CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI

(Translation)

I voted with the majority, accepting in particular that the Court had to answer the questions as put by the Commission. This was not a general, abstract request for interpretation from the Committee of Ministers under Protocol No. 2 to the Convention (P2), which could have related to the specific nature of compensation for non-pecuniary damage under Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50).

The Court rejects both the Government ’ s submission that the Court had no jurisdiction to determine the issue and the submission that the Court could not rule on a question of exemption from attachment.

The Court rightly notes that when considering a request for interpretation, it may exercise an inherent jurisdiction in a particular case and, if need be, clarify its decision in respect of Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50).

The applicant ’ s complaints relating to the procedural circumstances of enforcement measures taken in France are still under the jurisdiction of the national courts.

It was therefore solely in reply to the questions as put by the Commission under Rule 57 of Rules of Court A that the Court rejected the Commission ’ s request.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER

(Translation)

1.   In my opinion, we should have answered the Commission ’ s first question in the affirmative.

It is true that this question can be understood "as an invitation to interpret Article 50 (art. 50) in a general, abstract way" [3] . But that is so only in appearance. In reality, the Commission was asking us to say, in concrete terms and in the particular case of Mr Allenet de Ribemont , whether the "just satisfaction" awarded him in the judgment of 10 February 1995 had or had not to be "paid to [him] personally and be exempt from attachment".

At all events, it must not be forgotten, firstly, that questions "concerning the int erpretation and application" [4] of Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50) are just as much within the Court ’ s jurisdiction as those concerning the Convention ’ s other provisions and, secondly, that we very often include in the reasons given for our judgments forms of words defining "in a general, abstract way" the meaning to be given to such provisions before applying them to the particular case.

Nor is it sufficient to point out that in the judgment of 10 February 1995 the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to order the French State to "guarantee" the applicant "against any application for enforcement of the judgment delivered by the Paris tribunal de grande instance on 14 March 1979". That does not necessarily mean that it thus resolved the problem raised by the Commission in its first question by leaving it "to the national authorities acting unde r the relevant domestic law" [5] .

Such a solution is scarcely in keeping with the spirit of the Convention.

For one thing, it is hard to accept that the execution of a judgment in which an applicant is awarded "just satisfaction" under Article 50 (art. 50) should be subject to different legislation in different countries.

For another, it is just as hard to accept that the right to compensation for a breach of fundamental rights recognised by the Convention may be frustrated by an ordinary debt arising under national law. This is particularly offensive in the instant case as the claim against the applicant arose, at least indirectly, from a breach of such rights in regard to him [6] .

We should therefore have said, as our predecessors did in the Ringeisen case in reply to an identical question, that the compensation is to be paid to the applicant "person ally and free from attachment" [7] .

2.   As regards the other two questions put by the Commission, I am of the same opinion as the other members of the Chamber.

[1] The case is numbered 3/1994/450/529.  The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number).  The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

[2] Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9).  They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.

[3] Paragraph 19 of the judgment, first sub-paragraph.

[4] Article 45 of the Convention (art. 45).

[5] Paragraph 19 of the judgment, second sub-paragraph.

[6] See the judgment of 10 February 1995, Series A no. 308, p. 22, para . 59, and paragraph 10 of the present judgment.

[7] See the Ringeisen v. Austria judgment of 23 June 1973, Series A no. 16, p. 9, second point of the operative provisions, p. 6, para . 8, and p. 9, para . 15.