DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE STORME

                             (Translation)

        I regret that I am unable to agree with the present judgment

as I consider that the fact that it was not possible to reply to the

avocat général's submissions did not in the present case infringe the

applicant's rights to adversarial proceedings.

        I do not intend to reiterate in detail the role of the

procureur général's department at the Court of Cassation, which I

analysed in my dissenting opinion in the case of Borgers v. Belgium

(judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 214-B, pp. 53 et seq.).

        It is sufficient to note - as indeed is rightly stated in the

judgment - that the function of the procureur général's department is

to advise the Court of Cassation on the main principles of law, on

compliance with the law and rules governing the form of the procedure

and to ensure that the case-law remains consistent.

        In the present case, I do not find convincing the argument that

the fact that it was not possible to reply to the avocat général's

submissions, the content of which is an unknown, meant that the

applicant was prejudiced.

        It must be emphasised that the words "after submissions" in the

Court of Cassation's judgment in the Van Orshoven case have no special

meaning, as they do not indicate whether the submissions were in favour

of allowing or of dismissing the appeal.

        That formula may be used both for submissions in favour of

allowing an appeal and submissions in favour of its dismissal.

Accordingly, the applicant has not shown any special ground for

complaint.

        In the present case, it seems to me to be important to

highlight certain particular features.

        There was no procureur général's department either at

first instance or on appeal so that it was unable to take part at any

time or in any capacity in the proceedings on the merits.

        In the Court of Cassation the applicant had an opponent, namely

the Ordre des médecins, which marks an essential difference from the

cases of Borgers (cited above) and Vermeulen v. Belgium (judgment of

20 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I).  The

procureur général could not in the circumstances be the applicant's

opponent, that being the role of the Ordre des médecins.  Nonetheless,

the issue in the judgment is whether the right to adversarial

proceedings was infringed (see paragraph 41 of the judgment).

        In the present case, the disciplinary proceedings at first

instance and on appeal were properly conducted, as was pointed out by

the European Commission of Human Rights.

        Although the Court appears to have abandoned in its recent

case-law the principle of outward appearances, the finding of a

violation in the present judgment is in my opinion based on an

assessment of the right to adversarial proceedings that is purely

formal.  Indeed, the Court did not consider whether, in the instant

case, the lack of adversarial proceedings could have adversely affected

the applicant's interests (compare the Padovani v. Italy judgment of

26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-B; the Nortier v. the Netherlands

judgment of 24 August 1993, Series A no. 267; and the Remli v. France

judgment of 23 April 1996, Reports 1996-II: the applicant's fears must

be such that they may be held to be objectively justified).

        Lastly, it has to be said that the purely formal approach taken

in the present judgment will have repercussions not only in Belgium,

but also in international proceedings.  It seems to me that neither the

procureur général's department nor Crown Counsel attached to the

industrial tribunals (auditorat du travail) will be entitled to address

courts or tribunals - whether civil, commercial or industrial - last,

as is provided for by the Belgian Judicial Code.

        Similarly, the parties will have to have the right to make

observations on the opinion of the representative of the

Belgian Conseil d'Etat and on the submissions of the Advocates General

at the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.

        That of course would be a major change entailing, in my

opinion, unduly protracted proceedings as the inevitable general

consequence of the formal principle stated in the present judgment.