Court

(Prezes S*du Najwyzszego) lodged an extraordinary appeal against the

judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 1993.  He first

submitted that the Supreme Administrative Court had breached its

procedural rules in that, in view of the complexity of the legal issues

involved in the applicant's case, it should, before pronouncing the

judgment, have requested the Constitutional Court to examine the issue

of the compatibility of Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the Employees of

the State Administration Act with the Constitution.  The court declined

to do so, having disregarded the decision of the Constitutional Court

of 24 September 1991 in which the latter court had found that the ex

lege termination of employment of female university professors at the

end of an academic year in which they had turned sixty, whereas for men

this age was sixty-five, was unjustified as there were no relevant

reasons for this difference in treatment.  It was further argued in the

appeal that the Supreme Administrative Court's interpretation of

Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act

was superficial in that it had not addressed the issue of whether this

provision in fact amounted to discrimination against women on the

ground of sex and whether it was compatible with the constitutional

prohibition of discrimination.

     On 14 May 1996 the Supreme Court (S*d Najwyzszy) dismissed the

extraordinary appeal.  The court first considered that the Supreme

Administrative Court was under no legal obligation to refer the legal

question of the compatibility of any given statute with the

Constitution to the Constitutional Court, since the relevant procedural

provisions merely opened such a possibility to it, without imposing

an obligation to do so.

     The court went on to state that there were no reasons  to find

that the impugned judgment was in flagrant breach of the law.  This was

so firstly  because the Supreme Administrative Court had correctly

applied Article 13 of the State Administration Employees Act, and,

secondly, because this provision was not incompatible with the

Constitution.  The court observed in this respect that Article 13, in

conjunction with generally applicable social insurance regulations

allowed for a termination of service of a female civil servant five

years earlier than for men.  Such a situation was a direct consequence

of the privileged position of women in that they were entitled to

acquire retirement pension rights earlier than men.  The court referred

here to the Constitutional Court's decision of 7 September 1994 to

institute proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Article 13,

in which the Constitutional Court considered that in the assessment of

this provision it must be examined whether the lower age of retirement

for female civil servants, construed as a privilege, was not in fact

to their detriment and whether it did not amount to discrimination.

On the other hand, the Constitutional Court considered that any

situation in which the law confers a certain privilege on an

individual, without any adverse consequences, might be seen as

discrimination against persons who do not enjoy the privilege

concerned.  Thus, the negative results of a privileged position were

the inherent and inevitable costs to be borne by the privileged

persons.

     The Supreme Court further held that the prohibition of

discrimination not only prohibited different treatment, without any

objective and reasonable justification, of persons in relevantly

similar situations, but also banned identical treatment of persons in

different situations according to the relevant criteria.  The court

invoked here its decision of 24 October 1989 (K 6/96) in which it had

found that the regulations fixing a lower retirement age for women did

not amount to discrimination against men, and that fixing the same age

for both sexes would amount to discrimination against women.  The court

had held in this judgment that if the biological and social differences

between men and women were of relevance for the process in which human

resources are depleted by working, then fixing identical legal

conditions of acquisition of retirement pension rights would be in

breach of the principle of equality and of international treaties

ratified by Poland.

     The court went on to state that from a global point of view - and

it was only this general aspect, not the situation, feelings and needs

of a particular woman which were pertinent in this respect - the lower

retirement age for women was for them a particularly valuable and

advantageous solution.  This conclusion could not but be reinforced by

recent vehement protests against the idea of an equal retirement age

for men and women.  Therefore, in this respect the advantages of

different treatment outweighed any possible drawbacks.

     Having regard thereto, the court continued, there was no

contradiction between Article 13 of the Civil Servants Act and the

constitutional principle of equality.  Consequently, if there were

sufficient grounds for more advantageous regulations as regards women's

retirement entitlements, the same held true for different regulations

as regards termination of their employment in the civil service.  In

this sense, earlier termination of service was the price to be paid for

an earlier retirement age.  Therefore, there were no grounds for

finding that the said difference in treatment amounted to

discrimination against women.

Relevant domestic law

     Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees

Act provides that employment of a tenured employee can be terminated

if that person has acquired his or her pension rights in pursuance of

the generally applicable provisions concerning pension rights.

      Article 26 of the Retirement Pension Rights Act of 1982 provides

that an employee acquires pension rights if two conditions are

satisfied: the retirement age has been reached and the person concerned

has been working for a certain length of time.  The retirement age for

women is 60 years and for men 65.  The required periods of work are

twenty years for women and twenty-five years for men.

