Published on 30 May 2022

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 24999/21 Lárus WELDING against Iceland lodged on 10 May 2021 communicated on 13 May 2022

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The application concerns the applicant’s prosecution and conviction for financial crimes following the financial crisis of 2008.

The applicant was the CEO of Glitnir Bank from 2007 to 2008.

On 10 February 2014 he was indicted, alongside two others, on two counts of fraud by abuse of position ( umboðssvik ).

The applicant was convicted by the Reykjavik District Court on 21 December 2015 by a panel composed of two professional judges (S.S. and S.H.) and one ad hoc lay judge (H.S.B.). On 1 June 2017 the Supreme Court quashed the District Court’s judgment on the grounds of a lack of impartiality on the part of S.H., and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the merits.

The case was re-examined by the District Court, where S.H. was replaced on the panel by another professional judge, I.E.

By a judgment of 21 December 2017 the applicant was convicted as charged, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.

By a judgment of 26 June 2020 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction but suspended his sentence entirely, for a period of five years.

The applicant’s leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 26 November 2020.

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a trial by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated on account of the manner of appointment of H.S.B. He submits that her independence and impartiality vis-à-vis S.S., the District Court judge acting as president of the panel in the case, were compromised by insufficiencies in the legal framework which dictated the appointment of ad hoc lay judges at the material time.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

Has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to a trial by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the participation of H.S.B. as an ad hoc lay judge before the District Court, in particular with regard to the legal framework applicable to her appointment, participation in the panel, and renumeration (see, for example, Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, § 49, ECHR 2013 (extracts), and Parlov-Tkalčić v. Croatia , no. 24810/06, § 86, 22 December 2009)?

Has the applicant exhausted domestic remedies in respect of this complaint as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention?