DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOVLER

(Translation)

“ The frontier between the judicial and the political is not what it was. Nor are the foundations of legitimacy, still less normativeness, which is becoming plural and increasingly diffuse . ” ( A. Lajoie , Jugements de valeurs , Paris , PUF, 1997, p. 207)

I regret that I do not find myself among the majority and that, while I respect my colleagues ' opinions, I have to express publicly, by virtue of Article 45 § 2 of the Convention, my deep disagreement with the Grand Chamber ' s judgment in the present case.

My disagreement concerns the methodology of the analysis, the way the facts are presented, the analysis of the concepts of “ju risdiction” and “responsibility ” , and lastly the conclusions the Court has reached. I am therefore obliged to spend some time on each of those points.

I. Methodology of the analysis

This case provides an example of a situation in which “human rights become a policy” ( M. Gauchet, La démocratie contre elle-même , Paris, 2002, p. 326). In view of the particular nature of the case, in which the applicants ' situation is indissociable from an extremely complex geopolitical context, the Court finds itself in new territory, given the lack of applicable case-law. The Court ' s judgment in this case could have set a precedent for similar situations in other zones of conflict within the member States of the Council of Europe, including those which have joined recently. The historical roots of the conflict in which the countries of the region were involved and the “fragmenting - empire” effect are features which bring to mind conflicts such as the not-so-very distant Balkans or Caucasus have seen.

However, the Court (wrongly in my opinion) preferred to see the situation in terms of a Cyprus-type conflict, following its corresponding case-law and falling into the trap that that case-law represented. To my mind that was a methodological error. The superficial similarities between the present case and Loizidou are dece ptive . The only point in common (to which I will return) is the source of the conflict, namely the prospect for a sizeable community of being attached to another country from which it is radically differentiated by its historical, economic and cultural ties. Hence the reactions and counter-reactions of the participants in the conflict, which took violent forms and led to human tragedies.

However, even this Loizidou case-law has many lessons to teach us in that it can help us avoid hasty and simplistic conclusions. In his dissenting opinion in Loizidou , Judge Bernhardt, joined by Judge Lopes Rocha, pointed out: “[In] the present case ... it is impossible to separate the situation of the individual from a complex historical development and a no less complex current situation” ( Loizidou v. Turkey ( m erits ) , judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2242 ) . Noting the failure of the negotiations aimed at the reunification of Cyprus , which had caused the applicant ' s situation to drag on, he asked: “Who is responsible for this failure? Only one side? Is it possible to give a clear answer to this and several other questions and to draw a clear legal conclusion?” (ibid.).

In another dissenting opinion in the same case , Judge Pettiti observed: “ Whatever the responsibility assumed in 1974 at the time of the coup d ' état , or those that arose with the arrival of the Turkish troops in the same year, however hesitant the international community has been in attempting to solve the international problems over Cyprus since 1974 , ..., those responsibilities being of various origins and types, the whole problem of the two communities (which are not national minorities as that term is understood in international law) has more to do with politics and diplomacy than with European judicial scrutiny based on the isolated case of Mrs Loizidou and her rights under Protocol No. 1” ( see Loizidou , cited above, pp. 225 3 ‑ 54). The caution and wisdom of those words is entirely justified.

Unfortunately, in the present case the Court took the risk of examining on the basis of the isolated situation of the four applicants (since , unlike the position in Cyprus , no system for the reproduction of similar cases has come to light) a nexus of different problems: military (the judgment contains an analysis of the military aspects of the Transdniestrian conflict and a detailed calculation of weapons stocks worthy of headquarters staff), economic (assessment of the relations between partners who have been operating for decades in the same economic space), political (hard-to-verify quotations from “undated” statements by political leaders and military personnel). Admittedly, the Court was overwhelmed by the huge volume of contradictory information from the applicants, the three States who were involved in the proceedings and its own on-the-spot fact-finding mission; it performed an enormous and highly creditable task of selection . But the strictly legal questions (for example, what legal classification to give to the right of peoples to self-determination, within limits, or the first applicant ' s repeated calls to violence before he was arrested) have gone unanswered. In my opinion, that was a second methodological error, which led to a series of further errors.

II. Presentation of the facts

In such a complex and “sensitive” case as this , the detailed and objective presentation of the circumstances of the case plays a crucial role, since it determines how the case is to be prejudged, in the positive sense of that term. In my view , the general context of the case is presented summarily in a way that distorts the facts considerably. It is the point of view imposed by the applicants, for purposes that can be readily understood, which dominates. I can only single out a few facts, and the way they have been interpreted, which give false images of the true position.

The crucial difficulty in establishing the general context of the case is identification of the origins and main problems of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict. In fairly complicated and tricky cases such as Gorzelik and Others v. Poland ( [GC], no. 44158/98, ECHR 2004 -I ) and Assanidze v. Georgia ([GC] , no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004 - II ) , the Grand Chamber went back as far as the fourteenth century in order to analyse the Silesian problem ( Gorzelik , § 13) and even the eleventh century to shed light on the status of Ajaria within Georgia ( Assanidze , §§ 100- 07). In the present case , what is left unsaid is more eloquent than what is said: a snapshot of the removal of part o f Bessarabia from Romania on 28 June 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop P act and of the transfer from Ukraine of “a strip of land on the left bank of the Dniester” in order to form Soviet Moldavia gives the impression that the history of this multi-ethnic region begins there ( see paragraph 28 of the judgment ) – all of this being in the form of a reference (and a very selective one, it has to be said) to an OSCE document. But the document cited, like any other historical overview, gives a more complete idea of the history of the region, which I recapitulate briefly below.

The Principality of Moldavia, which was created in 1360 after being detached from Hungary , fell in 1456 under the domination of the Ottoman Empire , which lasted for several centuries. In 1711 Prince ( gospodar ) Dmitri Kantemir (whose son, Antiokh, incidentally, was to become an eminent Russi an writer and serve as Russian A mbassador in London and Paris) came to an agreement with Peter the Great concerning the protection of Moldavia, and it was in 1791 through the treaty signed following the war between Turkey and the Russo-Austrian coalition (whose forces were led by A. Suvorov) that Russia obtained control of the left bank of the Dniester, where a high proportion of the population were Slavs. In 1812, following a renewed outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey , the Treaty of Bucharest incorporated in the Russian Empire the eastern part of Moldavia between the Prut and the Dniester under the name of Bessarabia . The southern part of Bessarabia is inhabited by Bulgarians and Gagauz (a Turkish-speaking Christian people) . After the Crimean War (1854- 56) , Russia , in accordance with the Treaty of Paris (1856), ceded part of Bessarabia to the victor States. This territory was included in the Kingdom of Romania (created in 1859), but by the Treaty of Berlin (1878) Bessarabia was returned to Russia and Romania obtained Dobruja in compensation. In January 1918 Romania occupied Bessarabia and secured a vote from the local assembly in favour of its attachment to the Kingdom. At the same time , the Directory of Ukraine (at that time independent) proclaimed its sovereignty over the left bank of the Dniester (48% of the population at that time being Ukrainians, 30% Moldavians, 9% Russians and 8.5% Jews), and in 1924 a Moldavian autonomous republic was created there. After 1924 the USSR compelled Romania to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia (negotiations in Vienna ) , before occupying Bessarabia on 28 June 1940 . That is the controversial history of the region which since 1940 has formed a Moldavian entity whose two halves each have their own historical, economic, cultural and linguistic particularities. Those particularities have not escaped the attention of informed observers: “Transdniestria, the majority of whose population is made up of Russians and Ukrainians, has always felt close to Russia , of which it was part for two centuries. When the USSR broke up , Transdniestria rejected the first independent Moldovan g overnment ' s policy of union with Romania ” ( Libération , Paris, 1 August 2002 ).

As regards language and script, I do not wish to speculate on a very delicate problem and regret that the Court gives a rather simplistic account of the subject ( see paragraph 28 of the judgment), and that brings me to two quotations. “The first known text in Romanian dates from 1521: it is a letter written by the boyar Neaşcu to the mayor of Braşov ... These texts, translated from Slavonic (the liturgical language of Orthodox Slavs but also of Romanians), were written in Cyrillic script. ... It was not until the nineteenth century however that the modern Romanian language was finally established, strongly influenced by French – a process some have referred to as ' re - latinisation ' . It was also at that time that use of the Latin alphabe t took the place of Cyrillic” (s ource: Atlas des peuples de l ' Europe Centrale , Paris , La Décou verte, 2002, p. 137 ) . As for the languages used, the 1978 Constitution of Soviet Moldavia enshrined “equal rights, including the right to use the national language” (Article 34) and “schooling in the national language” (Article 43) and provided: “statutes and other legislation ... shall be published in Mold avian and Russian ” (Article 103) and “justice shall be administered either in Mold avian and Russian, or in the language of the majority of the population of the re gion ” ( Article 158).

I have added these historical digressions in order to reiterate the Court ' s position as expressed in the following dictum: “The Court considers that it should as far as possible refrain from expressing a view on purely historical questions , which it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate ; however , it can accept certain historical facts which are a matter of common knowledge and base its reasoning on them” ( see Ž danoka v . L atvia , no. 58278/70, § 77 , 17 June 2004; see also Marais v . France , no. 31159/96, Commission d e cision of 24 June 1996, D ecisions and R eports 86 -A , p. 184, and Garaudy v . France (d e c.), n o. 65831/01, E CH R 2003-IX). But it turns out that the “historical facts” are considerably distorted in our judgment, and as a result, to my great regret, some of the reasoning is too.

P aragraphs 30 to 41 mention in no particular order the build-up to and development of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian confli c t , stressing the military aspects, as if the major problem was the 14 th Army and the equipment of DOSAAF ( which, incidentally , was not a State body under the legislation in force ). As a national judge I wish to point out that the break-up of the USSR in 1988-91 a ffected not only the fifteen Soviet Republics which proclaimed their sovereignty one after another (often referred to as the “parade of sovereignties” ), but also territo ries within certain multinational republics such as Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhaz ia , Chechnya and so on . Moldova did not avoid this general movement, especially as the Moldovan Popular Front had proclaimed as its aim the union of Moldova in its entirety with Romania , the laws on language and the new flag mentioned in paragraph 29 being only the first step . Gaga uzia , a Turkish-speaking region , proclaimed its sovereignty first, on 18 August 1990 , followed by Transdniestria on 2 S eptemb e r 1990 . This was not, in my opinion, the result of “resistance to Moldovan independence” ( see paragraph 43 of the judgment ), but rather re sistance to the policy of refusing the right to self-determination . Let us not forget ( and this is another of the things left unsaid in the judgment ) that the first op e ration by the special forces of the Moldovan police, la unched against “separatists” in D ub ă sari on 12 June 1990, preceded the above proclamations, and therefore prompted them .

It is in that situation , in my opinion, that the Court should have sought the roots of the conflict , which had direct re percussions on the fate of the four applicants, rather than just in the de claration of 2 S eptemb e r 1990 concerning the cr e ation of the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”, as paragraphs 30 to 34 of the judgment suggest .

Legally speaking , the declarations mentioned did not mean at that tumultuous time a declaration of separation ( as evidenced by the presence of the word “ Moldavian ” in the title of the “MRT” ), but a declaration of the desire to obtain greater autonomy, including the right to a referendum on continued allegiance to the State entity in the event of that entity proclaiming its union with a foreign State, a prospect which was perceived as a real danger . “The emergence in 1990 of the first autonomist movements, followed in August 1991 by the proclamation of independence, encouraged the adoption between Ki s hinev ( Chişinău ) and Buc h arest of a plan for the integration of Mold ova into Romania or its annexation . But that plan, which the Moldovans initially found attractive, was abandoned when, on 6 March 1994 , in a referendum , to Buc h arest ' s great displeasure , 95.4% of Moldovan electors voted against attachment to Romania . But , hostile to the idea of the Republic ' s independence, and even more so to the possibility of its attachment to Romania, the Slav populations living for the most part in Transdniestria , a 5 , 000 km ² territory to the east of the Dniester, proclaimed their autonomy”, wrote Jean-Christophe Romer, a professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes européennes and the Ecole Spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr ( J.-Ch. Romer , Géopolitique de la Russie , Paris , Economic a , 1999, p. 63).

I would add to the above analysis that in February 1992 the 2nd Congress of the Moldovan Popular Front proclaimed Moldova , including the region of Transdniestria , an integral part of Romania , and that it was in March 1992 that the hostilities between the special police forces and the “separatists” began. On 19 June 1992 – a black day – came the beginning of the operation of the Moldovan special forces in Bender . The result: 416 deaths among the civilian p opulation. It was only on 29 July 1992 that the first detachments of the Russian peacekeeping forces entered Tiraspol in accordance with the Russo-Moldovan agreement of 21 July 1992 . I could continue to re construct the course of events, but I will stop there. I merely observe that the section on the “general background to the case” in the text of the judgment makes up for the absence of certain important facts by abundant quotations from political declarations reflecting a single approach to interpretation of the events . It is therefore not easy to find out where the truth lies. Once again, I deplore that fact.

I further regret that the Court did not take into consideration the fact that the events of 1992 ( “pacification” operation by the central authorities, armed resistance by the rebels, transitional period just after the break - up of the USSR, etc.) constituted in reality a case of force majeure in which all the parties involved directly or indirectly in the conflict, including the 14 th Army, took part .

I am also tempted to give my more fin ely shaded version of the armed conflict in 1991-92, as I think that the really abnormal size of this part of the judgment ( see paragraphs 42 - 110), the sole aim of which is manifestly to demonstrate Russia ' s participation in the conflict and its military support to the separatists, is the result of the methodological error mentioned above. Even in the inter- S tate case of Cypr us v. Tur key , the Court was much more “economical” with this type of analysis, conce ntrating on the legal problems.

However , although I do not wish to make this text more cumbersome , I cannot ignore the “Cossack question”. The judgment repeats an assertion made by the applicants that “i n 1988 there [were] no Cossacks in Moldovan territory” ( see paragraph 60). I would just like to point out that as early as 1571- 74 the Ukrainian Cossacks took part in a war of liberation to free the Moldavians from Ottoman domination and that free Cossacks had been living in Moldavia , Podoli a and Zaporo zhia for centuries ( see , among other sources , Ph. Longworth , The Cossacks , Lond on , 1969). The Cossacks were v ictims of Stalinist terror , but were rehabilitated by the Russian parliament ' s decree of 16 June 1992 as part of the rehabili tation of the peoples which had fallen victim to repression . It was only on 9 August 1995 that the Pr e sident of the Russian Federation sign ed the Ordinance on the r egister of Cossack a ssociations and on 16 Ap ril 1996 the Ordinance on c ivil and m ilitary s ervice by Cossacks . Freedom of movement and the paramilitary nature of their organisation are well-known features of Cossack life. It may be said that these are merely de tails, but the devil is in the detail .

There are quite a few of these details in the text, including “undated” statements by the Russian Vice-President (see paragraph 137 of the judgment ), an “undated” television appearance by the Russian President ( paragraph 138), a television interview broadcast “on an unspecified date” ( paragraph 14 5 ), and so on, notwithstanding the position stated by the Court in the following terms in paragraph 26: “In assessing both written and oral evidence , the Court has hitherto generally applied ' beyond a reasonable doubt ' as the standard of proof required . ” I am astonished that, contrary to the clarifying information supplied to the Court, paragraph 141 of the judgment reproduces ( “takes as established”! ) false information to the effect that Russia organised the election of 17 March 2004 “without the agreement of the Moldovan authorities” . The Russian Federation ' s electoral l e gislation provides for polling by Russian citizens abroad in ad hoc polling stations ( and therefore not always in “fixed consular posts, operating as polling stations” ) only with the agreement of the authorities of the State in question . I regret that the Court, whose judgments are studied everywhere in the minutest detail, has in many places failed to apply the criterion formulated in paragraph 26.

I t is also a pity that in setting out the general background to the case the Court has not always followed the principle it established itself in Ireland v. the United Kingdom as follows: “In the cases referred to it, the Court examines all the material before it, whether originating from the Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if necessary, obtains material proprio motu ” ( judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64, § 160).

Fo r ex a mple, I regret that the Court has carefully avoided making any mention in its judgment of the activities of the “ Bujor ” group and the applicants before their arrest ( except in paragraph 216, referring to the judgment of 9 December 1993 ). But the documents supplied to the Court are eloquent on that point . In an interview which appeared in the Leningrad periodical Smena on 6 December 1990 , Mr Ilaşcu gave details of the notorious “Directive n o. 6 ”. “We have two blacklists”, he said. “In the first there are 23 names , the whole of the leadership of the so-called Republic of Transdniestria . In the second there are 480, the members of their Second Congress . S erious preparations have been made for their physical liquidation . ” The conclusion was : “We have politicians who must always remain clean, but someone has to do the dirty work . ” From statements of the type “we are capable of organising a huge bloodbath” to concrete acts was only a short step. The names of the victims of those acts are known , as are the names of their widows and orphans. It is not by chance that the eminent specialists mentioned in paragraph 286 of the judgment propos ed that the applicants should be retried in a neutral country , as did the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, in fact, who did not exclude “ a possible new trial of Mr Ilie Ilaşcu in a neutral place ” (SG/Inf (2000) 53, 19 January 2001). What is the point of all the United Nations resolutions on the prevention of terrorism? Unfortunately the Court has given no reply to these questions , but it refuse d the request of one of the widows, Mrs Ludmila Gu sar, to give evidence to the Cour t ( see paragraph 8 of the judgment ).

III. Analys is of the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “ respons i bilit y”

But I regret even more deeply the fact that an opportunity has been missed to apply to a situation not hitherto considered a finer analysis of the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “responsibility” . Not claiming to be entitled to the last word as custodian of the truth, I would nevertheless like to explain how I see the problem .

M y initial position , which I expressed in the vote on admissibility on 4 July 2001 ( and which I still hold ) , was that the Court should declare the application inadmissible ratione loci and ratione personae as regards Russi a , while recognising Moldova ' s jurisdiction over Transdniestria , but at the same time noting that it did not have de facto control over the r e gion, a t least at the time when the applicants were arrested .

The Court could have gone on from such findings to reach the finding of a “legal vacuum” or “lawless area” to which the Convention provisions are inapplicable de facto . That idea is neither absurd nor new. The “ motion for a recommendation ” entitled “Lawless areas within the territory of Council of Europe member S tates” presented by Mr Magnusson, a Swedish member of the Parliamentary Assembly ( backed by a number of his colleagues ) , included the following passage :

“The Assembly feels compelled to admit, however, that there are a number of areas within t he territory of certain member S tates where the European Convention on Human Rights and other human rights protection instruments do not apply in practice.

This has become clear firstly from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, some of whose judgments have not been executed; examples are the Loizidou v. Turkey case, concerning the northern part of Cyprus , and the Matthews v. the United Kingdom case, concerning Gibraltar .

In addition, ' lawless ' areas have developed in separatist regions such as Chechnya , Trans n istria, Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh.”

In a sense, the territorial reservation made by Moldova on ratifying the Convention pleads in favour of recognising the existence of a “legal vacuum” in the region, a kind of “black hole” in the European legal area , especially as such a finding could be accompanied by recognition that Moldova does not have de facto control over the territory concerned . I am pleased to be a member of the majority on that point at least, namely that Moldova has jurisdiction, even if only in the limited terms of “jurisdic tion ... as regards its positive obligations” (point 1 of the operative provisions ).

N evertheless, I consider that the pre pond e rance of the territorial principle , where “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention is concerned , applies fully to Moldova, its responsibility and its obligations towards the applicants, even if these are limited de facto ( see paragraph 313 of the judgment ). In any case , Transdniestria is n ot a no man ' s land or terra nullius in international law terms: the international community continues to regard Transdniestria as an integral part of Moldova . The very fact that Moldova made a reservation in respect of Transdniestria when it ratified the Convention proves that in the long term it has not discharged its obligations towards that territory. To a ccept the opposite would be to present a priceless gift to all the separatists in the world by enabling them to say that for the first time an international court had recognised that part of a State ' s territory was outside the jurisdiction of the central authorities. I only regret that the majority held Moldova responsible only from 2001 onwards , in spite of the established fact that after 1994, and especially after it joined the Council of Europe i n 1997, Moldova did not take any steps whatsoever to secure the applicants ' retrial or release . In that respect I agree with most of the arguments in the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Casadevall and the colleagues who joined him .

The problem of “ extraterrit orial ” jurisdiction is much more complex. I firmly believe that the Court should follow the traditions of the “case-law of concepts” , in other words start from the idea that the essential concepts of contemporary positive law have been established by g e n e rations of jurists and should not be called into question except in exceptional cases . That was the Court ' s unanimous position in Bankovi ć and Others : “The Court is of the view, therefore, that Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case” ( Banković and Others v . Belgi um and O ther s (d e c.) [GC] , n o. 52207/99, § 61, ECHR 2001-XII). The Court went on to say that it needed to be “satisfied that ... exceptional circumstances exist in the present case which could amount to the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State ” ( loc. cit. , § 74).

What exceptional circ um stances could justif y such a conclusion in the pr e sent case ?

The Court, in my humble opinion, has chosen the easy way out by applying in its judgment criteria laid down in another exception al case , the difficult - to - ignore Loizidou case , and drawing from that precedent the following, too vague, conclusion: “The Court has accepted that in exceptional circumstances the acts of Contracting States performed outside their territory , or which produce effects there , may amount to exercise by them of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention” (see paragraph 314 of the present judgment ). The first criterion for identifying such “acts” to be found in Loizidou is the occupation through targeted military action of the territory of the other State. But that was not the case here, where the Soviet military forces had been stationed in the region for decades .

Even suppos ing that there was a “military action” such as there was in Cyprus , Judges Gölcüklü and Pettiti were absolutely right in seeking to separate “responsibility” from “ juri s diction ” : “While the responsibility of a Contracting Party may be engaged as a consequence of military action outside its territory, this does not imply exercise of its jurisdiction” ( see Loizidou ( p reliminary o bjections ) , judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, p. 35). The two concepts are to an extent autonomous in relation to each other , though it might be objected th at the distinction is academic.

Why has the Court neglected this very important difference of meaning in the present case, and not filled in a gap in its case-law, given the lack of a valid criterion applicable to extraterritorial jurisdiction ? In my view it was in order to reach more direct conclusions via the concept of responsibility ( see paragraphs 314 - 17 of the judgment ). It is juri s diction (territorial o r extraterritorial) which is a primary concept , respons i bilit y being derived from juri s diction rather than the contrary . The Court has indirect ly confirm ed this subordination by holding that Moldova has jurisdiction but excluding its responsibility before 2001! But in seeking to determine whether the Russian Federation has jurisdiction , it preferred the opposite logic in holding that there is “jurisdiction” because there is “responsibility”.

Even if it is accepted that the question is whether a respondent foreign State ' s responsibility is engaged , it would be necessary to prove that the respondent State ( a) continue s to exercise its responsibility , the latter having been engaged through a subordinate local administration ; and ( b) continue s to control the whole of the territory in question through a large number of troops engaged in active duties and exercising “effective overall contro l over that part of the island” , as noted in the preliminary objections in Loizidou . These two aspects were discu ssed in particular in paragraph 70 of the admissibility decision in Bankovi ć and Others , in which the Court emphasised this territorial aspect throughout the decision before concluding : “The Court is not persuaded that there was any jurisdictional link between the persons who were victims of the act complained of and the respondent States” ( see Bankovi ć and Others , cited above , § 82).

In determining whether the Russian Federation was responsible for the acts complained of , the Court, referring to Cyprus v. Turkey , uses the notion of “overall control over an area outside its national territory” ( see paragraph 316 of the judgment ). I refer in that connection to the Court ' s assessment in Loizidou : “ Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the ' TRNC ' . It is obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus ... that her army exercises effective overall control over that part of the island” ( see Loizidou (merits), cited above, p.2235, § 56 ). If my memory serves me correctly , I learned during my initial military training that the term “active duty” presupposes control of roads and railways , surveillance of strategic points ( telegraph/ telephone posts ), and control of stations, airports, frontiers , etc. Even without being a military strategist , anyone can compare the two situations: in one case 30,000 troops in a small territory inhabited by between 120 ,000 and 150,000 people, and in the other 2,500 officers and other ranks in a territory of 4 , 163 km 2 with an 852 k m-long border and a population of more than 750 , 000! Lastly, I come to the major difference, which is that there was no military invasion from outside the territory with the aim of establishing such control: the Russian troops, who had only just ceased to be Soviet troops ( two-thirds of them originally hailing from the region ), were caught out by events in the place where they had been station ed for many years without interfering in administrative matters. Those troops are not engaged in any “active duties” except guarding the weapons stocks and equipment due to be moved out.

As regards subordination of the local administrative authorities to the Russian authorities, the mere fact that those authorities have frequently prevented evacuation of the military equipment is revealing. After releasing one of the applicants under international pressure , the authorities of the “MRT” continue to hold the others in spite of the obvious interest of their presumed “guardian” in disposing of the embarrassing problem – if this is an example of an administration “subject to the authority of a foreign power”, it is a rather strange one.

The other argument pleading in favour of the Russian Federation ' s responsibility , according to the majority, is that the “MRT” was set up in 1991- 92 with the Russian Federation ' s support. I am obliged to point out that the birth of the “MRT” was proclaimed on 2 September 1990 , more than a year before the USSR broke up and Russia attained independence as a sovereign State. Here I am reminded of La Fontaine : “If it wasn ' t you, it must have been your brother. – I have no brother . – Well, it must have been one of your family anyway . ” The Moldovan Government ' s argument that Russia, as the successor State to the USSR, assumes full responsibility for the acts of that State is invalidated by the international law rule that where the responsibility of a subject of law is engaged on account of the conduct of another subject of law its responsibility can only be indirect ( Dictionnaire de droit international public , Bru ss els , 2001, p p . 996-97) .

For that reason alone , unlike the position regarding the proclamation of the “ T R N C ” , Russia could not be responsible for that act . In addition , it has never recognised the “MRT ” as an independent State. The t reaty of friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova sign ed on 19 November 2001 is clear on that point : “The parties cond emn separatism in all its forms and undertake not to lend any support to separatist movements” ( Article 5 § 2). But the Court prefers to reproduce “undated” irresponsible statements by certain members of parliament and former politicians as “evidence” of political support .

The “evidence” of alleged economic support ( see paragraphs 156 - 60 of the judgment ) does not withstand v e rification. I compare below the findings in the judgment with the observations of an NGO, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG), which has analysed the situation in the r e gion .

Exports of gas “on favourable financial terms” ( see paragraph 156): According to the BHHRG , the cost of 1 , 000 m 3 of gas supplied by Russi a to Transdniestria in 2003 was 89 United States dollars (USD) , the same price as gas supplied to Estonia (USD 36 for Belarus , USD 50 for G e orgi a ).

“Transdniestria receives electricity directly from the Russian Federation ” ( see paragraph 157): According to the BHHRG, the electricity market is controlled by the Spanish company Union Fenosa, which produ ces electricity using the gas bought from Russia .

“The Russian firm Iterra bought the largest undertaking in Transdniestria, the Râbniţa engineering works” ( see paragraph 160) : In August 2003 alone , a single Liechtenstein company bought 15 .6 % of the shares in the factory .

It is the American company Lucent Technologies which controls all tele communications, it is in Germany that banknotes are printed, it is the European Union which awarded the “ Arc of Europe ” priz e to textile production by the Intercentre Llux company, and so on ( s ource: British Helsinki Human Rights Group , Transnistria 2003 : Eye in the Gathering Storm – www.bhhrg.org) .

Next argument: supplying arms to the separatists . The applicants assert ( without giving any concrete evidence ) that the 14 th Army supplied weapons to the sepa r at ists , a fact which, in their opinion, engages the responsibility of the Russian Federation even more . N ot being a specialist in the subject, I refer to a reliable source: “The organised looting of weapons began after the proclamation of Moldova ' s sovereignty on 23 June 1990 and had become a serious problem by the time of the break-up of the USSR in 1991 ( there was a similar situation in Chechnya , Abkhazi a and other places ) ; 21 , 800 rifles , am munition and even tanks were ' expropriated ' . It was thanks to the efforts of the commanding officer of the 14 th Army, General Lebed, that some of these weapons were seized and returned to the stores . An investigation was opened by the military prosecutor” ( Commersant (a Russian newspaper) , 21 July 2001 ). The region ' s industrial potential makes it capable of producing practically all types of conventional weapons; even today arms sales account for a large part of the region ' s income , as the Court mentions ( see paragraph 161 of the judgment ).

In the final analysis , I have not found in the factual material concerning the military, political and economic aspects a ny valid evidence capable of establishing a limited or continuing intervention by Russi a in favour of Transdniestria , or proof of the “MRT” ' s military, political or economic dependence on Russi a .

In my heart of hearts , I regret that there is no evidence of what is now called “humanitarian intervention”, a more noble form of the military interventions of the past. I wish to be absolutely honest about Russia ' s responsibility in this respect. I am convinced that it was responsible for not intervening more energetically in 1992 to protect the civilian population and prevent the loss of more than 850 lives ( including the use of political and diplomatic means to dissuade the Moldovan authorities from conducting a punitive military expedition against their own population ). Where other powers do not hesitate to hoist the flag of humanitarian intervention in order to establish what has been called “ the new military humanism ” ( see : N. Chomsky , The New Military Humanism, Lessons from Kosovo , L, 1999), the Russian authorities of the time preferred a wait-and-see approach, leaving some of their soldiers and officers ( mostly origina ting from the region concerned ) to decide alone what was the right thing to do, which meant whether or not to defend their families .

I therefore propose to answer an obvious question: as a subject of international law , was Russia really capable in practice of assuming its responsibilities in the “MRT”, that is to say the task of solving problems or dealing with a systematic situation? To assist in finding the reply , I refer to Ireland v. the United Kingdom (cited above, p.64, §159) : “A practice incompatible with the Convention consists of an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system; a practice does not of itself constitute a violation separate from such breaches” . It is only where , behind a personal situation , systematic violations can be perceived that a foreign State ' s objective responsibility can be engaged; that is my reading of the judgment cited, especially as the applicants did not submit evidence of systematic violations of the same kind.

The other rule of international law confirmed by our case-law is that a State ' s extraterritorial responsibility is engaged to the extent that its agents exercise their authority over supposed victims or their property ( see C yprus v . Tur key , nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975 , Decisions and Reports 2, p. 1 50 ). Did that really apply to the four applicants outside the brief period of their arrest in 1992 ?

Apart from the factual aspects , account has to be taken of the legal aspect of the question of a State ' s international responsibility.

I refer to a document of paramount importance: Resolution 56/83 adopted on 12 December 2001 by the U nited N ations General Assembly entitled “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, the result of a number of years ' work by the International Law Commission ( ILC ). In referring to the work of the ILC , paragraph 320 of the judgment raises the problem of a State ' s responsibility on account of a violation of an international obligation, emphasising in paragraph 321 “continu ing violations” in the light of Article 14 § 2 of the r esolution . But Article 13 of the same document states : “ An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs . ”

That rule quite obviously confirms the ratione temporis rule in our own case-law . In other words , before establishing the continuing nature of a violation ( in our case, the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants ), it is advisable to make sure that the alleged violation does not fall outside the Court ' s jurisdiction ratione temporis.

On the subject of the ratione temporis rule , one of the pillars of the European Court ' s case-law , I very much fear that it will be shattered by the construction put upon the term “jurisdiction” in the present judgment in the following passage : “The Court considers that on account of the above events the applicants came within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, although at the time when they occurred the Convention was not in force with regard to the Russian Federation ” ( see paragraph 384).

