THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 31350/09 Vladimir Petrovich VASILYEV against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 21 February 2017 as a Committee composed of:

Luis López Guerra, President, Dmitry Dedov, Branko Lubarda, judges, and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 May 2009,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Vladimir Petrovich Vasilyev, is a Russian national who was born in 1946 and lives in Cheboksary, the Chuvash Republic. He was represented before the Court by Mr A.M. Tarasov, a lawyer practising in Kugesi, the Chuvash Republic.

2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr. G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

Initial judgment debt

4 . In 2003 the applicant was employed as the head of the Chuvashagroprompuskonaladka State Unitary Company ( ГУП « Чувашагропромпусконаладка » – “the company”) which belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Chuvash Republic. The company provided construction and installation services in Chuvashiya.

5. In August 2003 the government of Chuvashiya adopted a privatisation plan, concerning, among other entities, the company.

6 . On 31 March 2004 an audit was compiled for the purposes of payment of salaries to the company ’ s employees. According to the audit, the debt in respect of the applicant was equivalent to 1,271 euros (EUR).

7. On 12 August 2004 for the purpose of transfer of assets and debts of the company to A., a limited company, a transfer contract was drafted. The company ’ s debt in respect of salary arrears was reflected in the audit of 12 August 2004.

8 . On 10 December 2004 the Property Fund of the Chuvash Republic, a Republic Specialised State Institution (« Республиканское специализированное государственное учреждение « Фонд имущества Чувашской республики » ) sold the entirety of the company ’ s assets and debts to A.

9. On 15 July 2005 the local authorities registered A. ’ s title to the assets transferred from the company.

10. On 1 August 2005 the Justice of the Peace of the 2nd Court Circuit of the Cheboksarskiy District of the Chuvash Republic ordered the company to pay the applicant EUR 4,674 in salary arrears for the period between February 2003 and June 2005. The court order was based on a certificate signed by the applicant and by the company ’ s chief accountant. The award took effect ten days later.

11 . On 9 August A. suggested that the applicant provide documents for the purposes of payment of the court award. According to the Government, the applicant failed to do so.

12. On 11 August 2005 the applicant was dismissed.

13 . On 24 August 2005 the Bailiffs ’ Service opened enforcement proceedings. According to the Government, on 15 September 2005 the bailiffs received a statement from the applicant requesting the return of the writ of execution to him without enforcement. On 16 September 2005 the bailiff granted the applicant ’ s request and terminated the enforcement proceedings.

14. As of 11 July 2006 an entry regarding the company ’ s liquidation was made in the State Register of Legal Entities.

B. Relevant domestic law

15. The relevant provisions and case-law governing unitary companies with the right of economic control are described in the judgments of Liseytseva and Maslov v. Russia (no s . 39483/05 and 40527/10 , §§ 54-127, 9 October 2014) and Samsonov v. Russia ((dec.) no. 2880/10, 16 September 2014).

COMPLAINTS

16. The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 1 August 2005.

THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of non ‑ enforcement of the judgements

17. The applicant complained of the non-enforcement of the decision given in his favour on 1 August 2005 . He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which read as follows :

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The Government

18. The Government argued that the judgment in the applicant ’ s favour had been issued against a unitary company, which had been a commercial organisation and had operated independently from the authorities . They accordingly submitted that its debts were not attributable to the State.

19. The Government accepted that the decision to privatise the company had been taken by a State organ. However, the State had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that salary arrears would be paid to all the employees. For this purpose, not only had the assets been transferred to A., but also the company ’ s debts (see paragraph 8 above), as recorded in the audit of 31 March 2004 . The applicant had been the company ’ s managing ‑ director until 11 August 2005, and it had been his duty to ensure that the company ’ s debts in respect of salary arrears had been accurately reflected in the relevant documents. It had also been the applicant ’ s duty to ensure that salary arrears had been paid to all the company ’ s employees. Lastly, as managing-director he could have taken steps to execute the court award of 1 August 2005 in his favour.

20. Furthermore, the impossibility of enforcing the court order had been due to the applicant ’ s own omissions. He had failed to produce the documents requested from him by A. to effect the payment (see paragraph 11 above). Moreover, he had requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated without the court order having been executed (see paragraph 13 above). The bailiffs had not had the opportunity to take any measures to force the debtor company to enforce the court order. Therefore the authorities had taken all reasonable and relevant measures to ensure the execution of the court order.

