DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr M. M.A. NOWICKI

JOINED BY Mrs G.H THUNE, MM P. LORENZEN AND E.A. ALKEMA

We disagree with the majority's opinion that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention in view of delays in the proceedings.

Sharing the majority's view that it cannot be said that the applicant's conduct contributed to the length of the proceedings in question, we do not find that the authorities concerned failed to act with due diligence.  Our reasons are as follows.

We firstly note that the investigative stage of the proceedings lasted for about seven months and three weeks.  This period, in view of the volume of evidence collected cannot be regarded as excessive.

The proceedings before the court of first instance lasted for one year, nine months and sixteen days.  During this time the Poznań Regional Court scheduled seven hearings in all, of which two were cancelled.  At the same time the court heard evidence from eighteen witnesses and the applicant. It also considered reports submitted by several experts. Evidence from the psychiatrists was called on two occasions.

It is true that the PoznaÅ„ Regional Court's decision of 21 March 1996 to obtain evidence from the second psychiatric report resulted in the next hearing on the merits being held as late as 15 January 1997.  It is also true that, as the experts had failed to appear before the court, it decided to adjourn two hearings which were to be held on 28 October and 18 December 1996 respectively.   However, in the meantime, from 24 June to 23 August 1996, the applicant was placed under psychiatric observation which, apparently, was necessary in order to assess his criminal responsibility.  Also, when the psychiatric report was submitted to the court on 23 August 1996 and the case was ready to be finally examined, the court promptly scheduled the subsequent hearing for 28 October 1996.

As regards the appellate proceedings, these lasted for a reasonable period of about five months.  Similarly, the cassation proceedings, instituted by the applicant on 12 November 1997, have, to date, lasted for approximately six months. This period cannot be regarded as excessive either.

Finally, we stress that even though the proceedings as a whole have lasted for about three years and nine months, two judgments on the merits have been rendered by the courts during that time.

Therefore, having regard to the fact that there were no substantial delays in the proceedings attributable to the authorities, we consider that the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant has not exceeded a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.