Indeed, as neither Moldova , nor still less Russi a , had ratified the Convention a t the material time (1992), they cannot be accused of breaching an international obligation by which they were not yet bound . Consequently, neither Article 14 ( e xtension in time of the breach of an international obligation) nor Article 15 ( b reach consisting of a composite act ) of the r e solution mention ed is applicable , contra ry to what the Court says in its judgment ( see paragraph 321).

On the other hand , a different provision of the work of the ILC is to my mind entirely applicable to consideration of alleged Russian responsibility , as it confirms the force majeure hypothesis :

“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure , that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.” ( Article 23 § 1)

My question is: did the very height of a civil war constitute a situation of force majeure within the meaning of Article 23 as cited above , given that the respondent State, the Russian Federation , did not provoke the situation for the simple reason that it did not yet exist as a subject of international law ?

In my opinion , the Court cannot derogate from the rule confirmed by the Commission ' s opinion in Ribitsch : in determining whether the responsibility of a respondent State is engaged, the Court applies the provisions of the Convention on the basis of the objectives of the Convention and in the light of the principles of international law. The Commission went on to say: “The responsibility of a State under the Convention, arising for acts of all its organs, agents and servants, does not necessarily require any ' guilt ' on behalf of the State, either in a moral, legal or political meaning” ( Ribitsch v . Au s tri a , judgment of 4 December 1995 , Series A no. 336, opinion of the Comm ission, p. 37, § 110).

IV. Violation of Article 34 of the Convention

As regards the finding of a violation of Article 34 by Moldova and Russia , I just wish to say that I am shocked by the use of a stolen document (or a bought one – it makes little difference) – a diplomatic note. I am embarrassed to have to point out that it is an elementary principle in all judicial proceedings that evidence obtained unlawfully cannot be taken into consideration. Encouraging breaches of the confidentiality of diplomatic correspondence, contrary to the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations, and especially Article 24 thereof which states that the archives and documents of diplomatic missions “shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be”, by a complicit quotation ( see paragraph 278 of the judgment ) and by taking the content into consideration ( see paragr aph 481 of the judgment ) seems to me to be unworthy of a European judicial body.

Confidential consultations are a normal practice in international relations – indeed, a practice endorsed by the Russo-Moldovan treaty of 19 November 2001, Article 3 § 1 of which provides: “Being firmly committed to ensuring peace and security, the High Contracting Parties will hold regular consultations on major international problems and on questions of bilateral relations. Such consultations and exchanges of views will embrace ... questions of interaction within the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other European structures. ” In addition, by producing a leaked diplomatic note the applicants were breaking the rule against abuse of the right of petition (Article 35 § 3 of the Convention) and thus making themselves liable to the known consequences in the Court ' s practice. Unfortunately, they suffered no such fate. As the immortal La Fontaine put it: “Someone told me. I must have my revenge.”

V. A pplication of Article 41 of the Convention

As regards the sums awarded to the applicants, especially the first applicant, who has been free since 2001, the Court in my opinion has gone beyond the previous limits for sums awarded in the event of the finding of violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, even in the most horrifying cases. Having already recently crossed the established threshold in Assanidze (cited above), in which it generously awarded the applicant 150,000 euros “in respect of all the damage sustained”, the Court has now gone further in the present case, perhaps on account of the length of the applicants ' detention. Be that as it may, what I object to is that , while holding that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 , the Court thought it necessary to mention the subject of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, observing in paragraph 489 of the judgment : “The Court does not consider the alleged pecuniary damage to have been substantiated, but it does not find it unreasonable to suppose that the applicants suffered a loss of income and certainly incurred costs which were directly due to the violations found . ” That argument is unconvincing in my opinion and even dangerous for the future case-law, as it imprudently opens Pandora ' s box.

VI. Is the judgment enforceable ?

Lastly, I realise the objective impossibility for the second respondent State of enforc ing the Court ' s judgment to the letter, going over the head of sovereign Moldova , particularly in order to put an end to the applicants ' det ention. (I voted “for” on point 22 of the operative provisions in the light of all the possible approaches . ) It will be still more difficult to take general measures, as required by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. In Drozd and Janousek , the Court said: “ T he Convention does not require the Contracting Parties to impose its standards on third States or territories” ( Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain , judgment of 26 June 1992, Series A no. 240, p. 34, § 110). When that is translated into the language of international law , it surely means that neither the Convention nor any other text requires signatory States to take counter-measures to end the detention of an alien in a foreign country – the United Nations Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Res olution 26/113 of 9 December 1981) is still in force. Unless, on reading our judgment, people welcome the appearance right in the heart of old Europe of a new condominium like the New Hebrides . But I very much doubt that that would be a desirable development.

Case of Ilaşcu, Ivanţoc, Leşco and Petrov-Popa v. Moldova and Russia

(Application no. 48787/99)

Judgment (Annex)

Strasbourg , 8 July 2004

CASE OF ILAÅžCU AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

(Application no. 48787/99)

JUDGMENT

ANNEX

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS BY THE WITNESSES BEFORE THE COURT ' S DELEGATES

STRASBOURG

8 July 2004

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

Page

1. Ilie ILAÅžCU

2. Tatiana LEÅžCO

3. Eudochia IVANÅ¢OC

4. Raisa PETROV-POPA

5. Åžtefan URÃŽTU

6. Constantin ŢÎBÎRNĂ

7. Nicolae LEÅžANU

8. Andrei IVANÅ¢OC

9. Alexandru LEÅžCO

10. Tudor PETROV-POPA

11. Colonel Vladimir GOLOVACHEV

12. Stepan Konstantinovich CHERBEBSHI

13. Sergey KUTOVOY

14. Lieutenant-Colonel Yefim SAMSONOV

15. Vasiliy SEMENCHUK

16. Dumitru POSTOVAN

17. Valeriu CATANÄ‚

18. Witness X.

19. Mircea SNEGUR

20. Alexandru MOÅžANU

21. Witness Y.

22. Andrei SANGHELI

23. Witness Z.

24. Anatol PLUGARU

25. Nicolai PETRICÄ‚

26. Vasile RUSU

27. Vasile STURZA

28. Victor VIERU

29. Andrei STRATAN

30. General Boris SERGEYEV

31. Colonel Alexander VERGUZ

32. Lieutenant-Colonel Vitalius RADZAEVICHUS

33. Colonel Anatoli ZVEREV

34. Lieutenant-Colonel Boris LEVITSKIY

35. Lieutenant-Colonel Valery SHAMAYEV

36. Vasiliy TIMOSHENKO

37. Vladimir MOLOJEN

38. Ion COSTAÅž

39. Valentin SEREDA

40. Victor BERLINSCHI

41. Constantin OBROC

42. Mihail SIDOROV

43. Pavel CREANGÄ‚

1. Ilie ILAÅžCU

1 . Until his arrest in June 1992 the applicant was living in Tiraspol . He had been living there for ten years. In 1992 the applicant was chief economist in an enterprise based in Tiraspol . He was also the leader of the Tiraspol branch of the Democratic Christian Popular Front of Moldova, a position he had held since October 1989, when this party was created. On account of his political activity, pressure was put on him, grenades and stones were thrown into his house and he was finally fired from the position he held as chief economist. In February his family had had to take refuge in Chişinău. However, the applicant remained in Tiraspol .

2 . On the morning of 2 June 1992 , around 4.30 a.m. , as his dog in the courtyard started to bark, the applicant looked out of the window and saw armed soldiers dressed in camouflage and bullet-proof vests, jumping over the fence and taking up combat positions. The soldiers were wearing uniforms of the Fourteenth Army with the emblems of the Soviet Union .

The applicant ' s family, who were in Tiraspol for a few days, were sleeping. The applicant went to lock the door of the house, which was unlocked. The door then suddenly opened and five or six soldiers broke in and hit him in the face with the butt of a gun and tied his arms behind his back. He was then taken out and put in a Volga car. When taken out, he saw that in the courtyard and around it there were two armoured vehicles at the end of the street and around 50-60 soldiers led by a colonel accompanied by a lieutenant-colonel, whose name was, the applicant learned later, Vladimir Gorbov. The applicant also recognised among the people who started to search his house a certain Victor Gushan from the Transdniestrian secret services. The applicant claims that he had no arms or explosives in his house. When the applicant ' s wife asked them why they had arrested the applicant, Mr Gushan said it was because the applicant was the leader of the Popular Front of Moldova, and as they were at war with Moldova the applicant was considered to be dangerous and had to be detained.

3 . The applicant was taken to the building of the Ministry of Security in Tiraspol and put into a cell in the basement. When first arrested the applicant was told that arms had been found in his house or that he was suspected of having arms in his house.

4 . Some time later the applicant was taken to a room where he was interrogated by Vadim Shevtsov, “Minister of Security of the MRT” and three other colonels who were dressed in Fourteenth Army uniforms. On the third day interrogations started to take place during the night, one interrogation led by Vladimir Gorbov, another one by the three colonels. The applicant heard from the guards that the three colonels were from the secret services of the Fourteenth Army counter-intelligence division. During the interrogation led by Mr Gorbov relating to his political activity the applicant was accused of committing terrorist acts in Slobozia district. During the second interrogation a bargain was proposed to him, under the terms of which he, as leader of the Popular Front, would co-operate and say that he had been trained in Romania by special troops, somewhere near Braşov, that he had been armed by Romanians and sent to Transdniestria to carry out terrorist acts against the Russian civil population in Transdniestria. The applicant denied all these accusations and refused to accept such a bargain. Consequently, he was repeatedly beaten and subjected to psychological torture.

5 . During his first week of detention he had had no food at all. On many occasions during the initial investigation he was not allowed to sleep. The guards would come into the cell at 5 a.m. , the bed would be stood up against the wall and he would then not be allowed to sleep until they had taken the bed down again.

6 . After five or six days, maybe more, the applicant was blindfolded and was taken to another place. When food was brought to him he saw soldiers of Fourteenth Army and was told that he was in the military garrison of the Fourteenth Army. The applicant realised the next day that he knew the building, as he had been there before, when he was arrested in 1989 also by the Fourteenth Army, after founding the Popular Front.

7 . At the time when he was detained at the military garrison of the Fourteenth Army in 1992, the commander was Colonel Mikhail Bergman, whom the applicant remembers as having been the only one who treated him humanely. Mr Bergman never took part in the interrogations.

During his detention there, the applicant saw only Mr Godiac and Mr Ivanţoc. One day, the door of his cell opened and Ivanţoc was asked by Gorbov, Bergman and the other investigators to identify him, which he did. The applicant did not know Mr Ivanţoc at that time, but Mr Ivanţoc certainly knew him as he was the leader of the Popular Front.

8 . During his detention at the military garrison of the Fourteenth Army, the applicant was taken out to be interrogated in various offices probably on the second floor, certainly on a floor above the cells. He was not very badly ill-treated, as the offices had walls painted in white and there was a risk of traces being left. However, interrogations also took place during the night, in his own cell, whose walls were painted in black. There, he would be very badly beaten. During one of the beatings some of his teeth were broken. As a result of the beatings the applicant was left with a disabled kidney.

9 . The applicant was also subjected to psychological torture. He was told that Cossacks had come to his flat and kidnapped his wife and two daughters, and then raped them, that his wife and one of the daughters had been found and taken to the psychiatric hospital, but that the second daughter had not been found. He was then asked to give in and sign a confession. Three days later Mr. Gorbov came back and told him that his second daughter had been found dead and urged the applicant to sign so that he could go home and give his daughter a Christian burial. The applicant lost control of himself and hit Gorbov. As a result, he was seriously ill-treated.

10 . During his detention in the charge of the Fourteenth Army, the applicant was subjected to four mock executions.

11 . In all, the applicant was detained at the military garrison of the Fourteenth Army for two months. On 23 August Mr Bergman introduced the applicant to the new commander of the Fourteenth Army, Alexandr Lebed. After a couple of minutes of discussions between the applicant and Mr Lebed the new commander of the Fourteenth Army gave Mr Bergman two hours to remove the applicants from there. On the same day Mr Bergman, accompanied by five or six officers and four soldiers of the Fourteenth Army with automatic weapons and a dog called Ceank, took the applicant in a truck to the Tiraspol City Police headquarters. The applicant was left in a corridor. Mr Bergman told Mr Shevtsov in an angry tone that he did not want to keep the applicants in the territory of the Fourteenth Army any more and went away.

12 . The applicant was detained in the basement of the Tiraspol City Police headquarters for about half a year, and was then transferred to Tiraspol Prison no. 2 until his conviction. During the investigation he was with other detainees in a cell.

13 . A week after his conviction, on 9 December 1993 the applicant was transferred to Hlinaia Prison in a cell specially prepared for death penalty convicts. He stayed nine years alone in a cell.

There he was subjected to very harsh treatment. He was beaten many times. He was given bread and tea to eat, with cornmeal at lunch. He was also frequently put in a punishment cell. The applicant weighed 95 kilos when arrested and only 57 kilos six months later. He was not allowed to see his family on a regular basis or to receive parcels. Food parcels sent to the applicant were sometimes destroyed. Every visit had to be approved. Sometimes approvals were not granted, sometimes they were granted but when his wife reached the gates of the prison she was not allowed to see him. He was not allowed to write, so that he had to use other means to send messages out of prison. As he wanted his mother to come and visit him, he was told that he should write a special request to Mr Smirnov. The applicant refused, because he did not recognise the “MRT”, and so he was not allowed to see his mother, who died while he was in prison.

14 . After the applicant had cast his vote in the Moldovan parliament for the formation of the Sturza Government, there was an immediate effect on his visits: from April 1999 until January 2000 he was not allowed to see his family. From then on he was punished constantly on all sorts of pretexts – for example, his radio was taken away.

15 . There was no heating in winter because there was no technical possibility for this. The temperature went down to -10 o Celsius. The applicant did not have a shower for six months and had to wash in cold water. There was no toilet, no decent conditions.

He had no access to information. He was alone. No one else was present when he exercised in the evening. He ate on his own in the cell. He was even forbidden to talk to the guards. He could only speak to the secret service people and to Mr Golovachev. He had no access to daylight or even to an electric lamp.

16 . When the applicant asked for treatment from the prison doctor he was told that there were no medicines. The only medicines were brought by the applicant ' s wife. The doctors who examined the applicant came from Chişinău.

17 . The applicant never complained to the Tiraspol authorities because he refused to recognise them; he addressed his complaints only to the legal authorities in Chişinău.

18 . In July 1998, after the applicant had made several attempts to escape, he was transferred to Tiraspol Prison no. 2, which was better guarded.

The treatment in the Tiraspol Prison was sometimes better, sometimes worse than in the Hlinaia Prison.

19 . There was a toilet in the cell, and cold water. Not all the prison guards were hostile to the applicant, but the people from the security brigade under Mr Shevtsov ill-treated him. The Prison Governor and the guards were relatively correct with him. Colonel Golovachev, the Governor of the Prison, said, “I cannot stop the secret services ill-treating you.”

20 . In April 1999 the applicant lodged his application with the European Court of Human Rights. Initially, when the Tiraspol authorities got to hear of the application, he was treated much more harshly. There was no beating as such, but he was denied visits by his wife, books addressed to him in prison were seized, he was not allowed out of his cell for exercise, there were frequent searches of his cell, and so on. This also occurred after he had been visited in prison by the French Parliamentarian Josette Durrieux, who had advised the applicant to submit an application in the first place.

During the same period there was also an incident in which he was ill-treated by Mr Gusarov and some people from the secret services. He asked why he was subjected to such rigorous searches, but was dragged out of his cell and hit with the butt of a gun. One of the secret service men stuck a gun in his mouth, broke his teeth, and threatened him that there would be more of the same if he pursued his application with the European Court. Mr Ivanţoc was subjected to the same treatment by Mr Gusarov.

21 . The secret services came from time to time to ask him to withdraw the application. Then, on the morning of 5 May 2001 , his cell door was opened. He was given five minutes to get his things together. He was naked while two Transdniestrian television stations were shooting the whole sequence of events in his cell, although he had asked them not to do this. He was being taken to see Mr Smirnov, he was told, because representatives from the West wanted to see him. There were five or six civilians in the corridor, some of them members of the Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria, others with guns.

He was put into a car with Mr Shevtsov. When they came to territory controlled by Chişinău the applicant was handcuffed to two soldiers. He was taken to the presidential palace in Chişinău, and then to the Ministry of Security. Mr Shevtsov took out a paper declaring that the detainee Ilaşcu had been transferred to the authorities of Moldova . He told the applicant that the sentence of death was still valid and that he did not want to see him again. The applicant was then taken to the office of the Minister of Security of Moldova and questioned.

22 . As regards the so-called pardon, Mr Balala came to see the applicant two days before his release in order to speak of it. However, the applicant refused the offer of a pardon because the Transdniestrians wanted an acknowledgement of guilt on his part.

23 . After his release the applicant spoke to the secret services of Moldova and Romania about his colleagues who remained behind in prison in Transdniestria. They told him that there had been pressure from the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly on the Russian President, Mr. Putin.

24 . The applicant was under the impression that the Russians were behind his release, as they had said that they would ask the Transdniestrians to release him. The Romanian President Mr Iliescu even called Mr Putin. The applicant claims that Shevtsov is a Russian citizen, a representative of the Russian secret service.

25 . As regards the attitude of the Moldovan authorities concerning his release, the applicant claims that thirty-three persons arrested by the Transdniestrians were exchanged for Cossacks arrested by Moldova . In June 1992 he was about to be exchanged as a result of an agreement with President Yeltsin. Negotiations were going on, about customs stamps, economic relations and exchanges of prisoners, especially sick prisoners. However, the applicant claims that in his case the Moldovan authorities did not really do all that they could have done.

26 . The authorities of the Russian Federation are responsible for what happens in Transdniestria. The Russian Federation is the successor of the Soviet Union . In 1992 there was no Soviet Union . The war was between Russia and Moldova .

The Fourteenth Army participated in the aggression against Moldova, it supplied arms to the Transdniestrian forces – machine guns, tanks, armoured vehicles, guided rocket systems. There is only one armed headquarters force in Transdniestria, and that is the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army. Shots were fired from there towards the battlefields. General Lebed fought against Moldova , but he saved the applicant ' s life, as he refused to deliver the applicant to the Transdniestrians who came to get him, after losing lives on the battlefield.

The Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria had taken the whole Fourteenth Army under its authority. General Lebed was even elected as a Member of the Transdniestrian Parliament. Russian staff from the Fourteenth Army were leading the military operations and members of the Transdniestrian armed forces were involved only symbolically. When General Iakovlev was arrested before the conflict and taken to Chişinău, it was on suspicion of having armed units in Transdniestria with weapons from the Fourteenth Army. The applicant was told by Mr. Leşco, who worked in a factory, that arms had been brought to the factory by the Fourteenth Army to arm the workers there.

All along the Russian Federation has been maintaining Transdniestria. It supports the Transdniestrian regime militarily, politically and economically. It supplies natural gas free of charge to Transdniestria, it has given Transdniestria 70 to 80 million US dollars of credit, it has kept its markets open for Transdniestria. Mr Smirnov has received military medals from Russia . The Russian Federation protects this illegal regime, even in the proceedings in Strasbourg . The applicant considers that this is not an ethnic conflict, but a political conflict. The territory of Transdniestria is under the control of the Russian Federation .

27 . As regards the Moldovan authorities, it is true that the Transdniestrian authorities were hostile to them. According to the applicant, the Transdniestrians are Fascists, imperialists. The applicant was prepared to withdraw his application to the European Court of Human Rights against Moldova on condition that the Moldovan authorities produced to him documents describing the participation of the Russian authorities in the events of 1991 to 1992. The applicant knows that they have such material – documents, video tapes of interviews of Russian officers captured, and so on. The applicant claims that Mr Morei, the Minister of Justice, told him that the Moldovan Government could not agree to this because the Russian Federation was supplying natural gas to Moldova .

28 . The applicant complains that one of the witnesses that he wished to call, Mrs. Olga Căpăţînă, was beaten up and had to be hospitalised.

29 . The Moldovan authorities did allow the applicant to act as a Member of Parliament although he had been sentenced and was in prison. However, the secret services of the Government that came to power after 1992 abandoned the applicant and his colleagues. It did nothing to secure their release. When the applicant was released Mr Valeriu Pasat said, jokingly, “Some politicians are now trying to emigrate.” President Snegur said that the applicant was too much in favour of integration with Romania . The Moldovan parliament did adopt several resolutions in the applicants ' favour, including one calling for Mr. Ilaşcu to be released. But the Executive did nothing to act on this. The Parliament did ask for international bodies to intervene, but it could not oblige the Executive to act. Moldova has not exercised any control over the territory of Transdniestria from 1992 to the present day.

2. Tatiana LEÅžCO

30 . In June 1992 she was living in Tiraspol . She was not at home when her husband was arrested. She heard on the radio on 3 June that a terrorist group headed by Ilie Ilaşcu had been arrested. On 4 June she went to the militia where she was told that the name of Leşco did not appear in their ledger. For three days she had no news. On 6 June Starojouk, a public prosecutor, said to her, “I cannot tell you anything.” She went to see another prosecutor, but she was not allowed into his office; she was physically thrown out. She went back to the militia office where Starojouk confirmed that her husband had been arrested but gave no reason. On 8 June Starojouk received the witness in his office. He said that her husband had been arrested for committing terrorist offences. Although the witness had been married for twelve years, there had never been a word about terrorism during all those twelve years. On 9 June she was not allowed to see her husband. On 10 June she was taken to the basement; there was a terrible stench. She did not recognise him; his hair was unkempt; he resembled a skeleton.

31 . As to the arrest, the neighbours told her that it had occurred at 3.30 a.m. in the morning. A search of the apartment was carried out on 3 June. Her husband told her that people in uniform had come to arrest him. Four people. He could not see who did it. The janitor of the apartment building had called him. He had been told to get dressed and leave with them. He was arrested by a police officer, a Mr Gusan. He was taken in a Volga car and jeep with Mr Gusan and six other people. He was interrogated by Mr Gorbov and Mr Antiufeev, who is now a member of the Transdniestrian Government. He was held at the militia building where arrested civilians are taken. For six days there was nothing in the register about him.

When the witness saw her husband in the militia building, Starojouk was also there, in a separate office. The witness did not know if IlaÅŸcu was there as well. She did not know IlaÅŸcu personally. When she saw her husband for the first time he had done nothing but eat, wolfing down half a chicken, and he had drunk a lot of water. He said that they had not given him anything to eat or drink.

32 . The witness had a second meeting with him after a month or so. In the meantime she had not been allowed to see him or to give him any food. She had taken his dirty clothes away with her; they were full of vermin. His shirt was stained in the area of the kidneys. He had obviously been beaten up. The next meeting, after a month or so, was in the same building, in the basement again. And then there was another meeting after a further two months in Starojouk ' s office.

33 . The witness ' s husband told her that he had spent about a month at the headquarters of the Russian Fourteenth Army, at the Commandatura . He said it had been horrible. Three soldiers had kicked him in the chest and groin; he had passed blood in his urine; one of the soldiers had made a lewd suggestion. He had been taken to the lavatory once a day, allowed only 45 seconds to relieve himself, and then a dog was sent in and he was pushed back to his cell. He was not allowed to wash there was no water to wash with. There was no food or water. He did not know the names of the people who had ill-treated him. They had not introduced themselves. They were wearing the military uniform of the Russian Special Troops. They were heavily muscled men from the Fourteenth Army.

The witness ' s husband told her that when he was in the Commandatura of the Fourteenth Army it was the militia men who had the keys to the cell. The attack on him had occurred when the guards got drunk with three soldiers. The guards gave the soldiers the keys for some reason. It was then that the soldiers broke into his cell, assaulted him and tried to rape him.

34 . At the Commandatura he saw Ilie IlaÅŸcu being subjected to what turned out to be a mock execution. He saw Ilie IlaÅŸcu being led out, blindfolded; he heard the guns firing and then saw traces of bullets on the wall. But he then learnt that Ilie IlaÅŸcu was alive. The witness ' s husband mentioned to her two names: Gorbov and Antiufeev. He said that, after the Commandatura , they came to interrogate him every night back at the militia centre. Colonel Bergman was the commandant at the Commandatura . They saw one another at the Commandatura .

35 . After his conviction in 1993 the witness ' s husband was taken to Tiraspol Prison No. 2. That was the only prison where he had been detained. The first time that the witness was able to visit her husband there was after three months. She was allowed to leave food for him. After the trial she had regular meetings with him once a month, as laid down in the Criminal Code, through a glass screen. Letters were opened, but they did not correspond too often. Twice a year a long meeting was granted. Parcels were not always allowed. He was kept in an individual cell. There was no beating up, but he was subjected to moral pressure. The witness herself was called a Romanian prostitute. The guards would ask her, “Why did you sell out to Romania when you are a Russian?” There was ill-treatment of her husband in the militia building, but not in prison. The food in prison often had worms in it. She was sometimes allowed to bring in large food parcels.

Her husband has never said anything much about medical treatment in prison. He had a pancreatic crisis when the witness was there once. He was foaming at the mouth. She had to wait all day for any kind of treatment to arrive. In the end a doctor came and said that he needed an operation, otherwise he would die. He was made to walk with handcuffs and manacles on, despite his condition. The doctor gave the witness a list of medicines to get. The operation had been a success. He was manacled to the bed in hospital, despite being on an intravenous drip. The witness was allowed to visit him in hospital once a day but there were four armed guards present all the time. His stay in hospital had lasted two weeks.

36 . The witness claims that her husband did not receive any orders or instructions from the Moldovan authorities before he was arrested in 1992. She was with him all the time. He was a member of the Popular Front. After her husband ' s arrest they had to leave their residence. She went to plead with the factory-owner, but he said, “You must leave the flat, you are a terrorist ' s wife.” After ten days a woman with a child came to occupy the flat. The witness was chased away and went to Chişinău. Six months after the event she was given a hotel room by the Popular Front. Whenever she went to Tiraspol to visit her husband she stayed with a friend. Then eventually she was given a room as a refugee.

3. Eudochia IVANÅ¢OC

37 . The witness was living in Tiraspol on 2 June 1992 . She had not heard anything at all about a so-called IlaÅŸcu group before her husband was detained. They lived in Tiraspol and felt at home there.

38 . Her husband was arrested there when he was on his own. He told her that many armed people had entered the apartment, smashed their belongings, and beaten him unconscious. The persons who burst in were wearing black uniforms. Her husband was taken to the basement of the militia building in Tiraspol . The witness met him two days after his arrest. He was bruised on the forehead, the nail on one of his fingers was missing, and he was very dirty. They were forbidden to speak to one another in Romanian, but had to use Russian.

The witness met him in the office of the investigating offices, in the presence of three or four other people. It was a short meeting and it had been impossible for them to communicate properly. It was many weeks before the witness could send him a food parcel.

39 . From the militia building the prisoners were transferred to the Fourteenth Army Commandatura and then back to the militia building. Before their trial they were in either one or the other of these places. The witness had one short meeting with her husband during the period when he was being held at the Commandatura . She did not know that he was being held there. When she was in the militia building she saw him being brought into the building from a Volga car and it was then that Andrei told her, “We ' re being held at the Commandatura .” At that particular time they were refused any meetings. Before meetings he was prepared and cleaned up, so that the family would not see all the damage. “Boxers” were used in the basement to beat the detainees up. They had to speak in the Russian language and always in their presence.

40 . The conditions in the Commandatura were terrible. It was painful for the applicant to talk about it. He was kept alone in a cell; at midnight a bed was brought down from the wall for them to sleep on, but they were kept up during the whole day and so were not able to sleep properly. They were taken out to the toilet once a day, for a very short period; if they had not managed to relieve themselves in this very short period, dogs were let loose on them. They were not given much food. IlaÅŸcu and the others were detained there at the same time but in separate cells; the witness ' s husband was blindfolded when he was let out of the cell. The applicant told the witness that he had been kept in the Commandatura for two months, from July until August 1992. He was interrogated day and night; sometimes he was not allowed to sleep because the interrogations went on all night. He did not specifically tell the witness who interrogated him. The guards were from the Fourteenth Army. Gorbov, Starojouk and one other took part in the interrogation. He also mentioned the name of Bergman, but the witness could not remember exactly what he said in this connection.

41 . When he was held in police custody in Tiraspol the witness ' s husband was threatened with a sentence of death. The order was read out to him; he was taken out to be shot, and told, “Why do you want to bother about visits by your family if you are to be shot tomorrow?” There were times when he could not recognise the witness. Before his trial he was treated with psychotropic substances, so that his nervous system broke down. As a result, even today he suffers with constant headaches. His chronic diseases have got worse. He was in hospital for ten days before his trial. While detained in the militia building he was sent to Odessa for a psychiatric examination. He had not had any psychiatric examination until then. The findings of the Odessa examination had been destroyed. She knows from hearsay that he was kept naked on a concrete surface, but she cannot personally confirm that he tried to hang himself.

42 . Following the trial in 1993, the witness next saw her husband after a month as soon as she received the permission to meet him. Whenever events got worse, that affected visits. She was not able to visit her husband freely; she had to write to Mr Shevtsov to get approval. For a long time she was not allowed to give him newspapers in Romanian, but only in Russian. She could not correspond with him. He was kept in solitary confinement, in the toughest wing of the prison. It was very damp; there was a leaking roof and no daylight. There was permanent psychological pressure on him. In 1999 he was the victim of a physical attack when masked persons entered his cell, hit him with sticks and beat him up. Everything in his cell was broken and his personal effects were taken away. This is the time when he went on hunger strike. The 1999 incident occurred when the applicant ' s husband lodged his application with the European Court of Human Rights, or even before – when the Sturza Government was elected. He was not allowed to stay quietly in his cell, as there was a period of time when everyday someone tried to exert psychological pressure on him.

43 . The witness complained to various Moldovan authorities. She did not approach the Ministry of Justice directly. Together with the other wives, she approached the President of the Republic and the Ministry dealing with the Transdniestria issues. In reply, they were assured that negotiations were under way and things would be back to normal soon. This was so even when they applied to the Prosecutor General. But nothing ever came of these representations. The applicants ' wives also applied to the Ombudsman, but they were told that he could not go deeper into the case because he did not have sufficient power. The other side was not subject to his authority, and everything depended on higher authorities – in other words, the President ' s Office and the State authorities.

The OSCE mission visited her husband in prison after these representations in 1999.

44 . There was no proper access to medical assistance in the prison. The witness insisted that a doctor from Chişinău go to see him in the prison in Tiraspol . He had a liver condition, high blood pressure and a kidney condition. The witness brought all the medicine from home, as no medical care was dispensed in prison.

45 . On 15 February 2003 the witness was refused permission to see her husband, but she managed to see him one week later. He told her that again people had burst into his cell and broken all his personal effects.

46 . Although Andrei Ivanţoc needs a special diet, he does not receive what he needs. He cooks food for himself, from the parcels delivered to him by his family. The prison authorities in Tiraspol refused him access to a psychiatrist. Recently, however, a group of doctors from Chişinău had visited him, but they were then barred from presenting their written report to him. The prison doctor was present during this examination, together with three or four persons from the security service.

47 . The witness is not aware of her husband ever having received any instructions from the Republic of Moldova . There were no persons from the Republic of Moldova present during his interrogation, just persons from Tiraspol . Her feeling is that the Moldovan authorities could have been more insistent, and in particular could have involved international organisations.

4. Raisa PETROV-POPA

48 . In June 1992 the witness was living in Moldova in her parents ' village. Her brother was living in Tiraspol . He had been there for six years with his wife and family (his son). The witness was not in Tiraspol when he was arrested; she heard of his arrest one week after the event when his wife telephoned her. The applicant ' s wife told the witness that people had come at night and arrested him. She further told her that he had been taken to the premises of the Fourteenth Army. The witness saw him for the first time during his trial. She had no opportunity to talk to him, but only spoke to his wife, who told her that he had been ill-treated in custody. After the trial the witness occasionally visited him in prison. She very rarely wrote to him or received letters from him. When the family did send him letters, he frequently said that he had not received anything.

