FOURTH SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 34221/96 by D.P. against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section ), sitting on 6 April 2000 as a Chamber composed of

Mr M. Pellonpää, President , Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo, Mr L. Caflisch, Mr J. Makarczyk, Mr V. Butkevych, Mr J. Hedigan, Mrs S. Botoucharova, judges ,

and Mr V. Berger , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 2 September 1996 and registered on 18 December 1996,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Polish national, born in 1965 and living in Wrocław , Poland.

A. Particular circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

On 16 June 1995 the applicant was taken into custody by the police. On 17 June 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki ) dismissed his complaint about placing him in police custody.

On 17 June 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor ( Prokurator Wojewódzki ) charged the applicant with aggravated fraud and remanded him in custody. The charges related to a period between 30 January and 3 March 1995 when the applicant, together with his accomplices, allegedly defrauded several individuals and businesses by obtaining from them under false pretences cash, automobiles, furniture, computers and other goods of a total value of PLN 1,050,000. In addition, the applicant was charged with possession of a forged passport. The Regional Prosecutor considered that the applicant’s detention on remand was warranted by the fact that he was charged with several criminal acts which caused significant danger to society ( stopień społecznego niebezpieczeństwa jest znaczny ) , as he had acted within a criminal organisation and had obtained valuable goods. In addition, the applicant’s criminal activity took place over a long time and it was probable that if released he would collude and try to destroy evidence.

On 10 July 1995 the applicant requested the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor to release him from detention. On 12 July 1995 the Regional Prosecutor rejected the request. He dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s claims that poor health and financial situation of his family required his release. Moreover, the applicant’s contention that his ill-health called for release would be decided after a panel of medical experts examined him.

On 24 and 26 July 1995 the applicant again requested the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor to release him from detention. On 26 July 1995 his requests were dismissed. The Regional Prosecutor relied on a medical opinion issued by the Wrocław Prison Hospital, which stated that the applicant could remain in detention. In addition, he considered that since the applicant’s daughter and his de facto spouse lived with the latter’s parents, there was no need for him to be released to care for them.

On 2 August 1995 the applicant lodged a request for release from detention. On 4 August 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor rejected his request. The prosecutor referred to the medical opinion of 19 July 1995, which confirmed that the applicant’s state of health allowed the continuation of his detention. Furthermore, he considered that the fact that the applicant’s daughter had recently received medical treatment in the infant pathology ward of the Wrocław Regional Hospital did not constitute a ground for the applicant’s release. The prosecutor also pointed out that the applicant’s de facto spouse cared for his daughter.

On 9 August 1995 the Wrocław Appellate Prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Prosecutor’s decision of 26 July 1995. The Appellate Prosecutor considered that the evidence showed that the applicant had committed the criminal offences with which he was charged. Moreover, the state of health of his daughter did not require that he be released. The prosecutor was also of a view that the applicant’s detention was necessary to ensure the proper course of proceedings.

On 23 August 1995 the applicant lodged with the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny ) a complaint about his detention. On 31 August 1995 the court transmitted it to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor to consider it as a request to change the preventive measure applied to the applicant. On 1 September 1995 the prosecutor rejected the request. He dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s claims that his own state of health as well as that of several members of his family required his release from detention. In this connection, the prosecutor referred to medical opinions, which stated that the applicant was neither mentally ill nor retarded and that his detention would not cause any risk to his health and life. Furthermore, he considered that the investigation of the applicant’s claim that his detention constituted a hardship for his family had showed that it was unsubstantiated.

On 6 September 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki ) allowed the request submitted by the prosecution service and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 30 November 1995. The court considered that the evidence collected in the case sufficiently supported the charges laid against the applicant. It also relied on the significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences in question and the necessity to ensure the proper course of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the investigation of the case would have to be continued in order to clarify the applicant’s role in the commission of the criminal offences and to identify individuals who would be charged with receiving stolen goods from the applicant. Finally, the court considered that the applicant’s case did not disclose any of the grounds for release from detention listed in Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e. danger to the detainee’s life or health and extreme hardship caused to either the detainee or his family. On 6 October 1995 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Regional Court.

On 30 December 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor filed with the Wrocław Regional Court a bill of indictment against the applicant.

On 31 January 1996 the applicant asked the Wrocław Regional Court to release him from detention. On 5 February 1996 the court dismissed his request. It relied on the significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged and the evidence on which they were based. The court was also of the view that the applicant’s family did not suffer hardship which would justify his release.

On 19 April 1996 the applicant requested the Wrocław Regional Court to release him from detention. On 25 April 1996 the court dismissed his request. It referred to the previous court decisions refusing his requests for release. Moreover, the court considered that the claim that the applicant’s father suffered hardship was unsubstantiated.

On 6 and 20 May 1996 the applicant filed with the Wrocław Prison complaints that he was detained together with smoking individuals. He requested that he be transferred to another cell. The applicant also pointed out that in October 1995 his similar request had been allowed and he had been transferred to another cell.

The first hearing in the applicant’s case was held on 15 May 1996. It was adjourned because of the failure of one of the defendants to attend it.

On 16 May 1996 the applicant requested the Wrocław Regional Court to release him from detention. On 30 May 1996 the court dismissed his request. It relied on the significant danger to society caused by the criminal offences with which the applicant was charged and the evidence on which they were based. The court further considered that the applicant’s detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings. In addition, it observed that the applicant’s failure to pay child support did not warrant his release, as one of his children was in receipt of child support payments from the Child Support Fund ( Fundusz Alimentacyjny ) .

