FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 25175/15 JÚLIUS PERESZLÉNYI-SERVIS TV-VIDEO against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 25 May 2021 as a Committee composed of:

Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President, Erik Wennerström, Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges, and Attila Tepl á n , Acting Deputy S ection Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 13 May 2015,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant is a self-employed entrepreneur, operating under the business name of Július Pereszlényi - Servis TV - Video. He is a Slovak national, who was born in 1960 and has his business seat in Šúrovo. He was represented before the Court by Mr J. Fiala, a lawyer practising in Budapest (Hungary).

2 . The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková, who was succeeded by their co-Agent, Ms M. Bálintová.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . One of the applicant ’ s businesses is video production. In 2010 he acquired a licence for broadcasting in cable networks in the town of Štúrovo. The population of the area predominantly have Hungarian as their mother tongue.

5 . Under the State Language Act (Law no. 270/1995 Coll., as amended), television broadcasting on the territory of Slovakia is to be in the Slovak language, subject to exemptions and conditions set out in section 5 of the Act. Of the existing exceptions and conditions, those under section 5(1)(a) of the Act are relevant to the present case, under which broadcasting in a different than the Slovak language is allowed, if it is subtitled in Slovak or followed by broadcasting of the same programme in the Slovak language.

6 . Under section 16(3)(e) of the Broadcasting and Retransmission Act (Law no. 308/2000 Coll., as amended – “the Broadcasting Act”), it is the broadcaster who is liable to ensure respect for the rules concerning the use of the State language mentioned above.

7 . On 6 July 2012 a TV channel operated by the applicant broadcast a news item featuring comments in the Hungarian language, without subtitles in Slovak and without being followed by a broadcast of the same programme in Slovak. This brought the applicant under investigation by the National Broadcasting Council ( Rada pre vysielanie a retransmísiu ), the country ’ s broadcasting regulatory body. In the proceedings, the applicant produced no defence, despite having repeatedly been invited to do so.

8 . On 26 February 2013 the Council found the applicant in breach of inter alia section 16(3)(e) of the Broadcasting Act. When it came to sanction, it noted that he had already been found in breach of the same rule in the past and that, on that occasion, he had been sanctioned by a reprimand (that decision having become final and binding on 7 May 2012). The breach of 6 July 2012 was accordingly a repeated breach, in which case section 64(2) of the Broadcasting Act made it mandatory for the sanction to be a fine, within a scale of 165 to 6,638 Euros (EUR), as defined in section 67(2)(k) of the Broadcasting Act. In view of all the circumstances, the amount of fine of EUR 165 was adequate, and s uch was the fine imposed on him.

9 . On 8 April 2013 the applicant challenged the decision of 26 February 2013 by way of an administrative-law appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing an error in law in that the impugned commentary was protected by copyright and he had accordingly been entitled to broadcast it without subtitles. Under section 64 § 7 of the Broadcasting Act, the appeal automatically suspended the effect of the contested decision.

10 . On 15 May 2014 the applicant made a supplementary submission to the Supreme Court, stating that the impugned decision and the legal provisions on which it rested had interfered with his rights under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention. In particular, he acknowledged that the impugned legislation served legitimate aims, but argued that it was not proportionate to those aims since there were less intrusive mans of pursuing them. Furthermore, he contended that while the legal provisions in question protected the interests of the majority population, there was no equivalent protection to those of national and language minorities.

11 . In a judgment of 21 May 2014, following a hearing held on the same day, the Supreme Court upheld the decision under review.

It noted that the dispute concentrated on whether the copyright rules provided the applicant with any licence to broadcast the contested material without subtitles or being followed by the broadcasting of the same programme in Slovak, contrary to the requirements of the Broadcasting Act, in conjunction with the State Language Act. It concluded that such suggestion was purely self-serving and had no basis in law. The contested decision was in all aspects lawful and consistent with facts and with the Council ’ s role to ensure lawfulness and respect for the interests of the public in broadcasting, in view of which the essential consideration was the breach of the applicable rules and not the reasons behind it. The judgment takes no specific note of the submission of 15 May 2014 and no response to the arguments raised in it.

12 . On 30 July 2014 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, challenged the Council ’ s decision of 26 February 2013 and the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 21 May 2014 by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution to the Constitutional Court.

13 . He alleged a violation of his rights under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention by both the Council and the Supreme Court and under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention by the latter.

