PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE FURA ‑ SANDSTR Ö M JOINED BY JUDGE ZUPANÄŒIÄŒ

1. Disagreeing with the majority, I consider that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1, taken together with Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, since the applicant had to defend himself without the assistance of a lawyer after having participated in a demonstration in Yerevan on the occasion of Mother ' s Day.

2. It is not in dispute that the applicant waived his right to have a lawyer by signing the record of an administrative offence, a fact which he later confirmed before the court. The applicant put his signature in the section certifying that he had been made aware of his rights under Article 267 of the Code of Administrative Offences and added “I do not wish to have a lawyer”. Also, according to the record of the court hearing, the judge explained the applicant ' s rights to him. The applicant stated that he was aware of his rights and did not wish to have a lawyer (see paragraphs 14 and 20 of the judgment).

3. I note, together with the majority in paragraph 90 of the judgment, that such a waiver must be established in an unequivocal manner and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance. But I would also point out that in examining the validity of a waiver, the Court has previously attached weight to such factors as, inter alia , the choice made by an applicant being free, unambiguous and not affected by any external circumstances (see Thompson v. the United Kingdom , no. 36256/97, § 44, 15 June 2004) and the awareness of an applicant of the consequences of his actions (see Bonev v. Bulgaria , no. 60018/00, § 41, 8 June 2006).

4. I further note that, despite the fact that the applicant expressly waived his right to have a lawyer, the circumstances which led to this waiver remain unclear and are at the core of the dispute between the parties. The fact that the applicant refused to have a lawyer – even if the refusal was given expressly in writing – does not necessarily imply that his refusal was not given as a result of some sort of pressure or deception on the part of the police officers. While there is no objective evidence to support the Government ' s position, I would point to the existence of such objective data as the Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, which contains a detailed description of the wide-scale abuse of the administrative procedure by the authorities – and notably the police – during the period surrounding the presidential election (see paragraph 32 of the judgment).

5. The right to be assisted by a lawyer is part of the privilege against self-incrimination referred to in American doctrine as the “Miranda law”. It has been described as the “bright line” rule (beyond which nobody should cross) intended to forever extinguish the use of coercion but allowing pressure. The purpose of the rule is to neutralise the distinct psychological

disadvantage that suspects are under while dealing with the police. The case before us illustrates why it is so important to uphold.

6. I would like to draw attention to the relevant chapters of the Briefing Paper describing the methods used and the obstacles created by the police in order to deprive opposition activists of legal assistance, which support the applicant ' s account of events. Similar information is contained in the relevant report of the Council of Europe ' s Parliamentary Assembly (see paragraphs 29-31 of the judgment).

7. Furthermore it is to be noted that the applicant has been consistent in his account of events, making similar submissions in his complaint lodged with a local human rights NGO several days after his conviction (see paragraph 22 of the judgment).

8. Finally I am mindful of the finding of the Court that the applicant was not afforded sufficient time to adequately assess the charge against him, which, in my opinion, also includes the assessment of the need to have legal assistance.

9. All the above factors, while not sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicant, as he claims, was “tricked” into refusing a lawyer, nevertheless prompt me to seriously doubt whether the applicant ' s waiver was truly voluntary and whether he was fully aware of the legal consequences of such a waiver.

10. I cannot therefore consider this waiver to be valid from the point of view of the Convention. Having come to this conclusion, and on the basis of the same factors, I consider that the applicant was not given a real opportunity – prior to the start of the hearing, which itself lasted about five minutes – to decide whether it was necessary to engage a lawyer and, if so, to choose and appoint one.

11. Considering the above and the fact that the applicant ' s complaint under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention is closely connected to and partly results from his complaint under Article 6 § 3 (b) (see paragraphs 84-88 of the judgment), I consider that his right to be defended through legal assistance was infringed.