Communicated on 17 April 2020 Published on 2 June 2020

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 11/18 Mónica Ileana OLIVARES ZÚÑIGA against Spain lodged on 13 December 2017

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The application concerns the proceedings in which the applicant contested her dismissal from work.

The applicant was dismissed on disciplinary grounds. She then brought judicial proceedings seeking the dismissal to be declared null and void ( nulo ) or, subsidiarily , unfair ( improcedente ). The relevant Labour Court ruled in the applicant ’ s favour (judgment of 24 February 2014). The court declared the dismissal unfair, and ordered the applicant ’ s employer to either readmit the applicant to her previous position or pay her certain compensation for dismissal. The applicant then lodged an appeal seeking the dismissal to be declared null and void (instead of unfair). The High Court of Justice of Madrid dismissed the appeal by a judgment of 5 February 2015. The subsequent appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court.

Ultimately the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, which was declared inadmissible on 29 May 2017 on the ground that the applicant had not duly exhausted domestic remedies because she had not lodged an appeal for annulment ( incidente de nulidad ) provided for in section 241(1) of the Organic Law on the Judiciary.

QUESTION TO THE PARTIES

Did the applicant have a fair trial in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular,

(a) concerning the decision of the Constitutional Court to declare the applicant ’ s appeal inadmissible on the basis that she had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, was the decision arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable? Was the applicant required to lodge an appeal for annulment in accordance with the applicable law?

(b) concerning the judgments of 24 February 2014 and 5 February 2015, were they arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable as regards, in particular, the establishment of the facts of the case and the admissibility and assessment of evidence? Was the principle of equality of arms respected in connection with the distribution of the burden of proof?