21. The Government further submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. In particular, he had not complained about the bailiffs ’ decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings, or sued A. for payment of the judgment debt.

(b) The applicant

22. The applicant maintained that the debtor company had been, in fact, a State ‑ run company controlled by the authorities and that the State was responsible for the company ’ s debts. He also submitted that after A. ’ s title to the assets transferred from the company had been registered on 15 July 2005, he had not in fact been able to use the company ’ s property to execute the court awards against it, despite the fact that formally he remained the company ’ s managing-director until his dismissal on 11 August 2005.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) General principles

23. The Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia , no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002 ‑ III). It has been the Court ’ s constant position that a person who has obtained a judgment against the State should not be expected to bring separate enforcement proceedings (see Metaxas v. Greece , no. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004). In such cases, the defendant State authority must be duly notified of the judgment and is thus well placed to take all necessary initiatives to comply with it or to transmit it to another competent State authority responsible for execution. This is particularly relevant in a situation where, in view of the complexities and possible overlap of the execution and enforcement procedures, an applicant may have reasonable doubts about which authority is responsible for the execution or enforcement of the judgment (see Akashev v. Russia , no. 30616/05, § 21, 12 June 2008, and Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) , no. 33509/04, § 68 , ECHR 2009) . Consequently, the Court held that the burden to ensure compliance with a judgment against the State lies primarily with the State authorities starting from the date on which the judgment becomes binding and enforceable ( Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 69 ).

24. At the same time, the Court has accepted that a successful litigant may be required to undertake certain procedural steps in order to recover the judgment debt (see Shvedov v. Russia , no. 69306/01, § 32, 20 October 2005) . Accordingly, it is not unreasonable that the authorities ask the applicant to produce additional documents, such as bank details, to allow or speed up the execution of a judgment ( see, mutatis mutandis , Kosmidis and Kosmidou v. Greece , no. 32141/04, § 24, 8 November 2007, and Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 69). The creditor ’ s uncooperative behaviour may be an obstacle to timely enforcement of a judgment, thus alleviating the authorities ’ responsibility for delays ( see Belayev v. Russia (dec.), 36020/02, 22 March 2011 ). The requirement of the creditor ’ s cooperation must not, however, go beyond what is strictly necessary and, in any event, does not relieve the authorities of their obligation under the Convention to take timely action of their own motion, on the basis of the information available to them, with a view to honouring the judgment against the State (see Akashev , cited above, § 22, and Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 69 ).

(b) Application to the present case

25. The Court has held that the existing legal framework in Russia does not provide unitary companies with a degree of institutional and operational independence that would absolve the State from responsibility under the Convention for the debts of such companies (see Liseytseva and Maslov , cited above, §§ 193-204). In order to determine the issue of State responsibility for the debts of unitary companies the Court must examine whether and how the extensive powers of control provided for in domestic law were actually exercised by the authorities in a particular case.

26. However, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether the company ’ s debts were attributable to the State in the present case since, even assuming they were, the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

27. The Court notes that A. took steps to execute the court award in the applicant ’ s favour and requested documents from the applicant to secure payment. According to the information provided by the Government and undisputed by the applicant, the latter failed to do so (see paragraph 11 above).

28. Furthermore, the impossibility of enforcing the court order was due to the applicant ’ s own request to terminate the enforcement proceedings without the court order having been executed (see paragraph 13 above). The bailiffs did not have the opportunity to take any measures to force the debtor company to enforce the court order.

29. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicant ’ s behaviour in the present case was an obstacle to enforcement of the judgments in his favour . Consequently, the authorities cannot be held responsible under the Convention for the non-enforcement of those judgments.

30. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention

B. Other complaints

31. The Court observes that the applicant complained under Article 4 § 2 that he had been subjected to forced labour because the judicial award made in respect of salary arrears has not been paid to him to date.

32. Having regard to all the evidence in its possession, and to the extent that it has power to examine the allegations, the Court does not find any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by those provisions. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 16 March 2017 .

FatoÅŸ Aracı Luis López Guerra              Deputy Registrar President