     On 1 January 1997 the Civil Service Act came into force, but the

State Administration Employees Act remained in force.  The Civil

Service Act created a special category of civil servants of higher

qualifications which must be certified by special examinations.  The

employment of persons who had started to work in the State

administration before 1 January 1997 in pursuance of the provisions of

the State Administration Employees Act is to be governed by the

provisions of that Act and is to remain valid until 31 December 2007.

     Article 44 para. 2 item 1 of the Civil Service Act provides that

employment of a civil servant can be terminated, on the expiry of a

three-months notice period, if that person has acquired his or her

pension rights in pursuance of  the generally applicable provisions

concerning pension rights.

     On 3 April 1997 the Ombudsman lodged with the Constitutional

Court a request for examination of the compatibility of this provision

with the constitutional principle of equality of sexes.  He submitted

in particular that the impugned provision, identical with Article 13

para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act, could not

in fact be regarded as creating any privilege for female civil

servants.  Its effect was to leave to the employer the decision whether

to terminate the service of a particular person or not, whereas a

female civil servant did not have any influence on this decision and

could not herself decide whether she wanted to remain in service or

not.  Consequently, even those female civil servants who wished to

continue working, were obliged to leave at the age of 60 if their

employer wanted them to do so.  This effectively shortened their

careers and entailed all negative consequences thereof, both regarding

their  salary and other benefits normally linked with their work, and

regarding their  pension rights, the latter being normally inferior to

those they would have been entitled to had they been allowed to work

longer.  Such a situation could not be deemed compatible with the

principle of equality of sexes, enshrined in the Constitution.

     On 29 September 1997 the Constitutional Court rendered a decision

concerning the Ombudsman's request.  The court referred to Articles

77 and 78 of the Constitution which prohibited discrimination on any

grounds and further enshrined the principle that women had equal rights

to those of men.  The court considered that these provisions reflected

the legislator's conviction that there was a special need for specific

guarantees to ensure equality of women.  The court subsequently

recalled its case-law in this respect and emphasised that its principal

ideas were, firstly, that in order to ensure genuine equality it was

necessary in certain situations to undertake positive measures which

would counterbalance the disadvantages of women's generally more

difficult social situation.  Thus, in view of the constitutional

principle of equality, such measures could not be regarded as amounting

to discrimination or constituting a privilege.  Quite to the contrary,

in certain situations in which the differences between men and women

were particularly relevant, the Constitution obliged the legislator to

take such measures.  The necessary consequence of this was that the

assessment of any concrete legal provisions or institutions should

necessarily be made also from the point of view of whether their effect

was such that they de facto contributed to the elimination of

inequalities between men and women.  The court further referred to

certain international treaties and decisions of international bodies

in which this idea was expounded.  The court concluded that the

impugned provision was in fact to the detriment of women civil servants

as it gave them no choice of age at which to leave the civil service

since this decision was left entirely to the employer. Consequently,

they were forced to retire even in those cases in which they had no

wish to do so.  The court further held that the differences between men

and women were irrelevant here in that there were no convincing reasons

why a female civil servant aged sixty could not continue in service.

Thus, the impugned regulation amounted to discrimination against female

civil servants and as such was not compatible with the Constitution.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant complains under Article 3 read together with

Article 14 of the Convention that the decisions in her case amounted

to degrading treatment of her as a woman.  She refers in particular to

the Supreme Court's argument that "if the biological and social

differences between men and women were of relevance for the process in

which human resources were depleted by working - then fixing of

identical legal conditions of acquisition of retirement pension would

be in breach of the principle of equality".  She further refers to the

Supreme Court's argument that "from a global point of view - and it was

only this general aspect, not the situation, feelings and needs of a

particular woman which were pertinent in this respect - the lower

retirement age for women was for them a particularly valuable and

advantageous solution".

     The applicant further submits various complaints under Article

6 para. 1 of the Convention, alleging that the proceedings in her case

were unfair.

     The applicant finally submits that the decisions in her case were

in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention read

together with Article 14 of the Convention.  She contends that, by

being forced to retire five years earlier than male employees, she lost

her possessions in that she did not receive the salary or any of the

normal benefits which she would have received as an employee for a

further five years, had she remained in the service.  She also submits

that she lost her possessions in that, as a result of retiring five

years earlier than a man, her retirement entitlements, which are

calculated on the basis of salary, are lower than they would have been

if she had been allowed to work and given a possibility to earn for

five more years.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains under Article 3 read together with

Article 14 (Art. 3+14) of the Convention that the decisions in her case

amounted to degrading treatment of her as a woman.  She refers to

certain statements in the Supreme Court's judgment of 14 May 1996.

     Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads:

     "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

     degrading treatment or punishment."

     The Commission recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum

level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention as established in the case-law of the

Convention organs (Eur. Court HR., Ireland v. United Kingdom judgment

of 18 January 1979, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 162).  In the present

case the treatment complained of consisted of certain arguments in the

Supreme Court's judgment.  Whereas the Commission agrees that the

applicant might have legitimately felt that they were paternalistic and

that, in their sweeping character, the court did not show regard for

her personal situation and personal feelings, the treatment complained

of does not fall within the ambit of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant further submits different complaints under Article

6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, alleging that the proceedings

in her case were unfair.

     Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in its relevant part reads:

     "1.  In the determination of his civil rights and

     obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair .... hearing

     within a reasonable time by (a) ... tribunal ..."

     The Commission must ascertain whether Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention is applicable to the proceedings concerned.

     The Commission observes that the applicant's case was first

decided by the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June

1993.  The present application was introduced on 30 October 1996.

Therefore the Commission cannot examine those proceedings, as, pursuant

to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it can only deal with the

matter within a period of six months from the date on which the final

decision was taken.  However, the Commission observes that subsequently

the President of the Supreme Court lodged the extraordinary appeal

against this judgment with the Supreme Court which pronounced its

judgment on 14 May 1996.  It is therefore necessary to examine whether

the character of the proceedings instituted before the Supreme Court

by its President's extraordinary appeal was such as to bring them

within the ambit of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     The Commission observes that it was within the powers of the

Supreme Court to examine, and in fact it did examine, whether the

Supreme Administrative Court's judgment was in conformity with the

substantive law or ill-founded, or whether there had been a substantial

breach of procedure.  The Supreme Court in the extraordinary appeal

proceedings was competent to quash or to uphold the judgment of the

Administrative Court.  These proceedings must therefore be regarded as

having the same character as the original proceedings before the

Supreme Administrative Court in that the decision on the merits of the

case was to be taken by the Supreme Court.

     It thus remains to be examined whether the proceedings in the

applicant's case, both at the stage which ended with the judgment of

the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 1993 and at the later stage

before the Supreme Court, concerned in any way the applicant's "civil

rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention, regard being had to the character of the rights concerned.

     The Commission recalls in this respect that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention only applies to disputes over "rights and

obligations" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be

recognised under domestic law.  Article 6 (Art. 6) does not in itself

guarantee any particular content for "rights and obligations" in the

substantive law of the Contracting States (cf. Eur. Court HR, James and

others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no.

98, p. 46, para. 81, and Lithgow and others v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 70, para. 192).  The

dispute which gives a right to a determination by a court must be

"genuine and of a serious nature" (see Eur. Court HR, Benthem v. the

Netherlands judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97, p. 14, para.

32).

     In the present case there clearly was a dispute between the

parties regarding the constitutionality of the provisions of the State

Administration Employees Act and, consequently, the lawfulness of the

decision issued in pursuance of this Act, by virtue of which the

applicant was forced to retire.

     However, the Commission recalls that, according to the Convention

organs' case-law, disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and

termination of service of public servants are, as a general rule,

outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

(cf. Eur. Court HR, Massa v. Italy judgment of 4 August 1993, Series A

no. 265-B, p. 20, para. 26; Neigel v. France judgment of 17 March 1997,

para. 12;  Reports, 1997; Huber v. France judgment of 17 February 1998,

Reports 1997-II no. 32, para. 36).  The Commission further recalls its

decision in which it found that the proceedings relating to the

termination of service which had been governed by the State

Administration Employees Act fell outside the scope of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention (No. 25871/94, Dec. 2.7.97, unpublished).

     In the present case the proceedings before the Supreme

Administrative Court and subsequently before the Supreme Court related

to the lawfulness of the decision of 17 March 1993.  Pursuant to this

decision, the applicant's employment was terminated in conformity with

Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act.