49 . The witness ' s brother was detained in Tiraspol Prison until last year. He did not speak about his treatment in prison. There were always persons present who prevented him during the visits from speaking about matters other than family matters. He sometimes said that he had been taken out of his cell at night or verbally abused. The applicant never spoke about any medical treatment.

50 . The witness had not approached the Moldovan authorities on behalf of her brother in order to seek his release; his wife had, but the witness did not know what authorities she had approached. Nor did she know whether the Moldovan authorities had tried to do anything following her brother ' s arrest and conviction.

51 . She brought the application on behalf of her brother. Before the trial she did not know Ilaşcu, Leşco or Ivanţoc.

5. Åžtefan URÃŽTU

52 . The witness was formerly a permanent resident of Tiraspol . He now lives in Chişinău. He is the Chairman of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee and a Professor at the Tiraspol State University with its headquarters in Chişinău.

53 . By June 1992 he had been living in Tiraspol for nineteen years. He knew Ilaşcu and Ivanţoc but not Leşco or Petrov-Popa. He had been a member of the Popular Front. But in 1992 Ilaşcu had published a statement saying that the witness was excluded from the Popular Front for expressing pro-Snegur views.

54 . He was arrested on 2 June 1992 , twelve hours after Ilaşcu. He did not know who the people arresting him were. He later came to understand that the public prosecutor Luchik and Colonel Bergman, the Fourteenth Army commander, were behind it. Luchik had been the Moldovan Prosecutor of the city of Tiraspol . Then the separatists had converted him into the Prosecutor of the “ Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic ”.

55 . The people arresting the witness were not in uniform. When he was arrested, there were some vehicles from the Russian Army surrounding his house. He was taken to the militia building in Tiraspol . He did not see Bergman himself, but he saw the army vehicles and was told by those arresting him that Bergman was involved.

56 . The witness was held in the militia building from 2 June until 21 August 1992 . He saw Ilaşcu there through a crack in the door, but for most of the time Ilaşcu was kept at the Fourteenth Army building for security reasons. Opposite the witness ' s cell were Leşco, Ilaşcu, Ivanţoc and the others, except for the time when the applicants were taken to the Fourteenth Army. The main six detainees were kept there until September 1992. Over 30 people had been arrested in the operation. At one point the witness heard the scream of a crazy person. It was Ivanţoc, because they had told him that he was to be shot that day.

57 . The witness talked to LeÅŸco, who said that the conditions in the militia building were quite good compared to those at the Fourteenth Army. The other prisoner who was sharing the witness ' s cell also told him that his colleagues had been taken to the Fourteenth Army because the security was much stricter there. All this was done when the fighting was going on in Bender.

58 . He was told by those who were detained at the Commandatura that their beds were raised against the wall at 5 or 6 a.m. , that they were given no food, that there was no light in their cell, and so on. LeÅŸco also told him that they were subjected to mock executions.

59 . The witness received a letter from a potential witness at the trial saying that he had been warned that if he kept to his testimony that IlaÅŸcu had been beaten, he would lose his job. He is now in detention. A person who gave evidence at the 1993 trial in Tiraspol was summoned by the Tiraspol authorities and asked if he would give the same evidence now.

60 . During his detention in the militia building, the witness was interrogated by Shevtsov, or Antiufeev as he now calls himself. The witness was Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights created in 1990 and had access to information concerning the situation in Transdniestria. Many people came to see them for information. The constitutional Moldovan authorities avoided responsibility for what the separatists were doing. Shevtsov, whom the witness did not know at the time, was a better-trained professional than any Moldovan would have been. The witness told him that he gave the impression of being from Russia – because of his Moscow accent and because of his being so professional at his job. When he saw Shevtsov later on the television, he realised who he was. He was the person who had organised the attack on the Riga television tower in 1991. He and the eleven colleagues who accompanied him to Tiraspol had created a network in the Baltic Republics , but they were then ordered by Moscow to Tiraspol . He used to be called by the name of Antiufeev, but in his fourth passport he had the name Shevtsov. He does not conceal now that Antiufeev and Shevtsov are one and the same person.

61 . The witness was interrogated only once in the presence of a lawyer. Another time he was interrogated at night by Mr Gorbov and another. They ill-treated him and tried to get him to sign a document, but he refused.

62 . The witness was not tried. He was released after 82 days of detention. He does not know why he was released, although he was subject to the same charges of terrorism. During the applicants ' trial the witness sent a telegram to the President of the so-called Supreme Court of Transdniestria, Mrs Ivanova, asking to be heard by the court. He was refused. The answer given was that he was a criminal who deserved to be in the cage with Ilaşcu, and he could not be heard as a witness. Prosecutor Lukiç, whom the witness contacted, told him he could not protect him a second time.

63 . He had been released on signing an undertaking that he would not leave Tiraspol . Starojouk drove him to his home in Tiraspol . No personal belongings had been taken from his apartment. The witness promised not to make statements to the press. He was contacted by the Memorial group in Odessa , who invited him to Odessa . When he asked for permission to go to Ukraine , he was first refused, but in the end he obtained that permission. However, the witness fled to Chişinău instead of going to Ukraine .

64 . The witness stated that Ivanţoc ' s house had been surrounded by military vehicles and he had concluded that the Fourteenth Army and Colonel Bergman took part in the arrest.

65 . General Iakovlev had previously been arrested by the Moldovan authorities for providing arms to the separatists. The witness had seen the register, detailing how much weaponry had been given and to whom. It was given to people in their homes so that they could resist the constitutional forces of Moldova . As regards the arrest of General Iakovlev, the witness had heard that Mr. IlaÅŸcu was there to confirm to the arresting officers that they had the right person. Iakovlev was in plain clothes and about to flee to Odessa because he suspected that he was about to be arrested.

66 . General Iakovlev was subsequently exchanged for 28 Moldovans. On another occasion, 23 Moldovan policemen were exchanged for 23 paramilitary soldiers. Groups of 25 to 35 people were regularly sent from Transdniestria to Moscow to be trained in military and security matters, in order to create battalions. The witness knew about this from the soldiers.

67 . After his release, the witness had visited Tiraspol several times. Once he was part of a delegation of the Helsinki Committee. Another time he went there without warning the Transdniestrian guards.

68 . The witness considers that Moldova did not and does not do all that it can to ensure compliance with Moldovan legislation for the 600,000 hostages that are being held in Transdniestria by the separatist regime.

69 . Concerning the Russian involvement in the events, the witness stated the following. High-placed Russian personalities had visited Tiraspol as early as 1989 when the first law on languages in Moldova was adopted. Russian officials had also come to Chişinău. The Moscow Institute of International Relations had developed the idea of Transdniestria in case Moldova did not accept some degree of cultural autonomy. The creation of a tribunal to prosecute Moldova for violating humanitarian law had been mooted. The KGB forces were at this time out of control in Moscow ; they were seeking to keep the Soviet empire in existence. It was Nikolai Midveev, member of a Russian Federation Parliamentary Committee, who requested the release of Smirnov when he was being held in detention. He offered certain guarantees for Smirnov ' s release, for instance, Smirnov would not continue to destroy the Moldovan State structures, he would not contravene the legislation of Moldova , and the Russian Federation would ratify the Moldovan-Russian Agreement. However, this agreement was not ratified until 2001, when the Communist Party regime came to power in Moldova . Behind these manoeuvres were the FSB, the Cossacks and other structures created by Russia whenever it was a question of a territory where they wanted to keep control.

70 . On the day of the witness ' s arrest, when he was taken to the security service, he saw an important person coming out of the building. It was Makashov. He had visited the separatist republic and said that with such weaponry they would not be able to fight the Romanian fascists, that he was going to send them better arms and that Russia would help. Material was sent later from Russia , around one hundred units of Radio-Guided Anti-Tank Missiles, but only fifteen of them reached Tiraspol . Then there were the declarations of Mr Dakov, the Tiraspol Minister of Light Industries. He had admitted that the Fourteenth Army used to wear the uniform of the separatists or civilian clothing when fighting on the side of the separatists. Soldiers of the Fourteenth Army had been killed in the fighting. For instance, in about April 1992 an officer and four soldiers of the Fourteenth Army had been killed in the war. Their bodies had been brought from the front to be sent to the Russian Federation , and the witness and his students had seen them, as they had participated in the farewell ceremony.

71 . The Cossack troops who had taken part in the fighting were mobilised by the Russian Federation when it realised that the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union could not be maintained. The Cossacks had arrived in 1990. Russia said that this was a private initiative, not linked to the authorities. They lived in hotels. In 1992, on 1 or 2 March when the war started, their objective had been to prevent Moldova joining the United Nations. In Bender and Dubăsari, where there remained the last constitutional police station, the last place in Transdniestria where Moldova was maintaining a law-enforcement presence, there was an assault organised by Rateyev, one of the Cossacks. He was a member of the Alpha Group, which was one of the leading Russian security groups.

72 . In 1993 the separatist regime set up a parliament. General Lebed was elected to the Supreme Soviet. General Lebed himself declared that he was the one who guaranteed the independence of the Transdniestrian Republic , and that he had caused a few shots to be fired on a number of occasions from “Grad” launching pads in the direction of Moldovan territory. After that, Lebed said, President Snegur had agreed to sit at the negotiation table with Smirnov.

73 . During the war, the Transdniestrian side had tanks and armoured vehicles bearing the emblem of the Russian army – the witness had seen that himself – in addition to the Cossack troops. The witness went to Bender once. When he crossed the bridge on foot he saw many tanks carrying the Russian three-coloured flag. On other tanks the separatist flag was flying. He asked why Russian troops and separatist troops were there and he was told that both had taken part in the shooting. At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in Chişinău, where the negotiations took place, the witness made a statement in front of the ministers of foreign affairs present, including Mr Kozyrev and Mr Netkachiov, who was the Commander of the Fourteenth Army at that time. The witness told them he would lodge a protest because the Fourteenth Army was directly involved in the war. The participants in the negotiations replied that they would leave for Bender and try to gain evidence of that themselves.

74 . After his release the witness did all that he could to get the remaining six freed. They represented a symbol for the Transdniestrian regime, to discourage others from expressing political views. He was told by Prosecutor Irtenev that Moscow was interested in securing the release of people held by the Moldovan authorities. Prosecutor Irtenev told the witness that Moldova had been cheated, in that other, less important people had been released, but not the witness ' s six colleagues. Moldova released everyone, whether Russian or from Tiraspol , who had taken part in the fighting, whereas the Tiraspol regime had not released everyone, had not responded in kind.

75 . The witness did not know why he was arrested or why he was released. There was a letter from the Moldovan Ministry of Education asking for his release, the Ministry undertaking to ensure that the witness would be present for the purposes of the investigation. The witness possessed much information about the separatists, and for that reason he was not a convenient witness for the trial. Alex Kokotkin, a journalist for a Russian newspaper, had tried, before his arrest, to convince him of the benefits of collaborating with the separatist regime. The witness had seen him later in the office of the investigators, acting as if he was a boss. Kokotkin told him that additional Russian troops had been brought in to secure Transdniestrian independence; they were called peace-keeping troops. This journalist might have played a significant role in obtaining the witness ' s release.

76 . The witness also stated that he could name the persons who had gone to Moscow for military training for membership of a Dniester battalion. He knew who did the recruitment and where they went. He also knew the Russian secret services who installed special telephone devices for tapping official Moldovan telephone calls.

6. Constantin ŢÎBÎRNĂ

77 . The witness is the Director of the Surgical Clinic at the State University , Chişinău. He has been in Transdniestria lecturing and teaching; he also had professional relations there.

78 . He was requested by the Ministry of Health of Moldova to examine the Ilaşcu group in prison in Tiraspol . The Moldovan authorities in Chişinău even provided him with a car to go to the prison in Transdniestria. He would not have gone to examine these prisoners if he had not been invited to do so by the Moldovan Ministry of Health. There he carried out the examination, together with doctors from Tiraspol , and then he discussed with them the diagnosis and the treatment.

79 . When he examined the applicants, Ilaşcu was in Hlinaia, the others were in Tiraspol Prison. The prisoners made no complaints about the Russian Federation . They only discussed medical matters in fact. The witness did not see any signs of beatings, bruises or ill-treatment when he examined the prisoners. The level of medical assistance in prisons was very simple; there was no equipment, but Chişinău prisons looked very much like the prisons in Transdniestria.

80 . He saw Mr IlaÅŸcu himself only once. He looked like an ordinary prisoner, but he did have a disorder of the digestive tract. However, his condition did not necessitate any intervention by a surgeon; no surgery was necessary, and so he was treated by a gastro-enterologist.

81 . The witness examined Mr LeÅŸco when he was in hospital recovering from pancreatitis, after he had undergone a surgical operation. He was invited to examine Mr LeÅŸco because he was recognised as an expert on this condition. Mr LeÅŸco was introduced to him by the doctor who had operated on him earlier. He had seen the applicant in hospital, when he was suffering from acute pancreatitis. This is a severe condition, with a mortality of 20 to 30%. He also saw him later, when he was suffering from chronic pancreatitis, which often follows acute pancreatitis. He could have acquired pancreatitis during his childhood, although acute pancreatitis could also be the result of stressful conditions. The witness and a team of doctors, led by Dr. S. LeÅŸanu, examined the applicant and recommended further treatment.

82 . The witness saw Mr Ivanţoc in prison. He detected changes in his liver by means of an ultrasound examination and liquid in the abdominal cavity, which is a sign of high blood pressure.

83 . The witness made his notes on the applicants ' cases on sheets of paper provided by the prison doctors. They kept these notes for their archives. The witness then made his own report for his own personal purposes. He last went there over a year ago.

84 . There is freedom of movement of doctors from Moldova to Transdniestria and vice-versa.

7. Nicolae LEÅžANU

85 . The witness is the chief doctor on curative issues at the State Hospital of the Republic of Moldova . Until seven years ago he was working as adviser to the President of Moldova and was his personal physician. At his request he was sent to Tiraspol to see the three applicants detained there and to Hlinaia Prison to see Mr. IlaÅŸcu. The wife of Mr IlaÅŸcu had made representations to the President who, as a result, had done what he could to help. As part of his help he sent the witness to examine the applicants in prison in Transdniestria. As adviser to the President, the witness could talk to the local authorities in Transdniestria.

86 . The witness went to Transdniestria six times in all. The President and the relatives of the applicants were worried about their medical state in prison. The witness had to keep the President informed of their medical condition. He usually took other doctors with him, for example, Professor Ţîbîrnă and a gastro-enterologist.

87 . The applicants did not complain about ill-treatment.

88 . The medical notes made on the applicants were left behind with the prison authorities there. The team of doctors insisted that the prison medical service should follow their recommendations, which concerned the applicants ' medical treatment, medication and diet.

89 . Mr. Ilaşcu said that he did not trust the prison authorities or the prison medical service, as he was afraid of having drugs administered to him by the prison authorities. He accepted medicine supplied by the family or by the doctors coming from Chişinău.

90 . The examinations that the witness ' s team had carried out in Transdniestria were joint examinations with the doctors there. The applicants detained in Tiraspol Prison were subject to a freer regime than in Hlinaia Prison. In Tiraspol Prison there was a medical unit and only doctors were present during medical examinations.

91 . At Hlinaia Prison the regime was stricter. There was always someone from the prison service standing by, as well as the doctors.

92 . The witness and his team found no evidence either of physical ill-treatment or of the administration of psychotropic drugs.

93 . The witness visited the applicants for the last time in 1997 or thereabouts. He refused to go after that, despite a request from the Ministry of Justice, because he no longer had the powers that he used to have when he was the President ' s adviser.

8. Andrei IVANÅ¢OC

94 . On the morning of 2 June 1992 , nine or ten members of the special forces came in cars and arrested him. They were military people in plain clothes, wearing masks. In the group that arrested him he saw a lieutenant from the Russian special forces. They beat him up and took him to a basement at the pre-trial detention centre, which was a militia building. The applicant had never been there before – that is to say, the building where the basement was. He cannot say how long he spent there. He was blindfolded; there was no light. It may have been one hour, one day, but no more. He did not see Leşco or Ilaşcu in the militia building. He saw them later at the Commandatura .

95 . He was then taken to the Commandatura of the Fourteenth Army. There he was interrogated by military people. Upstairs there were special elite troops and Alpha troops. Colonel Bergman was the commander of the Fourteenth Army. The applicant saw him personally, but Colonel Bergman did not interrogate him.

96 . The conditions at the Commandatura were inhuman. Detainees were beaten up day and night by the marines and by Special Forces, who used batons and boots. They would throw green gas capsules into the cells. The applicants were detained in different cells. There were also other people detained there, including Mr Godiac. The conditions of detention there were very bad. They were taken to the toilet once every 24 hours and chased out by a dog if they did not finish in the time allotted to them. At that point the applicant wanted to hang himself.

Then he was administered drugs. He was delirious; he imagined things. His psychiatric problems resulted from his beatings.

The guards at the Commandatura , like everything there, were under the control of the Fourteenth Army. The special forces and marines all had Russian insignia on their uniforms. It was the Russian special forces and marines who beat them up saying that they were Romanian peasants. They had Russian emblems on their uniforms. The applicant thought that they were Russian marines because they had the berets and shirts of marines with Russian emblems on them.

The worst ill-treatment he suffered was at the Commandatura . It was total savagery.

97 . From the Commandatura of the Fourteenth Army he was taken to a psychiatric hospital in Tiraspol , where he spent one month. They then took him from the hospital back to the Commandatura , but as Colonel Bergman told the guardsmen that he did not want him there, he was taken back to the pre-trial detention centre. The applicant does not know how long IlaÅŸcu and LeÅŸco were held at the Commandatura after he left. He next saw them at the trial in the autumn.

98 . After September 1992, when he and the others were transferred to the basement of the pre-trial centre, they were also beaten up. They were taken out day and night. This was done in a special room, an investigation room. The applicant was beaten up until he lost consciousness, he was drugged, and his head was banged against the wall, or squeezed between the door and the wall. That was done by people from the Transdniestrian side.

99 . After the trial they were only occasionally beaten up. The applicants complained to the OSCE. Mr Antiufeev was the head of all that. At one point a Ministerial Commission came to investigate. The applicants were not examined by doctors. In any event, the prison authorities isolated them until the bruises were gone. The OSCE Commission came one month later, after the beatings, but there were not many traces left by then.

100 . The worst period of ill-treatment was in 1992, when they came to the applicant ' s cell and to IlaÅŸcu ' s. It was Antiufeev and Gusarov who were the prime movers.

101 . Currently the applicant is in solitary confinement: He sees no daylight, and only exercises for two hours a day.

102 . The doctors in the prison service were little better than veterinary surgeons. The prison doctor in the applicant ' s prison was in fact a dentist by profession. Professor Ţîbîrnă had visited the applicant. He had also been visited by other doctors from Tiraspol , including the surgeon who performed an operation on him. These doctors came only because he was ill; they did not come when he was beaten up. The applicant went on hunger strike on one occasion, but couldn ' t remember if he was examined by doctors then. Two of these medical examinations had taken place in special cells set aside for that purpose.

103 . In January 2003 he was in a room where prisoners are allowed long-term meetings. He had never been examined by a doctor in his own cell. During the examinations there was always someone from the prison administration there to check and control.

104 . Only relatives are allowed for family visits. Sometimes parcels are allowed, but on occasions there are problems with parcels. The applicants are not permitted to write or receive letters in Romanian or to receive Romanian newspapers. Two weeks before the hearings in February 2003, he had been seen by the Red Cross and, before that, by doctors from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.

105 . The most recent visit he had had was two weeks before the hearings in February 2003, when he was visited by a lady judge in connection with the Torture Committee.

106 . He has no right to correspond with persons outside the prison, whether lawyers or not.

107 . In May 1999, while he was in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, after he lodged his application with the European Court of Human Rights, he was subjected to ill-treatment there as well. Military forces came into his cell and beat him up. These were military people under the command of Gusarov and Captain Matrovski and people under Antiufeev/Shevtsov. He was told that if he did not withdraw his application he would be eliminated. Afterwards he went on hunger strike and wrote a complaint; and then a commission of investigation came.

108 . The only medical visits he had had were from doctors coming from Chişinău. The prison doctor Lieutenant-Colonel Samsonov was a dentist. The applicant claims that he has not received any services from the prison doctors.

109 . His cell and his belongings in it have been damaged. The first time this happened was on 16 November 2002 , and the last time was on 22 February 2003 or thereabouts.

110 . The applicant considers that everything that has been done to him, and that is now being done to him, has been done at Russian instigation.

111 . Lieutenant-Colonel Gorbov had been present at the arrest of Ilaşcu. Moldova did not and does not control the territory of Transdniestria , but the Moldovan authorities could have done more at the time to help them. They did nothing. The militia of Dubăsari were handed over to the Cossacks and beaten up. Russia had played games with Moldova . If this had not happened, Transdniestria would not have existed. So Moldova was responsible. The Chairman of the Russian State Duma, Mr. Selezniov, had come to the Moldovan parliament and said that, if it had not been for Russia , Moldova would have been part of Romania .

112 . After May 1998 the applicant did not see any Russian officials.

9. Alexandru LEÅžCO

113 . At the time of the events, in 1992, the applicant had been living in Tiraspol since 1973. On 2 June 1992 he was awakened at 2 a.m. when four armed persons entered his house and arrested him. Among them was a person called Gusan. He was in plain clothes and not armed. He showed the applicant his documents. The others were wearing khaki; they were military personnel and armed. He was taken by car to the detention centre. He was not beaten then; that came later. He had a three-hour interrogation with Shevtsov, also known as Antiufeev, with Gorbov and with a third person whom the applicant did not know. He was then taken to the basement, where he stayed for six days. On the second day he was put in a solitary cell. The interrogations started in earnest. They went on from 2 June until 1 or 2 July. He did not see Ivanţoc or Ilaşcu during that month. During this period he was interrogated and ill-treated.

114 . On 1 or 2 July he was taken to the Commandatura building. He was taken there in a car with the Russian emblem on the side and the Russian three-coloured flag on it. The applicant was taken there twice on the same day. The first time it was Delta people, Dniester people. The second time it was different people, Fourteenth Army personnel. They entered the base from a different entrance. He stayed there until 7 or 8 August in solitary confinement. The cells were on the ground floor. The applicant could not see the others – that is, Ilaşcu, Ivanţoc, Godiac. He didn ' t see Mr Petrov-Popa. And the guards there ill-treated him a few times. He was not interrogated in the Commandatura , just beaten up three times. He knew that Colonel Bergman was the commandant, but he did not have any meetings with him or see him. Starojouk, who was leading the investigation in his case, was at the Commandatura twice. He showed the applicant newspaper reports that Plugaru [the Minister of National Security of Moldova during the 1991-1992 events] had been dismissed, and that a peace agreement with Russia had been signed.

115 . The conditions were very harsh in the Commandatura . The food was good because they ate from the soldiers ' rations. But sometimes there was no access to a toilet for two or three days. They would then be taken out into the corridor and to the toilet by a guard who had an Alsatian dog called Chan. They were only given 45 seconds, which was not enough time, and then the dog was let loose on them. This is why the applicants refused food, in order to get more time to go to the toilet. The applicant had to relieve himself into plastic bags because he was not sure whether the next day he would be taken to the toilet. This went on for a whole month or so. At the weekends, when there were few commanders present in the buildings, the guards would come into their cells and assault them. They would say that they were acting against Russia and Russian citizens and they would beat them up.

116 . At the Commandatura he saw through a hole in the window of his cell Ilaşcu being taken out of the building. The guards stopped him and said, “You ' re next.” He saw that Ilaşcu refused to be blindfolded and he was put up against a wall. Ilaşcu said that he had been subjected to mock executions four times. The applicant saw it only once.

117 . He was only once beaten with batons, but he was scared all the time. At the weekend there were people who entered his cell. They had Russian insignia on their sleeves.

He stayed at the Commandatura until the beginning of August and then he was taken back to the basement at the pre-trial detention centre.

118 . In the pre-trial centre he was interrogated three or four times by civilian investigators, and beaten with a stick, but less than the other applicants. As for the conditions of detention there, he had a bath once every ten days. There was no toilet in the cell, so he was taken out of the cell each morning to go to the toilet. The applicant had no visits from his family or a lawyer for the first five or six months of his detention.

119 . After the trial he was taken to Tiraspol Prison No. 2. There were no sheets or blankets, and he slept on bare benches. He was not personally ill-treated in prison. He was not allowed to see his wife or his lawyer for six weeks.

He received no medical visits from local doctors. When the applicants met their wives, they would ask for Chişinău doctors to come; and then they were visited a few times. Professor Ţîbîrnă saw the applicant in 1996 when he had chronic pancreatitis. Doctor Leşanu also came to see him. He complained to these doctors about the prison conditions but not about any ill-treatment after the trial. His colleagues were held in separate cells, so he cannot confirm or deny that they were ill-treated. It was in 1992 and 1993 that all the applicants were ill-treated.

He had have received regular visits from his family. Lately he has been receiving parcels; in the beginning there were many more restrictions. It depended on how the prison administration felt.

120 . The Moldovan Government authorities could do much more. Although the applicant ' s wife told him that the Moldovan authorities have been trying to assist her during his detention, he considers that they could have done more after the conflict ended.

121 . The applicant heard about the so-called “Ilaşcu group” for the first time when he was arrested. He has never belonged to the military or secret services of Moldova .

122 . Since the events of 2 March 1992 , the constitutional forces of Moldova had ceased to exercise control over the Eastern side of the Dniester River ; there was a state of curfew in force in the town, with no authorisation to leave the house after 10 p.m.

10. Tudor PETROV-POPA

123 . On 2 June 1992 he lived in Tiraspol . Victor Gusan arrested him, together with a group of other persons all in civilian clothing. He was at home; it was 6 a.m.

124 . He was taken to the militia building. He was not immediately interrogated there. He stayed there until 12 noon . Then he was taken to the basement and put in a cell. He was kept there seven months. He was beaten up and ill-treated at the militia building.

The guards at the militia building told him that they came from various cities in Russia . They had uniforms, but with no insignia on them.

The applicant saw Starojouk and Gorbov. They interrogated him. They did not wear masks when interrogating him. They did not interrogate him about any links with IlaÅŸcu and the Popular Front. They simply wanted him to admit that he was part of the so-called IlaÅŸcu group and to confirm what they said. He was not a member of any political party, but he did not want to fight on the Transdniestrian side. He had been a soldier in Afghanistan . He had never met IlaÅŸcu. There were no Transdniestrian military forces in Transdniestria then, the only ones there being Russian. They were the ones who had beaten him. He was beaten by military men who wore masks, so he did not know who they were.

125 . Then he was taken to Tiraspol Prison. Before the trial, he was kept at the militia station for several months, and then in solitary confinement at Tiraspol Prison. He was never taken to the Fourteenth Army Headquarters. He was interrogated during his detention by persons who were wearing masks.

126 . The applicant did not know Gorbov. He had met Bergman at the trial. He did not really see Ilaşcu or Ivanţoc during his detention. He did not know any of them before the trial.

He was not visited by a lawyer at all during the investigation, only after.

127 . After the trial he suffered no ill-treatment. At the time of the hearing the applicant was detained alone in a cell in Hlinaia Prison, where IlaÅŸcu was.

In 1995 the applicant was visited by Professor Ţîbîrnă accompanied by Doctor Leşanu, in Tiraspol . In 1999 he was transferred to Hlinaia Prison, where the regime was harsher. He had no medical treatment there. He contracted tuberculosis in 1999. He had been offered medical treatment provided that he asked for a pardon. If he had done so he would have been transferred to a medical unit, but he refused.

128 . He has received family visits, but guards are always present. He has corresponded with his family, but they are not permitted to write to him in Latin script. He receives about six parcels per year.

129 . The Moldovan Government had not done all that it could. In fact it had done nothing; otherwise the applicants would already have been released. However, his family had been given material and financial assistance by the Moldovan Government.

130 . The applicant saw ammunition being given to the population in 1992. This ammunition was taken from the Fourteenth Army. The Transdniestrian army came from the Fourteenth Army, which had been the only one there before the Transdniestrian regime suddenly seemed to have armed forces of its own.

11. Colonel Vladimir GOLOVACHEV

131 . The witness previously worked in Moscow and had come to Tiraspol in 1985. He had started working in the prison service in Transdniestria before the conflict began. He had simply remained at his post when he received the order to do so.

He was born in the territory of Soviet Moldova and has a Soviet passport, with a paper in it saying that he is a citizen of the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”.

132 . Since July 1993 he has been the Governor of Prison No. 2 where is a harsher regime than in Prison No. 3, which has women prisoners. All the various conditions governing visits, whether long or short, parcels and so on are to be found in the Prison Rules. Prisoners who do not break the Rules benefit from all such entitlements. The strict regime includes all the common-use facilities, such as the small factory, the sporting facilities and so on, but also solitary confinement and a wing where dangerous prisoners are kept together. Exercise walks are not available for persons in special cells.

133 . Mr Ivanţoc is kept in a cell on his own, a cell designed for six prisoners, because he refused to go on to the ordinary regime. Mr Leşco is kept in the ordinary part of the prison and enjoys all the normal rights. This entails four short visits and two long visits per year. There has never been any problem about visits by lawyers. Persons detained under the strict regime however do not often ask to see lawyers.

134 . There was no deterioration in the applicants ' conditions as from 1999. Mr Ilascu never made a complaint about this.

135 . Mr Ivanţoc received medical visits from doctors coming from Chişinău.

136 . As to the existence of any agreements or rules regarding the transfer of prisoners to or from Moldova or elsewhere, the witness stated that this is a high-level matter. For example, there has recently been such an arrangement agreed with Russia . But such things are done at government level; it was not for the witness to decide.

137 . The witness was not aware that the Prosecutor General of Moldova had started criminal proceedings against him for unlawful imprisonment.

138 . Mr Ilaşcu was released in May 2001. He was freed by virtue of a decree by the President of Transdniestria and an order of the Minister of Justice, Mr Balala. He did not know how this happened, nor did he know who had accompanied Ilaşcu to Chişinău.

139 . Concerning the treatment of sick prisoners, they were previously transferred to Benderi hospital. Lately, however, this practice had been discontinued because of problems. Therefore, for ordinary illnesses the treatment took place in prison. Prisoners were taken to Tiraspol hospital for surgical operations and other delicate matters because they had no sophisticated surgical facilities in the prison.

140 . Prisoners do not often ask for a visit from a lawyer. If the lawyer has a proper permit, then the Governor will give authorisation for the visit to take place. It is the Minister of Justice who issues the permits. In Prison No. 2 there are only convicted prisoners, no remand prisoners. Pre-trial detention takes place in this part of the building, in Prison No. 3.

141 . Mr. IlaÅŸcu was kept in Prison No. 2 on his own from 1997 until he was freed. He was kept in cell no. 13. He was held in a cell on his own because they had never had such a category of prisoner before. There was therefore no point in putting him together with ordinary criminals. Mr IlaÅŸcu was not asked whether he wanted this. The witness knew nothing about IlaÅŸcu ' s allegation that on 13 May 1999 civilians wearing balaclavas came into his cell and assaulted him, and then took him out into the corridor. He never received such a complaint from him about this. The prison service does carry out periodic searches of the cells and the prisoners, but no one ever wears a balaclava helmet. When the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture carried out a visit, the witness was asked about members of the IlaÅŸcu group being beaten in May 1999, and he stated that as Governor he had never received any complaints from the applicants in this connection.

142 . Prisoners can complain about alleged assault by prison staff, interference with parcels and so on from 7.30 to 9.30 a.m. The witness stated that he was available to meet the prisoners and, if necessary, to hear their complaints.

