Communicated on 28 November 2017

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 65717/14 Rasa AUGUSTÄ– against Lithuania lodged on 25 September 2014

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The applicant, Ms Rasa AugustÄ—, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1969 and lives in KlaipÄ—da.

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

3. The applicant is a judge at the Klaip Ä— da City District Court, which is a court of first instance.

4 . The documents before the Court indicate that on 18 July 2012 the President of the Klaip ė da Regional Court, which is a court of second instance, asked the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission to start disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, on the grounds that she had been negligent when acting as a judge. In particular, she had not taken procedural actions in a timely fashion. After a disciplinary case against the applicant had been opened, by a decision of 4 March 2013 the Judges ’ Court of Honour held that the applicant had indeed breached a number of norms of the Code of Civil Procedure. For example, she had failed to inform parties of certain matters, had not sent them procedural documents, and had not been active in family-law cases. The Judges ’ Court of Honour considered that such behaviour by the applicant showed that she lacked professionalism. However, no disciplinary sanction was imposed on her.

5. By a letter of 23 April 2013 the President of the Klaip ė da Regional Court again asked the Judicial Council, a body assuring the independence and self-governance of judges, to consider whether the applicant ’ s actions had complied with the requirements of exemplariness and dutifulness ( pavyzdingumo ir pareigingumo reikalavimai ) set out in the Judges ’ Code of Ethics, and whether she should have been disciplined. The president referred to the applicant ’ s earlier negligence case (see paragraph 4 above), and stated that after those proceedings the applicant had shown much dissatisfaction with the Klaip ė da Regional Court and had even reported him and the judges of that court to the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission.

This time the president of the regional court wrote that, when taking a decision, the applicant had repeatedly ignored guidelines set by the higher regional court regarding how certain legal norms had to be interpreted, and this was in breach of Article 33 § 4 of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 36 below). The president also considered that the applicant had been negligent in her work, since in some cases she would unreasonably refuse to accept a civil claim for examination. Such irresponsible actions on her part had caused damage to the parties in the civil proceedings, given that they negated the principles of concentration and economy of civil proceedings ( civilinio proceso koncentracijos ir ekonomi š kumo principai ). He also argued that the applicant had been disrespectful to the Klaipėda Regional Court as an institution, as well as to its judges. She had ignored that court ’ s decisions and disclosed her views in that respect to the parties in civil proceedings, by such actions diminishing the courts ’ authority in society.

6. To illustrate such allegedly frivolous behaviour by the applicant, the President of the Klaip Ä— da Regional Court also submitted that, when taking a decision, the applicant would rely on the relevant case-law of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “the ECJ”), although the KlaipÄ—da Regional Court had already interpreted that case-law in the opposite manner (the president referred to the KlaipÄ—da Regional Court ’ s ruling of 20 January 2010 in civil case no. 2S-301-253/2010). The applicant provided the Court with an example of such a clash between herself, as a judge at the district court, and the higher instance – regional – court in KlaipÄ—da. Specifically, on 9 September 2014 in civil case no. L2-11789-769/2014 she refused to accept for examination a civil claim by a consumer credit institution, on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. When issuing a court ruling, the applicant relied on the ECJ ’ s judgment in case C ‑ 243/08 where, on the basis of a reference for a preliminary ruling, on 4 June 2009 the ECJ had delivered a judgment regarding concepts such as unfair terms in consumer contracts and the power of and obligation on a national court to examine of its own motion the unfairness of a term conferring jurisdiction. In that judgment the ECJ held, among other things, that “[a] national court is required to examine, of its own motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task. Where it considers such a term to be unfair, it must not apply it, except if the consumer opposes that non-application. That duty is also incumbent on the national court when it is ascertaining its own territorial jurisdiction”. Relying on that interpretation by the ECJ, the applicant pointed out that the consumer credit company had been registered in Klaip Ä— da, whereas the defendant ’ s registered place of residence, as well as her workplace, had been in Å iauliai (approximately two hours away). The applicant therefore considered that the term in the consumer credit contract – pursuant to which all the claims stemming from that contract had to be settled in the Klaip Ä— da District Court – was unfair, because it placed the defendant in a disadvantageous situation and also because the defendant could not have influenced the conditions under which she had signed the consumer credit contract. When issuing a ruling as a judge of the Klaip Ä— da City District Court, the applicant held that if that case was to be examined in the Klaip Ä— da City District Court, that would contradict the European Union law, the ECJ ’ s practice and the Lithuanian Constitution. The applicant also relied on the Constitutional Court ’ s rulings to the effect that, in the event of a conflict between Lithuanian statutory law and European Union law, the latter took precedence (see paragraph 34 below). In the light of foregoing, in the text of the ruling, the applicant highlighted to the consumer credit institution that it should lodge the civil claim with the Å iauliai District Court.

