CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE ZIEMELE

1. I voted with the majority in this case. I note that this judgment will become one of the leading cases dealing with the specific context of State succession and the application of the European Convention on Human Rights in a particularly sensitive area: that of the sharing of responsibility for debts. The Court had to ascertain the relevant principles of the law on State succession that might influence the interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this case. The “Relevant international law and practice” part of the judgment is therefore of particular significance.

2. It is important to point out that despite a very broad approach towards sources of international law enunciated in Demir and Baykara v. Turkey ([GC], no. 34503/97, §§ 85-86, ECHR 2008) there are certain limits within which the Court has to operate, and that therefore a more in-depth presentation and analysis of the applicable principles of the law on State succession was not provided by the Court in an area where, ultimately, there are still many questions and a wide variety of State practice (see Kova čić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, § 256, 3 October 2008). The Court thus takes the essential points from the relevant area of international law while focusing, of course, on its own case-law and principles.

3. It is also true that the main argument raised by Slovenia and Serbia concerned their emphasis on the principle of territoriality for the purposes of State responsibility in situations of State succession. The Court answers this submission by pointing out that this is certainly not the only principle applicable to the problem of debts following the dissolution of the State (see paragraph 121 of the present judgment). The Court largely resolves the issue by reiterating and emphasising the principles concerning the obligation to negotiate in State succession situations (see Kovačić and Others , cited above, concurring opinion of Judge Ress, point 4) and the principle of equitable proportion in dividing up the debts of the predecessor State. Given the limited scope of the present case, the Court does not (see paragraph 123 of the present judgment) enter full speed into the question of equitable apportionment of debts as such and certainly does not reflect on the unjust enrichment principle, which in my view might also be relevant to the facts of the case (see Articles 37, 40 and 41 of the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, Badinter Arbitration Commission Opinion no. 1, and Article 8 of the 2001 Resolution on State Succession in Matters of Property and Debts of the Institute of International Law). However, even without expressis verbis reference to these principles, one could argue that the solution is in line with their essence and with their application in international practice.

4. As regards the main point in the case – the role of the principle of territoriality in situations of State succession – the Court strengthens the position taken by the Institute of International Law in its 2001 Resolution in finding that the principle of territoriality is only one relevant element out of many which need to be taken into account in determining the respective responsibilities of the States concerned. The nature of the rights claimed is important. The Court traces the responsibility for the banks where the applicants’ foreign-currency accounts are frozen to Serbia and Slovenia (see paragraphs 116-17 of the present judgment). One can compare this approach with that taken by the Court in Likvidējamā p/s Selga and Vasiļevska v. Latvia ((dec.), nos. 17126/02 and 24991/02, 1 October 2013), which concerned frozen foreign-currency accounts in a bank in the Russian Federation. It is true that the international legal position of Latvia is different from that of the respondent States in the present case, since Latvia is not a successor State in the context of the demise of the USSR. However, the Russian Federation is a predecessor State and, also in such a scenario, the principle of territoriality, as claimed by the applicants in the Latvian case, could not be applied.

5. As already stated, I was in full agreement with the majority on the merits of the case. At the same time, I retain serious doubts as to the dicta in relation to the execution part of the judgment, even though I voted with the majority in the end (see operative paragraphs 10 and 11 of the present judgment). The Court has begun from time to time to set deadlines within which States have to execute a judgment under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. Practice shows that the Court has repeatedly had to come back to its original decision regarding deadlines. This is to my mind inevitable since judgments of the Court typically involve questions of principle and require legislative reforms, and such political processes are complicated (see, for example, L. v. Lithuania , no. 27527/03, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV), even more so in the context of State succession. There is no question that it is in the general interest in Europe that judgments of the European Court of Human Rights be implemented swiftly and that the broader consequences be assumed where possible. As far as the Court’s share in the common responsibility is concerned, it has done its utmost, even indicating possible solutions to the problem under Article 46 where applicable. It is high time that the States attend to their “homework” in complying with the Court’s case-law, since this also directly affects the efficiency of the Court. It is in this context that the Court has decided on occasion, including in the present case, to indicate deadlines of compliance to the respondent States. This is a somewhat desperate measure. It is a great pity that the Court has been placed in a situation where it has to resort to such measures. It is also a risk for the Court, since it may be asked to take another look at its decision and that raises serious questions in terms of the principles of legal certainty and finality of judgment. I would much prefer the States Parties to the Convention and the Committee of Ministers to tighten up their approach as regards the execution of judgments, rather than the Court having to take such a risk.

PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE POPOVIĆ

I voted with the majority for finding a violation in respect of Slovenia and Serbia in this case, but I think that paragraphs 109 to 125 of the judgment need to be clarified. The present judgment may by no means allow the Court in future to deal with applications of the same nature, if lodged against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and/or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in a single-judge formation. Such applications cannot be automatically declared inadmissible. On the contrary, they must be dealt with by a Chamber, first as to the question of admissibility and later on, should they be declared admissible, on the merits as well.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE NUSSBERGER JOINED BY JUDGE POPOVIĆ

A. Historical dimension and financial implications of the case

There can be no doubt that the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention have been violated. What the Grand Chamber was confronted with in this very complex and difficult case was, however, not only to decide if there had been human rights violations or not, but to whom to attribute those violations, which had lasted for more than twenty years and were embedded in the context of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“the SFRY”) and which thus took on a historical dimension.

At the same time, the Grand Chamber had to decide on the amount of money to be paid not only to the applicants, but also to all those in the same situation as the applicants. It thus had to take a decision with enormous financial implications.

To my regret I cannot subscribe to the solution adopted by the majority.

B. Attribution of exclusive responsibility for the violation of the applicants’ property rights to Slovenia and Serbia

The responsibility for compensating for the loss of “old” foreign-currency savings can be regarded either as a question of civil law (this is the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, see paragraphs 85, 87 and 96 of the present judgment) or as a State succession issue to be resolved on the basis of international law (this is the position of Serbia and Slovenia, see paragraphs 89 and 92). The majority of the Grand Chamber have opted for a civil-law approach [44] and have decided that it is Slovenia alone which is responsible for the violation of the rights of Ms Ališić and Mr Sadžak, and Serbia alone which is responsible for the violation of Mr Šahdanović’s rights. Thus, the States where, in “Yugoslav times”, the associated banks within the socialist model of self-management happened to have their head offices are now required to pay back all the debts incurred in a system created by another State before the entry into force of the Convention.

In my view this solution is unsatisfactory and inadequate, as it is based on an oversimplification of the complex historical developments and leaves out some important aspects. While it might be tempting to find a clear-cut and “easy” solution, a more differentiated approach should have been adopted.

1. Responsibility of the SFRY in setting up the system

It is uncontroversial that it was neither Slovenia nor Serbia alone which set up the whole banking system with its redepositing schemes, but it was the SFRY which was in dire need of foreign currency (see paragraph 14 of the present judgment). It is also uncontroversial that the system set up had no sound financial basis (see paragraphs 14 and 17). It had to be regarded as risk investment, attracting savers’ money by much higher interest rates than those offered on the market, often exceeding 10% (see paragraph 14). There was clearly no economic foundation for the expectation of the high gains thus promised.

This has already been clearly spelt out by the Court (see Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina , no. 27912/02, § 51, 3 November 2009):

“To begin with, it is a well-known fact that the global economic crisis of the 1970s hit the SFRY particularly hard. The SFRY turned to international capital markets and soon became one of the most indebted countries in the world. When the international community backed away from the loose lending practices of the 1970s, the SFRY resorted to foreign-currency savings of its citizens to pay foreign debts and finance imports.”

