Information Note on the Court’s case-law 231

July 2019

Larrañaga Arando and Others v. Spain (dec.) - 73911/16, 233/17, 3086/17 et al.

Decision 25.6.2019 [Section III]

Article 6

Article 6-2

Presumption of innocence

Compensation claims under legislation for victims of terrorism refused on the basis that deceased had been members of ETA: inadmissible

[This summary also covers the decision in the case of Mart ínez Agirre and Others v. Spain , 75529/16 and 79503/16, 25 June 2019]

Facts – The applicants’ relatives, Spanish nationals, died in France between 1979 and 1985 as a result of attacks allegedly perpetrated by terrorist groups. The applicants were awarded c ompensation payments under Spanish law for their relative’s killings. In 2012, by virtue of a new law, they applied for additional compensation which was refused on the basis that the applicants’ relatives had been members of the terrorist organisation ETA . The applicants complained that the reasons given by the domestic authorities for dismissing their compensation claims under the legislation for victims of terrorism had breached their late relatives’ right to be presumed innocent.

Law – Article 6 § 2: Th ere were two aspects to the protection afforded by the presumption of innocence: a procedural aspect relating to the conduct of the criminal trial, and a second aspect which aimed to protect individuals who had been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in re spect of whom criminal proceedings had been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they were in fact guilty of the offence charged. The second aspect came into play when the criminal proceedings had ended with a resu lt other than a conviction. In order for the second aspect to be applicable to subsequent proceedings, an applicant had to demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings.

In the applicants’ vie w, without their late relatives having previously been proved guilty according to law of being members of ETA, the domestic authorities’ decisions to refuse compensation, including the reasoning and language used therein, were incompatible with the presump tion of innocence. In this connection, what comes into play in the present case is the second aspect of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. As such, the Court had to examine whether there had been a link between any prior criminal proceedings that might have existed against the applicants’ late relatives concerning their alleged membership of ETA and the compensation proceedings brought by the applicants. In that context, the Court had first to examine whether each of the applicants’ late relatives had been “c harged with a criminal offence” for the purposes of their complaint under Article 6 § 2.

In Martínez Agirre and Others the police reports on which the domestic authorities had based their findings had referred to previous criminal investigations opened in Spain in connection with the applicants’ relatives’ involvement in ETA and its activities and crimes. Although it appeared that the arrest warrants had not been enforced because the applicants’ relatives had fled to France, and that they never stood trial in Spain, given that those criminal investigations had related either to membership of ETA or active participation in its crimes and activities, the Court accepted that the applicants’ relatives had been “charged with a criminal offence” within the autono mous meaning of that term and in respect of the criminal charge for which the applicants claimed the protection of the presumption of innocence. The criminal proceedings against the applicants’ late relatives had been discontinued as a result of their deat h.

As to whether there had been a link between the discontinued criminal proceedings and the compensation proceedings, the compensation proceedings had been administrative in nature and aimed at determining whether the applicants had had a right to obtain add itional compensation from the State for the killings of their relatives by terrorist groups. The subject matter of those proceedings was legally and factually different from that of the criminal proceedings or investigations instituted against their relati ves prior to their death for alleged participation or collaboration with ETA.

The relevant legal provisions for claiming compensation did not require that the alleged membership of the person concerned of a criminal or violent organisation be established b y a previous criminal conviction following criminal proceedings. While the police reports on which the domestic authorities had relied on had contained some references to the previous criminal investigations concerning the applicants’ late relatives, those had not been the only elements that had been taken into account for establishing that the latter had been members of ETA. The police reports had also relied on non-official publications allegedly close to the organisation in which the individuals concerne d had been named as being members of ETA, as well as on statements made by other alleged members of the organisation. Therefore, it did not appear that the contents or the outcome of those previous criminal investigations against the applicants’ relatives had been decisive for the impugned proceedings.

In any event, the domestic authorities had not engaged in a review or evaluation of the concrete evidence included in the criminal files against the applicants’ relatives. Nor had they analysed the decisions taken by the investigating authorities in those proceedings or reassessed the applicants’ relatives’ participation in the events leading to the criminal charges at issue. The domestic courts had limited themselves to taking into account, among other elemen ts, the previous criminal investigations instituted against the applicants’ relatives as mentioned in the police reports.

The applicants had not demonstrated the existence of the necessary link between the discontinued criminal proceedings against their r elatives and the compensation proceedings brought by them. It follows that Article 6 § 2 was not applicable to the latter proceedings.

In Larrañaga Arando and Others , where the applicants’ late relatives had not been subject to any formal criminal investigation, it followed that there had been no “criminal charge” within the meaning of the Court’s case-law. The right to be presumed innocent under Article 6 § 2 arose o nly in connection with the particular offence “charged”.

Also, where the applicants’ relatives had not been “charged” with the same criminal offence in respect of which the applicants had claimed the protection of the presumption of innocence, it also fol lowed that there had been no “criminal charge”.

Finally, where the applicant’s relatives had been previously convicted of an equivalent charge to that in respect of which the applicants had claimed the protection of the presumption of innocence, Article 6 § 2 could not apply in respect of that charge in the context of the compensation proceedings at issue.

Conclusion : inadmissible (incompatible ratione materiae ).

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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