CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES

I agree with the majority that Articles 8, 14 and 13 of the Convention are not applicable in this case. However, my decision rests on the conclusion, on the basis of the material before the Court, that the applicant has not made his case.

The applicant argues that he is the unrecognised illegit imate child of P. and complains that he has been the victim of unjustified treatment under the Netherlands law inasmuch as , unlike “legitimate” or recognised “illegitimate” children , he was unable to inherit from his putative father, P. The complaints of the applicant are based on the presumption that he was in fact P. ' s child. However, the evidence of that is in my opinion not strong enough to substantiate the applicant ' s allegation.

The available evidence, which the applicant relied on only after the death of P. , appears to consist of the following:

(a) T he statement of the applicant ' s mother, who went on to say that she had not known any man other than P. until nine years after the applicant ' s birth and that P. referred to the applicant in public as “my son” or “my little boy”.

(b) T he fact, as stated, that P. made regular payments towards the applicant ' s care and upbringing, gave the applicant presents for his birthday, visited him and , together with the applicant ' s mother , went on day trips with him. The applicant called P. “Daddy”.

(c) A statement made before the Court of Appeal by a friend of the applicant ' s mother , and the person who has been the applicant ' s co - guardian , to the effect that they were convinced that P. was the applicant ' s biological father and that P. had never denied this fact but had, on the contrary, assured them that the applicant would be well provided for.

This evidence is not sufficient to convin ce me that the applicant is P . ' s child . In this respect I also took into account the following facts of the case:

(a) P. never lived together with the mother of the applicant and never recognised the applicant as his child.

(b) During P ' s lifetime , the applicant never secured any written statement or even a clear and unambiguous admission from P. that he was in fact his father. While it may be so that P. called the applicant “my son” and “my little boy”, at this remove and taken out of context such apparent expressions of endearment cannot be persuasive.

(c) The applicant formally raised the question of his being P. ' s son for the first time through civil proceedings against K . , P. ' s undisputed nephew , who inherited his estate. Through these proceedings he was claiming inheritance rights. However, it is not apparent that the applicant ever sought to establish family ties of any kind while P. was alive.

In the circumstances, I find that the premise on which the applicant ' s complaints are based, namely that he was the child of P. , is not established. Therefore the application ought to have been declared inadmissible, even though this would have amounted to a reversal of the previous decision by which the application was declared admissible. This course of action is made possible by Article 35 § 4 of the Convention, which provides that “The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this Article. It may do so at any stage of the proceedings ” (emphasis added; see, for example, Medeanu v. Romania (dec.), no. 29958/96 , 8 April 2003 ).