In particular, he argued that he had been sanctioned for the having realised his right to freedom of expression and that, accordingly, there had been an interference with that right. Accepting that it was in accordance with the law, he contended that it did not serve a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society for its achievement. Moreover, the law was discriminatory in that it provided for the subtitling or dubbing of programmes in minority languages to Slovak, but not vice versa .

In addition, by failing to take any position on the arguments in his submission of 15 May 2014, the Supreme Court had failed to support its judgment by a reasoning compatible with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

14 . On 14 April 2015 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible.

15 . It noted that the review of the decision of the Council fell within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which excluded its direct review by the Constitutional Court by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity.

16 . As for the applicant ’ s objection with regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant himself had acknowledged in his constitutional complaint that that judgment was in accordance with the applicable law and that the essence of his complaint rested on his analysis of the applicable statutory provisions. However, it was established in the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law that, in the framework of the proceedings on an individual complaint, it had no power to review the validity of statutes. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the given part of the complaint.

17 . Lastly, in relation to the applicant ’ s challenge to the reasoning behind the Supreme Court ’ s judgment, the Constitutional Court found that the way how the latter had examined the case and reasoned its judgment had been free from any arbitrariness and compatible with all the requirements of fairness applicable. As to the matter of the specific arguments in the submission of 15 May 2014, the Constitutional Court reiterated that it was not for the courts to respond to all the arguments raised by the parties but only to those which were of substantial importance for the resolution of the case. The objection was accordingly manifestly ill-founded.

18 . The Constitutional Court ’ s decision was not amenable to appeal.

19 . Under Article 144 § 1 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended):

“In the discharge of their functions, judges shall be independent, and, in decision-making, they shall be bound only by the Constitution, constitutional law, international treaties under Article 7 § 5 [of the Constitution], and statute.”

20 . Pursuant to the relevant part of section 2(3) of the Judges and Assessor Judges Act (Law no. 385/2000 Coll., as amended):

“In the discharge of their duties, judges shall be independent; in their decision-making they shall be bound only the Constitution [...], constitutional statute, international treaties under Article 7 § ...5 [of the Constitution], and statute...”

21 . In that context, the relationship between international human rights treaties and statute in case of conflict is defined in Article 7 § 5 of the Constitution as follows:

“International treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms .... which have been ratified and promulgated in the manner required by statute shall take precedence over statute.”

22 . Nevertheless, by virtue of a presumption of constitutionality of statutes, organs of application of law, including the ordinary courts, are bound to consider a statute in force as valid until the Constitutional Court rules otherwise (see, for example, a constitutional judgement of 2 March 2016, case no. PL. ÚS 2/2016).

23 . It has been the Constitutional Court ’ s long-established practice that neither Article 127, which provides for the individual-complaint procedure, nor any other provision of the Constitution provides the basis for individuals to challenge legislation as being incompatible with the Constitution or with international instruments, including the Convention (see, for example, decision of 7 November 2007, case no. IV. ÚS 287/07).

24 . Under an amendment, which was adopted on 9 December 2020 (Constitutional Law no. 422/2020 Coll.), paragraph 5 has been added to Article 127, providing that:

“A complaint under paragraph 1 may be accompanied by an application for the Chamber of the Constitutional Court [in charge of examining that complaint] to initiate proceedings under Article 125 § 1 [of the Constitution] for the review of the compatibility of [the statute that is applicable in the matter at hand] with the Constitution, constitutional statute, international treaties under Article 7 § 5 [of the Constitution]... If the Chamber [in question] finds the application well founded, it shall stay the proceedings [on the individual complaint] and file a motion for the proceedings under Article 125 § 1 [of the Constitution]. The legal views of the Constitutional Court presented in a decision on that motion shall be binding for the [given] Chamber.”

25 . The amendment is due to enter into force on 1 January 2025.

COMPLAINTS

26 . The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings had been unfair in that the Supreme Court had failed to respond to his arguments concerning the alleged violation of his rights under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention.

27 . He also and separately complained that sanctioning him as he had been for the broadcasting in question had been contrary to his rights under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention, while the underlying statutory rules constituted an additional and separate violation of his rights under these provisions.

THE LAW

28 . The applicant alleged that the proceedings lacked in fairness within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

29 . The Government pointed out that the applicant ’ s appeal (8 April 2013) against the Council ’ s decision (26 February 2013) was subject to a fifteen days ’ time-limit since the service of that decision and that the supplement of that appeal (15 May 2014) had been filed more than a year later. They further submitted that, in any event, the applicant ’ s objections against the Supreme Court ’ s judgment (21 May 2014) had duly been examined by the Constitutional Court (14 April 2015). In their submission, the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.

