CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1 . I agree with the majority that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

I would, however, have preferred a somewhat different reasoning.

2 . The applicant complains about the decision of the Supreme Court declaring her appeal on points of law inadmissible (see paragraph 34 of the judgment). She argues that the manner in which the Supreme Court applied the statutory ratione valoris requirement for lodging an appeal on points of law was manifestly unreasonable and in contravention of its own practice (see paragraph 35 of the judgment).

This is a complaint with a relatively narrow scope. The applicant essentially argues that the Supreme Court misinterpreted domestic law. She vaguely refers to an existing practice of the Supreme Court in another sense, but without giving any concrete example [1] . She does not argue that there has been a reversal of the case-law in her case, still less that such a reversal was incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 § 1.

In my opinion, therefore, it would be sufficient to note that the interpretation and application of domestic law by the Supreme Court in the applicant ’ s case was not arbitrary or manifes tly unreasonable (see paragraph 44 of the judgment). Indeed, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in holding that where claims are based on different legal grounds, they are to be regarded as different claims for the purposes of section 37 of the Civil Procedure Act. Moreover, this assessment is in line with that of the Constitutional Court in the applicant ’ s case (see paragraph 16 of the judgment).

The mere fact that there may have been decisions in another sense than that of the applicant ’ s case is not sufficient to demonstrate the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the latter decision. There is no need to go into the broader issue of reversal of existing case-law (see paragraphs 43 and 44 of the judgment, as well as the dissenting opinion of the minority), since this issue has not even been properly raised by the applicant.

3 . Should the Court want to go further in its analysis, it could examine whether the effects of the Supreme Court ’ s interpretation of domestic law are compatible with the Convention (see, among other authorities, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 54, ECHR 1999 ‑ I; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC] , nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12 , § 149, ECHR 2018; and Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, § 81, 5 April 2018). The effect is that the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible.

The relevant principles are recapitulated in paragraph 41 of the judgment. They concern the compatibility of limitations on the right of access to a court with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In my opinion, the impugned ratione valoris threshold for appeals to the Supreme Court falls within the generally recognised legitimate aim of ensuring that the Supreme Court, in view of the very essence of its role, only deals with matters of the requisite significance (see Zubac , cited above, § 105). Moreover, considering that the applicant ’ s case was heard by two national courts at different instances (the Municipal Court and the County Court) exercising full jurisdiction in the matter, that no discernible issue of a lack of fairness arose in the case, and that the Supreme Court ’ s role was limited to reviewing the application of the relevant domestic law by the lower courts, the Supreme Court ’ s decision did not amount to a disproportionate restriction of the right of access to that court and did not impair the very essence of the applicant ’ s right of access to a court (compare ibid. , § 125).

4 . It is on the basis of the foregoing that I concur with the majority that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.