7. The consumer credit institution appealed to the Klaipėda Regional Court. It asserted that the applicant, as a judge of the Klaip ė da City District Court, had erred in refusing to accept its civil claim for examination. The consumer credit institution insisted that parties to a contract (in this case, a credit institution and a consumer) were free to decide whether to enter into a contract, and that the rights of the person who took out a loan could not be treated as being absolutely more important ( absoliutinamos ) than those of a credit institution. On that last point, the consumer credit institution relied on the case-law of the Klaipėda Regional Court (the 20 January 2010 ruling in civil case no. 2S-301-253/2010, and the 15 May 2014 ruling in civil case no. 2S-1012-459/2014). The consumer credit institution also argued that the applicant, as a judge, had been prejudiced against it and had denied it its right to a court. Even though the credit institution had provided the Vilnius City District Court with all its arguments based on the Klaipėda Regional Court ’ s practice, the applicant had ignored that particular practice by actions which had protracted the civil proceedings.

8. On 2 May 2013 the Chairman of the Judicial Council, who at that time was also the President of the Supreme Court, asked the Judicial Council to examine the applicant ’ s actions.

9. In a written response of 9 May 2013 to the Judicial Council, the applicant argued that the instructions from the Klaip ė da Regional Court on how certain procedural questions had to be handled, in particular those concerning consumer protection, were that such cases had to be dealt with only formally ( formaliai ), which was against the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law to the effect that justice should not be formal (see paragraph 33 below). The applicant also pointed out that the Law on Courts did not require a district court judge to unconditionally follow instructions of the regional court, especially if those instructions contradicted the Supreme Court ’ s practice and the case-law of the ECJ, which both held that a consumer, as a weaker party, should be protected. The applicant stated that she preferred to follow the European Union law, since that law was directly applicable in Lithuania and took precedence over Lithuanian statutory provisions and other legal acts (see paragraph 34 below). The applicant submitted that the judges at the Klaip ė da City District Court had been aware that they had to follow the European Union law, as well as the case-law of the ECJ, but had chosen not to, fearing repercussions from the Klaip ė da Regional Court which would result in reduced career opportunities. The applicant also explained that she had received the Klaip ėd a Regional Court ’ s ruling, which had unclear operative part, and had wanted to learn how to execute that ruling. Instead, she had been reproached as being disrespectful. The applicant asserted that it had been unofficial practice in Klaip ė da that, if an unclear ruling was received from the Klaip ė da Regional Court, the district court should make a telephone call to the regional court for instructions. However, she had been against such so-called “telephone law ( telefonin ė teis ė )”. The applicant stated that the Klaip ė da Regional Court should not see insolence in everything.

10 . Lastly, the applicant submitted that the Klaip ėda Regional Court President ’ s complaint had been prompted by her own critique, in particular her earlier complaint of 20 July 2012 to the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission, where she had asked the commission to verify whether the actions of certain judges of the Klaipėda Regional Court, including its President, merited disciplinary liability. The applicant wrote that the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission had refused to examine her complaint on the grounds that it had no capacity to evaluate the ethics of those judges ’ behaviour. However, lodging the complaint in itself had caused the President of the Klaipėda Regional Court to take action against her. The applicant thus asserted that she was not on an equal footing, since she had to comply with the Judges ’ Code of Ethics twenty-four hours a day, unlike the judges in the higher court – the Klaipėda Regional Court. Lastly, she wrote that she preferred to do her actual job, administering justice, instead of responding to inquiries by the Judicial Council, the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission, or the Judges ’ Court of Honour.

11. On 2 May 2013 the Chairman of the Judicial Council instructed three judges, E.L., V.Z. and V.V. (hereinafter “the three-judge commission”), to investigate how the applicant had performed her duties as a judge.

12. On 13 June 2013, in writing, the applicant asked the Judicial Council to remove Judges E.L. and V.Z. from the three-judge commission on the grounds that they were partial, since, according to the applicant, they had come to the Klaipėda City District Court on 27 May 2013 and had told her that she should always follow the higher – regional – court ’ s instructions, even if those instructions were unlawful. The applicant asserted that when acting as a judge she was independent and was bound only by law. The applicant relied on Article 109 of the Constitution and a ruling by the Constitutional Court of 6 December 1995 (see paragraphs 30 and 31 below).

