PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ZAGREBELSKY

I voted against striking out the complaint concerning the applicant ’ s dentures for the following reasons, which relate solely to the impact of this judgment for the Court ’ s case-law on Article 37 of the Convention. The merits of the applicant ’ s complaint (which was not declared inadmissible by the Chamber as manifestly ill-founded) are in no way the subject-matter of my dissent, any more than of the judgment itself.

In my view the matter giving rise to the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention cannot be considered resolved.

According to the Court ’ s case-law, “[ i ]n order to conclude that the matter has been resolved within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b) and that there is therefore no longer any objective justification for the applicant to pursue his application, the Court considers that it must examine, firstly, whether the circumstances complained of directly by the applicant still obtain and, secondly, whether the effects of a possible violation of the Convention on account of those circumstances have also been redressed. This approach reflects the structure of the Convention ’ s supervisory machinery, which provides both for a reasoned decision of judgment as to whether the facts in issue are compatible with the requirements of the Convention (Article 45), and, if they are not, for the award of just satisfaction (Article 41)” (see Pisano v. Italy [GC] (striking out), no. 36732/97, § 42 , 24 October 2002 ).

The Court, in a number of its judgments concerning the expulsion of aliens has accepted that to put an end to the risk of their being removed from the country by way of the delivery of (one of the various kinds of) residence permits can constitute an adequate and sufficient form of redress and thus a reason for finding that both of the above-mentioned conditions are met in cases concerning Article 8 (see, among other authorities, Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 97 , ECHR 2007 ‑ ... , and Ibrahim Mohamed v. the Netherlands (striking out), no. 1872/04, §§ 19-24, 10 March 2009 ). The same case-law has been adopted by the Court under Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning expulsions or extraditions whose execution was no longer possible (see Bilasi-Ashri v. Austria ( dec .), no. 3314/02, ECHR 2002 ‑ X ; Abraham Lunguli v. Sweden ( dec .), no. 33692/02, 1 July 2003; Laleh Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands ( dec .), no. 31252/03, 31 January 2008; Bari v. Sweden ( dec .), no. 56726/00, 5 March 2002; Hesam Safawi Bayat v. the Netherlands ( dec .), no. 7233/02, 8 July 2003; R.N. v. the United Kingdom ( dec .), no. 28242/02, 2 September 2003; Q v. Finland ( dec .), no. 42640/04, 22 May 2007; Azzedine Chelghoum v. France ( dec .), no. 54654/00, 10 October 2000; and Tony Chidobe v. Italy ( dec .), no. 30978/04, 9 September 2004). Apparently, the Court found that the matter had been resolved in a case where leave to remain in the country had finally been granted to the applicant (see Mostafa Kordoghliazar v. Romania ( dec .), no. 8776/05, 20 May 2008). In El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands ((striking out) [GC], no. 25525/03, §§ 30-34 , 20 December 2007 ) , the Court reached similar findings in a very specific case, brought under Article 9 of the Convention, concerning the denial and then the delivery of a residence and work permit to a foreign imam.

The Court, to my knowledge, has never found the matter to have been resolved in a case under Article 3 of the Convention such as the present one. The applicant suffered from the refusal of the authorities to provide him with the dentures he needed from at least February 2004 (see paragraph 13) to 26 June 2007 (see the note of 27 June 2007 from the applicant ’ s representative, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights). The Government ’ s action was taken after a long period of three years and four months (nearly three years after the application had been lodged). No redress has been granted in respect of the violation complained of (still less have the Government taken action to fulfil their procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention).

I am unable to see how it can be said that the issue of the case has been resolved by the sole fact that a possible violation of Article 3 has finally ended and I am deeply worried by a judgment that sets such a precedent in the Court ’ s Article 3 case-law. Moreover one can easily conceive possible developments and applications of this new precedent, capable of spreading across a broader range of Convention violations such as serious violations of Article 3, or of Article 5 and so forth.

I respectfully suggest that this judgment should not establish a precedent in the Court ’ s case-law.