143 . The prisons in Transdniestria are run in accordance with the new Prison Code. The Moldovan Code is not applicable there. Prison No. 2, like all the other prisons there, has been under the control of the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” since December 1992. Since that date the prison service in Transdniestria has not taken orders from the Government of Moldova. The Moldovan Government cannot take any decisions about these prisons. In 1992 there were in the Transdniestrian prisons some prisoners convicted by Moldovan courts, but gradually from then on there was a transfer of prisoners. Before 1991 transfers of prisoners were carried out all over the Soviet Union .

144 . Mr Ivanţoc was a victim of his own actions, because he had refused to leave his cell. As a consequence he had lost all his entitlements. He was in a cell by himself because he did not wish to share a cell with others.

145 . The possibility of early release is decided after reviewing the prisoner ' s file. But the applicants in this case have never asked for any such review. They addressed all their requests to the Moldovan Government.

146 . As Governor the witness has never had to discipline prison officers for ill-treatment – just for transmitting messages illegally outside the prison and that sort of thing.

147 . The uniform of the prison guards is similar to the Russian uniform. The insignia are different. The Transdniestrian officials do not take orders from the prison authorities in Russia but they do cooperate with them. Russian soldiers have never participated in guarding prisoners in Transdniestria, since these prisons are not within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation .

148 . The applicants ' lawyers had never asked for a meeting with their clients. Had they done so, such a request would have been properly considered.

149 . There is no law or official rule that prohibits prisoners ' correspondence in Romanian, but the prison administration uses the language which is common in Transdniestria, namely Russian. They must be able to have censors who are capable of reading the prisoners ' correspondence. But the prisoners are allowed to receive newspapers in Romanian.

12. Stepan Konstantinovich CHERBEBSHI

150 . The witness was born in Russia . From 1989 to 1991 he worked in the militia office and from 1984 to 1989 in the prison service. He was the Governor of Prison No. 1 from 1992 until 2001, and Deputy Governor before 1992. At the time of the hearing, the witness was retired. His pension is paid by the Ministry of Justice of the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”.

151 . In Hlinaia Prison, prisoners are held alone in their cell which measures 16 square metres. As regards the rules on visitors, correspondence and parcels, convicted detainees were entitled to receive visits but they had to get permission first according to the Prison Rules. However, prisoners in pre-trial detention had no right at all to correspond.

152 . The witness was not aware of the rules as to visits from lawyers.

153 . There was a medical department in the prison, with a pharmacy, but there was no clinic with beds. For that civil facilities were used. Medical visits occurred upon request from the prisoner. The applicants had been examined by outside doctors from Moldova .

154 . After their trial the applicants were sent to Hlinaia Prison. IlaÅŸcu was held separately and the other three were in one cell together. They had the right to leave the cell and to have an exercise walk for one hour per day. Those who were ill had one additional hour of exercise.

155 . Hlinaia Prison had a special wing for tuberculosis sufferers, but Petrov-Popa was not a prisoner when the witness was Governor of Hlinaia Prison.

156 . IlaÅŸcu had been subject to special conditions in prison because he had been sentenced to death. He was not allowed to share his cell with other prisoners. The window of IlaÅŸcu ' s cell had shutters which closed from the outside. The light still came through, but the prisoner could not look through the shutter. For IlaÅŸcu special permission from the Ministry of Justice was needed before anyone could visit him.

157 . The witness never received any official complaints from IlaÅŸcu about his treatment when in Hlinaia Prison. He never heard that IlaÅŸcu ' s sentence had been quashed by the Moldovan Supreme Court. IlaÅŸcu was not the only death-penalty prisoner: there was one other, who was kept in the same conditions.

158 . Hlinaia Prison was not subordinate to the Supreme Court of Moldova and the organs of the Moldovan State and the Moldovan Government had no authority over the prison service in Transdniestria.

159 . The witness never received any orders either from Russia or from the Russian military authorities stationed here. There were no Russians guarding the prisons in Transdniestria. The uniform of the prison service in Transdniestria was similar to the Russian military uniform, during his professional service.

160 . A prison governor has no power, without a superior order, to make a decision on the transfer of a prisoner. During the time the witness was Prison Governor, he never had a prisoner transferred from another country, for example Russia . For a transfer from the penitentiary system of one country to another there must be a special order.

13. Sergey KUTOVOY

161 . The witness has been the Governor of Prison No. 1 since 2001. He entered the penitentiary system in 1993 and has spent his professional career in prison administration. He is also studying for an Open University degree.

162 . In 2000 a new Criminal Code and new internal Prison Rules of the “MRT” had been introduced. The position was significantly different before, when the legislation and rules of the Moldovan Republic applied. Under the new regime prisoners ' conditions have been improved. More visits are allowed and, with good behaviour, the entitlements can be increased, for example with three additional visits. As regards visits by lawyers, convicted prisoners can receive visits without restriction. The Hlinaia Prison has round-the-clock medical care.

163 . No complaint was ever received from the prisoners about their conditions of detention. None were made to the Council of Europe ' s Committee for the Prevention of Torture. But it was true that a very recent report by this Committee made certain criticisms concerning the covering of the windows in the cells and the regime of isolation. The investigation of a member of the prison staff after a complaint by a prisoner was rather an exception. There had been no more than twelve since the witness had taken up his duties.

164 . The right of a convicted prisoner to receive a visit from his lawyer depends on the seriousness of the crime for which the prisoner is detained, on whether he has previous convictions and so on. There are three categories of prison regime. The prison authorities apply the courts ' decision as to what regime is to be applied to a prisoner. The prison administration can subsequently change the regime – for example, if the prisoner has committed a breach of the prison regulations.

165 . Neither the Prison Administration in Moscow , nor the Russian Operational Group in Tiraspol can give orders to the Prison Administration in Transdniestria.

166 . The transfer of a prisoner from one institution to another can only be decided by a court. The Government decide on an extradition case.

167 . At the time of the hearing, the only one of the applicants detained there was Petrov-Popa. Cell no. 31 used to be occupied by Ilaşcu. The cell had a standard window with shutters. These shutters are the same as those used in Chişinău prisons. Recently, in Hlinaia Prison the shutters had been dismantled in six cells, but for lack of financial and technical means it had not been possible to remove them in all cells, as the shutters needed to be replaced with bars.

168 . Prisoners suffering from tuberculosis are detained in all zones of the prison; there are no specialised units for such patients. Mr Petrov-Popa, who had tuberculosis, had moved into the cell previously occupied by Mr IlaÅŸcu. He was allowed to go for exercise walks just like the other prisoners. In 2002 Mr Petrov-Popa ' s regime had been improved on the witness ' s orders. He was the only prisoner to have benefited from a new regime in that year. Mr Petrov-Popa now has the right to receive six parcels and six short-term visits per year, instead of three.

No restrictions on language are applied. Thus, Mr. Petrov-Popa could receive letters or newspapers in Romanian. Mr Petrov-Popa has never complained about the conditions in his cell. He was the one who asked to go back into his present cell. Petrov-Popa has never asked for a visit by a lawyer.

14. Lieutenant-Colonel Yefim SAMSONOV

169 . The witness was head of the medical department in the Transdniestrian prison service.

170 . The witness examined the applicants during the trial, in Tiraspol Prison No. 2. There were prison officers present. The applicants never trusted prison medical services and categorically refused medical services from the medical staff of Prison No. 2. They never asked the witness to examine them in relation to alleged ill-treatment. The witness never saw any signs of ill-treatment on them. On several occasions, doctors from outside the prison service, from Chişinău, came to examine the applicants and brought the appropriate medicine with them. These were Professor Ţîbîrnă and Dr Leşanu.

171 . The applicants were not suffering from any special illnesses. In 2002 Mr Petrov-Popa was treated for tuberculosis. He had a damaged lung from which liquid was drained. Some time ago Ivanţoc had had a liver operation. Professor Ţîbîrnă came as a specialist from Chişinău to treat him. The recommendations of Professor Ţîbîrnă ' s team in relation to the applicants were not implemented, because the applicants refused, as they did not trust the prison doctors.

172 . The Prison Administration in Transdniestria did not take instructions from the Russian Federation . There was no organic link with the Moldovan Ministry of Health or Ministry of Justice, but there was sometimes a contact with the Moldovan Ministry of Justice.

15. Vasiliy SEMENCHUK

173 . The witness, the holder of a Moldovan passport obtained before he was working in the prison service, has been the prison doctor in Hlinaia Prison No. 1 since 1995. He never worked in Tiraspol Prison No. 2. As the prison doctor in Hlinaia Prison, he was responsible for all sanitary and hygiene conditions in the prison. The witness was a dentist, but he could also carry out blood tests. Moreover, he was assisted by a surgeon and other specialists on his staff.

174 . The witness had only met the applicant Ilaşcu, none of the other applicants. Mr. Ilaşcu never asked to see the witness; he wanted an outside medical delegation from Moldova or Tiraspol to see him. Lieutenant-Colonel Samsonov accompanied the external doctors when they examined Ilaşcu. Professor Ţîbîrnă and Dr. Leşanu came and took samples of blood and urine to analyse. The examination took place, not in Ilaşcu ' s cell but in an office. Ilaşcu did not make any complaint about ill-treatment, he just complained about his problem of digestion.

175 . There are no regular medical visits for prisoners, but only if the prisoner asks. There is a permanent medical unit in the prison.

176 . The witness did not meet the applicant Petrov-Popa. The applicant was detained in a cell on his own. Mr Petrov-Popa never asked for medical assistance. He was currently on level 3 of his illness, that is, the illness was not active. Treatment was needed every nine months, not at shorter intervals, as was confirmed by the Medical Department.

177 . There was a visit to the prison in 2003 by the Council of Europe ' s Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The witness did not remember the visit by this Committee in the year 2000. He did not remember that after the 2000 visit, the CPT was concerned about the applicant ' s access to treatment for tuberculosis, in that he was dependent on his family and their resources for purchasing medicine, and that it was up to his family to provide food for his special diet. The witness recalled that in the past the prison administration did not have the appropriate medicine to dispense to Mr Petrov-Popa, but stated that the situation had changed.

178 . Mr. Ilaşcu never complained about his teeth. He had all his teeth when the witness saw him. After the visit by Professor Ţîbîrnă ' s team, Ilaşcu ' s wife brought him medicine from Chişinău. The witness was always present during Mrs Ilascu ' s visits and he encouraged her to bring Ilascu the necessary medicines. Mr Ilaşcu complained about his stomach, but his pain was not the result of any act by the prison administration. The witness last saw Ilaşcu in 1999.

16. Dumitru POSTOVAN

179 . Mr Postovan worked as a prosecutor from 1990 till 1994 and as Prosecutor General from 1994 till 1998. He had been appointed prosecutor in 1990 by the Parliament of Soviet Moldova. At the time of the hearings, he was working for the Chamber of Trade and Industry, and advised its President on international law.

180 . There was never an official split between Moldova and Transdniestria. As a result of the military conflict in 1992, the constitutional authorities of Moldova had to pull out of Transdniestria as they lost control over this region.

181 . The applicants were not “arrested”; they were just captured. There was no custody order of an official court of Moldova. A number of people were captured. The Prosecutors ' Office wrote to Smirnov, in his capacity as head of the Tiraspol City Council (he had been appointed in 1990) asking him to hand these people over to the prosecuting authorities of the Republic of Moldova, but there was no answer to this request. It was Mr Sturza who headed the negotiations.

182 . General Iakovlev was detained around February-March 1992 upon an order issued by the Prosecutor General ' s Office. The order to arrest him was indeed discussed with the top leadership in Moldova , but it could not be said that it was the Government who ordered his arrest. This General, who, at the time of his arrest, was no longer in Command of the Fourteenth Army, had been instrumental in arming the paramilitary forces in Transdniestria. The Moldovan intelligence services arrested him in Ukrainian territory and took him to Chişinău. The investigation was carried out on behalf of the Prosecutor General ' s Office by Ministry of Security investigators. The Prosecutor General ' s Office monitored the evidence gathered. He was detained only 72 hours since, according to Moldovan legislation, suspects could not be detained for more than 72 hours. He was released because of a lack of evidence, as the Moldovan authorities simply did not have the opportunity to carry out a proper investigation in relation to the facts alleged against him. There must be in his file at the Prosecutor General ' s Office a written order for his release. As there was no access to Transdniestria to obtain further evidence, he had been released since the evidence that the prosecuting authorities had against him was insufficient.

The witness had heard about the rumours that Iakovlev had been released in exchange for the release of 23 Moldovans detained by the Transdni e strians . Indeed, the Moldovan authorities were detaining about 40 Transdni e strians and an exchange had take n place. But this had nothing to do with Iakovlev. The witness was not aware of any pressure from the Russian Government to release him. He knew that General Stolyarov came from Moscow to Chisinău to seek his release, as he had received the report concerning Iakovlev.

183 . The Prosecutor General ' s Office had warned the President of the so-called Supreme Court of the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” that she and her court had no jurisdiction and that the applicants should be transferred to the Moldovan authorities for trial. At the time the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” was governed by the Criminal Code of Moldova. On 9 December 1993 , on the second day after the trial, the Moldovan Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Supreme Court of the “ Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” as being unconstitutional.

184 . For every case where a crime was suspected of having occurred in Transdniestria, the Prosecutor General ' s Office opened a case file. It did so also as regards Ilaşcu and his fellow prisoners, after the decision of the “MRT Supreme Court” had been quashed by the Moldovan Supreme Court, but it was impossible to carry out an investigation and proceed to all necessary acts for that purpose. In August 1995 an amnesty was granted by the President of Moldova, followed up by a decision of the Parliament. The effect of this on investigations was that any case covered by the amnesty was stopped.

185 . The witness ' s deputy opened a criminal investigation in December 1993 in relation to the prosecutors and judges who had been involved in conducting the IlaÅŸcu trial, on suspicion of committing an abuse of power. A number of investigations concerning persons occupying posts of power in Transdniestria were opened. But it proved impossible, not just difficult, to carry out any investigation. The Prosecutor General ' s Office interviewed the families of the IlaÅŸcu group, but they could not provide much information.

186 . Apart from the IlaÅŸcu group, there were other people who were detained for short periods in Transdniestria, but no one was prosecuted.

187 . Following the motion of October 1995 by the Moldovan parliament calling on the Moldovan Government to deal as a matter of priority with the problem of the detention of the IlaÅŸcu group, the Prosecutor General ' s Office requested that the file be sent to them by the people in Transdniestria for the purpose of an investigation, and that the persons they were detaining be transferred to Moldova. But these requests were simply ignored. One could see no way of resolving the issue satisfactorily other than by diplomacy.

188 . The witness was not in office in the year 2000 and was therefore unable to answer any questions about the order annulling the prosecution of the judges and prosecutors in Transdniestria who had been involved in the trial against the applicants. Likewise, the only information he had about the release of IlaÅŸcu was what he had read in the newspapers: that this release was the result of negotiations between President Voronin and the Russian President.

189 . Between 1992 and 1998, apart from the dispatch of numerous letters, the witness ' s deputy, Vasile Sturza, was specifically charged with the responsibility of working to secure their release. He went to Tiraspol , he had meetings with the Parliament, and so on. It was not so easy for him to go to Tiraspol , but he managed to obtain the authorisation of the Tiraspol regime. However, when he got there, he did not meet anyone. No positive results were achieved. The Prosecutor General ' s Office also requested that prosecutors be permitted to travel to Tiraspol in order to investigate whether the members of the so-called IlaÅŸcu group had committed the murders of which they were accused, but these requests were ignored. They also requested that a joint investigation be carried out. This second request was again ignored. The witness and his office reported to the new Parliament in Moldova . His Deputy, Mr Sturza, was later assigned to negotiate with the Transdniestrian authorities.

The Prosecutor General ' s Office did not contact the Russian prosecution authorities directly, although there was an agreement to that effect between the Moldovan and Russian authorities.

190 . The witness stated that, officially, there were never any recognised or implemented agreements between the judicial authorities of Moldova and Transdniestria. He admitted that, unofficially, there were, with a view to combating serious crime. The Moldovan authorities would call the authorities in Transdniestria. There were sometimes exchanges of prisoners. However, practically all prisoners had been exchanged by the time the IlaÅŸcu group were arrested, so that there was no one else left to exchange. As regards serious crime, information would be exchanged or witnesses called from the other side, but no prisoners were exchanged. If a person had deserted the Transdniestrian military forces, the Moldovan authorities would not extradite or hand them over to the Transdniestrian authorities. There was no agreement for extraditing or handing over suspects. The witness admitted that there might on occasions have been some special operations by the security services, but there was never any official extradition agreement.

191 . The witness was not aware of the order issued by his successor, Mr Iuga, in August 2000, dropping the charges against the judges and prosecutors who had taken part in the IlaÅŸcu trial, but thought that the Prosecutor General should have invoked other Articles of the Criminal Code, for example the one on abuse of public power, so that they would not be free of any criminal charge.

192 . According to the witness, the effect of initiating a criminal investigation against the governor of the prison where the members of the IlaÅŸcu group are held, is that he would run the risk of being arrested in Moldova .

193 . The witness considered that the State authorities of Moldova had done all in their power to secure the applicants ' release. On the diplomatic level, all the initiatives had been met with the response that these issues would be determined when the status of Transdniestria was resolved and not before. Finally, the witness was of the opinion that only political action, not legal action, would secure the release of the members of the IlaÅŸcu group freed.

194 . The witness stated that there were other instances apart from the IlaÅŸcu case in which a criminal prosecution had been started against judges and prosecutors in Transdniestria. He did not know for certain the outcome of those investigations, but he presumed that they were stopped for the same reasons.

195 . The witness did not feel any pressure at all when he was working in the Prosecutor General ' s Office. The Prosecutor General was independent of the Government. The Minister of Justice could not give him instructions, though the Government could address requests or proposals for the opening of an investigation.

196 . The witness considered that the constitutional Moldovan authorities exercised no power or authority over the eastern part of the country.

197 . Smirnov was arrested in 1992 and then released. It is true that Antiufeev and others visited Moldova several times but were not arrested. This is because there was a truce on 21 July 1992 . After that truce the Moldovan authorities had to move in a different direction, they had to find points of agreement. Investigations were suspended; no retaliatory actions were carried out. Prisoners detained in the battle area, for example, Cossacks, were handed back; no investigations were started against General Lebed, and so on.

198 . The witness was not aware that officers of the Fourteenth Army had been detained by the constitutional Moldovan authorities during the conflict in 1992. Indeed, he had written to the Russian prosecuting authorities in relation to the presence of the Cossacks in Transdniestria in order to learn about the position of Russia on this. In reply, the Russian prosecuting authorities informed him that they did not officially recognise the authorities of the Transdniestrian separatist regime.

199 . There were official relations between the Prosecutor General ' s Office in Moldova and the prosecutor of the Fourteenth Army whenever that was required. As far as the IlaÅŸcu case was concerned, officially the Fourteenth Army denied that they were in any way involved and the Moldovan authorities had no official data enabling them to make a request to them in connection with the IlaÅŸcu case. The Fourteenth Army denied their involvement in the conflict in 1992.

200 . The witness had seen a film on Russian television about the participation in the elections there of a “Colonel Gusev” who was in fact General Lebed, but the Moldovan authorities had no official information on that, however.

201 . President Snegur went before Parliament to say that the Fourteenth Army had intervened in Transdniestria with their tanks. The witness thought that this information must have been true since he could not see otherwise where the Transdniestrian separatists had got their tanks from. The witness also acknowledged that in June 1992 official information was presented to Parliament by the Ministry of the Interior about the participation of tanks and armoured vehicles in the conflict. But it was not easy to say whom to prosecute. In the beginning, the Fourteenth Army was supposed to belong to Moldova , then it was decided that it belonged to Russia . There was in fact no close collaboration with the Fourteenth Army in prosecution matters because none was needed. There were no incidents.

17. V aleriu CATANÄ‚

202 . The witness was the Prosecutor General of Moldova from 1998 to 1999. Before that, from 1996 to 1998, he was the prosecutor for Chişinău. He worked in the Prosecutor General ' s Office from 1990 to 1996 and for the prosecuting authorities from 1973 to 1990.

203 . The constitutional prosecuting authorities of Moldova had no access to Transdniestrian territory from 1992 onwards in the absence of any official contact with the regime. In that period the witness never visited Tiraspol , although measures were undertaken by the Moldovan authorities in an endeavour to secure the release of the members of the IlaÅŸcu group. After ceasing to be Prosecutor General, the witness also ceased to follow the case.

204 . The witness had not heard about the order of 16 August 2000 by the Prosecutor General to stop the investigation against the judges and prosecutors in Transdniestria under Articles 90 to 192 of the Criminal Code on the ground that the persons concerned had never held official office in Moldova . The witness thought that the decision to stop the investigation was incorrect.

205 . The witness had read in the newspapers that President Voronin and the President of Russia , and even Romania , had assisted with the release of Mr IlaÅŸcu.

206 . There was no cooperation, whether official or unofficial, between the prosecuting authorities of Moldova and Transdniestria. The witness had personally never talked to a Transdniestrian prosecutor.

The witness knew that the Ministry of the Interior had orders to cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior of Transdniestria in order to improve the fight against crime - to return to the other side of the river persons suspected of serious crimes. But there was no formal extradition as such, since it concerned persons on the territory of the same State. But unofficially it did go on. As regards extradition in general, previously it was done by decision of a prosecutor. Now the legislation had changed and what was required was a decision by a court.

There was no official agreement between Moldova and Transdniestria to exchange people when the witness was Prosecutor General in 1998 and 1999. To his knowledge, no such agreement had ever been made. The transfer of persons between Moldova and Transdniestria was organised by the Ministry of the Interior. There were some cases of persons committing crimes in Transdniestria being transferred from Moldova to Transdniestria. Officially this was not done, but unofficially the two police forces would cooperate and would transfer these people. For example, in 1995 there was a case brought against the police commissioner in Dubăsari, and he was extradited to Transdniestria.

207 . During his period of office the witness received no requests from Mr IlaÅŸcu or the other applicants and had no contact with the Transdniestrian authorities about the IlaÅŸcu case. In that period no one in his office worked on the case brought against the judges and prosecutors in Transdniestria. The case was suspended. In the period 1998 to 1999 no investigation was pursued in that connection, although the formal decision stopping the case was taken in 2000.

208 . The Supreme Court of Moldova had received a copy of the judgment delivered by the so-called Supreme Court of the separatist entity, but not the case file. There was cooperation only at the level of the Ministry of the Interior. Prosecutors at a lower level may have made telephone calls to colleagues whom they knew in Transdniestria, but that would have been a purely personal affair. Up until 1998 there was no special prosecutor who dealt with Transdniestria. The witness created such a division in 1998, with responsibility for international relations, not specifically for Transdniestria; but if a problem concerning Transdniestria cropped up, then this department would deal with it. This department however was not competent to carry out investigations in relation to crimes allegedly committed by Transdniestrian officials; the competent one was the investigations department. But, in any event, Moldovan authorities had no access to information concerning events in Transniestria, so they would not have opened any investigations even if they had received a request from a private person.

209 . No complaint was sent by Mr. IlaÅŸcu to the Prosecutor General ' s Office. The letter which Mr IlaÅŸcu sent in 1999 to the Moldovan parliament was not forwarded by Parliament to the prosecuting authorities. The witness had never heard before of such a petition by Mr. IlaÅŸcu.

210 . The witness stated that he had been forced to resign for political reasons because persons from the Communist Party objected to his work, as he insisted on taking his decisions on the basis of the law and not according to the way the political wind was blowing . When a dismissal is judged to be desirable, one can always find a reason, and that is what happened to the witness. The post of Prosecutor General was a political position in a sense. The witness tried not to get involved in political activities and just to stick to the law. But unfortunately some cases touch on politics.

211 . The witness was of the opinion that the release of the IlaÅŸcu group would have been possible only by the use of force. The constitutional Moldovan authorities could not have done more than they did. Even in terms of international pressure, they did all that they could.

18. Witness X.

212 . The witness was a former senior official involved in negotiations with Transdniestria. At the time of the hearings, he was working in a non-governmental organisation.

213 . The Fourteenth Army was involved in the events of 1991 to 1992. Retired Fourteenth Army officers were hired by the separatists. The Fourteenth Army then intervened directly, which led to a military victory for the separatists. Thereafter Russia intervened, and imposed negotiations and “peace-keeping”.

There was a meeting of the Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian Ministers in which the witness participated. There was a possibility of a resolution of the situation in 1992. Romania supported the position of Moldova . But the formula proposed for the resolution was torpedoed when the Russian secret services provoked the incidents in the town of Bender , which wrecked the negotiations and ended the role of the observers. The military defeat of Moldova was sealed in July 1992 when the Russian President Yeltsin and the Moldovan President Snegur signed an agreement in order to stop the conflict. The agreement was only signed by these two Presidents. The conclusion to be drawn was that the Russian Federation was the other party in the conflict; it controlled the region, and it had the resources to stop the conflict after the military defeat of Moldova . The formula of “peace-keeping” was imposed by Russia . The conflict also saw the participation of the illegal troops of the Transdniestrian regime. As a result of the conclusions reached in the Control Commission set up under the Yeltsin/Snegur Agreement, the separatist regime was strengthened.

214 . Smirnov was hidden by the Command of the Fourteenth Army, by Guennadi Iakovlev, in August 1991 when he feared arrest by the Moldovan authorities. Iakovlev was then placed under the orders of Smirnov, with instructions to protect the unconstitutional regime in Transdniestria.

The witness was present in person in the spring of 1992 at the interrogation of a young man from Rostov on Don, who had been taken prisoner by the constitutional Moldovan military forces. He admitted that he had been sent to Moldova to protect the Russian land in Transdniestria. The witness had interviewed a former KGB official who was serving in Tiraspol in 1991. This officer told the witness that a Russian counter-intelligence division (GRU) had arrived in Tiraspol and that he intended to leave Tiraspol because he knew that trouble and bloodshed were coming. The Fourteenth Army was left under Russian control, so that Russia would have a reason to intervene.

215 . The witness carried out an interview with Igor Smirnov. He had been elected, together with 64 other representatives, to the United Council of Labour in Transdniestria in February/March 1990. He had voted for Mircea Druc as Prime Minister and so had every possibility to prove himself a democratic. The witnessed interviewed him with regard to the purpose of holding the so-called second Congress in 1990 (this being the Congress which led to the proclamation of the Transdniestrian Soviet Socialist Republic ). Igor Smirnov said that it was the languages legislation in Moldova which had turned him and his fellow Transdniestrians into second-class citizens. But he had been unable to show the witness one single provision in the languages legislation that had such an effect. This proved that his separatism did not have at its basis a problem that could not be resolved in a democratic way.

The scenario used in Transdniestria had been used before in Abkhasia and South Ossetia , but had failed in the Baltic States . The political process in Moldova on the break-up of the Soviet Union , with a delay of one year, followed that of the Baltic States . The result was a situation where public organisms were no longer controlled by the Communist Party. But the end story was different here. The Baltic States had managed to avoid separatism. In the Baltic States there were the same attempts by the Antiufeev group to undermine constitutional authority. Antiufeev, who was now a Minister in the Transdniestrian separatist Government had escaped from Latvia . In an interview he said that he had been sent to Moldova by the Soyuz Group in the Soviet Parliament, headed by Mr Lukyanov. He was offered Abkhasia or Transdniestria. He chose Transdniestria because there was no language problem. He was sent to another State to fight the established constitutional order, as he had done in Latvia . He and Oleg Gudymo, his deputy, are Russian citizens. He is included in the Duma electoral lists as a supporter of Stalin “black” candidates. These candidates were not elected, but it is informative that Antiufeev is part of that tendency.

216 . On 25 or 26 March 1992 the witness went to the Fourteenth Army Headquarters, together with several Moldovan MPs and General Netkachev, Commander of the Fourteenth Army. A majority of the officers were disoriented. They were in an informants ' environment where they could easily be manipulated. This is why some troops went over to be under the jurisdiction of the Transdniestrian separatists. An ethnic Moldovan officer of the Fourteenth Army came to Chişinău – he was a major – to tell the witness about the plans for the participation of the Fourteenth Army in the coming conflict. The so-called Transdniestrian Army, including a number of tanks belonging to the Fourteenth Army, was organised by officers of the Fourteenth Army. The separatists had at their disposal heavy artillery, which allowed them to take over the territory of Transdniestria . They had well trained tank drivers, helicopters and eighteen tanks. None of this was available on the private market.

217 . Igor Smirnov was a citizen of the Russian Federation .

218 . The witness thought that the Russian troops would stay in Moldova until a political solution convenient to the Russian Federation was found. If the Fourteenth Army had not been withdrawn in eleven years, that was because the Russian Federation had not wanted it. They kept the Russian military presence there in order to put pressure on Moldova and to protect the illegal separatist regime. An agreement was signed in Odessa in March 1998 between Mr Chernomyrdin, the Russian Prime Minister, and Mr Smirnov concerning the division of the military property of the former Fourteenth Army . Transdniestria ha d become the centre of illegal commercial activity, with sales and exports of arms from the equipment of the former Fourteenth Army.

If the Fourteenth Army withdrew, this would lead eventually to a solution of the problem. No military equipment had been withdrawn recently. The date for the complete withdrawal had not been respected, and the new one would not be either. There was a statement on the web site of the Russian Duma to the effect that members of the Duma were requested to refrain from making declarations on Transdniestria because of the case pending before the European Court of Human Rights, since such declarations could damage the situation in the case.

219 . Mr Ilaşcu represented the Popular Front in Tiraspol . He had been released under pressure from the Russian Federation . He was in a sense released conditionally – that is on condition that he withdrew his application. The other applicants remained hostage. This had been confirmed by President Voronin, who said that Ilaşcu was himself to blame for their continued detention because, if he withdrew his application to the European Court , they would be immediately released.

220 . General Lebed, Commander of the Fourteenth Army like Iakovlev before him, had allowed himself to be elected to the unconstitutional legislative body in Transdniestria. He had openly described how he had armed the Cossacks to fight the constitutional Moldovan authorities.

221 . One of the questions asked at the public hearing before the Court in Strasbourg was: does Russia provide economic support to Transdniestria? The answer given by the Representative of the Russian Federation was that the Russian Ambassador to Moldova had simply visited Tiraspol and declared the interest of the Russian Federation in participating in the privatisation process in Transdniestria. This was recognition of legitimacy as regards the separate economy of Transdniestria, quite apart from the agreement on cooperation, providing for a list of goods which would benefit from preferential treatment, for free movement of goods and tax exemption for goods from the eastern part of Moldova .

There was also a debt of seven hundred million dollars owed by Transdniestria to Russia for gas consumed, according to the representative of the company supplying gas, Gazprom . The Russian State had supplied gas free of charge to Transdniestria for eleven years. It had done this in order to support the illegal regime there, indeed to permit its economic survival.

As regards political support, one could cite the declaration s of the Russian Vice-President, Mr Rutskoi, in Moscow in 1992 and on visiting Tiraspol . A committee of the Russian Duma had been set up to help solve the problems in the Transdniestrian Region – with no mention whatsoever of the fact that this was an illegal regime in Transdniestria. One could also cite the memorandum signed in Moscow in 1997 by President Lucinschi of Moldova and Smirnov for the “ Moldavian Republic of Tran sdniestria”, and countersigned by President Yeltsin for the Russian Federation and President Kuchma for Ukraine, which recognised the legal validity of the Transdniestrian authorities in the negotiation process .

222 . The budget of Moldova at the time was three hundred million US dollars. The aid to the Transdniestrian region by Russia was twice the size of the annual Moldovan budget. The steel factory in Râbniţa, in Transdniestria, contributed 60% towards the Transdniestrian budget. Because it operated free of charge and free of taxes, it was essential for the survival of the illegal regime. There was also considerable smuggling activity, but that was another matter.