30 . The applicant opposed any suggestion that his submission of 15 May 2014 had been belated and considered that the Constitutional Court ’ s response to his arguments had been inadequate.

31 . The Court considers that it is not necessary to take a definitive stance as to the timeliness of the applicant ’ s submission of 15 May 2014 because, even assuming that it was lodged in time, the relevant part of the application is in any event inadmissible on the following grounds.

32 . It notes that the core of the applicant ’ s case is his allegation of a violation of his rights under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention in connection with the Council ’ s decision finding that he had violated the applicable rules by failing to ensure subtitles on or a subsequent broadcast of a dubbed version of a broadcasting in a different than the Slovak language and imposing a sanction on him. The applicability of the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has not been discussed by the parties. However, for the purposes of the subsequent analysis, the Court is prepared to accept that the proceedings concerning the application of the said substantive rules fell within the sphere of application of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

33 . As to the applicant ’ s specific complaint, the Court observes that his defence against the Council ’ s decision consisted of two lines of argument.

First, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the impugned lack of subtitles had been justified by operation of the copyright rules. This argument was dismissed by the Supreme Court and at no subsequent point has the applicant taken any issue with that.

His second line of argument, pursued in the supplement of his appeal as well as the ensuing constitutional complaint, was that the law in question was contrary to his substantive Convention rights as specified above. This is clear not only from the formulation of the supplement and the constitutional complaint, but also from his own acceptance in the latter that the Council ’ s decision was in accordance with the applicable law and from the context as described in the subsequent paragraph.

34 . In particular, the Council ’ s decision contained two essential rulings, namely, that the applicant had been in breach of the applicable rules and that he was ordered to pay a fine.

The first of these rulings was based on the provision of the State Language Act (that programmes in other than the Slovak language such as those in the present cases must be subtitled of followed by the broadcasting of the same programme in Slovak) and the Broadcasting Act (that it is the broadcaster who is to ensure respect of the former rule). At no stage has there been any argument as to how these rules were interpreted and applied.

The second of these rulings was based on the provisions of the Broadcasting Act that, in the event of a repeated breach of the above rules, as it was in the applicant ’ s case, the penalty had to be a fine of at least 165 Euros, as it was precisely in the applicant ’ s case. At no stage has there been any argument that this type of a penalty was inappropriate or that the amount of the fine was excessive.

35 . It follows from the above that, irrespective of how it is presented, the actual point of the applicant ’ s contention is the state of law, imposing the duty to subtitle or accompany with a dubbed version programmes as he broadcast on 6 July 2012 and providing for legal consequences for its breach.

36 . In that regard, however, the Court reiterates that the provision relied on, that is to say, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, does not in itself guarantee ratione materiae any particular content for (civil) “rights and obligations” in the Contracting States (see Gustafsson v. Sweden , 25 April 1996, § 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ II).

37 . It may accordingly be questioned whether that provision at all applied to the applicant ’ s specific complaint. In view of the scope of his subsequent constitutional complaint, it is likewise unclear whether the complaint has been submitted within the six-month time-limit (in that respect see the analysis below in relation to the complaints under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention).

38 . Be it as it may, to the extent the applicant presents his Article 6 § 1 complaint as one of the lack of adequate reasoning, the Court reiterates that according to its established case-law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999 ‑ I). Without requiring a detailed answer to every argument advanced by the complainant, this obligation presupposes that parties to judicial proceedings can expect to receive a specific and explicit reply to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of those proceedings (see, among other authorities, Ruiz Torija v. Spain , 9 December 1994, §§ 29-30, Series A no. 303 ‑ A; Higgins and Others v. France , 19 February 1998, §§ 42-43, Reports 1998 ‑ I).

39 . As to the judicial answer that the applicant received at the domestic level to his arguments of 15 May 2014, the Court notes first of all that the Supreme Court dealing with his administrative-law appeal was bound to apply international human-rights treaties along with the national statutory law and that, in principle, the former have precedence over the latter in a case of conflict (see paragraphs 19 , 20 and 21 above). However, as to the operation of those rules, unless and until the national statute in question was annulled by the Constitutional Court, it was a valid law for the Supreme Court (see paragraph 22 above).