13 . At a Judicial Council hearing of 28 June 2013 the Judicial Council rejected, by thirteen votes to three, the applicant ’ s claim that two members of the three-judge commission were partial.

14. On 18 July 2013 the three-judge commission held that the applicant had performed her judicial duties negligently. It established eight occasions when she had delayed in taking a decision, such as when she had not admitted a civil claim for examination in a timely fashion. The Commission considered that such behaviour by the applicant had therefore been systematic. It had caused the parties to the civil proceedings in question to incur additional costs, as those proceedings had been protracted. All this damaged the courts ’ authority. The Commission also underlined that the necessity to follow the established case-law of the Supreme Court and the ECJ did not refute ( nepaneigia ) the obligation – stemming from Article 33 § 4 of the Law on Courts (see paragraph 36 below) – to also follow the instructions of a higher court – in this particular case, the Klaipėda Regional Court – as to how the law should be interpreted and applied when hearing similar cases. The applicant ’ s view that she could not follow the decisions of higher courts if she considered them to be against the law could not be justified.

15. On the basis of the conclusions by the three-judge commission, and also on the basis of the Judicial Council ’ s resolution adopted on 2 August 2013, the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission then decided to start disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. The applicant ’ s case was to be heard by the Judges ’ Court of Honour. The applicant then wrote to that court saying that she did not wish to take part in the court proceedings, because she did not expect it to reach a fair decision.

16. On 16 December 2013, having reviewed the conclusions by the three-judge commission, the Judges ’ Court of Honour held that the applicant had been negligent when performing her judicial duties. She also did not wish to acknowledge her mistakes and lacked self-criticism. The Judges ’ Court of Honour thus considered that the applicant had discredited the title of judge and thus merited a disciplinary penalty. She received a strict reprimand.

17. The Judges ’ Court of Honour nevertheless underlined that it would not examine the merits of the cases which had been decided by the applicant in her capacity as a judge, for this was within the competence of other (higher) courts. It also emphasised that disciplinary liability had been applied in respect of the applicant not because she had taken procedural actions, but because she had not performed her duties in a manner whereby her behaviour would not discredit the courts ’ authority.

18. The applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court. In the appeal on points of law she submitted that the disciplinary proceedings against her had been opened not for actual breaches of law, but because: she sought justice and was principled, the latter fact having been noted by the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission (the applicant did not indicate when such a remark had been made); she refused to follow unlawful instructions by the Klaipėda Regional Court; she had offended the ego ( įžeista savimeilė ) of the President of the Klaipėda Regional Court; and she had previously dared to complain to the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission (see paragraph 10 above).

19. By a final ruling of 28 March 2014 the Supreme Court left the Judges ’ Court of Honour decision unchanged. At the outset, the Supreme Court pointed out that it would not be reviewing the decisions which the applicant had taken in her capacity as a judge, or the Klaipėda Regional Court ’ s rulings regarding those decisions by the applicant, because to do so would mean evaluating how the lower courts had been interpreting and applying the law, and the Supreme Court could not perform such a task in the abstract.

20. The Supreme Court then continued by noting that, on one hand, and under the Constitution, the courts of general jurisdiction, as well as their judges, could not interfere with how lower courts decided cases, or provide them any kind of recommendations (the Supreme Court relied on the Constitutional Court ’ s ruling of 28 March 2006, see paragraph 32 below). That being so, the Supreme Court also underlined that, on the other hand, and pursuant to Article 33 § 4 of the Law on Courts, the lower courts were bound by the legal interpretations adopted by higher courts in similar cases. Should a judge disregard that legal maxim, that could lead to a situation where a case could never be examined, which in turn would place the parties to civil proceedings in an intolerable situation.

21. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant had not denied having ignored the rulings and legal interpretations of the Klaipėda Regional Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant ’ s contention that, when issuing court decisions, she did not have to take into account the legal interpretations as formulated by the Klaipėda Regional Court, because instead she had chosen to rely on the legal interpretations formulated by courts other than the Klaipėda Regional Court. The Supreme Court considered that the applicant was bound to follow a legal interpretation by the Klaipėda Regional Court when that court returned a particular case to her to be decided at first instance. The Supreme Court also found that, in such a situation, the Klaipėda Regional Court ’ s legal interpretation was binding upon the applicant as a judge, and bound her more than the rules set out by other courts.