223 . If the Fourteenth Army had not participated in the conflict in 1991 and 1992, the illegal regime would not have survived. The participation of the Fourteenth Army was decisive for the military, political and moral defeat of the constitutional Moldovan authorities. And it was essential for ensuring the survival of the illegal, separatist regime.

224 . The witness first heard of the IlaÅŸcu group after their arrest. He did not know whether this group were members of the secret services of Moldova . Their trial was necessary for political reasons in order to strengthen the illegal regime.

19. Mircea SNEGUR

225 . The witness was President of Moldova from 1990 until 1996. At the time of giving evidence, he was honorary President of the Liberal Party.

226 . In 1989 Russian troops arrived in large numbers in Moldova . In that period, intellectuals in Moldova were fighting for their rights and, in particular, for the right to speak the Romanian language. The witness ' s statements for the attention of the United Nations, the Community of Independent States and the Government of the Russian Federation were based on the fact that the Fourteenth Army was still on the left bank of the Dniester, albeit perhaps in reduced numbers. This Army armed the separatist rebels. Because of this military support, the conflict broke out. The institutions of the Moldovan State began to be destroyed – the police, the courts and so on. A parallel army appeared, better equipped than the regular forces of Moldova . The witness made not only statements but also visits to Moscow to inform the Russian Government. Ammunition stores were broken into and arms distributed to the rebels. The constitutional forces were not so well equipped.

President Yeltsin possibly did not give any direct orders. But it could not be denied that there had been military, economic and intellectual support. The rebels in Transdniestria had at their disposal a very well-equipped army.

227 . The document ending the conflict, signed by Yeltsin and the witness, attested to the fact that the parties in the conflict were Russia and Moldova .

Before the presidential declaration was signed, it was the task of Alexander Rutskoi, the Russian Vice-President, to come to Chişinău to negotiate a settlement. The draft agreement he negotiated was then signed in Moscow . On the Moldovan side the main negotiators were the Prime Minister, namely Valeriu Muravschi, the Speaker of the Parliament and the witness himself.

228 . The July 1992 cease-fire agreement in Moscow was not signed by Smirnov, though he was present. When the agreement was signed between Russia and Moldova , the parties exchanged texts. There were only two signatures to the agreement as such: Yeltsin ' s and Snegur ' s. The witness did not know where the signature of Smirnov came from when it appeared subsequently. It could be that Mr Rutskoi let him sign it afterwards.

229 . The reason why the agreement in 1992 was signed was that there was a risk of seeing the Fourteenth Army in the streets of Chişinău. People were dying. One particular State was supplying arms to the rebels in order to make this possible. There was a risk of tanks arriving in Chişinău. No tanks are produced in Transdniestria. Forty per cent of the industry in Moldova in Soviet times was in the Transdniestrian region – steel works, factories for the production of domestic electrical appliances such as refrigerators, the manufacture of trucks, and so on. The Transdniestrian army had tanks, the Moldovan army did not. The tanks drove into Bender and then back. This constituted enormous psychological pressure; it was broadcast on all television stations. This was not simply a display on an exercise field.

What the Moldovan side wanted was an end to the conflict, a cease-fire, and that they obtained. They also supported, in the drafting of the document, the introduction of peace-keeping forces in Transdniestria from Russia , as they wanted them to influence Smirnov in Tiraspol .

230 . Tanks of the Fourteenth Army took part in the conflict. For example, in the Bender operation, tanks crossed the bridge and then went back.

231 . No negotiations took place directly with the Fourteenth Army. But there were telephone conversations with the Fourteenth Army in order to try to persuade them not to arm the separatist rebels, for example with General Lebed. The witness heard statements by General Lebed on television saying, “Our tanks are going to Bucharest if necessary”, and so on. But at that time the witness did not meet Lebed. He subsequently met him in Moscow at the Kremlin for a reception to commemorate the Second World War.

232 . In the agreement of 21 July 1992 Russia , acknowledged that it had influence over Tiraspol and that it did actually exercise that influence – for example in imposing a cease-fire - which was very important. Every day of continued fighting produced more corpses. It was therefore extremely important to bring about a cease-fire as soon as possible. Only later other matters such as the role of the Fourteenth Army were discussed.

233 . The witness thought that the political and economic support to Transdniestria from the Russian Federation still counted. Since this illegal separatist regime was still operational and accepted with all honours in the Russian Duma and had been visited by other personalities, there was plenty of evidence of support. There was a frank acknowledgment by the Deputy Speaker of the Duma, Guennadi Seleznev, on an official visit to Chişinău in 1992, when he said, “We Russians have to support Transdniestria. If we had not supported the Transdniestrians in the conflict, Moldova would have been integrated into Romania .” That was a perfectly clear acknowledgment. The regime could not have survived without Russian economic and political support. For example, in relation to energy resources – Transdniestria had huge debts to Russia for the supply of gas. Because of the fact that they were continuing to receive gas and electricity free of charge, the people in Transdniestria were living very well. They had been granted preferential access to the Russian and Ukrainian markets because they had no access to European markets, whereas Russia had stopped the gas supply to Moldova .

234 . As to relations with Transdniestria, since 1992, after the situation calmed down, there had been no more shooting. The next stage was to try to seek a final settlement of the conflict. The first productive meeting took place on 29 April 1994 near Tiraspol . A declaration of intent was signed to resolve the conflict by peaceful means and to provide a special status for Transdniestria within a unitary Moldova . When the witness was President, there was a schedule of meetings, with the Moldovans going to see the Transdniestrians and vice-versa, on currency issues, customs controls and so on. The intention was to rebuild not only commercial links but also political relations. There were many negotiations. Transdniestria was to be an entity where there were three State languages – Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan. After 1996 these concrete, specific steps towards reconciliation stopped. There was a ray of light when Mr Voronin came to power.

During the witness ' s time as President, there had been contacts with Transdniestria, sometimes good, sometimes bad . The Moldovan view was that negotiations were better than conflict. The participants were the witness himself, Mr Smirnov, the Speaker of the Moldovan parliament , Mr Diacov, and Mr Lucinschi. On the Transdniestrian side, there was also their so-called Prime Minister and other Ministers and Departments when particular items came up on the agenda – for example post, customs and media. Most of the time , the Moldovans met their demands, especially on economic issues, because otherwise ordinary commercial enterprises, the working people and the peasants would have suffered. There were no representatives from the Fourteenth Army there as a party. There were mediators present at all meetings – from Russia , Ukraine and the OSCE.

235 . As to the presence of Russian troops in Moldova , the witness stated that the presence of military personnel was not the only measure of an army ' s effectiveness. There were still more than two hundred thousand tons of armaments and missiles in Transdniestria. The Russian side should implement all the agreements into which it had entered, then Moldova would not be in the present situation.

If the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transdniestria had taken so long despite previous agreements, it was because this must have been the wish of the Russian Federation . The withdrawal of their troops had been stipulated in various documents. On the entry of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe, this was one of the conditions. At the Istanbul summit the withdrawal was to be terminated at the latest by the end of 2002. Now it was to be the end of 2003. This delay was probably the result of influence by politicians who were dragging their feet at the request of the Transdniestrian side until a final settlement had been reached.

236 . A number of efforts were made after the cease-fire to secure the applicants ' release. For example, there was the decree in 1995 declaring an amnesty for all those who had taken part in the conflict. For anyone detained in Moldova , amnesty was granted. The Transdniestrian side did not keep their part of the bargain. The sentencing of Ilaşcu and his colleagues was a farce, the result of bad faith. The witness immediately issued an order in 1993 declaring their trial illegal. The Ilaşcu question was on the agenda of every meeting with the other side. They just kept providing promises: “We will come back to this”, and statements to that effect. The witness met President Yeltsin personally and spoke to him about the issue. Moldova raised it at the CIS meetings. But the Moldovans were not listened to by the Russians. The Communist President of Moldova was listened to by the Russians two days after he entered into office, with the result that Ilaşcu was released.

237 . Mr Yeltsin ' s reaction every time was one of understanding and compassion and promises to influence Smirnov. But this did not happen. President Yeltsin never said that he had no influence. He was forever making promises that he would try to influence Smirnov, but his promises would stay without effect until the next meeting. The release of IlaÅŸcu was not the result of any action by Smirnov himself. It was only done because of pressure from the outside.

238 . The signing by President Lucinschi of the memorandum of May 1997 in Moscow was a mistake . This amounted to recognition of Transdniestria as a separate State. Thus a document was signed whereby Transdniestria was recognised as a separate country. One element of that memorandum was the synchronisation of the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army and the final resolution of the conflict. This was done on the initiative of the Transdniestrian regime and the Russian Federation .

239 . In the Joint Control Commission, under the aegis of the Ministry of Integration, there were always problems because of interventions by the Transdniestrian side, especially in connection with Bender and their attempts to get the Moldovan police to withdraw.

The witness had signed documents giving greater local authority to Transdniestrian authorities within the territory of Moldova but these did not imply recognition of the regime. For example, documents concerning customs stamps did not involve official recognition of the illegal regime. Solutions to practical problems were sought, as the Moldovan authorities did not want to create an economic blockage. They recognised Transdniestria as an “area” and needed to coordinate services.

The witness had no problems in going to or from Transdniestria, he was never stopped or humiliated.

240 . The constitutional Moldovan authorities provided support to the families of the IlaÅŸcu group.

As to Mr Ilaşcu, the witness met him when he went into politics. After Mr Ilaşcu was released they met once, in Chişinău. He once telephoned to the party ' s headquarters and left his telephone number, but he had no more contact with him.

241 . Smirnov was released for a number of reasons, in particular good intentions prompted by good faith, by a desire to obtain what the Moldovan authorities wanted through negotiations.

20. Alexandru MOÅžANU

242 . From 1990 until February 1993 he was the President of the Moldovan parliament , and from 1993 until 2001 he was a Member of Parliament.

243 . The Parliament had evidence that the separatist forces on the left bank of the Dniester were equipped with various kinds of weapons and trained by officers of the former Fourteenth Army. The television showed film on 19 May 1992 of tanks of the former Fourteenth Army flying the flag of the Russian Federation and taking an open part in the conflict. Following this direct and open intervention by the Fourteenth Army, the Parliament adopted a Resolution characterising these actions as open military aggression against Moldova by the Russian Army. This Resolution was addressed to all Parliaments and peoples in the world. It described the former Fourteenth Army as an occupying army in a free, sovereign country. The decision to adopt this Resolution was taken at a full session of the Parliament of Moldova.

Guennadi Iakovlev, who was the ideologist of the separatist movement, said in a newspaper article on 18 June 1992 that the Fourteenth Army and the Transdniestrian people were united. In the Tiraspolkaya Pravda, on 2 September 1992 , Smirnov said that the Transdniestrian Republic survived only thanks to Russia and the Fourteenth Army.

244 . Without the support of the Russian Federation , the Transdniestrian regime would never have survived. The United States Senator Larry Pressler came to Moldova in the period May to June. He studied the problem on the ground and concluded, in a report of 24 June 1992 to the United States Congress, that the problems then were due to the involvement of the Fourteenth Army.

245 . Towards the end of June 1992 General Lebed, as Commander of the Fourteenth Army, called the witness on the telephone, when the President of the State was away, and ordered him not to allow the transfer of certain military formations of the Moldovan Army from one zone of the country to another. When the witness replied that he did not know who Mr Lebed was and that he had to come and explain the purpose of his visit to Moldova , General Lebed said he would come with tanks to Chişinău.

246 . At about the same time, at the end of June 1992, the supply of electricity to Chişinău from the power station in Cuciurgani, in Transdniestria, was disconnected. As Moldova had no other alternative source of energy, the witness went to Minsk to ask the President of the Supreme Soviet in Belarus for help. Mr Shuskevich, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus , telephoned President Yeltsin in front of the witness and asked him to intervene. By the time the witness arrived home the electricity had been reconnected.

247 . In 1992 the witness did not know about the IlaÅŸcu group; he learned about it later. At that time many people were being killed, arrested and buried. Mr IlaÅŸcu was not an MP then. He was first elected in 1994 on the list of the Popular Front, and re-elected in 1998.

248 . The authorities in Moldova provided transport for Mrs IlaÅŸcu to travel to Tiraspol . Mrs IlaÅŸcu was also able to draw the salary due to Mr IlaÅŸcu in his capacity as a member of Parliament.

The witness heard of Mr Ilaşcu on 5 May 1993 , when the so-called trial opened in Tiraspol . The witness organised a meeting on 6 May in Chişinău to support his group. He knew from the newspapers of Mr Ilaşcu ' activities in Tiraspol , but never discussed with him Order No. 6 or his activities in Tiraspol .

249 . A committee was set up in Parliament to deal with the problem of the IlaÅŸcu group. The authorities in Tiraspol were contacted and the Moldovans were told that nothing could be done. In fact more effective action was taken outside Parliament. The Moldovan parliament raised the issue at the OSCE meetings and at meetings with foreign States, for example the United States of America . Mr Snegur also raised this issue in 1999 at a meeting in Berlin of the Inter-parliamentary Union, and as a result a special resolution concerning Mr IlaÅŸcu was adopted.

250 . There was no reaction on the part of the Russian authorities when appeals seeking withdrawal of the Cossacks were made. The witness telephoned Mr Hasbulatov, the Speaker of the Russian parliament , but he showed no interest. The Moldovan parliament also sent representative s to the Russian and Ukrainian p arliaments to explain their position. There was no official response to the Moldovan appeals.

In October 1994 Moldova signed an Agreement with the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of Russian military units from Moldovan territory. The Moldovan parliament ratified that Agreement. The Russian parliament has never ratified it; moreover it has been taken off the agenda of the Russian parliament .

The Moldovan parliament supported Yeltsin during the coup in Moscow . In September 1991 Yeltsin sent Mr Nikolay Medvedev, together with a group of colleagues, to act as mediators. The Moldovan authorities rejected this initiative because they considered that the problem was an internal issue and that it was not up to the Russians to intervene. But Mr Medvedev went to see the witness and told him that the treaty between Moldova and Russia would not be ratified until the demands of the MRT were accepted by Moldova .

251 . The reason behind the cease-fire agreement of 21 July 1992 was that if Moldova had not signed that humiliating agreement, the tanks of the Fourteenth Army would have come to Chisinău. Moldova only had a volunteer army, a weak army with no trained troops. Many were killed during the skirmishes. Moldova had no choice but to sign.

252 . Moldova did not exercise any control over the Eastern part of the country. All political actors did what could be done to make representations in favour of the Ilaşcu group. But the pressures – political and economic – from outside, from the Russian Federation , were too strong. The attitude of the Moldovan authorities at the time was: if Moldova does not grant passports or customs stamps to the Transdniestrians, it cannot know how they will behave. Now that the leaders in Tiraspol had been deprived of their right to travel to the West, their attitude had changed. The Moldova leadership should have accepted in 1992 the United States proposal to take part in the peace commission.

21. Witness Y.

253 . At the time of giving evidence, the witness was a senior member of the Liberal Party of Moldova. He was a former member of the Moldovan parliament and a former diplomat.

254 . The Dniester war started in March 1992. The Parliamentary Committee had no chairman then and was not therefore involved in debating events concerning the Dniester River . At the time of the Bender events, the witness was outside the country. On becoming Chairman of the Committee, he demanded that the three responsible Ministries submit to the Parliament information concerning the cause of the events in Bender and the actions of the Moldovan authorities. The relevant documents were transmitted to Parliament. According to the information in those documents, there were good grounds for suspecting that the Fourteenth Army had taken the side of the separatists during those events. On 20 and 21 June, when the first detachments of the Moldovan Army arrived in Bender, a platoon of soldiers being transported in a bus in plain clothes and carrying light arms was attacked; it was machine-gunned from two sides. The area where the firing came from belonged to the Fourteenth Army. Twenty Moldovan soldiers were killed.

When President Snegur and the Prime Minister, Andrei Sangheli, were in Moscow , they raised the issue of the IlaÅŸcu group many times. There were personal meetings between Yeltsin and Snegur, one to one, in which the issue was raised by Mr Snegur. The witness was the person responsible for preparing the press releases relating to these meetings. For example, on 15 May 1993 the issue of the IlaÅŸcu group was raised; it was said that, for both sides, action would be taken to secure the release of this group as soon as possible.

However, the talks between Moldova and the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova did not include the issue of the IlaÅŸcu group. The main problem for the Moldovan side in the negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops was that the Russian side was insisting on a synchronisation of the withdrawal of the Russian Army with the final resolution of the Transdniestrian problem. For Moldova , these were two distinct processes, with no link between them. The Moldovan party was aware that, theoretically speaking, if there were such a link, there was a risk that the Transdniestrian conflict would not be solved: any party which might have had an interest in keeping a Russian military presence in Moldova would then have worked to ensure that the Transdniestrian issue was never settled. This point of view was conveyed to the Russian counterpart in the negotiations. However, the Russians insisted on the synchronisation formula and, unfortunately, this went into the final document.

Failure to solve the overall problem gave the Russians the excuse to keep their Army there. And it was they who controlled the possibility of settling the dispute.

The synchronisation formula was proposed by the representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was expressly included in the press release at their request. When Moldova proposed that the press release include mention of both sides being interested in the release of the IlaÅŸcu group, the Russians agreed on condition that the synchronisation formula also be put in. Subsequently, the Moldovan authorities realised that they had made a big blunder in accepting the synchronisation formula.

255 . The witness was not aware of any cases of the peace-keeping forces breaching their terms of reference. His main dossier was the Russian Organisational Group, and the peace-keeping troops were not part of his brief. The witness learned later that the peace-keeping forces were used several times by the Russian military without the consent of Chişinău.

256 . The Ilaşcu issue was raised many times by the Moldovan authorities. In December 1992 negotiations were commenced with the Transdniestrian side, at a venue outside Tiraspol , and the Ilaşcu issue was raised by the Moldovans. Up until March 1993 there were four rounds of negotiations. Moldova never obtained the permission of the separatist authorities to meet representatives of the Ilaşcu group. The issue of medical assistance was also raised. The question of medical doctors going to Tiraspol from Chişinău to provide medical treatment for the group was discussed. The issue was taken up by the Parliamentary Committee. The witness received instructions from President Snegur to raise the issue in meetings with Russian officials. In September 1993 the witness therefore raised the issue with the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (the Speaker of the Russian parliament ), Mr Husbalatov, who had promised that Russian Members of Parliament going to Tiraspol would try to obtain information about the Ilaşcu group.

257 . There where indications of the Russian policy towards Transdniestria on the Internet sites of various research and other institutions in Russia . Konstantin Zatulin was the head of one such institution, namely the Law Academy . On the Internet site of that institution there was a report outlining different scenarios and plans on how things were to be organised in Transdniestria. There were other examples, such as the site of the legal section of the Academy of Sciences where there was a theoretical model for building Transdniestria into a state. The witness could not tell whether that model had been developed with the authority of the Academy of Sciences .

258 . The witness recalled an ultimatum from the Russian side, given in 1994 at the United Nations General Assembly when the Moldovan Representative, for the first time at such a level, alluded to the participation of the Russian side in the Transdniestrian conflict. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation had a meeting with the witness and told him that the Russian side was not happy about this initiative taken by Chişinău at the United Nations. Russia , he said, would find an “adequate opportunity” to reject this initiative.

259 . The treaty drafted in 1990 was much better for Moldova than the treaty signed with the Russian Federation in 2001. In 1990 it was a question of a treaty between two Soviet Republics who were members of the USSR . The desire of Moldova to obtain its independence was reflected in that treaty. The later treaty, between two independent countries, contains some provisions which should have been unacceptable for the Moldovan side.

260 . From 1997 to 1998 the witness was adviser on Transdniestrian issues, including the question of the release of the IlaÅŸcu group. This problem was raised many times. In the witness ' s view, much more could have been done, more efficiently, than the efforts that were actually made. The witness ' s plan for the settlement of the Transdniestrian problem was rejected by the then Moldovan authorities, and he was dismissed as the principal adviser in charge of Transdniestria because his plan was disclosed.

261 . The Russian authorities were unfortunately providing support to the illegal Transdniestrian regime in Tiraspol . This included economic support. For a number of years natural gas had been available to the public in Transdniestria for half the price charged to people living in other parts of the Moldovan Republic . As from 1 February 2003 , the price had doubled in Transdniestria. Before that, many people in Transdniestria said they did not wish to rejoin the Moldovan Republic because, if they did so, they would be paying much more for gas. Transdniestria has a 750-million-dollar debt to Russia for natural gas. This debt will be cancelled if Russia receives shares in national enterprises in Transdniestria. Consequently, part of the population of Moldova is indebted to Russia .

262 . On 1 April 1992 President Yeltsin issued a decree ordering the transfer of the Fourteenth Army under Russian jurisdiction. In so doing, he breached the national jurisdiction of Moldova and Moldovan sovereignty. This is because earlier, in January, President Snegur had issued a decree that all units of the Fourteenth Army stationed on Moldovan Territory were to be transferred to Moldovan jurisdiction. President Yeltsin issued his decree without any consultation whatsoever of the Moldovan Government. This was a problem still to be settled.

263 . The 200,000 tons of Fourteenth Army military equipment remaining in Transdniestria should belong to Moldova because of the decree of President Snegur. Or perhaps it should be administered and controlled by the OSCE. There would be no problem if this military equipment were to pass under international control. The problem had been that, to date, Russia had exercised control unilaterally.

264 . Smirnov was a citizen of the Russian Federation . This was therefore a problem for Russia to solve, as he was one of their citizens. President Voronin had said to the Russians that he, as President of Moldova, would be happy if Russia were to take Smirnov and place him in a Moscow suburb.

22. Andrei SANGHELI

265 . The witness became Prime Minister in July 1992. The armed conflict occurred before then. At the time of giving evidence, he was working for a French firm as Director General. The witness had held no political office after 1997.

266 . Although there was no proof that the Fourteenth Army was involved in the fighting in 1992, arms, ammunition and equipment of the Fourteenth Army were used by the separatist forces. The ammunition and armoured vehicles that the Tiraspol rebels used in all their battles and clashes with the constitutional Moldovan forces came from the reserves of the Fourteenth Army.

267 . The problem of the IlaÅŸcu group was on the agenda at every meeting that Moldova had on Transdniestria. Moldova tried to do all that it could, morally and materially. The success of the present Government was due to what had been done before. But the circumstances at the time meant that Moldova had no other option but negotiations. The conflict in 1992 was a tragedy for the country.

The release of the IlaÅŸcu group was a political problem. The Transdniestrian regime was keeping the remaining applicants in prison as a bargaining chip. They wanted to derive benefit from any decision to release the prisoners. Moldova had done all that it could. The constitutional authorities of Moldova were not responsible for what had happened to the IlaÅŸcu group. The families of the applicants approached the authorities regularly, and they obtained from the Moldovan authorities political, medical and other support.

268 . Concerning the financial support allegedly accorded to the rebel regime in Tiraspol by Russia , there were no official documents, but there was information that could be gleaned from speeches by Russians visiting Tiraspol . Then there were the energy debts. The gas had been given to the Transdniestrians free of charge by Russia . This could be considered economic assistance. In the negotiations with Russia in 1992, the witness participated on economic issues. The main discussion centred on energy supply and Russian markets for Moldovan products such as wood and coal, as well as credit facilities. Gas was to be supplied at a lower price to Transdniestria than to Moldova . When the witness was Prime Minister the company supplying gas was a State entity. After it was privatised, the situation became worse for the Moldovan people. Today it was a joint-stock company, but the State had the largest shareholding. Neither the Moldovan nor the Transdniestrian economy could function without Russian gas.

269 . In 1993 the witness discussed this debt issue with the Russian Government and also with the Transdniestrian authorities. They agreed to divide the debt in two. The witness did not know whether the Transdniestrians paid their part, but thought that they did not.

23. Witness Z.

270 . The witness was a former minister of Moldova .

271 . The witness participated in all the relevant negotiations. He therefore had information about the transfer of military equipment from the Fourteenth Army and the ROG to the separatist forces. Before the war broke out there had been a massive transfer of munitions to the separatists. This started with a decision of the Supreme Soviet to set up a paramilitary force to ensure order.

At the time of the referendum about joining the Soviet Union in 1991, and continuing until March 1992, General Iakovlev, former Commander of the Fourteenth Army, started to transfer weapons and munitions, and this coincided with the arrival of the Cossacks. This transfer of munitions was made in particular to the Transdniestrian Guard, which became the Ministry of Defence of Transdniestria. All units, including the Cossacks, were equipped with automatic weapons, machine guns, armoured cars, and so on. An engineer ' s battalion from Parcani openly joined the Transdniestrian side. Eighteen T-74 tanks were given as a gift to the Transdniestrian side.

The witness stated that he was in possession of a great deal of information on the quantity of arms actually transferred. After the war the process continued. This was done through resolutions of the Russian and Transdniestrian Governments. The Russian Prosecutor General inspected the Russian Army.

The witness pointed out that there was archive evidence, in the form of television film, which showed clearly that the main tanks that took part in the assaults were flying Russian flags. Some of these tanks were indeed flying two flags, the Transdniestrian as well as the Russian flag.

272 . After the armed conflict, there was an exchange of prisoners. The Dubăsari hostages, i.e. 30 policemen captured by the Transdniestrian forces, were kept for about a month. Moldova exchanged them for General Iakovlev. Such exchanges often took place. Moldova exchanged those who had disturbed order and the Transdnistrians exchanged those whom they had taken prisoner. The witness had tried to discuss the possibility of exchanging the Ilaşcu group. The Transdniestrians responded that the members of the Ilaşcu group were not simple participants in the conflict but were terrorists and that, therefore, they could not be exchanged. Moldova had no one comparable to exchange with them. Ilaşcu was seen as a fighter against separatism. Transdniestria needed to justify its existence. This was perhaps the reason for their not wishing to exchange him or the other applicants.

It was never intended to include the IlaÅŸcu group in an operation involving the exchange of Iakovlev for the 30 policemen, since Iakovlev ' s release had occurred before Mr IlaÅŸcu ' s arrest.

The issue of the IlaÅŸcu group was nevertheless raised by the Moldovan authorities in the context of an exchange of prisoners. During the armed conflict Moldova captured a number of prisoners. But the Moldovan proposal for an exchange was rejected point blank when the issue of the IlaÅŸcu group was raised. This was so at all levels. Moldova was unable to secure their release despite all efforts. The separatist regime needed a justification for the accusation that Moldava was involved in terrorist acts, and the IlaÅŸcu trial provided a smokescreen for their own terrorist acts committed through mercenaries.

273 . The direct negotiations with Mr Smirnov were aimed at the implementation of various decisions taken by Parliament and the Government regarding the settlement of the conflict. These negotiations took place with General Creangă and concerned, for example the withdrawal of military formations. That was in March 1992. Then, on 21 July 1992 , there was the Moldovan/Russian Agreement on the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. The witness was included in the discussions leading to the solution of conflict at the local level.

274 . The relations between Moldova and Transdniestria were governed by the Moldovan/Russian treaty of 21 July 1992 .

The Control Commission was initially composed of a Russian delegation, a Moldovan delegation and a Transdniestrian delegation. Later they were joined by delegations from the OSCE and the Ukraine . The Control Commission was intended to deal with all the problems arising from the conflict – for example compensation for damage, withdrawal of troops and so on. Some problems were solved. Later, because of Russia ' s inertia and different strategy, the Russian military forces stayed on. Where there used to be a Russian peace-keeping force, now there were Russian military forces. And, as the OSCE had confirmed, the Transdniestrians now produced missiles and military equipment.

275 . The separatist regime could not exist without Russian support. It was not ethnic, religious or even internal political reasons that prompted this conflict. It was dictated by external reasons. It was designed to split Moldova because Moldova was not willing to sign a treaty to join the Soviet Union . Within a few months, the Transdniestrian separatists liquidated the constitutional prosecution and law-enforcement bodies – the prosecutors ' offices, the police and the rest. They could not have done this without the support of the Fourteenth Army. Previously the left and right banks of the Dniester lived in peace. This conflict, this splitting of the left and right banks, was provoked by Russia for political reasons of its own.

276 . This was not an ethnic conflict. Guslyakov was the General in command of the Bender police station. He ensured law and order there on behalf of the constitutional Moldovan order. He was Russian-speaking. He did all that he could to maintain order, for as long as he could. He subsequently became a Deputy Minister in Moldova .

277 . Moldova was naïve when signing documents with the Transdniestrians. Moldova was not ready for the war that broke out on 19 June when the police station in Bender was surrounded. Kostenko attacked Dubăsari on 16 June. A decision was taken on the Moldovan side to send Special Forces to aid the police. After the town of Bender was free of Kostenko ' s gangs, the Moldovan soldiers, who did not know where to disperse, came to the citadel where they were taken prisoner and some of them shot. The Russian Army, which was occupying the citadel and controlling that area, was involved in this. When they freed the bridge, the Moldovans did not fire on the Russian forces, but Russian tanks flying the Russian flag fired on them.

278 . Iakovlev was arrested by the Moldovan security service. There was enough evidence of his having helped to arm the separatists. It is not true that he was freed because there was not enough evidence against him.

279 . General Lebed, who was the Commander of the Russian Operational Group, was elected to the Transdniestrian Parliament in 1993. Moldova was indignant about his political support for the separatists. But the Russian Duma had quite clearly stated its position on this. Only later did General Lebed himself come to understand what kind of regime he stood for. He said that it was a criminal regime.

280 . Paramilitary forces from Transdniestria took part in the war in Abkhasia. A Dolphin force detachment belonging to the Transdniestrians took an active part in the operations in Abkhasia. This was confirmed by Antiufeev ' s colleague from OMON, Goncharenko Matveev, Deputy Minister of Security of the Tiraspol regime. Goncharenko was one of the commanders of the Russian Special Forces operating in the Baltic countries. He took part in the operation in Riga . He then came to Transdniestria with Shevtsov/Antiufeev, and was responsible for the formation of the Transdniestrian forces.

Goncharenko requested that people who had fought against the legal, constitutional forces of Georgia be decorated. These were similar conflicts involving separatist, Russian-speaking rebels, supported by Soviet and later Russian troops. Russia had a record of being responsible for providing military support to these illegal paramilitary forces.

281 . Moldova had no regular forces when the conflict broke out. The police force bore the brunt, together with volunteer units. The forces in the conflict were unequal. There was a well-equipped army on one side, police and armed citizens on the other. Moldova could not survive.

Russia provided peace-keeping troops but imposed certain conditions. The Russian/Moldovan Agreement was drafted in Moscow and Moldova was not able to introduce anything important, as it had wished, for instance, on the notion of state independence, sovereignty, etc. This Agreement was only a military tool for a certain time, but three months later, in September 1992, Moldova stated that this Agreement had been implemented and that there was a need to organise further negotiations leading to other conventions that would ensure peace.

24. Anatol PLUGARU

282 . The witness was the Minister of National Security between August 1991 and July 1992. Before that, he was a colonel and was appointed head of the KGB in Moldova at the time when the Soviet Union was breaking up in August 1991. Before that, he was a parliamentarian, a member of the Supreme Soviet. From July 1992 to September 1993 he served as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thereafter he did not work in Government. At the time of giving evidence he was a free-lance legal expert and journalist.

283 . The witness knew Mr IlaÅŸcu because of his job. He came into contact with him when Moldova was forced to mobilise its citizens because of the emergence of the illegal regime in Transdniestria. This was in March 1991. A resistance movement, initially uncontrolled, sprang up in Transdniestria. Tens of thousands of citizens were asking for arms in order to defend their country. Moldova did not have an army. The Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Security were meant to mobilise people who had received some military training. Mr IlaÅŸcu fell into that category.

284 . The witness did not know whether the Russian special services, the Alpha Group, were involved in the interrogation of IlaÅŸcu.

