THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 49188/11 Stanislav HUÄŒKO against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section ), sitting on 25 March 2014 as a Chamber composed of:

Josep Casadevall , President, Alvina Gyulumyan , Ján Šikuta , Dragoljub Popović , Luis López Guerra, Johannes Silvis, Valeriu Griţco , judges, and Marialena Tsirli , Deputy S ection Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 August 2011 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Stanislav Hučko , is a Slovak national, who was born in 1964 and lives in Otley, the United Kingdom . He was represented before the Court by Mr F. Chochol , a lawyer practising in Vranov nad Topľou .

The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, M s M. Piro šíková .

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

3. In 1998 a former business partner sued the applicant for a sum of money in the context of the dissolution of thei r partnership. On 8 January 2001 the applicant filed a counterclaim.

4. The case was dealt with by courts at two levels of jurisdiction.

5. On 27 April 2009 the Humenné District Court dismissed both parties ’ claims. It found the claim lodged by the applicant to have lapsed.

6. On 12 February 2010 the Prešov Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant as having been lodged out of time.

7. The Regional Court ’ s decision was served on the applicant by the District Court several times owing to difficulties in obtaining a certificate of service. Thus, in a letter of 10 August 2010 a judge stated that the above impediment had prevented the District Court from indicating the date when the decision in issue took effect. On 3 March 2011, following the receipt of the relevant document and the return of the case file, the District Court put a stamp on the decision indicating that it had become final on 13 December 2010.

8. In the meantime, on 10 May 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully applied to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office for the lodging of an extraordinary appeal on points of law on his behalf. He argued that he had appealed within the statutory time-limit.

9. On 12 January 2011 the applicant posted a complaint to the Constitutional Court. He alleged a breach of his right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time in the proceedings before the ordinary courts. The applicant affirmed that the complaint had been lodged within two months of 12 November 2010, when he had been notified that his application to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office had been dismissed.

10. The applicant noted that the copy of the Regional Court ’ s judgment enclosed with his constitutional complaint had no stamp indicating the date of final effect. This was due to the fact that such indication had to be made first in the original decision, and that had been possible only after the case file had been returned to the District Court.

11. On 3 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as having been lodged outside the statutory time-limit of two months. It held that the applicant should have lodged his complaint within two months of the service of the Regional Court ’ s decision. The Constitutional Court admitted that the exact date of service of that decision was unknown. However, it found that decision to have been served not later than on 10 May 2010, the date of the applicant ’ s application to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office. The applicant had posted his constitutional complaint more than two months thereafter, namely on 12 January 2011. His application to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office could not affect the position as it concerned an extraordinary remedy.

12. On 3 May 2011, in a reply to the applicant ’ s complaint, the vice ‑ president of the District Court indicated, with reference to the case file, that the decision in the applicant ’ s case had become final on 13 December 2010.

13. On 24 May 2011 the applicant ’ s representative asked the Constitutional Court to review its decision.

14. In a letter of 13 September 2011 a judge of the Constitutional Court, after examining the file, replied that the Regional Court ’ s decision of 12 February 2010 had actually become final on 8 April 2010. It had been served on the applicant on that date; he had been the last person on the list of those on whom it had to be served. The indication of 13 December 2010 as the date of final effect of the decision by the District Court had been an error, but it could not affect the legal position because it was of a merely declaratory nature. Finally, the letter stated that the applicant ’ s complaint was in any event inadmissible on account of his failure to seek redress by means of an appeal on points of law.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

15. Pursuant to Article 158 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a certified true copy of a judgment is to be served on the parties or their representatives in person.

16. Article 159 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment which has been served and which can no longer be challenged by means of an appeal is final.

17. Section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993 provides that a complaint to the Constitutional Court may be lodged within two months of the date on which the decision in question becomes final and binding or on which a measure is notified or notice of some other interference with the complainant ’ s interests is given. As regards measures and other types of interference, this period commences when the complainant has had a practical opportunity to become aware of them.

18. Pursuant to section 62(1) of Regulation no. 543/2005, a court ’ s legal secretary is obliged, as soon as the date of final effect of a decision has been established, to indicate the same on the cover page of the original of the court ’ s decision. Under section 63 of that Regulation, upon request courts are to confirm, by means of a stamp on the cover page of a true and certified copy, the date when the decision acquired final effect and became enforceable.

19. As regards complaints about ordinary courts ’ decisions in the context of civil proceedings, the Constitutional Court has held, in a number of cases, that the above time-limit of two months starts running on the day when the contested decisions become final (see, for example, decisions II. ÚS 99/2010 of 4 March 2010; IV. ÚS 188/2010 of 19 May 2010; III. ÚS 106/2010 of 9 March 2010; or II. ÚS 298/2010 of 24 June 2010).

20. In the context of complaints about judicial proceedings the Constitutional Court has consistently considered irrelevant, when determining compliance with the time-limit of two months under section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, the dismissal of plaintiffs ’ request for an extra-ordinary appeal to be filed on their behalf. It held the date of final effect of the contested judicial decisions to be relevant in that context (see, for example, decision file no. IV. ÚS 42/06 of 28 February 2006, with further references).

COMPLAINTS

21. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a fair hearing by a tribunal had been breached as a result of the dismissal of both his appeal against the Humenné District Court ’ s judgment of 27 April 2009 and his complaint to the Constitutional Court.

22. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the applicant complained that the courts had refused to grant his claim.

23. The applicant further complained that in the above proceedings he had been discriminated against contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.

24. Finally, the applicant alleged a breach of Article 13 of the Convention in that he had no effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his above complaints.

THE LAW

A. Complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

25. The applicant complained that his right to a fair hearing by a tribunal had been breached as a result of the dismissal of both his appeal against the Humenné District Court ’ s judgment of 27 April 2009 and his complaint to the Constitutional Court. He alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

1. Arguments of the parties

26. The Government relied on the letter by the Constitutional Court judge of 13 September 2011 (see paragraph 14 above), arguing that the decision to dismiss the applicant ’ s complaint as having been submitted out of time was not contrary to his rights under Article 6 § 1 in the circumstances.

27. In particular, the Regional Court ’ s decision had become final on the date of its service irrespective of the date of the District Court ’ s stamp, which was of a declaratory nature only. The applicant must have been aware of the date of final effect of the contested decision when he had applied to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office for the filing of an extraordinary appeal on his behalf. In accordance with the Constitutional Court ’ s practice, the dismissal of that application was irrelevant from the point of view of the statutory time-limit for filing a constitutional complaint.

28. Finally, the Government pointed to the fact that, in any event, in order to comply with the statutory requirements the applicant should have sought redress by means of an appeal on points of law prior to filing his complaint with the Constitutional Court.

29. The applicant argued that the Constitutional Court had proceeded arbitrarily in that it had rejected his complaint as belated without having established the date of final effect of the ordinary courts ’ decision complained of. He considered that the Constitutional Court should have dealt with his complaint as it had been submitted within the statutory time ‑ limit of two months from the date which the District Court had officially indicated as the date when the decision in issue had become final.

The applicant further maintained that the dismissal of his appeal against the District Court ’ s judgment had been arbitrary.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) Recapitulation of the relevant principles

30. The relevant principles are set out, for example, in Eşim v. Turkey ( no. 59601/09 , § § 18-21 , 17 September 2013 ) , with further references. They can be summed up as follows.

31. The right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, must be construed in the light of the rule of law, which requires an effective judicial remedy enabling litigants to assert their civil rights. That Article embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect.

32. The “right to a court” is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. However, these limitations must not restrict or reduce a person ’ s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.

33. It is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law. The Court ’ s role is limited to verifying compatibility with the Convention of the effects of such an interpretation. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature such as time-limits governing the lodging of appeals which are intended to ensure a proper administration of justice. That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy.

(b) Application of the relevant principles to the present case

( i ) As regards the dismissal of the complaint to the Constitutional Court

34. The Court notes that in the present case the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant ’ s complaint as having been filed out of time. The decision stated that the dismissal of the applicant ’ s application for the lodging of an extraordinary appeal on points of law on his behalf could not be taken as the starting point for the running of the time-limit of two months as the use of that remedy was within the discretionary power of the General Prosecutor. The Constitutional Court further noted, with reference to section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, that the applicant should have lodged his complaint within two months of the service of the Regional Court ’ s decision . The Constituti onal Court admitted that the exact date of service of that decision was unknown. However, it found th e decision to have been served not later than on 10 May 2010, the date of the applicant ’ s application to the General Prosecutor ’ s Office.

35. The applicant did not argue and the documents before the Court do not indicate that the above Constitutional Court ’ s conclusion as to the service of the Regional Court ’ s decision was erroneous. The decision in issue had been served on the applicant by the District Court several times owing to difficulties in obtaining a certificate of service (see paragraph 7 above) .

36. The Court notes that it has been established practice of the Constitutional Court not to take into account, for the purpose of the statutory time-limit of two months, unsuccessful requests for extra-ordinary remedies to be lodged on behalf of parties to proceedings (see paragraph 20 above).

37. In these circumstances, the Court considers that by rejecting the applicant ’ s complaint on the above grounds the Constitutional Court did not restrict the applicant ’ s right of access to a court in such a way that the very essence of that right was impaired.

38. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

( ii ) As regards the dismissal of the applicant ’ s appeal

39. As regards the alleged breach of Article 6 § 1 on account of the dismissal of the applicant ’ s appeal against the District Court ’ s judgment of 27 April 2009, the Court notes that under domestic law it was open to the applicant to seek redress by means of an appeal on points of law (see also paragraph 14 above) and, ultimately, by filing a complaint to the Constitutional Court.

40. Since the Constitutional Court rejected the latter remedy as falling short of the formal requirements and since the Court declared inadmissible the applicant ’ s complaint in respect of that decision (see paragraphs 37-38 above), it concludes that the applicant failed to use the remedies available in Slovak law as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

B. Other complaints

41. The applicant also complained ( i ) u nder Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the courts had refused to grant his claim ; (ii) under Article 14 of the Convention that in the above proceedings he had been discriminated against; and (iii) under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaints.

42. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Marialena Tsirli Josep Casadevall Deputy Registrar President