DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr E.A. ALKEMA

                   JOINED BY Mr F. MARTINEZ

     I disagree with the majority's decision on two related grounds:

firstly, on the issue of the length of the proceedings as such and,

secondly, on the reasons given for finding that the reasonable time has

been exceeded in this case.

     The proceedings at issue are still pending.  As of today they

have lasted five years and five months or, if calculated from the date

on which Poland's declaration acknowledging the right of individual

petition took effect, almost four years and six months.  During that

period eight complete or partial court decisions were taken, not

counting some further decisions on court fees.  No substantial lapses

of time without any judicial activity occurred during that period.

Therefore, I consider that there has been no undue delay in the instant

case.

     In this respect the majority's decision seems not to be in line

with the Commission's case-law, e.g. Nori (No. 19978/92 Dec. 1.12.94

- proceedings concerning an injunction to pay, which lasted eight years

and three months before three instances).

     Further I object to what is said in para. 47:

     "Thus, the authorities, in particular the Walbrzych Regional

     Court, by their failure to follow the binding instructions of the

     Supreme Court, substantially contributed to the length of the

     proceedings in question".

     This is a somewhat cavalier paraphrase of the account in para. 25

of the facts:

     "On 31 August 1995 the Wroclaw Court of Appeal quashed the

     judgment ... since the court of first instance had clearly failed

     to comply with the Supreme Court's legal opinion and guidelines

     expressed in respect of this matter".

     I particularly take exception to the idea of lower courts being

under an obligation to "follow binding instructions" from a higher or

supreme court. Of course, there are instances where the lower courts

are faced with direct orders, e.g. to reopen proceedings or hear

evidence from witnesses, with which they have to comply.  However, as

far as a "legal opinion" or "guidelines expressed" by higher courts are

concerned the courts have other competencies and other corresponding

responsibilities.  Responsibilities which are inherent in judicial

independence; responsibilities which may also vary with the specific

competencies attributed to the courts in domestic law.

     It is in principle not for the Commission to pass judgment on the

manner in which these competencies are exercised.  Within a judicial

system with second and even third instances, it is first and foremost

a matter for those higher courts to assess the lower courts' exercise

of their competencies.

     Admittedly, such a system may be time-consuming but it also

offers most valuable guarantees.  If civil parties, nevertheless,

prefer speed to those guarantees they have the option of arbitration.