2. Breakdown of the system in “Yugoslav times”

The breakdown of the system had already happened in “Yugoslav times” (stoppage of the redepositing system in 1988 (see paragraph 20 of the present judgment); abolition of the system of basic and associated banks in 1989 ‑ 90 (see paragraph 21); massive withdrawal of foreign currency (see paragraph 22)). It was the SFRY which first resorted to emergency measures restricting to a large extent the withdrawals of foreign-currency deposits (see paragraphs 22 and 53). Such measures would not have been necessary if the savers’ money had not already been lost at that time. That all happened in a State which does not exist any more at the present time.

This has already been explicitly outlined in the Court’s case-law (see Suljagić , cited above, § 10; compare also Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, § 40, 3 October 2008, and Molnar Gabor v. Serbia , no. 22762/05, § 6, 8 December 2009):

“Problems resulting from the foreign and domestic debt of the SFRY caused a monetary crisis in the 1980s. The national economy was on the verge of collapse and the SFRY resorted to emergency measures, such as statutory restrictions on the repayment of foreign-currency deposits (see section 71 of the Foreign-Currency Transactions Act 1985). As a result, foreign-currency deposits were practically frozen.”

Even though the State guarantee under the civil law had not been activated before the dissolution of the SFRY (see paragraph 15 of the present judgment), the consequences of the dysfunctioning of the system set up by the SFRY are to be regarded as the shared responsibility of the successor States.

The international-law dimension of the case must not therefore be ignored.

3. Scope of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis

Most of the measures adopted by the successor States as a follow-up to the breakdown of the system introducing a special regime for “old” foreign-currency savings were adopted in the early 1990s (see paragraphs 23 et seq. of the present judgment) and thus before the entry into force of the Convention in the respective States (Slovenia: 28 June 1994; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 10 April 1997; Croatia – 5 November 1997; Bosnia and Herzegovina – 12 July 2002; and Serbia – 3 March 2004). Basically, the foreign-currency accounts remained “frozen” in all the successor States, but withdrawals were allowed under specific conditions, especially on humanitarian grounds (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, see paragraph 25 of the present judgment, and Serbia, see paragraph 44; the materials at the disposal of the Court do not contain any information on the emergency measures taken by Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s, see paragraphs 42 and 52). Slovenia assumed the former SFRY guarantee already in 1991 and agreed to repay original deposits and interest accrued in 1993, but only in so far as savings in the domestic branches of the banks were concerned (but covering both Slovenian banks and the domestic branches of foreign banks, see paragraph 48). The guarantees undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina were restricted to domestic banks (see paragraph 24).

It is evident that all these measures adopted immediately after the breakdown of the SFRY were emergency measures aimed at securing trust in the new State structures and at avoiding major discontent and protests in turbulent times. With the passing of time, supplementary measures were taken. They were all tailor-made for the concrete needs of the respective successor State, with the consequence of including some and excluding others (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina – guarantees and, later on, payments only for savings in domestic banks (see paragraphs 24 and 27 of the present judgment); Serbia – exclusion of citizens from other former SFRY States in the repayment schemes (see paragraph 45)). The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on the contrary, repaid all the old foreign-currency debts (see paragraph 52); for Croatia, this seems to be controversial (see paragraph 42, and also Kovačić and Others , cited above, § 183).

The Court has no jurisdiction ratione temporis to analyse how far the measures adopted before the entry into force of the Convention constituted interferences with the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or how far they were discriminatory and violated that Article taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The status quo at the time the Convention came into force in the respective States was that the applicants had been banned from having access to their own money already for several years. In my view, the States’ duties under the Convention therefore have to be analysed as positive obligations and not as interferences. The money had de facto already been taken away. It could not be taken away a second time, but the losses had to be compensated for.

