PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE VEHABOVI Ć

I agree with the outcome in this case but I dissent from the decision of the Chamber not to deal with the applicant ’ s complaints under Article 8 of the Convention alone but only under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8.

My opinion is that the Chamber did not address the applicant ’ s complaints from the standpoint of Article 8, which is essential for his case and from which all his other arguments arise.

The applicant complained that his removal from Ukraine would entail unjustified interference with his personal and family life, as he had lived in Ukraine since 1993, had established close personal links with the country, and was still married to a Ukrainian national (Article 8). The applicant further complained that the authorities had acted in bad faith when they had fined him for violating migration regulations in March 2010. Relying on Article 13, he alleged that the authorities had not carried out an independent and rigorous scrutiny of his allegations under Article 8 and that the domestic proceedings to which he had had recourse had not complied with the requirements of an effective remedy. In particular, his appeals against the court decisions ordering his forcible expulsion had not had suspensive effect. The applicant also submitted other arguments, for example that the proceedings had been excessively lengthy, that the decision ordering his expulsion had been contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 and that the domestic law did not provide for the procedural safeguards required by that provision.

In the case of B.A.C. v. Greece (no. 11981/15, § 46, 13 October 2016, not yet final) the Court found that Article 8 of the Convention had been breached on account of the State ’ s failure to discharge its positive obligation

“ ... consistant à mettre en place une procédure effective et accessible en vue de protéger le droit à la vie privée, au moyen d ’ une réglementation appropriée tendant à faire examiner la demande d ’ asile du requérant dans des délais raisonnables afin de raccourcir autant que possible sa situation de précarité ... ”

In addition to the very lengthy period of uncertainty endured by the applicant in that case (more than twelve years) and his consequently precarious situation, the Court also had regard to the negative consequences which this had for the enjoyment of his right to respect for his private life (ibid., §§ 41-44). The general circumstances of that case and the conclusions that can be drawn from it are of a similar nature to the present case.

In addition, the circumstances of the present case can be contrasted with those of the applicant in the case of Aristimuño Mendizabal v. France (no. 51431/99, 17 January 2006), where the lengthy period of uncertainty and precariousness endured by the applicant – it took the authorities fourteen years to issue her with an official residence permit – led the Court to find a breach of Article 8 since the authorities ’ conduct was not in accordance with the law. The Court also identified the negative consequences which this delay entailed for the applicant (ibid., § 71).

In the present case, the Chamber failed to properly identify the stage during the applicant ’ s stay in Ukraine at which an issue first arose regarding his right to respect for his private life, in terms of the uncertainty which he endured and the precariousness of his situation.