CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO

1. Like my colleagues, I have voted in favour of the finding of a violation of Article 8 in the present case. I would, however, like to express my reservations regarding the preliminary issues dealt with in paragraphs 54-56 of the judgment. The applicant in this case is a minor. In line with its usual practice in similar situations, the Chamber has accepted that the child’s parent, in this case the mother, may act as the child’s representative in the proceedings before the Court, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint arises from a dispute between the mother and the father relating to custody and contact rights concerning the child. Furthermore, the lawyer engaged and instructed by the mother for the proceedings before the Court has previously acted for the mother in the domestic proceedings.

2. I have addressed the issue of a child’s representation as an applicant before the Court in previous separate opinions (see A and B v. Croatia , no. 7144/15, 20 June 2019, §§ 18-21 of the joint separate opinion by myself and Judge Eicke, and, in particular, Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway ([GC], no. 372823/13, 10 September 2019, joint dissenting opinion by myself and Judge Nordén on the question of the first applicant’s right to represent the second applicant, §§ 1-11 on the general remarks).

3. I will not repeat the reflections and arguments set out in those opinions on this occasion. It is sufficient to reiterate them by reference. Although the problem of the child’s representation manifests itself in the present case in a procedural situation which in one respect is different, namely in that the child alone is the applicant before this Court, the main considerations in my view remain very similar. In this case, it is clear that the underlying conflict is one between the child’s mother and the father. The domestic authorities have found that the mother has developed a “symbiotic relationship” with the child and her influence on the child has even been characterised as “emotional abuse” and “dangerous for the child’s development” (see paragraphs 13, 17 and 21 of the present judgment). Under such circumstances, it is doubtful whether the mother can be considered capable of properly and genuinely representing the best interests of child as a legal subject in his own right.

4. Indeed, it is striking that the Chamber by the present judgment condemns the fact that the child was not properly represented in the impugned proceedings at domestic level, but fails to acknowledge the same problem in the proceedings before the Court. Despite the findings referred to above, the Court does not discern any conflict of interest between the mother and the applicant on the subject matter of the complaint. Yet in the light of the underlying conflict, there is no reliable basis for determining whether the recourse to the proceedings taken by the mother on behalf of the child, including those before the Court, is indeed in the child’s best interests. Similarly, the examination of the complaint on the basis of submissions made under instructions by the mother, rather than by an unbiased representative of the child, is problematic.

5. In view of the fact that it will be necessary to develop an appropriate overall solution to the question of the representation of child applicants in proceedings before the Court and to do so in cooperation with the States Parties, I have gone along with the examination of the complaint as presented.

6. On the basis of the material before us, I concur with the conclusions reached on the merits of the case.