40 . It is true that the Supreme Court gave the applicant ’ s arguments of 15 May 2014 no specific answer, limiting itself to noting that in view of the Council ’ s mandate the essential consideration was the breach of the applicable rules and not the reasons behind it. However, in response to the applicant ’ s complain, the Constitutional Court acknowledged those arguments and added what may be understood as a conclusion that those arguments were not of relevance such as to call for a separate answer. Agreeing or disagreeing with these reasons is a matter of substance going beyond the material scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In view of it as well as the Supreme Court ’ s own rules on applicable law, the answer the applicant received cannot be seen as incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

41 . In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant ’ s right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The compla i nt under that provision is thus in any event manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

42 . The applicant alleged a violation of his rights under Article 10, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, as a result of being sanctioned for having breached the applicable rules. In addition, he claimed that those rules by themselves constituted an additional and separate violation of his rights. The provisions in question read as follows:

Article 10

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

Article 14

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

43 . The Government contended that the applicant in fact sought to challenge the applicable law. There was no effective remedy before the Constitutional Court in that respect, as demonstrated by its decision of 14 April 2015. In such circumstances, the six-month time-limit had commenced at the latest when he had been granted his broadcasting licence (2010). His application (2015) was accordingly clearly out of time.

44 . The applicant replied as follows. As regards the alleged violation consisting of the specific instance of application the contested law to him, since he had been specifically affected by it, he had been bound to provide the domestic courts with an opportunity to remedy the situation. They and especially the Supreme Court had had the power under Article 7 § 5 of the Constitution to favour international human rights over the applicable statute in the event of a conflict. The final decision in that respect had been given by the Constitutional Court on 14 April 2015. The application had thus been introduced (13 May 2015) in time. Moreover, in so far as the contested legislation itself constituted a separate violation of his rights, it was still in force and the six-month time ‑ limit had not even commenced.

45 . The Court notes at the outset that the Government ’ s objection is one of a failure to respect the six-month time-limit. However, on the specific facts, this objection is directly linked to the matter of effectiveness of any remedies the applicant has had at his disposal at the domestic level for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Both of these notions in turn correlate with the applicant ’ s claim that the law itself amounts to a separate violation of his rights under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention.

46 . The Court considers it appropriate to address first the allegation that the contested legislation as such constitutes a violation of the applicant ’ s rights. In that respect, it reiterates that, in order to be able to lodge a petition by virtue of Article 34, a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals must be able to claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. In order to claim to be a victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure: the Convention does not envisage the bringing of an actio popularis for the interpretation of the rights it contains or permit individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention. However, it is open to a person to contend that a Law violates his rights, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if he is required either to modify his conduct or risks being prosecuted or if he is a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation (see, for example, Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 104, ECHR 2010, with further references).

47 . The applicant in the present case is a holder of a licence to broadcast television programmes in cable networks at a local level. As such, by virtue of the Broadcasting Act, he is liable to ensure respect for the rules laid down in the State Language Act in relation to TV broadcasting.

48 . However, on the facts, the applicant has provided no elements enabling to assess what if any concrete impact this legislation has had on him, other than in the context of the Council ’ s decision of 26 February 2013 contested in the present case. From the contents of that decision, it can be established that there had been one previous instance of application of those rules, in a decision that became final on 7 May 2012 (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant has however neither relied on that decision nor provided any indication whatsoever as to his broadcasting other than the impugned programme of 9 July 2012. To the extent that the application has been substantiated, therefore, there is no indication that the law in question itself constitutes a violation of the applicant ’ s rights under the Convention provisions invoked.

49 . As to the programme of 9 July 2012, the law has had a concrete impact on the applicant in that, in its decision of 26 February 2013, the Council found him in breach of that law and imposed a sanction on him. It must then accordingly be ascertained whether, in the circumstances, the applicant had at his disposal any effective remedies against the decision of 26 February 2013 for the Convention purposes.

50 . Under the applicable procedural rules, the review of that decision fell withing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, upon an administrative ‑ law appeal by the party concerned.

51 . The applicant ’ s administrative-law appeal automatically suspended the effect of the contested decision (see paragraph 9 above). Of the arguments advanced before the Supreme Court, those taking an issue with the applicable law are of relevance to the applicant ’ s complaints before the Court (see paragraphs 10 and 33 above).

52 . In that respect, the Court reiterates first of all that Article 13, which has a close affinity with the rule of exhaustion of effective domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports 1996 ‑ IV), does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State ’ s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority (see Gustafsson , cited above, § 70, with further references).