4. Breach of positive obligations

In the context of State succession, the positive obligations of the respondent States on the basis of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were twofold. On a vertical level they had a duty to make up for the losses the applicants had incurred and to provide immediate relief. On a horizontal level they had to negotiate among themselves to achieve an adequate distribution of the debts accumulated within a system that they had all been involved in setting up. While the first duty resulted directly from Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, it was intertwined with the second duty, resulting from general international law and the Agreement on Succession Issues. The Court has repeated many times that the rights guaranteed under the Convention are not theoretical and illusory, but practical and effective. The right to obtain a compensation payment is only effective if it is clear against whom it has to be directed. Therefore, all the respondent States had a positive obligation to negotiate over the issue of the “old” foreign-currency deposits.

In my view, Croatia breached this duty by refusing to continue the negotiations in 2002 (see paragraph 63 of the present judgment), whereas all the other States were willing to take them up again.

Concerning the positive obligation to make up for the losses sustained by the applicants, I agree with the majority that Slovenia and Serbia have not fulfilled their positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. By restructuring the old Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana and transferring most of its assets to Nova Ljubljanska Banka Slovenia in 1994, that is, at a time when the Convention had already come into force, Slovenia rendered the repayments de facto impossible without adopting any compensatory measures (see paragraph 49 of the present judgment). The same is true for Serbia, which did not prevent the bankruptcy of Investbanka (see paragraph 47).

I do not, however, agree with the majority that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not responsible at all in this respect. They deliberately excluded State guarantees for and repayment of “old” foreign-currency deposits in foreign branches of domestic banks (see paragraphs 24 et seq. of the present judgment) and thus allowed the human rights violations to continue. The example of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (see paragraph 52), as well as the solution found with respect to the Post Office Savings Bank, where States had taken over the guarantees as regards the branches in their respective territory (see paragraph 64), show that there was no consensus in favour of excluding the responsibility of the State where the deposits had been made. A categorical refusal to pay is all the more unjustified as it is undisputed that, within the redepositing system, part of the money had been transferred back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thus, the majority of the Grand Chamber have failed to scrutinise the positive obligations of all the respondent States against whom the applicants’ complaint was directed.

C. Compensation scheme

1. Compensation on the basis of schemes developed before the entry into force of the Convention

The majority of the Grand Chamber have decided that “Slovenia must make all necessary arrangements ... so as to allow Ms Ališić, Mr Sadžak and all others in their position to recover their ‘old’ foreign-currency savings under the same conditions as those who had such savings in the domestic branches of Slovenian banks”, that is to say, repay the original deposits with interest (see paragraphs 146 and 48 of the judgment). [45] Serbia has to repay the “old” foreign-currency savings “under the same conditions as Serbian citizens who had such savings in the domestic branches of Serbian banks”, that is, partly in cash and partly in government bonds (see paragraphs 146 and 45 of the judgment).

Such a solution could be justified if the Court had found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, as it would offer adequate compensation for discriminatory treatment. It could also be justified on the basis of unjust enrichment if it could be proven that Slovenia and Serbia are still in possession of the money deposited by the applicants and that they earned interest on it in the period between 1990 and 2014.

But neither of those conditions are satisfied in the present case.

The Court has explicitly refrained from finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention in the present case.

Concerning “unjust enrichment” the following aspects have to be taken into account.

Firstly, as it is undisputed that not all money “ended up” in Slovenia and Serbia (see paragraph 116 of the judgment), it is inadequate to request full repayment of the “old” foreign deposits by Slovenia and Serbia alone. In socialist times the associated banks in Slovenia and Serbia had transferred back some of the funds they had received to meet the liquidity needs of the basic banks (see paragraphs 18-19 of the present judgment). As dinar loans (initially interest-free) were granted by the National Bank of Yugoslavia to domestic companies on the basis of the redeposited foreign currency and thus benefited the local economy, the rule of international law concerning local debts (Article 29 of the 2001 Resolution on State Succession in Matters of Property and Debts of the Institute of International Law, see paragraph 60 of the present judgment) is not “evidently” inapplicable, as deemed by the majority of the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 121). Secondly, the fact that redepositing payments were made to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade is not contested. Thirdly, as emergency measures were deemed necessary and adopted by the SFRY (see paragraph 22) it is highly likely that most of the money was already lost in “Yugoslav times”.