285 . The witness considered that Mr IlaÅŸcu was a prisoner of war falling under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Protocols. A number of attempts had been made to exchange Mr IlaÅŸcu and his colleagues but Moldova had no prisoners they could offer in exchange.

286 . Moreover, Moldova knew who was behind all that. The Fourteenth Army wanted to cross the river. “A Cossack is a Cossack even in Bucharest ,” is what could be heard at the time. Moldova could not afford to use force, although it did carry out some operations, for example the one relating to Iakovlev. General Iakovlev was arrested by the secret service of Moldova . Mr Ilaşcu was not involved in this. Iakovlev was detained because he had supplied arms to the separatist rebels. He could only be kept in custody for a limited period, but the investigators could not collect enough evidence to bring him to trial. General Stolyrov, the deputy to Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief of the CIS Forces, came from Moscow – he was the Deputy Head of the Russian secret service – to ask for Iakovlev ' s release. As soon as it was clear that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute him, the Moldovan authorities came up with the idea of exchanging him and the witness discussed the matter with Stolyrov. In the end, General Iakovlev was exchanged for 30 police officers detained in Dubăsari.

287 . The Ministry of the Interior did talk to the Transdniestrian authorities. Many attempts were made to have Mr IlaÅŸcu and the other applicants released. But all proposals were rejected because the IlaÅŸcu case represented a means of effective leverage for the Transdniestrians, a tool which they could use to humiliate Moldova . The regime was supported by Russia and the Ukraine . More energetic efforts to get Mr IlaÅŸcu and his colleagues released would have led to greater tension. The Transdniestrian regime was able to exercise pressure on the constitutional Moldovan authorities through the IlaÅŸcu case, in order to obtain recognition.

288 . The separatist regime de facto , was outside the legal control of the constitutional Moldovan authorities. The Moldovan legal authorities had been effectively destroyed in Transdniestria. The Transdniestrian regime was armed with weapons from the stocks of the Fourteenth Army. Iakovlev had armed these paramilitary forces. Lebed had pursued a policy of “active neutrality”. Moldova had no access there. On taking up his command, General Lebed should have reported to President Snegur, as the official Head of the State where the Fourteenth Army was stationed. But General Lebed had ignored these elementary rules. When he arrived, he did not notify the President of Moldova; and there was no notification either from the Kremlin.

289 . There was the “Balkan Arch Plan” with the following scenario : if Moldova had not stopped the armed conflict, it would have spilled over into Romania . Presidents Yeltsin and Putin had made statements in favour of Moldovan sovereignty, but many members of the State Duma, including Mr Rutskoi, had gone to Transdniestria and supported the Transdniestrian separatists. They had interfered in Moldova ' s internal affairs in a brazen manner. If a section of the Russian Government, the official Government, had cooperated, the armed conflict could have been avoided.

290 . Russia had at the time great problems with the huge army that it had stationed in Moldova . Many soldiers did not want to go back to Russia . No preparations had been made to receive them there. The Russian military in Transdniestria were providing military support to the Transdniestrian regime. Tanks of the Russian Army took part in the armed conflict; this was broadcast on the television. Other than those of the Fourteenth Army, there was not a single tank in Moldova at the time.

291 . The cease-fire agreement with the Russians was signed in July 1992. The witness was dismissed five days before that, under pressure from the Russians.

292 . The witness stated that he had never met Mr Gorbov. Earlier, before the armed conflict, he was dismissed from the Moldovan Ministry of the Interior. When the conflict broke out, he offered his services to the Tiraspol regime because he could not agree with the Chişinău authorities. He was given responsibility for dealing with the Ilaşcu group. He prepared the investigation, together with the Commander of the Fourteenth Army and Colonel Bergman. Then the relations between him and the Tiraspol regime soured. He might have gone to Moscow .

The witness knew Olga Căpăţînă, he knew that she was a civil activist. She was involved in the League of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers who died in Afghanistan . The witness had no information about her involvement as an intelligence agent during the conflict. But anyway he did not know who were the individual agents working in the field.

293 . The witness met Mr IlaÅŸcu in his capacity as head of the ex-Soviet Union ' s KGB. Mr IlaÅŸcu was mobilised by order of the KGB of Moldova. He was not an agent of the KGB as such. He was mobilised because he had experience of gathering information. After the KGB structure was changed, three Ministries were involved: Defence, the Interior and Security. Moldova was fighting enemies who had penetrated the country, groups who had infiltrated the country, that is, in Tiraspol , which was part of the Republic of Moldova .

294 . The Moldovan Ministry of Security did not receive any support from outside. It is true that Romania provided Moldova with some arms, but these were very old weapons which did not work.

But support was given by Russia to ethnic Russians in Transdniestria. The Cossacks came to Transdniestria because they had been let out of prison. There were long convoys of weapons being transported to Transdniestria. The Moldovan Ministry of Security sent agents to work in Transdniestria and the Fourteenth Army. That was quite normal, having regard to the situation. At the time, Moldova ha d documentary evidence , received through agents, to show that after April 1992 the Fourteenth Army was helping the rebels with arms and in other ways. General Netkachev admitted that Transdniestrians were using lorries to get access to the armament stores through minefields.

25. Nicolai PETRICÄ‚

295 . The witness was a graduate of a tank academy. On 17 April 1992 he left the Soviet Army and joined the Moldovan Army until June 1993. Before that, in Afghanistan , he was Deputy Head of the Military School . From 1964 until 1974 he had served in Chişinău, and after that, he left the Fourteenth Army and went to Moscow to serve in the Soviet Army. At the time of giving evidence, he was the holder of the Military Chair in the Technical University of Moldova.

296 . He commanded the Moldovan forces in the Dubăsari fighting. It was Russian Army soldiers that shot at the Moldovans. They were using 152 mm shells, which the separatists did not have at that time. They were shooting from the Cocieri-Dubăsari line. Negotiations took place on 24 May 1992 with the Colonel who was commanding the Transdniestrian paramilitary forces. There were no representatives of the Fourteenth Army present. But, had it not been for the presence of Russian forces in Transdniestria, the separatist forces could not have been armed. On 19 May the separatists had received thirteen T-64 tanks from the Fourteenth Army. They used other military equipment, such as artillery, which must have come from the same source. The witness did not actually see the Fourteenth Army or their soldiers.

297 . The church in Golicani was destroyed by a 152 mm shell; shells of that calibre also fell in the village of Cruglic . In later discussions that the witness had with commanders from the Fourteenth Army, they had confirmed that there had been cases when artillery equipment was used against the right-bank forces.

General Lebed openly said that he was pursuing a policy of “active defence”. They, the Russian soldiers, fired shots towards the town of Tighina (Bender).

298 . Between 21 July and 16 October 1992 , when the witness was the commander of the Moldovan peace-keeping forces, he was not informed about Russian peace-keeping forces being involved on the rebel side. On the contrary, Moldova and Russia together were able to secure peace in that zone. The witness collaborated very well with the Russian General, and they kept full control of the situation.

299 . In May 1992 sixteen tanks were handed over to the Transdniestrian Guards. Of them, thirteen tanks went to the Kacheevskii bridge-head. But on 24 May the witness met his opposite number, whom he knew as a comrade from the Far East . They agreed to maintain their positions, but without engaging in any fire. But on 19 June the tragedy happened. Lebed was using his troops and tanks. Presumably he had his orders, because no General would act in that way without instructions from his political superiors. Bender was destroyed by the artillery and the tanks of the Fourteenth Army, not by the Moldovan side. The tanks used were tanks of the Fourteenth Army, of the 59th Division. But Lebed had also disarmed the Kostenko brigade, a brigade of Transdniestrian rebels. In other words, he took the decision to stop the fighting.

It was not possible for the Transdniestrians to seize tanks. Lebed was permanently there. The order came from Moscow and Lebed had to implement it.

300 . On 21 July 1992 Russia took a decision to settle the Transdniestrian problem and that decision included something about the release of Ilaşcu and his group. But perhaps Moldova was not persistent enough. Moldova took up the issue in the Joint Control Commission set up under the Moldovan/Russian Agreement of July 1992. Mr Catană was there.

26. Vasile RUSU

301 . At the time of giving evidence, the witness was the Prosecutor General of Moldova . Before that he was a lawyer and a Member of Parliament, on the Communist Party list.

302 . The criminal investigation opened in December 1993 against the judges and prosecutors involved in the IlaÅŸcu trial was not taken far because the necessary inquiries would have had to have been undertaken on the eastern, left bank of the Dniester, and that was under the control of the separatist regime. The legitimate authorities of Moldova had no access to the eastern part of the Republic. Likewise, in relation to the complaints filed in 1992 under Article 82 of the Criminal Code of Moldova in connection with the murder of the citizen Gusar, the Moldovan authorities were regrettably not in a position to carry out any investigation in the territory of Transdniestria .

In December 2002 the investigation was suspended. A criminal investigation was also opened in 2000 in respect of the governor of Hlinaia Prison for unlawful deprivation of liberty, but that investigation had also been suspended because it was impossible to carry out any real investigatory work.

The witness was of the opinion that the proceedings instituted against the judges and prosecutors under Articles 190 and 192 of the Criminal Code were incorrect. It would have been more appropriate to investigate under Articles 116 § 2 and 207 for usurpation of the identity of an official person and unlawful imprisonment, as was done in regard to the investigation launched against the governor of Hlinaia Prison.

303 . An exchange of prisoners involving the IlaÅŸcu group was proposed to the Transdniestrian authorities, but the proposal was rejected. In the witness ' s period of office there had been no exchange of convicted prisoners between Moldova and the regime in Tiraspol .

The witness did not know the Prosecutor General of Transdniestria, he had never had any telephone contact with him.

304 . If the judges and prosecutors involved in the Ilaşcu trial or the governor of Hlinaia Prison chose to come to Chişinău, as they could, they would be questioned and the required procedure would be carried out. It would not be necessary to detain them and it could not be known whether, as a result of any interrogation, they would actually be charged with deliberate usurpation of public office - that would be prejudging the investigation.

The witness was not aware that the offences with which the prosecutors and judges were charged (under Articles 116 and 207 of the Criminal Code) were considered to be time-barred according to the Public Prosecutor Iuga ' s decision of August 2000.

The witness was of the opinion that if the Tiraspol prosecutors or judges involved in the IlaÅŸcu trial travelled to the right bank of the Dniester, a criminal investigation under Article 207 of the Criminal Code could be launched against them despite possible problems of prescription.

Persons can be convicted in absentia if there is sufficient evidence to confirm their guilt. If these persons went abroad, for example, to Russia , then it would be possible to ask the Russian authorities to extradite them to Moldova . Colonel Golovachev, the Governor of Hlinaia Prison, was informed of the opening of the investigation against him and summoned to Chişinău through the Prosecutor ' s Office in Tiraspol .

305 . As Prosecutor General, the witness was not allowed to travel to the left bank. At the time of giving evidence, his Office had no control over events on the other side of the river. The witness preferred not to answer the question as to whether he was able to work with his colleagues on the other side of the Dniester River .

306 . The witness stated that if the file came before him as Prosecutor General of Moldova , he would initiate an investigation into the death of the two victims of the alleged terrorist acts of the Ilaşcu group – Gusar and Strapenko – despite the fact that they were citizens of the Russian Federation .

The witness had not had the opportunity to question Mr Ilaşcu when he came to Chişinău after his release, on 5 May 2001 , since he had taken up his duties as Prosecutor General only on 18 May and, on 10 May 2001 , Mr Ilaşcu had received the highest order of Romania , “The Star of Romania”.

27. Vasile STURZA

307 . From 2000 until 1 January 2003 he was Chairman of the Commission for negotiations with Transdniestria. As its name suggested, this Commission had the task of negotiating the status of Transdniestria and related matters. During the period 1991 to 1992 he was the First Deputy of the Prosecutor General of Moldova , having taken up that office in September 1990 and remaining in it until April 1994. From April 1994 until May 1998 he was Minister of Justice. From May 1998 until January 2001 he was again the First Deputy of the Prosecutor General.

308 . The Commission of which the witness was Chairman was dealing essentially with the political problems relating to the status of Transdniestria and its main goal was to settle the latter ' s legal status. There was another Commission dealing with the social and economic problems arising from the Transdniestrian situation. The economic, cultural and social aspects were handled in parallel in another commission.

309 . In the context of the negotiations on the status of Transdniestria there were discussions about the legality of official acts accomplished by the Transdniestrian authorities, but the Moldovan side had always insisted on the unconstitutionality of acts carried out by the Transdniestrian authorities. Between 2001 and 2003 many draft texts for the status of Transdniestria were discussed during the negotiations, some of which contained provisions concerning what was to be done about decisions of the Transdniestrian authorities, for example criminal sentences imposed and civil court judgments delivered in the previous ten years.

310 . Concerning the possible release of Ilaşcu and his group, the Prosecutor General ' s Office asked the Prosecutor ' s Office in Transdniestria for them to allow the Ilaşcu case to be investigated by the constitutional authorities of Moldova . The witness discussed the matter several times with Prosecutor Lukiç, who was supervising this investigation in the period 1992 to 1993. The problem was that whatever the prosecuting authorities in Transdniestria did about the Ilaşcu case was unconstitutional and could not be executed in Moldova . Moldova proposed therefore that prosecutors from other countries be invited to investigate the case, for example representatives of the former USSR such as the Ukraine , Belarus and the Russian Federation . The witness personally went to Minsk to discuss the matter with the Prosecutor General of Belarus , who agreed to investigate the case. But the Transdniestrians refused. He also had a meeting with Mrs Ivanova, who was in charge of the trial and tried to convince the Transdniestrians that investigation by an unconstitutional body would cause problems for everybody. Again they refused.

311 . In 1994, while the witness was in the Prosecutor General ' s Office, he was sent by President Snegur to Transdniestria to seek the release of Mr Ilaşcu and the other applicants. Later, in 1996, he was allowed by Mr Smirnov to have a first meeting in person with Ilaşcu in Hlinaia Prison. The witness was the first to meet him in this way. The witness had a personal discussion with Smirnov, on the instructions of President Snegur, to request the release of Ilaşcu and the others. It was a complex and sensitive matter. A lot of politics were involved in the case. He had many discussions with Mrs Ivanova, the judge who tried the case as President of the so-called Supreme Court of Transdniestria, with Mr Lukiç, the prosecutor in the case, with the Minister of the Interior of the Transdniestrian regime, and with the President of the Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria. At the beginning they agreed to examine the case with a view to the release of all the prisoners who had been tried, but they required that the procedure laid down in Transdniestria be followed.

312 . There was a Decree issued by Smirnov in March 1993 whereby a Commission on Pardons was created. A Regulation on the activity of this Commission was brought out. In order to observe the proper procedure, therefore, one had to convince the members of this Commission to release the detainees in question. The witness therefore had meetings with the Chairman of the Commission. Throughout 1996, from April until the autumn, the witness had many discussions with the Commission, which had the power to grant pardons to all persons tried in Transdniestria. It was complicated, because one had to convince each individual member of the Commission. The last meeting that the witness had was with the representatives of all the services, that is to say, the Prosecutor ' s Office, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Soviet. All attended. Their conclusion was that the release of the IlaÅŸcu group could go ahead if confirmed by the decision of Mr Smirnov, who refused however.

The discussions concerning release continued after 1996. Smirnov would say “yes”, and then “no”. The final decision was taken in spring 2001. Previously, on 16 May 2000 at one meeting between President Lucinschi and Smirnov, the Moldovans again asked Smirnov about Mr Ilaşcu. Smirnov said he could not agree on a release, pure and simple, but could agree to the re-examination of the case by a court of a different State. That led to a number of subsequent initiatives. For example, Moldova asked Ambassador Hill, Head of the OSCE Mission, to use the good offices of the OSCE to raise the possibility of referring the Ilaşcu case to a court of a different State. Following an address made by Ambassador Hill in Vienna , Switzerland , Poland and Hungary agreed to the possibility of the Ilaşcu case being tried in one of their courts. Ambassador Hill discussed the possibility with the representatives of Switzerland . Discussions were initiated by the witness himself with the Ambassadors of Poland and Hungary in Chişinău. They even went into discussing the technical details, such as the number of judges who should sit, which code of criminal procedure should be applied, who should be the prosecutor, who should support the Moldovan participants, and so on.

The Moldovan authorities continued at the same time to discuss with the Transdniestrian authorities the unconditional release of Ilaşcu and his group. Mr Voronin and Mr Hill made separate appeals. There was a request for a trial of the case by the Polish courts. These appeals were sent by the witness to the Transdniestrian authorities. Finally, on 12 April 2001 , the Transdniestrian authorities agreed to proceed with an unconditional release, and not one mediated through a foreign court. Discussions took place as to the technical details of the release. On 16 April the witness went to Tiraspol by car in order to bring back the detainees to Chişinău, but the Transdniestrians refused even though there was an agreement. The witness met all the members of the group in the prison in Tiraspol , together with a representative of the OSCE. On this occasion the Transdniestrians were saying that they were ready to release all the detainees.

When, on 5 May 2001 , only Mr IlaÅŸcu was released, and not all the applicants, this was a big surprise for the Moldovans. They received a letter from Smirnov informing them of the release.

As to why the Transdniestrians refused to release them all, Moldova had to negotiate to settle the problem of the Transdniestrian region. The Moldovan authorities could not refuse to talk to unconstitutional bodies. At the same time a criminal investigation was opened against the judicial officials who had taken part in the illegal trial in Transdniestria against the IlaÅŸcu group. But at that time, the Moldovans were convinced that all the applicants would be released.

Following the failure to release the others, this issue was raised at all meetings with the Transdniestrians when the witness headed this Commission. There was another appeal signed by the witness and by the then Minister of Justice, Mr Morei.

313 . After May 2001 there was no further meeting with Smirnov on this topic. They avoided any such meetings. The witness discussed the issue of the applicants ' release with his Tiraspol counterpart in the Commission for negotiations on Transdniestria.

314 . As to the order for the investigation of judicial officials who had taken part in the illegal trial in Transdniestra, this was quashed on 16 August 2000 by Mr Didic, Deputy to the Prosecutor General.

The witness had a discussion with President Snegur at the relevant time on this issue, and then a lunch with the Transdniestrian authorities who were constantly asking for this criminal investigation to be annulled. It was discussed at the level of the leadership of the prosecuting authorities on both sides. It was stipulated as one of the conditions for the settlement of the status issue in general. But the legal and political considerations were different and separate. The witness was of the opinion that what the Transdniestrian prosecutors and judges had done was unconstitutional and that they should be brought to justice. The status of Transdniestria is still the subject of discussion on the basis of a draft instrument. This discussion embraced the general question of criminal liability not just that of the persons involved in the IlaÅŸcu case.

The Moldovan authorities were aware of the request to resolve the problematic situation of the people involved in creating the conflict. The witness therefore found it difficult to say whether the decision of 16 August 2000 was a legal decision or one linked to a political decision. The draft instrument on status covered precisely this issue.

315 . The withdrawal from Transdniestria of Russian troops was never raised in the status-negotiation Commission. This issue was addressed in a different context. In the list of guarantees on the status of Transdniestria, one related to military issues. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence discussed the question of the withdrawal of Russian troops within the framework of the bilateral relations between Moldova and Russia . Although the link between the resolution of the status of Transdniestria and the withdrawal of Russian troops was raised by the Transdniestrian side, the issue was discussed in a separate context – namely the chapter in the draft instrument which dealt with guarantees for the status of Transdniestria.

In Transdniestria thousands of criminal cases had been tried. There was a lot of politics bound up with the IlaÅŸcu case. The Transdniestrians had always said it was not a political case but an ordinary case of citizens who had committed murders and must therefore serve their sentences. Moldova has a different angle: if these people have committed illegal acts, then the case should be investigated and they should be tried by constitutional bodies. After the trial, the proceedings in the IlaÅŸcu case were examined by Professor Rzeplinski from Poland . In the light of his report, the Transdniestrians must have realised that they had made many procedural mistakes in conducting the prosecution and trial. But it was important for them to show that they exist as a State.

316 . The witness met the applicants, and also their families on many occasions, in connection with various issues such as medical care, material support, conditions of detention. All their requests had been satisfied in so far as they came within the competence of the constitutional Moldovan authorities. Family visits to the prison had been facilitated by the Moldovan authorities with the provision of transport. Health care had been provided through the Moldovan Ministry of Health. Mr Sturza ' s Commission saw to it that they were sent what they requested, such as newspapers and financial support for the family.

317 . The Ministry of Justice carried out preparatory work for Moldova ' s entry as a member of the Council of Europe. The main problem was the question of the observance of human rights. It was clear that the legal Moldovan authorities could not ensure observance of human rights in this region of Transdniestria. This led to the controversial reservation to the European Convention on Human Rights, which was approved by the Parliament of Moldova in September 1997. The text of this reservation was discussed and coordinated, word by word, with the Council of Europe. Moldova liaised with officials from Strasbourg . The witness considered the fact that the other detainees in the IlaÅŸcu group had not yet been released to be proof that the legal Moldovan authorities were not able to ensure observance of human rights in the region.

318 . The Moldovan authorities have never recognised the judicial decisions and official acts of the Transdniestrian region; they consider them unconstitutional. In order to prevent the Transdniestrian people from suffering from this situation after the events of 1990, Moldovan courts for areas in the Transdniestrian region have been established on the right bank of the river. In the instances mentioned in the question (of measures in family-law matters adopted by Transdniestrian courts and authorities), citizens are forced to go to the constitutional (i.e. legal) courts of Moldova to have their case re-examined after a decision by the Transdniestrian courts or authorities. The witness had many discussions in order to resolve this problem. The Transdniestrians think that the problem should be settled in a different way, so that the policy adopted in relation to such decisions does not adversely affect the Transdniestrian population. The problem concerns not only registry offices for marriage but also police matters, notaries ' offices, and so on. For example, if Transdniestrian people wish to go to the Ukraine or Russia , they have to go the right bank of the river in order to get travel documents.

This whole problem is the subject of on-going discussions. Ten thousand civil cases have already been decided by the Transdniestrian courts. It is necessary to settle what will happen in those cases. It would be an unrealistic solution for them all to be reviewed afterwards. However, if a citizen living in Transdniestria does not agree with the decision taken by the Transdniestrian court, he or she should have the right to appeal to the constitutional Moldovan authorities in order to have the case reviewed.

319 . In any instance where a citizen whose case has been decided in Transdniestria goes to the Supreme Court of Moldova, he or she will obtain a review. And the Supreme Court will declare the Transdniestrian decision unconstitutional. There have been many such cases over the years. Civil cases are reviewed, so as to ensure that the rights of the individual are preserved.

320 . When the Moldovan authorities heard of the deaths of Gusar and Ostapenko, they were ready to investigate and to find out who were the culprits. They entered into contact with the Tiraspol Prosecutor ' s Office in order to find out who was to blame for the murders. But the Moldovan authorities were met with a blank wall.

321 . The negotiations about the technical details of the Ilaşcu group ' s release started on 12 April 2001 . On 16 April 2001 the witness personally went to Tiraspol in order to bring them all back to Chişinău. When he met with the refusal of the Transdniestrian authorities, he had to start work all over again. On 5 May members of the Transdniestrian secret services brought Ilaşcu to the secret services in Chişinău, not to the prosecution authorities. It is difficult to say whether Mr Ilaşcu could have been interrogated by the prosecuting authorities upon his release. The criminal investigation was still open but Ilaşcu was a free man, he left Moldova of his own accord.

Immediately after May 2000 when Smirnov said that he could agree to the review of the IlaÅŸcu case by another country, the Moldovan authorities contacted Hungary , Poland and Switzerland . Technical discussions with these countries took place. However, the release of IlaÅŸcu in 2001 put an end to the possibility of having the case as a whole examined by another court in another country.

322 . Every thing done in the IlaÅŸcu case and in relation to the Transdniestrian problem in general, was done in earnest, with the utmost seriousness, regardless of when the events occurred. The witness himself studied the case-file several times. Some important studies were carried out at the instigation of the OSCE. Any preliminary criminal investigation would be complicated today, eleven years later, but the Moldovan prosecuting authorities would try their best.

28. Victor VIERU

323 . The witness has been the Vice-Minister of Justice since 2001. Before that he was a lawyer. The witness never dealt with the IlaÅŸcu case. It was never raised in any meeting that he attended.

The witness was indeed a member of the Commission on the negotiation of status headed by Mr Sturza. However, in meetings in which he participated, release of the remaining members of the IlaÅŸcu group was never raised as an issue.

324 . The witness found, as a lawyer, that the decision taken by the Prosecutor General ' s Office in August 2000 to quash the order of 1993 opening a criminal investigation against the persons responsible for the trial of IlaÅŸcu and his colleagues was incorrect.

325 . The Moldovan authorities have never recognised documents issued by the unconstitutional authorities of Transdniestria. The witness was of the view that the protocol of May 2001, signed by Mr Voronin and Mr Smirnov, was not legally binding. Firstly, the supreme law of the Republic of Moldova , as laid down by the Constitution, does not include in the category of legal acts an act such as this political decision. Secondly, it cannot be deemed to be an international instrument under the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969: the right to sign treaties is available only to States and Transdniestria cannot be so recognised. Thirdly, any legal act must be published in the Official Gazette. In any event, documents issued by the constitutional Moldovan authorities are not recognised in the Eastern part of the country.

29. Andrei STRATAN

326 . The witness was the Director of Customs Control from 1999 until 2001. At the time of giving evidence, he was Ambassador, Head of the Office for the Pact for Stability in South-East Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to 1999, he was Deputy Director at the Customs Department, attached firstly to the Ministry of Finance and then directly to the Government.

327 . The Moldovan customs authorities have no authority de facto regarding the transport of goods in the territory of Transdniestria up to the border of Ukraine , because they have no access to this territory.

Most of the corporate entities in Transdniestria prepare their customs documents in Tiraspol . When they want export permits, for example for textiles, they approach the authorities in Chişinău who will issue the appropriate documents. There are no constraints on corporate entities in Transdniestria coming to Chişinău for appropriate documents for exports to third countries. In Transdniestria, however, exports and imports are carried out without the authorisation of the constitutional Moldovan authorities. They frequently receive goods imported directly to Tiraspol . Some goods, such as textiles, can be exported to the European Union only after they have received a permit from the Moldovan Ministry of the Economy. This is because there are export quotas. This is not a customs procedure as such. It is a procedure for obtaining a permit from the Ministry of the Economy. The Customs Department has no control over this procedure.

Arms exports from Moldova come under the jurisdiction of the constitutional authorities of Moldova . A Government decision is needed. In fact, an inter-departmental Committee takes decisions as regards the export of, or other transactions in regard to, arms. The witness did not know what the procedure used by the authorities in Tiraspol was.

Arms were exported from Tiraspol via Ukraine directly to other countries, because Chişinău was unable to exercise control at the Ukrainian border.

328 . The Customs Department was not responsible for the issue of certificates of origin. That came under the responsibility of the Chamber of Commerce.

329 . Some goods were manufactured partly in Moldova and partly in Transdniestria, in which case they were transported to and from Transdniestria. It was natural for left-bank corporate entities to deal with those on the right bank. The Moldovan authorities had no statistics on this, as this was considered to be domestic trade.

330 . No joint customs posts were ever set up between the right and left banks of the river. Since 1995 Moldova has been part of the International Customs Union. Transdniestria is an integral part of Moldova , but customs control has never been exercised by Moldovan authorities over services and goods emanating from the left bank region. There has therefore never been any smuggling, formally speaking.

331 . Energy supplies from Russia to Moldova are organised in accordance with the agreements that were signed before the conflict. The Customs Department knows the volume of energy imported from Russia to Moldova . There is a unit in the Customs Department which supervises the importation of energy supplies. The Customs Department receives official papers concerning the supply of gas and electricity. But the Moldovan authorities cannot control what happens on the border between Moldova and Ukraine in order to record the import volumes for the Transdniestrian segment. There is an exchange of information between Russian and Moldovan Customs Departments about gas exports from Russia to Moldova . Moldovagas also supplies a declaration, which the Department has to verify as correct. There is no customs duty as such imposed in relation to the importation of natural gas to Moldova from Russia , only payment for customs procedures and value added tax.

332 . The witness did not know whether the transport of goods, destined for export from Transdniestria direct to another country, would be registered. The witness never had any such documentation before him, which suggested, to his mind, that other ways of exporting such goods had been found and that there was uncontrolled trade between Transdniestria and third countries, apart from weapons. The Moldovan Customs Department has a brigade for the investigation of illegal exports. But this brigade can only operate in territory that is accessible to them and open to their control. Cross-border trade between Transdniestria and the Ukraine is therefore not controlled by the Moldovan Customs Department.

333 . The witness did not know how it was possible that on bottles of brandy made in Tiraspol available for sale in Russia the country bar code on the bottle was that of Russia and not Moldova . He considered that the question should be put to the custom authorities of the Russian Federation .

334 . The Moldovan Customs Department does not operate any customs control on the right bank of the Dniester because this is not an international border. Consequently, the Moldovan authorities do not carry out any investigations on the matter. It is not a crime to transport goods from the right to the left bank of the river.

30. General Boris SERGEYEV

335 . The witness was born on 17 January 1950 in Orenburg , Russia . He has been the commander of the ROG since 18 January 2002 . Before that, from 1996, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the ROG.

336 . The mission of the ROG is twofold: Peace-keeping force (PKF) and units responsible for guarding, and gradually repatriating to the Russian Federation , the ammunition and property of the former Fourteenth Army.

337 . As to the PKF, there are about 360 persons: two battalions and an aviation group. The battalions alternate on duty and, when on duty, they are subordinate only to the Joint Command of the PKF. The Russian PKF battalions are organisationally dependent on the ROG. These battalions are located separately from the ROG troops, and have their own command centre. Other units of the ROG are not involved in the PKF and never were. The Russian PKF has no tanks. The aviation group is responsible for Tiraspol airport.

338 . The present headquarters of the ROG were formerly the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army. The overall number of staff in the ROG was at the time of his giving evidence less than 1,500 persons, comprising all military units.

339 . There is a military airport in Tiraspol . During Soviet times there was an air division based there. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 aviation equipment was divided between Moldova , the Ukraine and Russia . The Fourteenth Army had only a helicopter squadron based in Tiraspol . This squadron became a part of the PKF. Today it has nine helicopters and a logistics back-up service comprising about 180 servicemen. They are not a part of the ROG, but are subordinate directly to the Russian Air Force. They are used only for the PKF inspections: they monitor the security zone.

340 . There is very little traffic at Tiraspol airport. Air space is controlled by Ukrainian and Moldovan air traffic controls: when an aircraft flies over the territory of Ukraine, air traffic control is provided by the air traffic control services of Ukraine, and when an aircraft approaches the territory of Moldova, it is directed by the air traffic control services of Chişinǎu. Therefore, without the permission of the Moldovan air traffic controllers in Chişinău, the Russian aircrafts and helicopters could not land and take-off.

As to the security of the airport, the ground used for the landing and take-off of heavy aircraft and helicopters of the Russian forces is protected by the Russian forces. The territory of the aerodrome is nevertheless open, so the Transdniestrians, if they wanted, could interfere. However, they do not interfere and similarly the Russian forces do not interfere with the way the Transdniestrians use their part of the airport.

341 . The withdrawal of the ROG should have been completed by the end of 2002. It has now been put back to the end of 2003. At present, equipment from the warehouses in Kolbasnoye was being transported. 69 trips were required for the supplies and ammunition, and another 15 for military equipment. This would take until the end of 2003. The witness stated that he preferred not to say why the withdrawal had taken so long, as making a statement on this issue would be beyond his call of duty. The timetable was fixed by the President and the Ministry of Defence. The witness only had to implement their decisions.

