CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE TSATSA ‑ NIKOLOVSKA

I was able to vote that there had been a violation in this case as the operative part of the judgment is a very general one, but I would like to explain my position.

In paragraphs 48, 49 and 50 of the judgment, the Court assessed the association ' s aim concerning “abolition” of the border between Bulgaria and Macedonia , which was indicated in clause 8 of its articles of association.

The applicant, when directed by the Supreme Court of Cassation to state the grounds for appeal, said that the association did not seek the abolition of the border. The Supreme Court of Cassation delivered judgment after holding a hearing and upheld the Plovdiv Court of Appeals ' judgment only as regards clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the association ' s articles, without making any assessment on clause 8.

As the applicant expressed in the clarification he gave to the Supreme Court of Cassation, the association had abandoned the aim in clause 8 – the abolition of the border and since the final interference with the applicant ' s rights came with the Supreme Court of Cassation ' s judgment, in which abolition was not the subject of assessment, I consider that there is no place for the Court to consider that aim as well, or to assess whether or not there were sufficient grounds to refuse registration. The aim indicated in clause 8 – abolition of the border, as explained by the applicant, simply does not exist any more.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MARUSTE

While being in agreement with the majority in finding a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, I would like to add some more considerations in this respect.

My first and main point is that the problem of registration or non ‑ registration of associations stems at least in part from the insufficient and somewhat contradictory provisions governing associations other than political parties in the Bulgarian legal system. Article 12 § 2 of the Constitution stipulates that “associations ... may not pursue political goals or carry out political activities that are characteristic solely of political parties”. A simple reading of that provision would imply that all other political goals are accepted. This is exactly what one would expect in a normal democratic order. The question is: on what basis, by whom and in what manner can this be decided?

Article 44 § 3 of the Constitution stipulates that “the law shall specify the organisations which are subject to registration, the manner of their dissolution, as well as their relations with the State”. Fine. But if we look at the lex specialis in that respect – the Persons and Family Act of 1949 –, we see that it does not cover all these aspects. I would specifically point to the lack of clearly listed legal grounds for non ‑ registration or dissolution and of a procedure for challenging and making decisions in disputes of this kind. Maybe this is the reason why the courts have had to rely only on the general provisions of the Constitution. This in itself is acceptable, but leaves the courts to decide on rather abstract and even speculative grounds and allows them rather broad powers of discretion.

My second point is that freedom of association is closely linked to freedom of speech and opinion. Very often an association is created to express certain views and opinions. Therefore, the statutes of the association inevitably reflect certain views and goals which might also be regarded as political; all this depends very much on interpretation. Because of the close link between freedom of expression and freedom of association, the most appropriate and best way of assessing the nature of the association and its conformity with the Constitution and the Convention is to conduct an assessment based not just on a formal reading of the association ' s goals as set down in the statutes, but also on the means the association intends to employ and, especially, its actions and activities in real life. Hence, an assessment of the legality of an association in abstracto , such as has been conducted here, confers an undue degree of discretion on the authorities.