The Court has thus stated in Suljagić (cited above, § 51), referring to Resolution 1410 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the repayment of the deposits of foreign exchange made in the offices of the Ljubljanska Banka not on the territory of Slovenia, 1977-1991 of 23 November 2004, and the explanatory memorandum prepared by the rapporteur, Mr Jurgens:

“... The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has established that, as a result, a major part of the original deposits ceased to exist before the dissolution of the SFRY ...”

2. Compensation in cases concerning changes in the political system

Furthermore, the approach taken by the Grand Chamber is not compatible with its jurisprudence in similar cases. Generally, the Court is very reluctant to condemn States for property violations committed before the entry into force of the Convention (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, §§ 53-61, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX; Von Maltzan and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, §§ 110 ‑ 14, ECHR 2005-V; and Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, §§ 99-117, ECHR 2005 ‑ VI). Exceptions are made in the case of continuing violations (see Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, §§ 63-64, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ VI) and in the case of legitimate expectations concerning proprietary interests (see Broniowski v. Poland (dec.) [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 97-102, ECHR 2002 ‑ X). However, whenever violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 have related to events that took place before the entry into force of the Convention, on a mass scale, the Court has accepted models offering less than full compensation (see Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement) [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 31 and 43, ECHR 2005 ‑ IX; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (friendly settlement) [GC], no. 35014/97, § 27, 28 April 2008; and Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, §§ 115 and 118 ‑ 31, 25 October 2012).

Thus, the Court stated in the case of Vistiņš and Perepjolkins (ibid., § 113):

“This principle applies all the more forcefully when laws are enacted in the context of a change of political and economic regime, especially during the initial transition period, which is necessarily marked by upheavals and uncertainties; in such cases the State has a particularly wide margin of appreciation (see, among other authorities, Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX; Jahn and Others , cited above, § 116 (a); and Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina , no. 27912/02, § 42, 3 November 2009). Thus, for example, the Court has held that less than full compensation may also be necessary a fortiori where property is taken for the purposes of ‘such fundamental changes of a country’s constitutional system as the transition from a monarchy to a republic’ (see Former King of Greece and Others [ v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94], § 87[, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII]). The Court reaffirmed that principle in Broniowski ([ v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96], § 182[, ECHR 2004 ‑ V]), in the context of a property restitution and compensation policy, specifying that a scheme to regulate property, being ‘wide-reaching but controversial ... with significant economic impact for the country as a whole’, could involve decisions restricting compensation for the taking or restitution of property to a level below its market value. The Court has also reiterated these principles regarding the enactment of laws in ‘the exceptional context of German reunification’ (see [ Von ] Maltzan and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, §§ 77 and 111-12, ECHR 2005 ‑ V, and Jahn and Others , cited above).”

It is true that these cases concerned expropriation of real property. But there is no convincing reason to treat the loss of risk investments substantially better than the loss of real property and to expect not only the amount lost to be repaid in full, but even the lost interest to be compensated for.

It is worth mentioning that the Court has accepted considerable deductions in the amounts repaid in cases concerning compensation for “old” foreign-currency deposits lost and has granted the respondent States a wide margin of appreciation (see Trajkovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 53320/99, ECHR 2002-IV; Suljagić , cited above, §§ 27-30 and 52-54; and Molnar Gabor , cited above, §§ 21, 23-25 and 50).

Concerning more specifically the interest rates fixed in the original schemes set up in the 1980s, it can be argued that there was no longer a legitimate expectation at the time the Convention came into force in Slovenia in 1994 and in Serbia in 2004. On the other hand, in determining adequate compensation it is necessary to take into account the adaptation to inflation of the savings originally deposited in Deutschmarks (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 71243/01, §§ 38-44, ECHR 2014).

3. Subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation

In setting up pilot procedures the Court has, up to now, always left a wide margin of appreciation to member States in finding adequate solutions to systemic problems. In the first two cases ( Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska , both cited above), the Grand Chamber endorsed the friendly settlement reached by the parties in respect of both general and individual measures and has thus accepted models offering less than full compensation in respect of other adversely affected persons. In its recent judgment in Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) ([GC], no. 26828/06, ECHR 2014), where the parties had failed to reach a friendly settlement, the Court had due regard to the fact that the Slovenian Government had set up an ad hoc domestic compensation scheme after the expiry of the time-limits indicated in the principal judgment in order to secure proper redress to the “erased” at national level (ibid., §§ 138-40). The Grand Chamber observed in that connection that, according to the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation which went with it, the amounts of compensation awarded at national level to other adversely affected persons in the context of general measures under Article 46 of the Convention were at the discretion of the respondent State, provided that they were compatible with the Court’s judgment ordering those measures (ibid., § 141; see also, mutatis mutandis , Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, § 88, ECHR 2009).

4. Necessity of cooperation in finding adequate solutions

As explained above, the context of State succession must not be ignored in determining who is responsible for the human rights violations in the present case. This is also true for the setting up of the compensation mechanism. It is of utmost importance that all the successor States cooperate in establishing the scheme and in verifying the existence of the relevant claims. The Court has already been confronted with regrettable abuses in this context. Thus, for example, two applicants in the case of Kovačić and Others (cited above, § 260) failed to inform the Court that, further to the Osijek County Court’s decision of 7 July 2005, they had received payment of their foreign-currency deposits in full.

In the case of Suljagić (cited above, § 19) the Court stated:

“Legislation providing for the use of ‘old’ foreign-currency savings in the privatisation process had limited appeal and, moreover, led to abuses: an unofficial market emerged on which such savings were sometimes sold for no more than 3% of their nominal value.”

In my view, the important aspect of cooperation between the respondent States in verifying the claims has not been sufficiently dealt with in the judgment of the Grand Chamber.

D. Alternative solution to the case

To sum up, in my view, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia are responsible for the violation of the rights of Ms Ališić and Mr Sadžak under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia are responsible for the violation of Mr Šahdanović’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention. Whereas Croatia is responsible only for the long duration of the violation and should pay part of the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the main responsibility lies with Slovenia and Serbia respectively, which should pay the major part of the award in respect of pecuniary damage, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for only a small part of the damage under both heads.

On the basis of their shared responsibility for the system created in the SFRY, all the respondent States should cooperate in devising an adequate compensation mechanism.

On that basis, it should be possible to compensate those unlawfully deprived of their assets in an adequate manner and secure the execution of the judgment within a short period of time.

[1] . Ljubljanska Banka Sarajevo is different from and should not be confused with the homonymous bank set up in 1993, mentioned in paragraph 30 below.

[2] . See paragraph 43 below.

[3] . See paragraph 52 below.

[4] . Here and in the footnotes below the full titles of the domestic legislation referred to in the judgment are provided in the original language. Zakon o deviznom poslovanju , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 66/85, 13/86, 71/86, 2/87, 3/88, 59/88, 85/89, 27/90, 82/90 and 22/91.

[5] . Zakon o bankama i drugim finansijskim organizacijama , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 10/89, 40/89, 87/89, 18/90, 72/90 and 79/90.

[6] . Zakon o sanaciji, stečaju i likvidaciji banaka i drugih finansijskih organizacija , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 84/89 and 63/90.

[7] . Odluka o načinu izvršavanja obaveza Federacije po osnovu jemstva za devize na deviznim računima i deviznim štednim ulozima građana, građanskih pravnih lica i stranih fizičkih lica , Official Gazette of the SFRY no. 27/90.

[8] . Zakon o obligacionim odnosima , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89 and 57/89.