Withdrawal to Russia was usually done by train and only in exceptional cases by air. The last time equipment was taken away by air was in 1996 for anti-tank ammunition. Some items were destroyed on the spot, like armoured vehicles and air-defence complexes. A prototype destruction method for a given type of combat material is agreed with the OSCE experts, and thereafter OSCE closely monitors this process. The destruction is performed in a way that excludes any possible future use or reconstruction. 108 tanks were destroyed in 2002 and currently air-defence systems were being destroyed.

342 . The witness stated that he would contact the Transdniestrian authorities regarding the withdrawal only if he was directed to do so in each individual case by his superior authorities. The process is often hindered by the Transdniestrian authorities, but at present they have undertaken to cooperate and to let the transport pass. The ROG offered compensation to the “MRT” for the withdrawal, either by writing off debts or by transferring non-military assets to them.

343 . The O SC E performs inspections both at the places where the equipment is loaded for transportation, and in Russia where it arrives. The Moldovan authorities also supervise the process: first through the OSCE, then when the transport (train) is ordered from Moldova, the Russian authorities specify the items and quantity to be loaded, and a list of the load is forwarded to the Moldovan authorities for the crossing of the Moldovan - Ukrainian border.

344 . ROG personnel can only move around if authorisation is given by the Transdniestrians. The same authorisation is needed for importing goods and supplies. Express authorisation is also needed from the Transdniestrian authorities to use railroad and road transportation, both in and out. The ROG is required to submit notice of every proposed movement, with details about the vehicle. Otherwise the Transdniestrian authorities detain or block cars and transport vehicles.

The witness stated that at the time of giving evidence, there were three vehicles detained illegally by the Transdniestrian authorities.

345 . The ROG held no joint exercises with the Transdniestrian armed forces.

346 . Whenever the need arose to contact the Transdniestrian authorities, the hierarchy in Moscow specifically authorised the witness to contact someone in the Transdniestrian administration, specifying the persons and the subjects for discussion.

347 . The ROG does not lack military supplies and ammunition and does not need to bring in any fresh material of that kind. Other supplies for maintenance purposes (e.g. fuel) come from various places - from the Ukraine , Poland or directly from Russia . Heavy equipment (such as aircraft engines) needing repair are sent back to Russia . For this sort of thing a request is sent to the local authorities, not to the central Moldovan authorities. The ROG buys some food locally, in Transdniestria. Whatever is brought in by air, the Moldovan officers from the peace-keeping forces are invited since, under the terms of the 1992 Agreement, they are responsible for customs and border control.

348 . The Transdniestrian authorities consider that, following the break-up of the Soviet Union , a part of the property of the former Fourteenth Army in Transdniestria belongs to them. The ROG only transfers to them non-military equipment. It does not include any arms, ammunition or armoured vehicles, only catering equipment, cars, certain types of engineering equipment, shovels, fuel-transportation equipment, tents, power equipment and the like. Before the transfer, the list is authorised by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of State Property in Moscow . Tanks were never transferred to the Transdniestrian authorities.

349 . In 1992 Mikhail Bergman was the military commander in Tiraspol , the head of the Commandatura . At that time, the headquarters of the Army was a closed compound, entrusted with specific military tasks. The Commandatura was situated separately from the ROG headquarters and dealt with various administrative tasks, like the registration of newly arriving servicemen, registration of leave and missions, etc. It had a 24-hour military presence and military communications. At the Commandatura there were also military police and detention cells. The building of the Commandatura was situated about one kilometer away from the HQ. About three years ago the building was transferred to the Transdniestrian authorities.

350 . The Fourteenth Army was created in 1956, as part of the Odessa military circuit. The headquarters were in Chişinău, but in 1986 or 1988 the command centre moved to Tiraspol . The Army was situated in the territories of both the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldovan SSR. No units were ever stationed on Russian territory. The Fourteenth Army did not include any aircraft division. In Moldovan territory there were air-defence, engineering, communications and logistics units, and paratroopers. In the Ukrainian SSR there were airborne troops. The Army was divided in the following way: everything that was on Moldovan territory went to Moldova , with the exception of the equipment on the left bank of the Dniestr, which went to Russia . After December 1991, the Army briefly belonged to the CIS armed forces. On 1 April 1992 Russia took over the Army. Mr Lebed was the first commander of the Fourteenth Army after 1991. After that the Fourteenth Army was renamed ROG; then General Yevnevich took it over. At the time of giving evidence, the witness was the commander of the ROG. Generals Yakovlev and Netkachev used to serve in the Soviet Army, but were never members of the new Russian armed forces.

The witness did not know anything about General Lebed ' s election to the Transdniestrian parliament in 1993. After Tiraspol he was appointed Secretary of the Security Council in Moscow .

351 . The uniform of the ROG has a chevron on the sleeve saying Russia which was introduced by the Ministry of Defence in 1994. Before that, from 1988, the uniform had chevrons and shoulder straps saying SA for Soviet Army. The witness stated that although the two chevrons were different, he could not tell whether they could be distinguished by an onlooker.

352 . The ROG holds joint exercises with the Moldovan armed forces, in central Moldova , but there was never a case of joint exercises with the Transdniestrian forces.

The cooperation with Moldova is done within the CIS framework, under the military cooperation agreements. The witness declared that he had regular meetings and telephone contacts with the Moldovan authorities - the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of Staff and the President. He had never met Smirnov, however.

353 . The witness was subordinate to the commander of the Moscow military circuit, the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defence. Russian male citizens aged over 18 years may be drafted into the armed forces even if they do not reside permanently in Russia . The ROG has recruits from the Moscow military circuit. The witness stated that he did not know of 400 persons apparently drafted in Transdniestria in February 2000.

354 . Soldiers guarding ammunition stores are issued with a manual explaining when they can open fire. There has never been any question of opening fire on Moldovan troops.

31. Colonel Alexander VERGUZ

355 . The witness was born on 24 November 1960 , in Tiraspol . He was Deputy Commander of the ROG in charge of educational work since April 1999.

356 . There had been three instances in 2002 of Transdniestrian authorities seizing ROG vehicles with supplies and holding them illegally.

357 . The ROG ' s main function in Transdniestria was to maintain order within the ROG forces; it was not involved in political issues. The ROG was stationed outside Russian territory, and dealt only with things that arose within the ROG. The main tasks of the ROG were guarding the arms and ammunition stores and training military personnel. The PKF ' s task, to keep order in the security zone, was directed towards the “outside world”, but the PKF troops were not a part of the ROG; they were a separate force.

358 . The witness has been serving in Tiraspol since 1992. In June 1992 there was fighting in the towns of Bender and Dubăssari, but not in Tiraspol , so he did not witness any fighting. The witness further stated that the Russian military remained strictly neutral and took no part in the fighting. He was not aware of tanks taking part in the conflict.

359 . There was no transfer of weapons, but weapons were forcibly seized because the people were in revolt. It was unforeseeable. Women and children came and, under cover of their intervention, the seizure of weapons took place. The soldiers who were under a duty to guard the weapons could not possibly shoot at women and children. The situation was truly exceptional. The people who did it were desperate: there was a war; they needed to defend their homes. Lorries were also used to break into stores that were protected by mines. It would have been impossible to recover the seized weaponry without provoking a combat situation. There were no seizures of weapons before the armed conflict broke out.

360 . The loss of weapons was categorised as robbery or theft, and proceedings were started to investigate each and every incident. The witness stated that he was not aware of the outcome of these criminal proceedings.

361 . Mikhail Bergman was the Commandant in 1992. The building of the Commandatura was situated in the Kirpichny proezd, about one kilometre away from the HQ. It was under full control of the Russian military at that time; it could not be shared with any Transdniestrian authorities.

32. Lieutenant-Colonel Vitalius RADZAEVICHUS

362 . The witness was born in Vitebsk , Belarus . He was discharged from service in December 2002; before that he was senior officer in the military intelligence of the ROG. He had served in the region since February 1993. His duties were collecting data and training intelligence groups.

363 . The movement of transport in Transdniestria was difficult. Recently three transport vehicles being sent to Russia were detained. The ROG had no contacts with either the Transdniestrian authorities or their intelligence service. Meeting the Moldova intelligence service was not part of the witness ' s duties either.

364 . Olga Capatina served in the ROG under the name of Olga Suslina . The witness thought she was an agent of Smirnov.

365 . The witness denied that the marines or the Alpha Group of the FSB were ever deployed in Transdniestria.

3 3 . Colonel Anatoli Z V EREV

366 . The witness was born in 1953 in the Kaluga region of Russia . He has been in service in Tiraspol since January 2002; before that he served in the Moscow military circuit.

367 . The joint peace-keeping forces were established by virtue of the Agreement of 1992 between the Moldovan and Russian Presidents. The Russian part of the peace-keeping forces was made up of 294 personnel, 29 vehicles, and 264 rifles. It also had 17 armoured vehicles, stationed at the posts of the PKF and used for communication. The guns were Kalashnikov machine-guns and Makarov pistols; there were no heavier weapons, like grenade-launchers, flame-throwers, anti-tank missiles, etc. All vehicles and servicemen of the PKF bore special insignia. They were allowed to travel around freely - as stipulated by the 1992 Agreement. The Russian Peace-keeping forces and the ROG were entirely separate. The senior positions in the PKF were occupied by officers from Russia . From 1992 to date, the post of Senior Commander of the Russian PKF had never been held by someone from the ROG; the Commander had always been someone from Moscow . The PKF did not cooperate with the ROG in the performance of their duties.

368 . The PKF ' s duties were to prevent the transport of arms, explosives and drugs, and to ensure law and order in the security zone.

The Moldovan and Transdniestrian forces were responsible for monitoring and preventing actions by destructive forces from their respective sides. In 1992-1993 the tasks of the PKF were different: to stop the armed conflict, to separate the combatants, to take away the arms and help to restore order. At present they were maintaining peace and monitoring the implementation of the agreements.

369 . The witness ' s immediate superior was the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which was set up by the same 1992 Agreement. The JCC was composed of three delegations: one from the Russian Federation , one from the Republic of Moldova and one from the Region of Transdniestria. Each party had six representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Security. There was also the Joint Military Command, responsible for the PKF. Since 1996 a group of military observers from the Ukraine had participated in the JCC. All decisions were taken by consensus between the three parties and the Ukraine . The PKF was based on the principle of the equal division of tasks and responsibilities between members. The JCC cooperated with the OSCE.

3 4 . Lieutenant-Colonel Boris LEVITSKIY

370 . The witness was born on 31 May 1961 in the Novgorod Region of Russia. He was President of the 80th Military Garrison Court . At the time of giving evidence, he had been serving in this position since 2000.

The witness was the President of the court, and the only judge. The place of the second garrison judge remains vacant. The witness was dealing with administrative, civil and criminal cases as well as military disciplinary offences. As a military judge, he was subordinate to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court - not to the ROG or their commanders, or to the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Justice.

The military court which existed in Transdniestria in the days of the Fourteenth Army was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation at the same time as the Army. Such courts are part of the legal system of the Russian Federation . As a Russian military court it has jurisdiction only over Russian citizens - servicemen of the ROG and non-military personnel. The court does not have jurisdiction over anybody else such as the local population, the Transdniestrian militia, etc. In case of theft of military property, for example, the court would have jurisdiction over a Russian citizen in service in Transdniestria, but if the suspected thief were a Transdniestrian person, that would be a matter for the local courts. In any event, the ROG ' s military court in Tiraspol would not have the means of dealing with such a situation. The witness stated that he had not come across any cases related to the theft or illegal transfer of ammunition or arms.

371 . The ROG had no direct contacts with either the Moldovan or the Transdniestrian judicial authorities. If anyone were to escape to Moldovan territory, the ROG would have to seek that person ' s extradition through the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow , who would address themselves to the authorities in Chişinău.

The witness stated that the Transdniestrian authorities prevented the free movement of the ROG ' s military personnel. For instance, he was himself one day stopped in his car when travelling to Kolbasnoye, and was prevented from getting there.

3 5 . Lieutenant-Colonel Valery SHAMAYEV

372 . The witness was born on 9 June 1966 in Yaroslavl , Russia . He was appointed to his present position as Prosecutor of Military Unit 14101 in April 2002; before that he was the Deputy Military Prosecutor of the Moscow Region. At the time of giving evidence, he was being transferred to another position in the Moscow Region.

373 . As Prosecutor of Military Unit 14101 the witness was directly responsible to the Military Prosecutor of the Moscow military circuit. The Chief Prosecutor of the Moscow District could not however tell the witness to take a particular line in a prosecution, although he could point out that he was not following the correct procedure. Military prosecutors were not subordinate to the ROG command; they had no responsibility to it. The ROG commander could not give them instructions.

The witness ' s duties were to oversee compliance with the law in the ROG, and to investigate criminal offences committed by ROG military personnel, not those committed by local civilians. The witness had had no cases of theft, robbery or the illegal transfer of arms or equipment.

374 . The ROG ' s military prosecutors did not generally have direct contacts with either the Moldovan or the Transdniestrian judicial authorities. The witness did not have any special instruction on how to deal with the Transdniestrian authorities.

The only case involving any co-operation had occurred in 2002. A ROG soldier and some under-age civilians were suspected of beating up an elderly person, who had died. The law enforcement bodies in Tiraspol gave the witness some documents from which it appeared that one of the ROG ' s servicemen might indeed have participated. The witness carried out an investigation against that soldier and summoned some civilians as witnesses. So the ROG did have some minimal form of cooperation with the Transdniestrian law-enforcement bodies, which involved exchanging telephone calls and helping to locate witnesses.

As the witness did not lay any charges against those civilians, he did not institute proceedings against them, but the local prosecuting authorities did bring a case against the local suspects before the Transdniestrian courts. The witness was not aware of any other such instances of cooperation.

375 . The witness stated that the ROG ' s personnel had no problems moving around in Transdniestria; he himself could move around freely in his car. They could also travel freely to the other side of the river, with the permission of their superior officer.

376 . The witness was aware of the three vehicles detained illegally by the Transdniestrian authorities. No investigation had been conducted into the case, because the military prosecutor only has jurisdiction over Russian military personnel. The witness knew that the Command was trying to negotiate their return. Likewise the theft of arms from the Russian Army by Transdniestrian militia would not fall within the witness ' s powers. He would investigate if it were uncertain who had committed the theft but, once the evidence established that it was Transdniestrian people he could not take the matter further. He would send the file to Moscow , who would have to contact the official Moldovan prosecuting authorities to take over the investigation. Connivance or negligence by Russian military personnel in facilitating the theft would be within the witness ' s jurisdiction, but the witness had never experienced such a situation and had no information about what had occurred before he was there.

377 . The witness could not contact the Moldovan authorities directly, unless he had special permission.

3 6 . Vasiliy TIMOSHENKO

378 . The witness was born on 3 September 1941 in Kirovograd , Ukraine . At the time of giving evidence he was retired. From September 1982 until April 2002 he had occupied the position of Military Prosecutor of the Fourteenth Army, then of the ROG.

379 . The Fourteenth Army headquarters moved to Tiraspol from Chişinău in 1984.

The witness ' s job was to oversee the law and order in the Fourteenth Army. The jurisdiction extended only to the military - previously of the Fourteenth Army, now of the ROG - not to civilians or the Transdniestrian militia. If there were an assault on a Russian serviceman by a Transdniestrian civilian, that would be investigated by the Transdniestrian prosecuting authorities. In practice the Transdniestrian authorities always acted on their own, and did not ask for Russian participation. The ROG ' s military prosecutors would normally investigate suspected connivance by military personnel, including circumstances where the actual theft had been carried out by civilians and, if there were sufficient evidence of connivance by military personnel, they would go ahead with a prosecution. In the event of theft of army property by the Transdniestrian militia with the connivance of Russian military personnel, the ROG military prosecutor could thus prosecute the latter but not the former. But no such facts had occurred in normal times. The ROG ' s military prosecutors investigated cases against servicemen when arms and equipment were taken from the Russian military, but only during a conflict. And during the 1991-1992 conflict there was in fact no supply of military equipment to outsiders by Fourteenth Army military personnel.

380 . The Commandatura building had detention facilities. It was under the supervision of the prosecutor ' s office and also subject to the garrison head of the Fourteenth Army. No civilians would be detained there. The Commandatura was disbanded in 1996, and now the Transdniestrian prosecutor ' s office was situated there.

381 . The witness gave the following account of the applicants ' arrest and detention. When the conflict broke out, a group of terrorists began operating in the region, the Bujor group. Some prominent persons, like Gusar, a member of the Transdniestrian militia, Ostapenko and others were killed, and their funerals turned into massive demonstrations. These people were killed by the Chairman of the Popular Front IlaÅŸcu and the circumstances in which these people had been shot and burned were known to the whole town.

Therefore, Mr Chariev, the Transdniestrian prosecutor, made a request to the commander, General Lebed, to place the terrorists in the military premises for a while, in order to prevent public revenge. General Lebed refused permission. The witness, as prosecutor, inspected the guard-house (date not recalled). He noticed that in one wing there were three or four cells partitioned off and, instead of a ROG escort and guard, there were Transdniestrian police. There was also a separate entrance for access to the wing where the applicants were held. Mikhail Bergman told the witness that he had given permission for the terrorists to be held temporarily at the ROG guard-house, to protect their lives and health from the mob. The witness drew his attention to the fact that he had broken disciplinary regulations and directed that the guard-house be vacated immediately, which Mikhail Bergman refused to order. The witness then informed General Lebed about this, who became very angry with Mr Bergman. The witness went the next day to see Mr Bergman in order to use his powers to deal with the breach. But the cells had already been emptied. Therefore, the applicants were only kept there one or two days.

Bergman was wrong to allow the detention of these civilians in the Commandatura and their supervision and interrogation by the Transdniestrian militia. No disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Bergman, because this was a minor disciplinary infringement which was corrected almost immediately.

382 . The applicants were not transferred to the Moldovan authorities for trial, as this was a time of war. These people had blood on their hands and had to face justice for what they had done. If the applicants had been released, it was not certain they would have been punished. Emotions in the population were running high.

383 . After the collapse of the Soviet Union , the Fourteenth Army was divided between the Ukraine , Moldova and Russia . Moldova and the Ukraine received tank regiments. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union , many officers who did not want to serve in the Moldovan or Ukrainian army or take the oath there, were laid off and came to Transdniestria. The situation was very volatile. Naturally, every soldier was tending to think of himself. Two battalions changed their allegiance and switched to the Transdniestrian authorities. This was during the period of the CIS command. No legislation on this kind of defection existed. Those were very difficult times - for Russia as well.

On 1 April 1992 President Yeltsin declared the Fourteenth Army in Moldova to be under Russian jurisdiction. After that the situation calmed down, and there were no more defections, or transfers of military personnel from Russia to Transdniestria. However, those servicemen who wanted to return to Moldova were free to do so.

384 . The Russian Army sleeve chevrons and shoulder flashes were introduced in 1994; before that the insignia were those of the Soviet Army. The Transdniestrians had been using their flag and symbols since 1992.

385 . There had been no occupation of Moldova by Russia . The main reason for the tragedy there was the chaotic circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union . The armed conflict was ignited in 1990, when a new language law was adopted in Moldova . The situation in Transdniestria became very tense. “ Moldova belongs to the Moldovans,” was the slogan one could hear. Mr Ilaşcu issued Order No. 6, which was published in September 1990 and immediately incited fear in the Transdniestrian population. People started to leave the region after it. And it was immediately after the issue of that “order” that these tragic events started. The Ilaşcu group did a lot of damage, stirring up ethnic troubles. The “ Bujor ” group was preparing to blow up the building of the local parliament; for this purpose, they brought in large quantities of explosives. Because of the unrest and the activities of this terrorist group at that time, many officers sent their families away, including the witness, who evacuated his family to the Ukraine .

386 . When the conflict started in 1992, the ROG continued to maintain good communications with the Moldovan military. When the premises of the Fourteenth Army near Bender were hit by shells from the Moldovan side, the witness called them on the telephone to tell them that they had hit the ROG. After that, the Russian troops opened an investigation into the bombardment. The file was sent to Moldova for further investigation, but there had been no reply since.

387 . Neither the Fourteenth Army nor its tanks were involved in the armed conflict. There was an incident when two tanks were hijacked by the Transdniestrians and driven onto the bridge. The Russian forces tried to stop them, and one of them was hit from the Moldovan side and set on fire.

388 . The witness had never heard about 40 unarmed Moldovans being killed in a bus in Bender near the fortress. But he did hear about an ambulance being shot at by the Moldovan armed forces, an attack in which a pregnant woman and a nurse had died. He also heard about other atrocities committed by the Moldovan forces - for example, the incident about one month later when the Moldovan forces bombed inhabited settlements. The Moldovan planes bombed the town of Parcani , which is on the Transdniestrian side. There was no Russian aviation present in the region, only helicopters.

389 . The witness was not aware of incidents when the Fourteenth Army supplied arms to the Transdniestrian authorities or armed civilians. The Fourteenth Army retained all its military hardware; nothing was handed over. No theft of Fourteenth Army military property occurred during the 1991-1992 period. There were four cases of seizure of military property at the beginning of the armed conflict. The witness sent these cases to the Transdniestrian prosecutor, as it was not possible to send the file on to the Moldovan authorities.

390 . The witness knew General CostaÅŸ, former head of the Moldovan DOSAAF (Voluntary Society to Support the Army, Air Force and Navy). The DOSAAF of Moldova had a lot of military equipment for training - planes, tanks, armoured vehicles, etc. It had a military range where it would give people training in how to drive tanks, make parachute jumps, fire and reload cannons, and so on. The Moldovan DOSAAF left their equipment to Moldova , and the part in Transdniestria went to the local authorities.

391 . The witness knew personally Mr Nosov, the first deputy to the Chief Military Prosecutor, but was not aware that Mr Nosov had come to Tiraspol in 1996. He thought that had there been any investigation carried out by Mr Nosov he would have been informed or would have been involved in it. The witness disputed the existence of the report of 30 August 1996 and the authenticity of the document.

37. Vladimir MOLOJEN

392 . The witness was the General Director of the Department of Info rmation Technology (DIT) of the Government of Moldova. He had held this post for two and a half years. Before that he was the Head of the Department responsible for citizenship documents in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1991 and 1992 he was the Deputy Minister of the Interior.

393 . The witness ' s Department delivers passports and part of its work is drawing up the register of Moldovan citizens. As far as people living in Transdniestria are concerned, documents are delivered confirming that they are Moldovan citizens. The register of Moldovan citizens does not yet include all citizens because the establishment of the register is a ten-year programme, continuing until 2005. Citizens wanting a passport will apply to passport offices which exist in various places in the country. This applies to citizens living in Transdniestria as well. Officially there is no such thing as a Transdniestrian passport. There are rumours to the effect that one is being planned. The Moldovan DIT has no contacts with the Transdniestrian authorities as regards the issue of passports.

394 . The DIT of Moldova has no lists concerning the number of Russian citizens living in Transdniestria, although foreign citizens residing in Moldova should comply with Moldovan legislation and register. The DIT has no official data as to whether Smirnov possesses a Russian passport, though this is what is said in the newspapers. The DIT only has the data received from the regional offices and from the Russian consular authorities.

Any person who wants the establishment or renewal of a Russian passport would have to go to the Russian Embassy. According to the Moldovan statistics there are more than a thousand Russian citizens residing in Moldova . But, those statistics do not cover Transdniestria. The DIT has never asked the Russian Embassy to give them such information, although the DIT enjoys good cooperation with the Russian Embassy and, whenever they want information, they send the Russian Embassy an official request.

The witness pointed out that at the time of giving evidence, according to Moldovan law, a person could only hold one citizenship. Consequently, if a Moldovan citizen took out the citizenship of another country, then they would be expected to send a request to the DIT for cancellation of their Moldovan citizenship. In exceptional cases, by virtue of a presidential decree, a Moldovan citizen could have dual citizenship. Only Moldovan citizens could work in the public service and be a civil servant.

395 . Telephones, both land and mobile, come under the Department that deals with communications, not the Info rmation Technology Department. The DIT has no contact with the telephone people. The witness did not know whether there was a common telephone system for Moldova , including the Transdniestrian region, or whether there were separate systems.

396 . Mr Smirnov does not hold Moldovan citizenship and has never asked for it. There was a protocol of 6 May 2001 between the Moldovan President and the leader of the Transdniestrian regime in this connection. The Moldovan President was trying to ease the relations with the Transdniestrian leadership, but this protocol remains merely a statement of intent with no official value. In order to make this protocol effective, Moldova would have to change the law. When cancelling Moldovan citizenship, the DIT acts on request, but does not impose it. The drawing-up of the national register of citizens is an exercise being carried out within a ten to twelve year framework. This exercise does lead the DIT to a certain extent to verify whether persons have a second citizenship. The DIT is also discussing the possibility of exchanging information with various other States, such as Romania , the Ukraine , Bulgaria and Russia , but this is not operational yet. There is no sanction for non-compliance with the obligation to renounce Moldovan citizenship on acquiring another citizenship. The DIT believes that a significant number of Moldovan citizens do have second passports. This is not a problem that concerns only Russia (as the country of second citizenship) but all the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

397 . In 1992 the majority of the population in Moldova still had a Soviet passport. It was only in 1993 that the Moldovan President signed a decree on a unified passport system for Moldova . The first passports were issued in 1995 and 1996. What showed that a person was a Moldovan citizen before that date was an entry in the Soviet passport from 1974. Moldova introduced legislation involving a zero option. Persons living in the territory were accorded a certain status, but a timetable was established within which that status had to be confirmed. Persons who did not have the special entry in their Soviet passport had to apply for citizenship. All those who lived in the territory of Moldova had the right to obtain Moldovan citizenship if they wanted to.

A person possessing two passports would be offered a choice. But he or she would remain a Moldovan citizen until the choice had been made, despite having two passports at the same time.

398 . A telephone call from Chişinău to Tiraspol is an internal call.

399 . The question whether a residence permit could be refused to someone who has committed a crime was not a matter for the DIT, but for the Immigration Department. The witness knew however that Moldovan legislation provided for the refusal of a residence permit to a foreign applicant who had committed a crime.

Concerning the issue of a Moldovan identity document to Mr Ordin, a member of the Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria regarded as a danger to the national security of Moldova , the witness stated that the DIT issues documents without asking questions. An identity card as a citizen of Moldova is issued to any person who is permanently resident in Moldova .

38. Ion COSTAÅž

400 . The witness was the Minister of Defence of Moldova from February 1992 until 30 July 1992 .

The witness became a General in the Soviet Army in 1984. He is a graduate of the Air Officers ' Institute. He was a military pilot. He graduated from the Gagarin Military Academy in Moscow and served in the Far East and the Balkans.

From 24 May 1990 until 20 February 1992 , he was the Minister of the Interior. Before that he was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence. After his period as Minister of Defence, he served as military attaché in Bucharest , from July 1992 until October 1993. Thereafter he withdrew completely from politics and never entered the public arena again. He was now a retired person living on his pension, and a reserve General.

401 . In 1992 the Moldovan side started recruiting people for the defence of the realm against the forces of Smirnov. Moldova had some troops under the Ministry of the Interior. In March 1992 they started recruiting troops for the Ministry of Defence. At that time many Moldovan military personnel were coming back to the country. Fifty-one officers returned from the army of the former Soviet Union . At the Ministry of the Interior the witness realised that they had to create a Ministry of Defence as soon as possible. Moldova had no national army when the conflict broke out, when war was imposed on them by the Transdniestrian side. The Ministry of Defence therefore joined forces with the Ministry of the Interior. There were eight, ten, perhaps twelve battalions, that is all Moldova had to oppose the Cossacks, militia and military forces on the other side. This was confirmed by Mr Seleznev when he addressed the Moldovan parliament in 2002. On the Moldovan side there must have been twenty-five to thirty-five thousand people altogether. This figure included reservists and non-military personnel such as construction engineers and so on. At the same time the Russian Army in Moldovan territory numbered about 14,000 professional soldiers.

The Transdniestrians had nine thousand militiamen trained and armed by officers of the Fourteenth Army. These officers were moved to the reserves and appointed commanders of platoons and battalions of the OSTK police. In addition, there were five to six thousand volunteers who came forward after an appeal was made on Russian television for fighters to go to Transdniestria to support the cause. These volunteers came from all over the Russian Federation . On top of this there were fifteen to twenty thousand soldiers. There were, therefore, at least thirty-five to forty thousand troops from the left bank who were opposed to the legal forces of the Republic of Moldova .

This is without talking about the arms and ammunition which were available on both sides. There were no tanks at all on the right side of the river - no artillery of the Grad-type, mobile missile launchers or heavy shells. On the left side of the river they had three battalions of Grad-type artillery, missile launchers and grenade launchers. They had aircraft from the DOSAAF Organisation and helicopters and tanks of the Fourteenth Army. Moldova had no tanks. General Lebed made available to the volunteers (the Cossacks, OSTK) whole stockpiles of ammunition situated on the perimeter of the East bank of the river.

402 . At a meeting that President Snegur had with Mr Gorbachev in 1990, the latter made it clear that, unless Moldova signed the Federative State Agreement, three Republics would be created in Moldovan territory, namely a Gagauzian Republic , a Transdniestrian Republic and a Moldovan Republic . And that is what had happened.

403 . As to the presence of Russian troops in Moldova in 1991 to 1992, this was covered by a decision signed by Marshal Shapashnikov, former Commander-in-Chief of the CIS forces, countersigned by a number of Generals and Colonels, i.e. Document No. 314/1 of 23 March 1992 . The arms and ammunition of the Fourteenth Army were divided up. This document specified which arms and ammunition were to remain with the Fourteenth Army, and which were to go to the Republic of Moldova .

404 . The witness stated that he held information from the General Staff that in 1990 to 1991, when the Soviet Union still existed, the Moscow leadership took a secret decision to withdraw the Army from Republics over which a question mark hung, including the Baltic States and Moldova . Tank regiments were withdrawn en masse from Moldova . For example 120 tanks, together with a missile brigade, were withdrawn from Balţi. Munitions were stockpiled in Kolbasna. All tanks were withdrawn from the right bank of the Dniester , as well as missile launchers. Nothing remained on the right side, even the mortar units and grenade launchers held by certain units in Moldova were completely withdrawn and transferred to the left bank. The 300th airborne regiment should have remained with the Moldovan Army, but instead it was withdrawn to the territory of Russia .

405 . DOSAAF was a civic organisation composed of all persons fit for combat, from the age of fourteen to the age of sixty. It included therefore the whole society and was an immense organisation, with a permanent structure. In the Soviet Union it was a paramilitary organisation headed by active servicemen, and their deputies were all military people. The rest were civilians. The object of the organisation was to train people, particularly young people. It was a monster, comprising 102 million people in the Soviet Union . In Moldova it had 2 million members. It had sports aircraft, delta planes, radar systems, marine schools for training people to use submarines, and so on.

There were no tanks, helicopters, missile launchers and the like available to DOSAAF in Soviet times. There was not much weaponry made available to that organisation; it was mainly for training.

The CIS, after it was set up, had armed forces, with a command led by representatives of the Russian Army. Marshal Shapashnikov was the Commander and also the Minister of Defence of the CIS. This Minister was appointed in accordance with a proposal made by the President of the Russian Federation , Mr Yeltsin. But there was also a Russian Minister of Defence at the same time, namely Pavel Gratchev.

All the top commanders of CIS troops were from Moscow , the others were Ukrainian and Russian Slavs.

Moldova did not ratify the military part of the CIS Treaty. Moreover, Moldova had no influence on the acts of the Minister of Defence of the CIS, Marshal Shapashnikov. It was during the conflict that the Fourteenth Army was transferred from the CIS to the Russian Federation .

406 . Marshal Shapashnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the united armed forces of the CIS, did not respond to the letter sent to him in April 1992 by the President of Moldova, drawing his attention to the fact that CIS military forces were participating in the transfer of arms to the separatists.