22. The Supreme Court also noted that the applicant had not challenged the fact that such behaviour on her part had caused the parties to civil proceedings negative consequences, because the question of whether to accept a civil claim for examination had taken an unjustifiably long time to decide. The Supreme Court considered that, by such actions, the applicant had reduced the parties ’ and all of society ’ s trust in the law, the court system, and the inner harmony of that system.

B. The case of Judge G.V.

23. In 2013 Judge G.V., who was a judge at the Vilnius City District Court, did not grant a prosecutor ’ s application to detain a suspect in an organised crime case who had been arrested in Lithuania under a European Arrest Warrant. The suspect then fled Lithuania and, according to the information in the press, he has not been found to this day.

24. After the suspect ’ s escape there was much outcry in Lithuania, and in the public domain the judge was blamed for having acted negligently.

25. During the same Judicial Council ’ s hearing of 28 June 2013 when the applicant ’ s disciplinary liability was discussed (see paragraph 13 above), the Judicial Council also examined the matter of Judge G.V. ’ s disciplinary liability. One of the members of the Judicial Council, Judge L.G., then underlined that, in her view, a judge could not incur disciplinary liability on the basis of a procedural decision that he or she had taken. The President of the Supreme Court, who was also the Chairman of the Judicial Council, stated that he would have to ask the Constitutional Court to interpret the law as regards certain aspects of judges ’ disciplinary liability.

26. Afterwards the President of the Supreme Court asked the Constitutional Court to interpret the following excerpt from the Constitutional Court ’ s earlier ruling of 21 December 1999:

“... the Constitutional Court notes that the system of guarantees of the independence of a judge and the courts does not create any preconditions on the grounds of which a judge could avoid the proper fulfilment of [his or her] duties, investigate cases in a negligent manner, act unethically with persons taking part in a case, and violate human rights and dignity. Judges must protect the honour and prestige of their profession. Therefore, the system of self-regulation and self-government of the judiciary must ensure that judges perform their duties properly, and that all unlawful or unethical behaviour of a judge be properly assessed.”

27. The information before the Court indicates that in summer 2013 Judge G.V. submitted a letter of resignation to the State President, but later withdrew it. He would later state that he had initially succumbed to public pressure to resign. The Judicial Council nevertheless considered it necessary to examine whether he was fit to be a judge.

28. By a ruling of 10 March 2014, the Constitutional Court principally held that disciplinary liability could be imposed on judges if they performed judicial duties negligently, but not solely if their procedural decisions were quashed by a higher court (for a more complete explanation, see paragraph 35 below).

29. From the documents before the Court, it is unclear how the Judicial Council proceeded after the Constitutional Court ’ s ruling. The fact remains that Judge G.V. continued working as a judge of a first-instance court until very recently, 2 October 2017, when the State President granted his application for resignation.

C. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. The Constitution and the Constitutional Court ’ s rulings

30 . The Constitution reads:

Article 109

“In the Republic of Lithuania, justice shall be administered only by courts.

When administering justice, judges and courts shall be independent.

When considering cases, judges shall obey only the law.

Courts shall adopt decisions in the name of the Republic of Lithuania.”

Article 111

“The courts of the Republic of Lithuania shall be the Supreme Court of Lithuania, the Court of Appeal of Lithuania, the regional courts and the district courts.

For the consideration of administrative, labour, family, and cases of other categories, specialised courts may be established according to the law...”

Article 115

“Judges of the courts of the Republic of Lithuania shall be removed from office according to the procedure established by law in the following cases:

...

5) when their conduct discredits the title of a judge...”

31 . In the ruling of 6 December 1995 the Constitutional Court underlined the importance of courts ’ independence and held:

“The judicial protection of human rights is enshrined in the Constitution. Paragraph 1 of its Article 30 establishes that a person ‘ whose constitutional rights or freedoms are violated shall have the right to appeal to a court ’ , and Paragraph 2 of its Article 31 sets out that ‘ Every indicted person shall have the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court ’ . Thus, it is absolutely necessary to safeguard the independence of courts in order to secure human rights and freedoms in the first place.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 109 of the Constitution provide: ‘ When administering justice, judges and courts shall be independent. While considering cases, judges shall obey only the law ’ . Therefore, the assumption that the independence of the judiciary is not a privilege, but one of the principal duties of judges and courts, ensuing from the human right to an impartial arbiter in a dispute guaranteed by the Constitution, must necessarily be the criterion guiding the assessment of the independence of judges and courts. Such a concept of independence is also reflected in a number of international instruments.”

