Communicated on 18 November 2019

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 41655/16 Miloš ANTIĆ against Serbia lodged on 21 July 2016

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The present case concerns the extradition from Serbia of an individual with dual Canadian and Bosnian nationality to the United States of America (“US”), which was carried out in disregard of an interim measure granted by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to stay the applicant ’ s extradition.

The applicant was arrested on 31 July 2015 by the Serbian police when he tried to enter Serbia from Montenegro based on a warrant issued by the New York District Court for alleged smuggling of 5.5 kilos of cocaine into the US, an offence with the penalty range from 10 years imprisonment up to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On 5 July 2016 the Ministry of Justice allowed the applicant ’ s extradition to the US for the purpose of criminal proceedings against him.

The applicant contested his surrender by arguing that it would put him at risk of being sentenced to two life sentences with no possibility for parole, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Following the applicant ’ s request, on 22 July 2016 the Court granted the interim measure ordering Serbia to avert from extraditing the applicant until further notice. The applicant was, however, extradited on 25 July 2016 and is currently detained in the US.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Has the applicant exhausted all effective domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as regards the compatibility with Article 3 of the Convention of the risk of imposition by the judiciary in the United States of a life sentence without the possibility of parole?

2. Was the applicant ’ s extradition to the United States consistent with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see, in particular, Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom , nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07, 17 January 2012; Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Trabelsi v. Belgium , no. 140/10 , ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Lopez Elorza v. Spain , no. 30614/15, 12 December 2017 )? In this connection, did the domestic courts or the Government consider the sentencing practice in the United States of America for the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged? Does the applicant risk under US criminal law, in respect of the relevant charge, the imposition of a maximum penalty of life imprisonment that precludes early release and/or release on parole de jure and de facto and, if so, would that be consistent with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008)? What are the concrete legal mechanisms, if any, under which the applicant may be entitled to request a review of his possible final life sentence? Has the Serbian Government requested or received any assurances from the US regarding the possibility for the applicant to have his possible final life sentence reviewed?

The parties are requested to provide documentary evidence of the relevant sentencing practices of the trial courts in the United States of America in similar proceedings.

3. Given that the applicant was extradited from Serbia notwithstanding an interim measure issued under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on 22 July 2016 , has there been a hindrance on part of the State to the effective exercise of the applicant ’ s right of application, ensured by Article 34 of the Convention (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 128-129, ECHR 2005 ‑ I) ? Was there an objective impediment which prevented compliance with the Court ’ s Rule 39 measure? Did the Government take all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed of the situation (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806/05, § 92, 10 July 2009, and Rrapo v. Albania , no. 58555/10, § 75-88, 25 September 2012)?