[9] . Zakon o deviznom poslovanju i kreditnim odnosima , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 15/77, 61/82, 77/82, 34/83, 70/83 and 71/84.

[10] . A copy of the report was provided to the Court by the Slovenian Government (annex no. GC10).

[11] . As noted in footnote 1 above, Ljubljanska Banka Sarajevo should not be confused with the homonymous bank set up in 1993, mentioned in paragraph 30 below.

[12] . Odluka o načinu na koji ovlašćene banke izvršavaju naloge za plaćanje domaćih fizičkih lica devizama sa njihovih deviznih računa i deviznih štednih uloga , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 28/91, 34/91, 64/91 and 9/92.

[13] . Odluka o načinu vođenja deviznog računa i deviznog štednog uloga domaćeg i stranog fizičkog lica , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 6/91, 30/91, 36/91 and 25/92.

[14] . Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o preuzimanju i primjenjivanju saveznih zakona koji se u Bosni i Hercegovini primjenjuju kao republički zakoni , Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 2/92.

[15] . A copy of the report was provided by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government.

[16] . Odluka o uslovima i načinu isplata dinara po osnovu definitivne prodaje devizne štednje domaćih fizičkih lica i korišćenju deviza sa deviznih računa i deviznih štednih uloga domaćih fizičkih lica za potrebe liječenja i plaćanja školarine u inostranstvu , Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 4/93; Odluka o uslovima i načinu davanja kratkoročnih kredita bankama na osnovu definitivne prodaje deponovane devizne štednje građana i efektivno prodatih deviza od strane građana , Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska nos. 10/93 and 2/94; and Odluka o ciljevima i zadacima monetarno-kreditne politike u 1995 , Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 11/95 and 19/95.

[17] . Zakon o utvrđivanju i realizaciji potraživanja građana u postupku privatizacije , Official Gazette of the FBH nos. 27/97, 8/99, 45/00, 54/00, 32/01, 27/02, 57/03, 44/04, 79/07 and 65/09.

[18] . Uredba o ostvarivanju potraživanja lica koja su imala deviznu štednju u bankama na teritoriju Federacije, a nisu imala prebivalište na teritoriju Federacije , Official Gazette of the FBH no. 44/99.

[19] . Zakon o utvrđivanju i načinu izmirenja unutrašnjih obaveza Federacije , Official Gazette of the FBH nos. 66/04, 49/05, 35/06, 31/08, 32/09 and 65/09.

[20] . Zakon o izmirenju obaveza po osnovu računa stare devizne štednje , Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 28/06, 76/06, 72/07 and 97/11.

[21] . Zakon o postupku upisa pravnih lica u sudski registar , Official Gazette of the FBH nos. 4/00, 49/00, 32/01, 19/03 and 50/03.

[22] . Zakon o pretvaranju deviznih depozita građana u javni dug Republike Hrvatske , Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 106/93.

[23] . Pravilnik o utvrđivanju uvjeta i načina pod kojima građani mogu prenijeti svoju deviznu štednju s organizacijske jedinice banke čije je sjedište izvan Republike Hrvatske na banke u Republici Hrvatskoj , Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 19/94.

[24] . A copy of the document was provided by the Slovenian Government (annexes nos. 273-74).

[25] . Odluka o uslovima i načinu davanja kratkoročnih kredita bankama na osnovu definitivne prodaje deponovane devizne štednje građana , Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 42/93, 49/93, 71/93 and 77/93; Odluka o uslovima i načinu isplate dela devizne štednje građana koja je deponovana kod NBJ , Official Gazette nos. 42/94, 44/94 and 50/94; Odluka o uslovima i načinu isplate dela devizne štednje građana koja je deponovana kod NBJ , Official Gazette nos. 10/95, 52/95, 58/95, 20/96, 24/96 and 30/96; and Odluka o privremenom obezbeđivanju i načinu i uslovima isplate sredstava ovlašćenim bankama na ime dinarske protivvrednosti dela devizne štednje deponovane kod NBJ isplaćene građanima za određene namene , Official Gazette nos. 41/96, 21/98 and 4/99.