32 . As regards the courts being independent when taking a decision, on 28 March 2006 the Constitutional Court held:

“In this context, it should be noted that it is not possible to construe the system of courts of general jurisdiction at different levels ( bendrosios kompetencijos teismų instancinė sistema ) set out in the Constitution as one which is hierarchal, as no lower court of general jurisdiction is subordinate to any higher court in an administrative or organisational aspect or in any other way: first-instance courts of general jurisdiction are not subordinate to either appellate courts of general jurisdiction or courts of cassation, and the Court of Appeal of Lithuania is not subordinate to the Supreme Court of Lithuania.

The system of courts of general jurisdiction at different levels set out in the Constitution may also not be construed as restricting the procedural independence of lower courts of general jurisdiction; however, as mentioned before, under the Constitution, when issuing decisions in cases of equivalent categories ( atitinkamų kategorijų bylose ), lower courts of general jurisdiction are bound by decisions of higher courts of general jurisdiction – precedents in similar cases. Higher courts of general jurisdiction (and their judges) may not interfere in cases considered by lower courts of general jurisdiction, nor give them any instructions, either obligatory or recommendatory, on how equivalent cases must be decided, and so on. From an aspect of the Constitution, such instructions (whether obligatory or recommendatory) would be regarded as the relevant courts (judges) acting ultra vires . Under the Constitution, court practice is formed only when courts decide cases themselves. A different construction of the provisions of the Constitution firmly establishing the system of courts of general jurisdiction at different levels, as well as the legal regulation based on that different construction ... , would create preconditions for higher courts of general jurisdiction (or their judges) to assume functions not provided for them and powers not set out in the Constitution, would deny the independence of courts entrenched in the Constitution, [and] would vio late the provision of Paragraph 2 of Article 109 of the Constitution that, while administering justice, a court and judges shall be independent, and the provision of Paragraph 3 of that Article that, when considering cases, judges shall only obey the law. It should also be noted that giving obligatory or recommendatory instructions to lower courts of general jurisdiction on how equivalent cases must be decided, and so on, would also restrict the possibilities of higher courts of general jurisdiction to independently and impartially review those cases in an appeal and cassation procedure in the event that this is necessary.”

33 . In a ruling of 21 December 2006 the Constitutional Court underlined the need for a just court decision and held:

“The principle of justice entrenched in the Constitution, as well as the provision that justice is administered solely by courts, mean that the constitutional value is not the issuing of a decision in court, but rather the issuing of a just court decision. The constitutional concept of justice implies not only a formal and nominal justice administered by a court, not only an outward appearance of justice administered by a court, but, most importantly, such court decisions (other final court acts), which are not unjust in terms of content. The justice administered only formally by a court is not the justice which is consolidated in and protected and defended by the Constitution.”

34 . As regards the place of European Union law in the Lithuanian legal system, on 4 December 2008 the Constitutional Court held:

“It also needs to be noted that, under Paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Act ‘ On the Republic of Lithuania ’ s Membership of the European Union ’ , the norms of European Union law shall be a constituent part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania.

... the Constitutional Court [has] held that the Constitution established expressis verbis the rule [concerning what happens when there is a conflict between laws] consolidating the precedence of European Union legal acts in terms of application in cases where provisions of the European Union law arising from the founding Treaties of the European Union compete with legal regulation established in Lithuanian national legal acts (regardless of what their legal force is), save for the Constitution itself (see also the Constitutional Court ’ s rulings of 14 March 2006, 21 December 2006, and 8 May 2007).”

35 . In Item 7 of section I of the reasoning part of its ruling of 21 December 1999, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania stated:

“... the Constitutional Court notes that the system of guarantees of the independence of a judge and the courts does not create any preconditions on the grounds of which a judge could avoid the proper fulfilment of [his or her] duties, investigate cases in a negligent manner, act unethically with persons taking part in a case, and violate human rights and dignity. Judges must protect the honour and prestige of their profession. Therefore, the system of self-regulation and self-government of the judiciary must ensure that judges perform their duties properly, and that all unlawful or unethical behaviour of a judge be properly assessed .”

As regards the possibility of disciplinary liability being imposed on a judge, on 10 March 2014 the Constitutional Court held that the above-mentioned part of its 1999 ruling meant that:

“ the constitutional principle of the independence of judges and courts does not preclude the possibility of imposing disciplinary liability on judges if they evade their duties without justifiable reason and perform their duties inappropriately ( inter alia , by negligently considering cases). However, the mere fact that a higher court, having reviewed under the procedure provided for in procedural laws a decision issued by a judge, amended or rescinded [that decision] due to errors in the interpretation and/or application of the law or breaches of procedural laws made while it was issued, does not mean that [this fact] can serve as a basis for imposing disciplinary liability on a judge and dismissing him or her from office under Item 5 of Article 115 of the Constitution, having recognised that [he or she] has discredited the title of judge by his or her behaviour;

recurrent gross and obvious errors in the construction and/or application of the law, as well as recurrent gross and obvious breaches of procedural laws by a judge while issuing decisions, serve as a basis for (a) a self-governing court institution or institutions with the relevant powers to assess the conduct of a judge in terms of the inappropriate performance of [his or her] duties ( inter alia , the negligent consideration of cases) and [his or her] lack of necessary professional qualifications, impose disciplinary liability on a judge, and recognise that a judge has discredited the title of judge by his or her behaviour. The system of self-regulation and self-government of the judiciary must function in such a manner that preconditions for the dismissal from office of a judge who discredits the title of judge by his or her behaviour would be created.”

2. Other relevant domestic law

36 . The Law on Courts at the relevant time read:

Article 33. The legal sources when hearing the cases ( Bylų nagrinėjimo teisės šaltiniai )

“ 1. When hearing cases, the courts shall be guided by the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, this Law and other laws, international agreements to which the Republic of Lithuania is a party, Government resolutions, [and] other legal acts in force in the Republic of Lithuania which are not in conflict with the laws.

2. When hearing cases, the courts shall also be guided by the officially published decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, and shall take account of the rulings of the Supreme Court published in the bulletin of that court, and the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court published in that court ’ s bulletin.

3 . When hearing cases, the courts shall apply norms of European Union law and be guided by the European Union judicial institutions ’ decisions, as well as the preliminary rulings on matters concerning the interpretation and validity of European Union legal acts.

4. When passing decisions in cases of equivalent categories ( atitinkamų kategorijų bylose ), the courts shall be bound by the rules of legal interpretation created by them in analogous or essentially similar cases. The lower courts, when passing decisions in similar cases, shall be bound by the rules of interpretation formulated by the higher courts in analogous or essentially similar cases. Court practice in cases of equivalent categories must be changed and new rules for legal interpretation in analogous or essentially similar cases may be created only where it is inevitable or objectively necessary.”

COMPLAINTS

37. The applicant complains under Article 10 of the Convention that she was punished for her opinions. She maintains that a disciplinary penalty – a strict reprimand – was imposed on her because of her honesty and her opinions, and because she refused to issue unlawful decisions in particular cases where she expressed her view that the interests of a weaker party in civil proceedings – the consumer – had to be protected.

38. On the basis of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 10, the applicant also complains that she was discriminated against. She points out that on 20 July 2012 she wrote to the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission regarding the actions of the President of the Klaip ė da Regional Court. The applicant also maintains that in the case of another judge, Judge G.V., disciplinary proceedings for negligence at work were not initiated after the Chairman of the Judicial Council received the ruling ( i š ai š kinimas ) of the Constitutional Court. However, in the applicant ’ s case, the Judicial Council proceeded with disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in her receiving a disciplinary sanction.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Has there been an interference with the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression (see Kayasu v. Turkey , nos. 64119/00 and 76292/01, § § 77-81, 13 November 2008, and Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12 , § § 140-142, ECHR 2016 as well as the case-law cited therein )?

Has there been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention on the grounds that a disciplinary punishment – a strict reprimand – was imposed on the applicant? The Court refers to the applicant ’ s argument that she was punished for her opinions when issuing decisions in her capacity as a judge (see, mutatis mutandis , Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, § § 128 ‑ 131, 134 and 135, ECHR 2015 and the case-law cited therein).

2. Has the applicant been discriminated against because of the opinions she expressed in her capacity as a judge, this being in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 10? The Court refers to the applicant ’ s statement that in another judge ’ s case, that of Judge G.V., disciplinary proceedings were discontinued after the Constitutional Court ’ s decision of 10 March 2014 .

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

The parties are requested to provide a copy of the applicant ’ s complaint of 20 July 2012 to the Judges ’ Ethics and Disciplinary Commission, as well as the response of that Commission, together with any other supporting documents.