The policy which he was pursuing was designed to keep Moldova and other republics within the Soviet Union , or at least within the sphere of direct influence of the former Soviet Union .

When Lebed took over the Fourteenth Army, a substantial transfer of weapons occurred, including a lot of anti-personnel mines, to the separatists by the Fourteenth Army. Stockpiles of arms were moved from Kolbasna. In 1990, when he was the Minister of the Interior, the witness took part in a meeting with General Iakovlev, Commander of the Fourteenth Army and the Moldovan Prime Minister Muravschi. As regards the separatists, Iakovlev said that he had received specific instructions from the Russian Ministry of Defence to provide arms to the militia in Transdniestria. In reply to Mr Muravschi, who wanted to know if that was a warning, General Iakovlev said: “No, it is just a fact that 10,000 Kalashnikovs have been transferred to the militia for the defence of the Transdniestrian region.” General Iakovlev added that he had been given instructions to resist attempts by Moldova to bring the region under its control and not to allow Moldova to establish any such control.

The transfer of weaponry was therefore inevitable. Everything was well organised. Moldova had authoritative factual evidence, for example, from prisoners taken by the Moldovan forces, who admitted that this had happened. Moldova had also obtained documents from the Fourteenth Army showing that weaponry had been transferred to the separatists. At a certain moment, in May 1991, the then Commander of the Fourteenth Army, Netkachev, received instructions from the Minister of Defence in Moscow to call up reservists and to put the troops and military equipment into a state of combat readiness because Transdniestria was “Russian territory and ... we [Russians] must defend it by every means.” The witness had a meeting with General Netkachev who told him that reserve officers were leaving the Fourteenth Army to train the separatists.

The witness pointed out that civilians cannot lay mines; this specific task can only be performed by professionals with military training. After the conflict, Moldova asked for the help of specialists from the United States to clear mines from the territory of Transdniestria . Americans also trained Moldovan specialists to demine the minefields.

407 . The Ministry of Defence of Moldova was not able to put up any meaningful resistance to the Transdniestrian forces. When the conflict broke out the separatists had 30 tanks, 50 artillery pieces, mortars of 6 and 120 mm and tactical groups well trained in the use of artillery. Their military actions were well organised by active military officers. Shells of 120 mm cannot be bought on the open market; only the Fourteenth Army had shells like that in the region. DOSAAF did not have any shells of that calibre. There was quite a powerful group of the Fourteenth Army in Bender, along with the Transdniestrian Popular Guard. The buses in which unarmed Moldovan soldiers were being transported were fired at from the fortress in Tighina ( Bender ) . Following investigations by the Moldovan authorities, the conclusion was that it was Russian soldiers who had done this. Twenty-three persons died.

408 . The witness had not wanted to retire; it was the decision of Parliament and President Snegur, who were saying that his departure was required by Moscow .

409 . There was an incident in which Moldovan aircraft dropped bombs on a village in Transdniestria. There were two air missions, involving four units, with two aircraft taking part on each occasion. When the order came through to stop the separatists crossing the bridge, the order was given to bomb the bridge. The aircraft used were not properly equipped for bombing missions. The bombs were dropped but did not fall on the bridge. There were tanks on the bridge. It was not necessary to be a military officer to identify whose tanks they were; it was clear that the tanks and the soldiers were from the Fourteenth Army. They had deliberately put the soldiers on reserve, and then called on them to man the tanks. The people manning those tanks were not amateur cyclists. Only a professional could manoeuvre a tank. They fired on the Moldovan forces. It was all filmed and recorded.

410 . The military action could have been avoided had the Russian side not provoked and supported this invasion. The conflict was the deliberate decision of the Russian leadership at the time.

411 . When the Soviet Union broke up, a small country like Moldova found enormous difficulties in co-existing with a great country like Russia . The first step for Moldova was to create an army, a Ministry of Defence. Neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the Ministry of Defence proved able to maintain the territorial integrity of the country. In the first few months of its existence, Moldova could not act effectively; it had no arms, ammunition or weapons, because most of this material had been withdrawn to Russia or Transdniestria in 1990 to 1991. It had no artillery units able to resist, or to attack, the units on the other bank of the river. Moldova had no other military equipment. In order to obtain military equipment, Moldova asked its neighbour, Romania . Moldova bought light arms from Romania . No Romanians, however, took part in the fighting, despite what the newspapers said. No military personnel from foreign States were enrolled in the forces of the Moldovan Ministry of Defence.

412 . General Lebed said many times that his Fourteenth Army was able to reach Bucharest in two hours, although it never had this in mind as an objective. The object of the Russian aggression was to retain power over the territory of Transdniestria and to maintain pressure on the small country of Moldova .

413 . The separatists in Transdniestria in 1991 to 1992 did not have much difficulty in restructuring their manufacturing lines in the existing factories there in order to produce arms. Probably by 1992 they were already able to manufacture arms of their own.

The Moldovan air force had Mig-29 aircraft combat. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was the President, President Snegur, and the General Staff was under General Creangă. The witness denied having spoken to Mr Plugaru on the telephone in relation to the use of combat aircraft, since Mr Plugaru was not on that level.

414 . The witness stated that he had never received any reports alleging ill-treatment by Moldovan soldiers of the civilian population and that he had no power anyway to investigate such matters.

415 . After the bloodshed had stopped, Russia followed the same policy, protecting its own strategic interests, in trying to maintain its influence in Moldova .

39. Valentin SEREDA

416 . At the time of giving evidence, the witness had been the Director General of Prisons in Moldova since August 2001. He had been working in the penitentiary system since 1978/1979.

417 . There are no agreements for judicial cooperation in the penitentiary field between Moldova and Transdniestria. There are no practical arrangements for the transfer of detainees. There has never been a transfer of prisoners from one side to the other. One attempt was made to have people in Tighina ( Bender ) transferred to a hospital in Moldova . But the Moldovan authorities refused because no agreement had been reached. Moldovan doctors do not have access to the prisons in Tiraspol , and vice versa. There are no telephone conversations between prison doctors in Moldova and Transdniestria. The witness had no information about doctors outside the prison service treating prisoners. Transfer of prisoners to other States does occur, by means of extradition procedures. This is handled by the Office of the Prosecutor General.

418 . The institution which treats patients for tuberculosis in Tighina had its water and electricity supplies cut off by the Transdniestrian authorities. Moldovans sent a diesel energy plant and water tanks there. Cars visiting from Moldova were detained at the border for one to three days. The local authorities in Tighina prohibited the transfer of tuberculosis patients from Moldova to this medical centre. The Tighina militia posts checked every car in and out.

419 . There is not one single prisoner detained in Moldovan prisons on the basis of a decision by a Transdniestrian court. This is so even in Moldovan institutions in Tighina. Similarly, no person is detained in a Transdniestrian prison on the basis of a Moldovan court decision.

420 . The witness came from Tighina, but he had never visited any prisons there during the last fifteen years. However, he thought that there were no major differences as regards the conditions of detention, prison food, medical assistance, and so on, between Moldova and Transdniestria.

421 . If a prisoner from Moldova escaped and fled into Transdniestria , Moldova would probably seek assistance from the Transdniestrian authorities.

422 . In 2002 Moldova began removing the shutters (“eyelashes”) on the windows of prison cells; this operation should be finished by the end of 2003. These shutters prevent ventilation and natural light penetrating into the cells. Moldova tries to improve cells generally, but as there are not sufficient funds, they have begun with juvenile detainees. They, for example, have wash basins and a shower in every single cell. It is possible for prisoners to receive television sets and so on from their relatives.

423 . During the cross-examination by the applicants ' lawyers, the witness was informed that a transfer of detainees occurred between the Russian Federation and the “MRT”.

In particular, the applicants ' lawyers put forward the case of V.C., who was born in 1968, arrested in the “MRT” in 1992 and transferred in 1993 to Astrakhan ( Russian Federation ) where he was sentenced by a Russian Federation court to fifteen years ' imprisonment. The same year he was brought back to Transdniestria. Then in 1999 he was transferred again to a Russian Federation prison and he was finally transferred back to a Transdniestrian prison in 2002. A second example put forward was that of one R.C., born in 1973, who was arrested on 20 October 1992 in Astrakhan and transferred on 2 July 1993 to Tiraspol , Transdniestria, where he was convicted on 14 March 1996 by the “Supreme Court of the MRT”. On 27 November 1999 he was transferred to Moscow and on 8 December 1999 to Astrakhan . There he was convicted by a court of the Russian Federation and sentenced to ten years ' imprisonment. On 21 October 2002 he was transferred to a prison in Tiraspol .

In response to this information, the witness stated that he was not aware of that, and that he could not be, as he was only aware of transfers from or to the territory controlled by the Moldovan authorities. He was certain that those transfers were not effected through or with the authorisation of Moldovan institutions and assumed that they were arranged directly between the authorities of Transdniestria and those of the Russian Federation .

40. Victor BERLINSCHI

424 . The witness was a Member of Parliament from 1990 until 1994 and Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on fighting crime. At the time of giving evidence, he was a practicing lawyer and no longer a Member of Parliament.

425 . The Parliamentary Committee had no involvement with the Transdniestrian conflict. The witness himself had no direct knowledge of the IlaÅŸcu case. He withdrew completely from politics in 1994.

He was however involved in the discussions in 1991 until 1992 with the Transdniestrian leadership to resolve the conflict. But they said that they had their own armed forces and would do their own job, and the discussions came to nothing.

41. Constantin OBROC

426 . The witness was Deputy to the Moldovan Prime Minister from May 1990 till June 1992. From 1993 until 1996 he was an adviser to President Snegur on local administration. From 2002 onwards he had been an independent consultant. As Deputy to the Prime Minister, he was dealing mainly with problems of local administration. There were three Deputies to the Prime Minister in the Muravschi Government. The witness was appointed head of the Parliamentary Committee dealing with the negotiations with the Transdniestrian regime. As one of its last acts, this Committee managed in 1992 to bring Transdniestrian parliamentarians to the Moldovan parliament . Then the armed conflict broke out.

427 . The witness did not resign of his own accord in June 1992. The whole Muravschi Government was dismissed; there was a crisis between Parliament and the Government because of the Transdniestrian situation.

The relation between Russia and Transdniestria was very clear. According to the last statements by the President of the State Duma, Mr Selezniov, when he was in Chişinău, whatever happens in Transdniestria is intrinsically tied up with the Russian Federation .

428 . The witness did not have any information about the distribution of arms by the Fourteenth Army to the Transdniestrian population.

However, the participation of the Fourteenth Army in the conflict was a well known fact. It was fully documented in the press. The tanks of the Fourteenth Army, in particular, were involved. The witness was not in the field, he did not see the military operations himself, so that he could not describe directly to what extent the Fourteenth Army participated, how many soldiers and so on. But it was quite clear that it happened; everyone knew about it.

429 . The witness did not take part in any negotiations with the Russians, but with the Transdniestrian people. The Parliamentary Committee he headed brought together elected parliamentarians from Transdniestria, the Ukraine , Moldova and Romania . No representatives of the Russian parliament were contacted in the context of the negotiations carried out by the Committee.

430 . The witness ' s opinion was that the IlaÅŸcu trial was the consequence of a political game on a large scale. There were no clear reasons for their trial. There had been an exchange of prisoners on both sides, but this group had been excluded.

If the Russian side had wanted the release of the IlaÅŸcu group, this would have happened.

431 . The interests in Moldovan territory went back more than two centuries, to the time of the Russian-Turkish war. There had been so many Slavs, i.e. Russians and Ukrainians, living in Moldova . These big countries took the presence of their people as an excuse for wanting to control what went on in Moldova .

The activities on the left bank were promoted and coordinated by the Soviet authorities. President Gorbachev sent his representative, Marshal Achrameyev.

432 . The witness came up with a proposal to resolve the Transdniestrian problem: give the Transdniestrians a degree of power to govern themselves, so as to allay their fears and to satisfy them. The witness suggested that the area be called the Transdniestrian “Region” (whereas they now call themselves a Republic), that there be a common currency and a common responsibility for foreign relations for the whole country of Moldova, that the Transdniestrians be allowed to have some symbol of their own, such as a flag, and that they have some military forces under their authority. A similar scheme was proposed for Gagauzia. The plan also involved dividing the Regions into counties but preserving Moldova as a single entity. The idea was to leave more autonomy to the people of the Transdniestrian region and counties because of their particular history. But this proposal was rejected.

Originally, the point of view of the Transdniestrian authorities was the same as that of the Moldovan authorities. When the Moldovan Republic was being created, no one talked of the infringement of the rights of these Russian-speaking people. But there were in this region other people who had separatist and other objectives. At the same time the Popular Front was creating conditions for Moldova to reunite with Romania . Moldova had to deal with this situation. Before the local administration of the illegal Transdniestrian regime was formed, of course the local authorities there were recognised. The central authorities worked with them; they participated in all the normal activities. After the separate regime in Tiraspol was created, the right bank ceased to recognise the local authorities on the left bank. However, in reality, the Moldovans were in contact with real people on the other side. The de facto situation was that they were the leaders of the region.

Concerning the recognition issue, it was difficult to adopt a strictly legal, formalistic approach, to the effect that since the lawfulness of the Transdniestrian regime is not recognised by the Moldovan Government or the international community, Moldova should not have any working contact whatsoever with them. This would mean that the conflict could never be resolved, but Moldova was concerned with helping real people.

433 . The witness did not know anything about the applicants being allegedly Moldovan intelligence agents in Transdniestria.

434 . No one in the Government was in favour of the use of force in order to solve the Transdniestrian conflict. But when the militia premises and other buildings were occupied in the beginning, Moldova had to react with force.

Romania has interests in Moldova . Moldovans and Romanians are people of the same ethnic origin. Romania was involved in the Tighina ( Bender ) negotiations. The Romanian side always acted in an objective way, beyond reproach. The negotiations achieved a compromise. They brought back the local representatives to act as one State.

435 . Assistance was provided by the central Moldovan Government and local authorities to the families of the IlaÅŸcu group. In his position as presidential adviser, the witness had received Mrs IlaÅŸcu on several occasions and taken her to see the President of Moldova.

436 . One objective of the Yeltsin/Snegur Agreement of 21 July 1992 was to stop the military conflict, the battles and the killing. This did not mean that the Moldovan Government had abandoned its sovereignty over this territory.

42. Mihail SIDOROV

437 . At the time of giving evidence, the witness was a Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities.

The witness started his career as a professional judge. For fifteen years he worked in the judicial system of Moldova . He was appointed as a judge 30 years ago. He was a member of the Praesidium of the Supreme Criminal Court. From 1981, following his judicial career, he went to work at the former Supreme Soviet. He was Deputy Head of the Legal Department of the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet. In 1991 he was dismissed from his office in Chişinău only because he was of Russian origin and he took the decision to go to Transdniestria. He was appointed Head of the Justice Directorate in Transdniestria. He worked less than a month there. Until December 1993 he worked in private business. From February 1994 until 1998 he was a Member of Parliament. From 1998 until 2001 he was the Ombudsman.

438 . When he was elected Member of Parliament in 1994, the chapter in his life concerning his position as former Head of the Justice Directorate in Transdniestria was closed. No one on the Central Election Committee raised any objections. There the witness did not hear anything of the IlaÅŸcu case.

The fact that for a short while he was at the service of the separatist regime in Transdniestria has not been an obstacle for the witness in his subsequent career in Moldova , as Ombudsman, for example.

439 . In May or June 1998, when the witness was Ombudsman, the wives of the IlaÅŸcu group came to see him. The witness and his colleagues advised them that they had no real means of solving the problem and that they would be better served in going to see the OSCE Mission. The witness then worked with the OSCE. Other citizens from Transdniestria came to see the witness with problems, but the Ombudsman ' s office was not capable of solving these problems without the OSCE.

440 . The Moldovan Government had no power to influence the Transdniestrian regime in order to secure the release of the IlaÅŸcu group. After the illegal regime created its own administration, including courts, there was no contact, no official channel through which the Moldovan authorities could influence them. Four years after the trial, there were attempts to do something. Before that it would have been pointless, because Moldova had no means of tackling the problem. The witness realised that even the meetings involving the OSCE did not change the situation.

The witness took part in international meetings of Ombudsmen because he took the view that Moldova could not solve the problem internally. Moldova acceded to the Framework Convention on Minorities in 1996. In 1997 Moldova enacted the Law on the Status of National Minorities. The human rights situation in Moldova was discussed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, where it was said that a lot was being done in Moldova to ensure observance of human rights. The Government has a department on inter-ethnic relations. The minorities in Moldova are made up of 13% Ukrainian, 13 % Russian, 5% Gagauz, 4% Bulgarian and 3% Jewish. Over 35% of the population in Moldova is made up of ethnic minorities. In Transdniestria 40% are Moldovan, 28% are Ukrainian and 22% are Russian.

441 . In March 1994, just after Mr IlaÅŸcu had been elected as a Member of Parliament for the first time, the Parliament prepared the conditions for him to serve as Member of Parliament. At that time the IlaÅŸcu file had a political dimension. If one viewed the case only from a strictly legal point of view, perhaps one could have acted in a quicker and more constructive way.

Mr IlaÅŸcu ' s release was the result of a political move; it did not follow from any measure by the legal authorities.

The Government did not have any realistic possibility of doing anything about the IlaÅŸcu case. It could not deal with it as a matter of priority. In 1997 the witness was nominated to act with the Deputy Minister of Justice, Mr Sturza, to deal with the IlaÅŸcu problem. There was a meeting between Mr Sturza and the so-called Minister of Justice of Transdniestria. This was a purely protocol meeting. It did not change anything. There were no relations afterwards. If the meetings had continued, the IlaÅŸcu problem would have been raised, but things did not happen that way.

442 . The witness could not remember which of the three Ombudsmen dealt with the IlaÅŸcu case. It was during the first months of the Ombudsman ' s office. The witness had meetings with the OSCE at which he raised the issue of the IlaÅŸcu case. As a parliamentarian he did not approach any international organisations about the IlaÅŸcu case. His opinion was that they were not in a position in Moldova to resolve this specific problem.

443 . The witness was not aware that a judgment of 3 February 1994 by the Moldovan Supreme Court had ordered the IlaÅŸcu case to be sent to the Moldovan Public Prosecutor for a fresh criminal investigation. He was only aware of Sturza ' s proposal that the charges against the IlaÅŸcu group be the subject of a new trial in a foreign country .

444 . The witness had never seen the Ilaşcu file. From the information he had, it seemed to him that the main provisions of criminal procedure were fulfilled – that is to say, the accused were charged and indicted, the defence had access to the court file, evidence was taken from witnesses, proof of the alleged conduct was adduced, and there was a hearing before a court at which the defendants were present. From the procedural point of view, it appeared to the witness that all the standards of criminal procedure were fulfilled. The witness admitted that the judgment of the trial court was quashed as being unconstitutional and agreed that that decision itself needed to be implemented. He thought that an appeal or review court should study the whole file.

As regards the victims of the alleged crimes, the witness ' s opinion was that the decision in this case would be linked to the settlement of the whole Transdniestrian problem.

445 . In so far as further action should be considered in terms of criminal procedure, the witness saw two possible scenarios. Firstly, the Supreme Court of Moldova, as the highest court in the land, would review the case. Secondly, one could start from the premise that the facts did indeed prove that a criminal prosecution should have been brought: there was a criminal investigation, evidence was assembled, and so on. On that basis, the case should be referred to the Supreme Court for further study. There should be a re-consideration of impartial evidence, outside the political context. The witness was of the opinion that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not include any provision for what was done by the Supreme Court in the IlaÅŸcu case. In any event, he did not know of any other such cases in Transdniestria and Moldova . Finally, he found it obvious that international standards were not complied with by the Moldovan Supreme Court.

446 . The witness was aware of the decision of August 2000 by the Prosecutor General to quash the criminal investigation against the Transdniestrian prosecutors and judges who had taken part in the Ilaşcu trial. In 1995 or 1996 the Moldovan parliament had a meeting with colleagues from Tiraspol during which the witness asked them why they would not come to Chişinău. The parliamentarians from Transdniestria replied that they could not come to Chişinău because a criminal investigation had been opened against them by the Moldovan Prosecutor General. The witness thought that the launching of this criminal investigation against the Transdniestrian prosecutors and judges was a political rather than a legal act. Likewise it was a political issue whether to cancel the decision to launch a criminal prosecution.

447 . The witness stated that at the time when he was Ombudsman there were three Ombudsmen. He could not remember which one of them was specifically dealing with the Ilaşcu case. If they had directly approached the Transdniestrian administration, they would not have achieved anything. This was illustrated by their efforts regarding the problems encountered by the institution which existed for the treatment of prison inmates with tuberculosis in Bender. The Transdniestrian local authorities had cut off the electrical and gas supplies and the sewers. One of the Ombudsmen approached Mr Smirnov. But there was no response at all. The Ombudsman ' s office approached the OSCE, an international organisation – the only entity with some influence in the region.

448 . Courts had been functioning in Transdniestrian towns for more than ten years; they had ruled on more than 4,000 criminal cases and more than 10,000 civil cases. The question therefore arose whether every such judgment should be annulled or not. Either all these cases would be re-heard or there would be a simple review of these cases on request, if necessary with a decision by the Supreme Court.

449 . The crisis of 1991 to 1992 was not the result of spontaneous acts. In 1989 a new languages law was enacted in Moldova . This was not a welcome decision. It led to part of the population organising protests as from June/July 1989, with the left bank, Tiraspol , taking an active part. This constituted the first push towards the break-up. In 1990 the situation worsened in Chişinău when certain political forces began organising activities against parliamentarians from the left bank. There are 360 seats in the Parliament. Some left-bank parliamentarians were beaten up, the law-enforcement bodies did not take any action and, as a result, about 60 parliamentarians from the left bank left Parliament. From then on the situation worsened.

Similar events occurred in the Gagauzian region. Parliament was summoned in order to settle the problem through peaceful means, but the Gagauzians and the Transdniestrians decided to set up their own power structures. Parliament thereupon declared these power structures unconstitutional. Consequently, as from August 1990 there were three regions in Moldova . After the Gagauzian situation was resolved, it was only Transdniestria which de facto was not under Parliament ' s authority.

The events in 1990 developed very fast. In October 1990 there was a march by volunteers to southern Moldova . This march was provoked by the proclamation of the Gagauz Republic in August of that year. It was all part of an attempt to instil fear in the country. Luckily, in the South there was no fighting or loss of life. The armed conflict was provoked by what happened in Dubăsari on 2 November 1990 , and from then onwards it was practically impossible to stop developments.

In March 1992 the armed conflict flared up, first in Dubăsari and then in Bender. After that all the links of the negotiating process broke down. Parliament had no access to the left bank. There were no relations between official structures from 1992 onwards. It was only in 1994 that Parliament established a Committee for re-establishing contact between the official structures of Moldova and Transdniestria. The witness was a member of the Parliamentary Committee for the resolution of the Transdniestrian problem. This committee set up an investigative team to investigate what had occurred in 1992. In 1995 a few meetings were held with parliamentarians from Transdniestria. In 2000 yet again a special Committee for dealing with the Transdniestrian problem was created. A few meetings were held in 2001, but none in 2002 unfortunately. The witness stated that he had high hopes for the success of the initiative taken by the OSCE Mission, with the participation of the Ukraine and Russia . He welcomed the statement by President Voronin and the draft settlement that had been worked out.

450 . The witness took part in drafting the law on Gagauzia, which conferred an autonomous status on this region in 1994. There was no military conflict between Gagauzia and Moldova , and Moldova hoped that it would be possible to solve the conflict with Transdniestria in the same way. But the war in 1992 in Transdniestria caused hundreds of deaths on both sides and time was needed to heal such deep wounds. The witness thought that if politicians on both sides were now willing to take a step forward, this problem could be solved within a short time.

451 . Since the end of 1990 there had been a separate judicial system in Transdniestria. None of the judgments delivered by the courts in Transdniestria was recognised by the judiciary in Moldova . The conviction of Mr IlaÅŸcu and his group was quashed but their case has never been examined by the courts in Moldova .

452 . The witness underlined that Transdniestria exists de facto as a sovereign State, with its own legislation, its own judiciary and its own processes for the execution of judgments. It had recently created a Constitutional Court . He pointed out that Russia had always insisted on preserving the territorial integrity of Moldova as it existed in 1997, which was confirmed by the Agreements with Russia .

The witness was of the opinion that there was no responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation for the events being considered by the Court. The relations between Russia and Transdniestria were tense. The administration of Transdniestria had never met the President or Prime Minister of the Russian Federation , whereas the Moldovan President and Moldovan Ministers had gone to Transdniestria.

453 . Referring to the influence other countries have over Transdniestria, the witness emphasised that Transdniestria was a free market place. Its most stable source of investment was German capital but that there was also some Belgian investment in local enterprises. According to the Transdniestrians, their currency was printed in Germany .

454 . Moldova provides the telecommunications system for Transdniestria. There is one single “space” for telecommunications in Moldova . But in Transdniestria they have their own telecommunications company, and it is to this company that Transdniestrian people pay their telephone bill. It is only cellular telephones that do not work in Tiraspol . The Moldovan football championship includes Transdniestria. Indeed, the current football champion of Moldova is Tiraspol and they have a fine football stadium in Tiraspol . The Moldovan national football team was going to play the Netherlands on 1 April 2003 in the Tiraspol stadium. Transdniestria is therefore essentially a political problem.

455 . In November 1990 Parliament adopted a decision as regards the taking of measures to stabilise the social and economic situation in Moldova . This decision condemned any attempts to resolve inter-ethnic disputes by force. The witness worked for the department preparing the relevant bills. An inter-ethnic department was created in the Government. Its brief was to protect national minorities. A Law was adopted in 2001. But, previously, a grave problem had existed in Moldova as regards ethnic minorities.

43. Pavel CREANGÄ‚

456 . The witness was Deputy Minister of Defence in May/June 1992. He was then Minister of Defence from 1992 until 1997. At the time of giving evidence he was retired. Before his service as Deputy Minister of Defence in 1992 he had returned to Moldova in 1990 from Belarus , where he had been an army commander. After serving as an adviser on Cuba , the witness retired from the Soviet Army and came back home. He then took an oath of allegiance on taking up new duties in Moldova .

From 1990 until 1992 he worked at the Military Department. From 1997 onwards he had not held any official posts.

457 . After the declaration of Moldovan independence, some people in Moldova wanted to stay part of the Soviet Union . They pursued this objective by the creation of paramilitary troops, the so-called Popular Guards, which became the separatist forces. Moldova could not accept this and tried to solve the problem by peaceful means. But in 1990 it was obliged to create battalions from reservist forces. Armed groups started to make their appearance then. The Ministry of Defence, for its part, started doing something in May 1992, when the witness began as Deputy Minister. He was Deputy Minister of Defence and a member of the President ' s Private Office. He was told to open a command centre in Transdniestria in May 1992.

It was no secret that the separatists received support from Odessa and Moscow . Moldova ceased to have control over the eastern part of the country from the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992.

The Moldovan armed forces in 1992 comprised approximately ten battalions, that is, six thousand active troops on a permanent basis and that was the position until the end of the conflict. They were made up of troops from the Ministry of the Interior and the police, and there were three detachments of volunteer forces. That made a total of up to six thousand active troops. The Transdniestrian forces also numbered about six thousand. The Russian Fourteenth Army had about twelve to fourteen thousand troops.

The Moldovan armed forces did not have the kind of equipment that the separatists had. The Moldovan forces had one automatic weapon for every ten people in the beginning. They did not have proper units.

The Fourteenth Army provided the separatists with equipment and support. The officers of the Popular Guards came from the Fourteenth Army and the Fourteenth Army was supplying them with weapons.

The witness went to see Iakovlev who told him that the Transdniestrians had thousands of rifles. Under the guise of seizure, using children and women, large numbers of weapons were handed over. About 30 tanks were transferred, 32 armoured personnel carriers, 24 artillery weapons, mortars, anti-tank grenade launchers, anti-tank artillery and air defence units. The Commander of the Fourteenth Army, General Lebed, declared on television that he had personally called up and armed twelve thousand soldiers for the Transdniestrians and that he personally had made the existence of their armed forces possible. The operations of the Transdniestrian armed forces were carried out under the control of officers of the Fourteenth Army.

The tanks that appeared on the Dniester Bridge belonged to the Fourteenth Army. Tanks have numbers on them.

The witness stated that he had documents on the handing over of weapons to the separatists by the Fourteenth Army and added that perhaps the documents were still in the Ministry of Defence. One thing is a physical handover, a transfer. A formalised transfer on the basis of official documents is quite another thing. The separatists “seized” weapons from the Fourteenth Army by the use of women and children. The tanks which had been seized with the help of human shields were from the 183rd motorised infantry regiment and other units of the Fourteenth Army. Under the disguise of a seizure using a human shield of women and children, it was in reality a handover.

The weaponry and equipment in question could not have been part of DOSAAF property. DOSAAF did indeed have one million bullets, but only very light weapons. DOSAAF did not have any combat weapons at all.

458 . The armed units of the Transdniestrians were better equipped than the Moldovan units. They had tanks, whereas the Moldovans did not have one single tank. They had more armoured cars than the Moldovans did. The Moldovans had powerful artillery, for example the Uragan system which is capable of travelling up to 27 km, but that was not used. Moldova only used artillery when the Transdniestrians used tanks. The Moldovans warned the Transdniestrians that if they used tanks, Moldova would use artillery in response. The Moldovans also had howitzers and cannons.

459 . Moldova never opened fire on villages or inhabited areas. Not one single building was destroyed by Moldovan forces. But this was not the sort of war the witness was prepared for in military college.

460 . As to the shooting in the Tighina ( Bender ) fortress, when the Moldovan forces entered the city of Bender , some of the so-called Popular Guards retreated into the fortress, in the past occupied by the chemical defence battalion of the Fourteenth Army. Subsequently they fired, possibly together with the chemical battalion.

461 . Moldova had 122 mm ammunition and used it. The Uragan artillery system that the Moldovans had was much more efficient than the Grad system that the Transdniestrians had. But the Moldovans never used the Uragan system because they knew its destructive power. If Moldova had wanted victory at any price, it would have used the powerful Uragan system.

The Moldovan troops did have an air defence, but there was no collective defence with the Ukraine and Romania . The Moldovan forces had to use Mig 29 airplanes for bombing. There were armed groups on the other side using artillery; it was not a police operation. There was only one solution - to bomb the bridge but not the residential quarters. The intention was to destroy the bridge in order to prevent tanks crossing it, and thereby to prevent heavy losses on the Moldovan side. This was in Tighina ( Bender ) .

462 . The volunteer groups fighting for Moldova did not kill other people. They were defending their country against separatists. The Moldovan armed forces never shot at inhabited settlements.

463 . Moldova did not send intelligence groups into Transdniestria. The Moldovan forces used people they knew. They did not send anyone specifically there to act as an intelligence agent. But they had people voluntarily sending them information.

464 . During the conflict, the Fourteenth Army was stationed at the Tiraspol military airport. It was used by one of their squadrons. Planes were flying in from Moscow . After the conflict, there was an agreement which defined the rules according to which the airport was to be used.

465 . At the time when the witness was Minister of Defence, there were agreements signed between Moldova and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of certain units of the Fourteenth Army. The 300th parachute regiment was withdrawn, as were a communications battalion and some other units. These agreements also concerned the regime of the military airport in Tiraspol and the legal status of the Russian soldiers on Moldovan territory.

[1] . I nformation document of 10 June 1994 produced by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre on the subject of the Transdniestrian conflict. The document concerned, published in English on the Internet portal of the OSCE mission to Moldova , is entitled “Transdniestrian conflict: origins and main issues”.