[26] . Zakon o regulisanju javnog duga Savezne Republike Jugoslavije po osnovu devizne štednje građana , Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 36/02.

[27] . Zakon o izmirenju obaveza po osnovu devizne štednje građana , Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 59/98, 44/99 and 53/01.

[28] . Zakon o privatizaciji , Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia nos. 38/01, 18/03, 45/05, 123/07 and 30/10.

[29] . Ustavni zakon za izvedbo Temeljne ustavne listine o samostojnosti in neodvisnosti RS , Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia nos. 1/91 and 45/94.

[30] . Zakon o poravnavanju obveznosti iz neizplačanih deviznih vlog , Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia no. 7/93.

[31] . Zakon o Skladu Republike Slovenije za sukcesijo , Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia nos. 10/93, 38/94 and 40/97.

[32] . Zakon o Skladu Republike Slovenije za nasledstvo in visokem predstavniku Republike Slovenije za nasledstvo , Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia nos. 29/06 and 59/10.

[33] . Decision published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia no. 105/09.

[34] . Закон за преземање на депонираните девизни влогови на граѓаните од страна на Република Македонија , Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia no. 26/92; Закон за гаранција на Република Македонија за депонираните девизни влогови на граѓаните и за обезбедување на средства и начин за исплата на депонираните девизни влогови на граѓаните во 1993 и 1994 , Official Gazette nos. 31/93, 70/94, 65/95 and 71/96; and Закон за начинот и постапката на исплатување на депонираните девизни влогови на граѓаните по кои гарант е Република Македонија , Official Gazette nos. 32/00, 108/00, 4/02 and 42/03.

[35] . Odluka o načinu vođenja deviznog računa i deviznog štednog uloga domaćeg i stranog fizičkog lica , Official Gazette of the SFRY nos. 6/91, 30/91, 36/91 and 25/92.

[36] . This Act was enacted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which existed from 1992 until 2003. It was made up of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia is the sole legal successor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[37] . In 1983 the SFRY signed that treaty. In 2001 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lodged an instrument advising its intent to maintain the signature made by the SFRY.

[38] . The Commission was set up by the European Community and its member States in 1991. It handed down fifteen opinions pertaining to legal issues arising from the dissolution of the SFRY ( International Law Reports 92 (1993), pp. 162-208, and 96 (1994), pp. 719 ‑ 37).

[39] . See the travaux préparatoires of the Agreement provided by the Slovenian Government (annexes nos. 265-70).

[40] . A copy of that letter was provided by the Croatian Government.

[41] . A copy of that letter was provided by the Croatian Government.

[42] . A copy of relevant SWIFT correspondence and other relevant documents were provided by the Serbian Government.

[43] . The coverage level was increased from 20,000 euros to 100,000 euros in 2010 (Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay).

[44] . The civil-law approach is basically justified with reference to the jurisprudence of the Slovenian and Serbian courts themselves (see paragraphs 44, 45, 49, 51 and 112 of the present judgment), which is said to “undoubtedly confirm” the liability of Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana and Investbanka. At least concerning the jurisprudence of the Slovenian courts this is, however, not exact. The Slovenian courts found the old (not the new!) Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana liable for the payment of “old” foreign-currency deposits. The old Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana (see paragraph 49 of the judgment) as well as Investbanka (see paragraph 47 of the judgment) are, however, in a state of “rehabilitation” or bankruptcy, so the direct civil-law claims are directed against insolvent banks.

[45] . There might be problems in executing the present judgment. As the law to which the Grand Chamber refers was adopted in 1993 and regulated the interest rates up to that time only, it seems to be unclear what scheme applies to interest accrued after 1993.