The applicant, in her appeal against the decision of 17 March 1993,

called into question the compatibility with the Constitution of the

termination of her career in the civil service.  It is true that the

applicant argued in her appeal that she had a pecuniary interest in the

case in that she maintained that, as she had retired earlier, the

period in which she had been paying contributions to the Social

Insurance authorities was shorter than that of male employees, which

meant that her retirement pension would be lower.  However, the

proceedings before the Supreme Court did not relate to the applicant's

pension rights.  Therefore, the Commission considers that the dispute

in the instant case related essentially to the termination of the

applicant's service and that her pecuniary interests would not be

directly affected by their outcome so as to bring the proceedings

within the ambit of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     Therefore, the Commission considers that Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention is not applicable to the proceedings concerned.  It

follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione

materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   The applicant submits that the decisions in her case were in

violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention read

together with Article 14 of the Convention (P1-1+14).  She contends

that, by being forced to retire five years earlier than male civil

servants  would have been obliged to, she lost her possessions in that

she did not receive a salary throughout that period and any of the

normal benefits which she would have received as an employee for a

further five years, had she remained in employment.  She also complains

that her retirement benefits were lower as they were calculated on the

basis of her salary, which would have been higher had she been allowed

to work for a further five years.

     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, insofar as

relevant, reads as follows:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

     his possessions except in the public interest and subject

     to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

     principles of international law.

     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

     impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

     deems necessary to control the use of property in

     accordance with the general interest or to secure the

     payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

     The Commission observes that Poland ratified Protocol No. 1 to

the Convention on 10 October 1994.  It follows that the Commission is

competent to examine this complaint insofar as it relates to events

which occurred after that date.

     The Commission recalls that, according to the Convention organs'

case-law, the making of contributions to a pension fund may, in certain

circumstances, create a property right in a portion of such fund and

such right may be affected by the manner in which the fund is

distributed (No. 4130/69, Yearbook 14, pp. 224 and 240 et seq.;

No. 5849/72, Dec. 16.12.74, D.R. 1, p. 46; No. 9776/82, Dec. 3.10.83,

D.R. 34, p. 153; No. 12264/86, Dec. 13.7.88, D.R. 57, p. 131).

Further, the rights originating from social insurance systems are

pecuniary rights for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

to the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16

September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, no. 14, p. 1142, para. 41).  However,

even if it is assumed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

guarantees persons who have paid contributions to a social insurance

system the right to derive benefits from the system, it cannot be

interpreted as entitling that person to a pension of a particular

amount (5849/72, Müller v. Austria, Comm. Report 1.10.75, D.R. 3,

p. 25; No. 10671/83, Dec. 4.3.85, D.R. 42, p. 229).

     According to the Convention organs' case-law, a person

complaining of an interference with his property must show that such

right existed (No. 7655-7657/76, Dec. 4.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 111).

Moreover, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention does not

recognise any right to become the owner of property (No. 11628/85,

Dec. 9.5.86, D.R. 47, p. 270).

     The Commission further recalls that "possessions" within the

meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) may be either "existing

possessions" (Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of

23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, para. 48) or claims, in

respect of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a

"legitimate expectation" of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property

right (Eur. Court HR, Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland judgment of

29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51; Pressos Compania

Naviera S.A. v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332,

p. 21, para. 31).

     In the present case the essence of the applicant's complaint is

that the legal regulations in force at the relevant time obliged her

to retire, and, as a result, she lost the salary which she could have

earned had she remained in the civil service.  Secondly, had she

remained in service, she would have been entitled to a higher

retirement pension.  In this sense her complaint does not concern any

"existing possessions".

     It remains to be examined whether the applicant could have any

"legitimate expectation" of having her claims satisfied.  The

Commission observes that the Supreme Court, by its judgment of 14 May

1996, dismissed the Ombudsman's  request to have the 17 March 1993

decision on the termination of the applicant's service set aside.

As regards the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 29 September

1997, even though in principle it was in line with the applicant's

argument, it did not concern any individual situation, but was limited

to an analysis of the constitutionality of the Civil Servants Act. This

Act entered into force on 1 January 1997, a long time after the

applicant retired.  This judgment did not directly relate to the 1993

decision by which the applicant was obliged to take her retirement and

did not have any bearing on the applicant's individual situation.

Moreover, the Commission observes that the Civil Servants Act is

applicable only to the category of civil servants in the full sense of

the term.  This category was in fact created by the Act, which sets out

their special rights and obligations.  As this group did not exist

before that date, the findings of the Constitutional Court cannot have

any influence on the applicant's status, either past or present.

     It follows that the applicant has not shown that she has any

relevant "existing possessions" or any legally recognised claims which

could be regarded as "legitimate expectations" of enjoying property

rights.

     The application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with

the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              J.-C. GEUS

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber