DISSENTING OPINION OF MR A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

     I do not find it possible to join the majority in concluding that

there has been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. In my opinion,

there are no solid grounds for concluding that, in this case, the

interference was not necessary in a democratic society and, in

particular, not proportionate to the aim of maintaining national

security and public safety.

     In order to assess whether Mr Ceylan's conviction and sentence

answered a "pressing social need" and whether they were "proportionate

to the legitimate aims pursued", it is important to analyse the content

of the applicant's remarks in the light of the situation prevailing in

south-east Turkey at the time. In so doing, the Commission, taking

account of the margin of appreciation left to the Government, should

have confined itself to the question whether the judicial authorities

had good reasons to believe that there was a pressing social need for

such a measure, based on an acceptable assessment of the relevant

facts.

     I note in this regard that, according to the national courts, the

applicant's article exceeded the limits of mere criticism and amounted

to incitement of the people of Kurdish origin to hatred and enmity

based on race, class and region. In particular, the applicant had

asserted in his article that "... a genocide is carried out against the

Kurds in Turkey ..." and that "... the outcry of the Kurdish people is

being violently oppressed ...". I find that certain indissociable

sections of the applicant's article are in fact of an inflammatory

nature and could, therefore, be deemed dangerous propaganda. In these

circumstances, the applicant's conviction and the penalty imposed on

him on account of the publication of his article could reasonably be

said to arise out of a pressing social need.

     In the light of these considerations and having regard to the

State's margin of appreciation in this area, I am of the opinion that

the restriction placed on the applicant's freedom of expression was

proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and that, therefore, it

could reasonably be regarded as necessary in a democratic society to

achieve those aims.