PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES

1. The applicant’s complaint was that his right to respect for his private life and correspondence had been violated due to the statutory requirement for “Internet communication organisers” (ICO) to store the content of all Internet communications and related communications data, and to submit those data to law-enforcement authorities or security services at their request, together with the information necessary to decrypt electronic messages, if they were encrypted.

2. While I agree with points 1-3 of the operative provisions of the judgment, I respectfully disagree with points 4-6.

3. In particular, I disagree with (a) paragraph 82 of the judgment and point 4 of its operative provisions to the effect that, having found a violation of Article 8 in the present case, there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 13; (b) paragraph 86 of the judgment and point 5 of its operative provisions, which hold that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; and (c) point 6 of the operative provisions dismissing the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

4. As regards the Court’s decision that there is no need to examine the Article 13 complaint, I would argue that since this complaint was raised by the applicant, the Court has a duty to examine it, failing which the applicant’s right to an effective remedy would not be afforded any protection whatsoever by the Court. Like any other Convention right that has allegedly been infringed, the right under Article 13 must be examined and given practical and effective protection by the Court, as required by the principle of effectiveness and that of indivisibility of rights, and by the right of individual application, which is the cornerstone of the Convention. However, the Court cannot afford an applicant effective protection if it decides, as it has in the present case, not to deal with the relevant complaint.

5. Turning now to the matter of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) (see paragraph 84 of the judgment), while the Government submitted that he could not claim any award in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage as his rights had not been violated (see paragraph 85 of the judgment). However, the Court has found that there was a violation of Article 8 in the present case – a violation which, in my view, was severe. I also submit that the applicant sustained non-pecuniary damage in the present case and should therefore have been granted a monetary award in that regard under Article 41 of the Convention. I have had the opportunity in a number of separate opinions to criticise the Court’s decision to reject claims for non ‑ pecuniary damage under Article 41 merely by relying on a standard phrase, namely, “the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction of any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant”. It will suffice for me to refer to three such opinions criticising this standard manner of rejecting monetary claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, thereby sparing me the need to reiterate the same arguments again here: see, therefore, paragraphs 3-16 of my partly dissenting opinion in Tingarov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 42286/21, 10 October 2023; paragraphs 22-38 of my partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023; and paragraphs 4-10 of the joint partly dissenting opinion I authored with Judge Felici in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], no. 43572/18, 15 March 2022.