53 . Nevertheless, as already noted, when dealing with the appeal in this case, the Supreme Court was to apply inter alia international human-rights treaties, along with the national statutory law, the former having in principle precedence over the latter in the event of a conflict. However, as also already noted, in practice the national statute was a valid law for the Supreme Court unless and until annulled by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 37 above).

54 . It has neither been suggested nor established otherwise that the Supreme Court had any power to disregard or otherwise arrive at not applying the applicable national statute. Thus, when it comes to an ordinary court, the rule on precedence of international human rights treaties (Article 7 § 5 of the Constitution) appears to be of relevance in particular with a view to ensuring, in so far as possible, an interpretation and application of the existing statutes in compliance with those treaties (see Babylonová v. Slovakia , no. 69146/01, § 19, ECHR 2006 ‑ VIII).

55 . In the given circumstances, it cannot be excluded, as a matter of principle, that an administrative ‑ law appeal in a context as in the present case may amount to a remedy compatible with the requirement of effectiveness within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Court however finds that it is not necessary to give this question a definitive answer on the facts of the present case because, even assuming that the answer is affirmative, for the reasons laid out below the application is in any event inadmissible as being belated.

56 . In that respect, the Court notes that, after the judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 May 2014, the applicant further pursued his cause before the Constitutional Court by way of an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution.

57 . In situations where as in the present case the alleged violation is closely linked to the applicable law itself, it has found in the past that, to the extent that the applicant might be understood as considering unlawful or erroneous the ordinary courts ’ decisions in their case, it was open to them to seek redress before the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 127 of the Constitution, which was a remedy to be exhausted for the purposed of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention since its enactment with effect from 1 January 2002. However, to the extent that they could be understood as alleging that the breach of their rights resulted from the way in which the law governed the given matter, they had no remedy at her disposal in that respect since the Constitutional Court considered itself as not having jurisdiction to examine a complaint lodged by natural or legal persons when the determination of the point in issue involved the preliminary question of conflict of legal rules (see Jenisová v. Slovakia , no. 58764/00, §§ 58-60, 3 November 2009; and also Babylonová , cited above, § 44; and L.G.R. and A.P.R. v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 1349/12, § 55, 13 May 2014, with further references).

58 . It is true that, formally speaking, the relevant part of the applicant ’ s constitutional complaint in this case was directed against the Supreme Court ’ s decision. However, in terms of content, his argument under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention essentially was that the law in question lacked any legitimate aim, was not necessary, and was discriminatory (see paragraph 13 above). In its decision of 14 April 2015, the Constitutional Court pointed out specifically that the applicant himself had acknowledged that the challenged decision was in accordance with the applicable statute, and found that he was in fact seeking to bring a challenge to the law itself, which he had no standing to do (see paragraph 16 above).

59 . The Court for its part notes not only the nature of the applicant ’ s arguments before the Constitutional Court, which are indeed directly concerned with the applicable law, but also the absence of any complaints as to interpretation or the application of that law and the exercise of any discretionary power by the Board or the Supreme Court (see paragraph 34 above). It is in particular the latter aspect of this case that distinguishes it from Orange Slovensko, a. s. v. Slovakia ((dec.), no. 43983/02, 24 October 2006). There, the matter at stake was a determination by an administrative body of the scope of a duty imposed by a statute, while the latter as such was not being contested by the applicant company.

60 . In view of the above, the Court finds no room for disagreeing with the Constitutional Court that, in the guise of his constitutional complaint, the applicant was in fact seeking to pursue a matter to which he had no standing before that court. The applicant did so, despite being represented by a lawyer (see paragraph 12 above), and despite the rules on standing having since long been well established (see paragraph 23 above). The fundamental character of those rules has recently been confirmed by the adoption of a constitutional amendment for their change, with the date of entry into force set well in the future (see paragraph 24 above).

61 . Accordingly, the Court cannot but to conclude that in relation to the object of the applicant ’ s complaints before the Court under Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention, a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution was not an effective remedy to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Therefore, even assuming that his appeal to the Supreme Court was such a remedy, and that consequently the Supreme Court ’ s judgment (21 May 2014) was the final decision for the purposes of the six ‑ month rule, the complaints under those provisions have been introduced (13 May 2015) out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 17 June 2021 .

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Attila Tepl á n Krzysztof Wojtyczek Acting Deputy Registrar President