Lexploria

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

18 July 1986, the following members being present:

MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President

C.A. NØRGAARD

F. ERMACORA

G. TENEKIDES

S. TRECHSEL

B. KIERNAN

A. WEITZEL

J.C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 27 November 1985 by

B.H. and M.B. against the United Kingdom and registered on 18 February

1986 under file No. 11991/86;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The first applicant Miss Beryl Daphne Hibbs is a British citizen born

in 1933 and is resident in Cambria. She is the clerk of the

management committee of the Meeting for Sufferings of the Religious

Society of Friends, commonly known as the Quakers. The second

applicant Mrs. Maisie Birmingham, a British citizen born in 1914 and

residing in Dorset, is also a member of the management committee of

the Society. She is the former Assistant Clerk. The applicants

present their complaints on behalf of the society as a whole and in

particular on behalf of the employees of the society. The applicants

are represented by Waterhouse and Co, solicitors. The facts as

submitted on behalf of the applicants may be summarised as follows:

It is a fundamental principle of the religious beliefs of the members

of the Society that war and the taking of steps preparatory to war is

contrary to the teachings of Christ and therefore prohibited.

The Society employs staff to carry out its religious purposes at

Friends House, Enston Road, London NW1. Under English law the Society

is required to deduct from its employees' salaries income tax due to

the Inland Revenue.

The applicants, however, on behalf of the Society and in compliance

with their religious beliefs withheld from the Inland Revenue that

proportion of the income tax (estimated at 12%) which would be spent

by the Government on military preparations unless and until the Inland

Revenue agreed to pay those sums into a fund which would not be used

for military purposes.

The amount deducted from the tax due (12%) was placed in a special

account pending advice or assistance from the respondent Government on

how the sums could be paid to the Inland Revenue without breaching the

applicants' religious beliefs.

The Inland Revenue brought an action against the applicants in the

Mayors and City of London County Court for payment of the 12% of the

income tax withheld. The applicants entered a defence relying on the

freedom of conscience of the employees of the Society who had

instructed the applicants, as their agents, to act in the above

manner.

On 22 January 1985 the County Court Judge upheld the Inland Revenue's

claim against the applicants considering that the applicants were

under a statutory duty to make the payments, that the law of agency

did not arise and that the applicants had not disclosed any defence to

the plaintif's claim.

An appeal by the applicants was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on

4 June 1985 and on 17 July 1985 the Appeal Committee of the House of

Lords dismissed a petition by the applicants seeking leave to appeal

as being unfit for an oral hearing.

COMPLAINTS

The applicants claim to be victims of a breach by the Government of

Article 9 (art. 9) of the Convention.

In particular the applicants claim that the legal obligation on them

to pay over to the Inland Revenue income tax which they know will be

used for military purposes

a) limits or restricts or interferes with their right to freedom

of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 para. 1

(art. 9-1) of the Convention and

b) is not necessary in a democratic society for any of the

reasons stated in Article 9 para. 2 (art. 9-2) of the Convention.

The applicants submit that they are aware that the Commission has

already rejected as inadmissible a very similar application, C. v. the

United Kingdom, Application No. 10358/83, on the ground that the

obligation to contribute through taxation to arms procurement does not

constitute an interference with an applicant's rights guaranteed by

Article 9 para. 1 (art. 9-1).

However, the applicants submit that the Commission should revise its

approach. They argue as follows:

Article 9 para. 1 (art. 9-1) recognises that the right to freedom of

religion is a fundamental right and covers the freedom to "manifest"

one's religion or belief in "practice and observance". But because no

society could allow people to do whatever was required by their

religious beliefs, the State is allowed to interfere when the criteria

listed under Article 9 para. 2 (art. 9-2) are fulfilled.

In the circumstances of this case, the State is requiring the

applicants to do something which conflicts with one of the most

central tenets of their faith and belief. The fact that the context

is taxation, or any other general legislation, does not reduce or

affect the nature of that conflict with their religious beliefs and

practices. It should therefore fall on the Government under Article 9

para. 2 (art. 9-2) to show that the interference with their religious

beliefs is justified; otherwise the object and purpose of Article 9

(art. 9) - i.e. to prevent state interference with religious beliefs

and practices unless Article 9 para. 2 (art. 9-2) is satisfied -

would be frustrated .

The applicants argue that here there is no "pressing social need" to

interfere with the religious principles of the applicants who would be

happy to pay taxes in full if the Inland Revenue would place such

funds into an account used for non-militaristic purposes. No reason

has yet been given for this refusal other than administrative

convenience, which is not sufficient for the purposes of Article 9

para. 2 (art. 9-2).

THE LAW

The applicants invoke Article 9 (art. 9) of the Convention in relation

to their complaint that they should not be obliged to pay a portion of

their taxes without an assurance that they will not be applied for

military or related expenditure. Article 9 (art. 9) provides:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief

and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or

private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject

only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in

a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the

protection of public order, health of morals, or for the protection of

the rights and freedoms of others."

The applicants who are Quakers contend that to compel them to

contribute to expenditure for armaments, rather than peaceful

purposes, is an interference with their religious beliefs. It is a

fundamental principle of the religious beliefs of members of the

Society that the waging of war, or the taking of steps to prepare to

wage war, is contrary to the spirit of the teachings of Jesus Christ

and is therefore prohibited. It is therefore their contention that it

is central to the Quaker beliefs of the applicants and the employees

of the Society in practice and observance that the income taxes

collected by the Society on behalf of the Inland Revenue should not be

used for war preparations but should be diverted to different peaceful

purposes.

The Commission recalls that it has previously recognised pacifism as

falling within the ambit of the right to freedom of thought,

conscience and religion (Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, Application

No. 7050/75 Comm. Rep. 12.10.78, DR 19 p. 5). However, the Commission

at the same time has held that the term "practice" in Article 9

para. 1 (art. 9-1) does not cover each act which is motivated or

influenced by a religion or a belief.

The question of whether the obligation to contribute taxes to a

general fund from which armaments are paid for rather than a fund for

peaceful purposes may constitute a violation of Article 9 para. 1

(art. 9-1) has already been considered in two previous cases: see Ross

v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 10295/83, Dec. 14.10.83 and C.

v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 10358/83, Dec. 15.12.83.

In these decisions, the Commission has held:

Article 9 (art. 9) primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs

and religious creeds, i.e. the area which is sometimes called the

forum internum. In addition, it protects acts which are intimately

linked to these attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion which

are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally

recognised form.

However, in protecting this personal sphere, Article 9 (art. 9)

of the Convention does not always guarantee the right to behave in the

public sphere in a way which is dictated by such a belief: for

instance by refusing to pay certain taxes because part of the revenue

so raised may be applied for military expenditure....

The obligation to pay taxes is a general one which has no specific

conscientious implications in itself. Its neutrality in this sense is

also illustrated by the fact that no tax payer can influence or

determine the purpose for which his or her contributions are applied,

once they are collected. Furthermore, the power of taxation is

expressly recognised by the Convention system and is ascribed to the

State by Article 1, First Protocol.

The Commission has examined carefully the arguments submitted by the

applicants but is unable to find any factor to distinguish this

application from those cited above or to lead it to depart from its

previous reasoning. The Commission finds therefore that there has

been no interference with the applicants' rights guaranteed by

Article 9 para. 1 (art. 9-1) of the Convention. It follows that the

complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (J.A. FROWEIN)

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H. ; B. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

H. ; B. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

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