On 25 June 1996 the President of the Criminal Section of the Wrocław Regional Court replied to the applicant’s complaint about the unreasonable length of court proceedings in his case. The President pointed out that a hearing fixed for 15 May 1996 had been cancelled because one of the defendants had been ill. The next hearing was fixed for 31 July 1996, as none of the judges dealing with the applicant’s case was available before that date. The President was of the view that the case did not disclose an unjustified delay. In this connection, he pointed out that the case was complicated. Moreover, the applicant himself had contributed to the delay by filing numerous requests for release from detention and complaints about the decisions of the trial court. As a result of those complaints, the case file had been transmitted on numerous occasions to the Wrocław Court of Appeal. In addition, the President observed that the applicant could see the members of his family on terms provided by the relevant regulations and that the court had not restricted his right to practice his religion.

On 8 July 1996 the applicant submitted to the Wrocław Regional Court a request to release him from detention. On 15 July 1996 the court rejected the request. It relied on the grounds for continuing his detention listed in previous court decisions.

The applicant claims that on 24 July 1996 he was assaulted by prison officers and placed for 2 days in solitary confinement.

On 5 August 1996 the applicant asked the Wrocław Regional Court to release him from detention. On 8 August 1996 the court dismissed his request. It considered that the evidence collected in the case sufficiently supported charges laid against the applicant. Furthermore, the court was of the view that the applicant’s inability to provide care to his children over a long period of time did not result in exceptional hardship for his family.

On 12 August 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request to release him from detention submitted on 6 August 1996. The court relied on the evidence collected in the case, which in its opinion supported the charges laid against the applicant. In addition, it considered that the prospect of a severe penalty, which could be imposed on the applicant, could prompt him to abscond.

On 19 August 1996 the Vice-President of the Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the Ministry of Justice and the applicant that the applicant’s case did not disclose unreasonable length of proceedings. In particular, he pointed out that 13 individuals were accused in the case, the case file consisted of 17 volumes and evidence had to be taken from 58 witnesses. Furthermore, the Vice-President observed that the first hearing fixed for 15 May 1996 had been postponed until 31 July 1996 because one of the defendants had been ill. The second hearing had been adjourned until 30 August 1996 as 2 defendants had failed to attend it. Finally, he stated that “the judge rapporteur deals with 25 other cases and therefore is not able to decide this case sooner than it is possible.”

On 3 September 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 8 August 1996 rejecting his request to release him from detention. The appellate court quashed the impugned decision and instructed the trial court to reconsider the applicant’s request. It acknowledged that “in the present case the detention on remand had been lasting quite long”. In addition, the appellate court considered that the trial court’s statement on the applicant’s intention to abscond was not precise enough. As the applicant’s detention had lasted already 16 months and he was not charged with a serious offence, the mere reference to the possibility that the applicant could abscond because of the prospect of a severe penalty was not sufficient. The appellate court also observed that the trial court had not considered whether another preventive measure could replace the applicant’s detention on remand.

On 12 September 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s 4 requests for release submitted in August and September 1996. The court considered that the charges against the applicant were sufficiently supported by the evidence. Moreover, the difficulties in finding the applicant’s place of residence during the investigative stage of the proceedings and the prospect of a severe penalty showed that he could go into hiding if released from detention. The court further noted that the applicant could not be released on bail as he had stated that he had no funds to pay it. Finally, it considered that there was no evidence pointing towards the existence of any of the grounds for release provided for by Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The hearing held on 13 September 1996 was adjourned until 27 September 1996 as some of the defendants failed to attend it because of ill health.

On 27 September 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request to release him from detention.

On 7 October 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 12 September 1996. The appellate court observed that the applicant’s release would delay the proceedings, as his de facto spouse lived in Opole . It also noted that the applicant had contributed to the delay in the proceedings because on numerous occasions he had submitted requests and appeals. In addition, on several occasions a case file had been transmitted from the trial court to the Wrocław Detention Centre after the applicant had asked to consult it.

On 17 October 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 27 September 1996. The appellate court referred to previous court decisions rejecting the applicant’s requests to release him from detention. The court further noted that although the length of the applicant’s detention could be worrying ( trwa ju ż niepokojąco długo ) , it had not been caused by the inactivity of the trial court. Moreover, the appellate court recommended that “more energetic steps” be taken to expedite the proceedings. Finally, it acknowledged that the state of health of the applicant’s de facto spouse and his daughter was not good. However, the court was of the view that the applicant’s release would not contribute to the improvement of their health.

On 22 October 1996 the Regional Director of the Prison Service replied to the applicant’s complaints submitted on 11 September 1996 to the Ministry of Justice. He informed the applicant that his complaints had been investigated by the Wrocław Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service ( Okręgowy Inspektorat Slużby Więziennej ). However, the investigation showed that they were unsubstantiated. In particular, the director noted that, contrary to the applicant’s claim that his complaints submitted to the prison service had been considered with delay, all had been dealt with within the time-limits provided by law. In addition, the complaint allegedly lodged by the applicant on 20 May 1996, had not been received by the prison service. Finally, the director observed that no regulations had been breached with respect to the applicant’s right to recreation in an exercise yard and a common room.

In a letter of 23 October 1996 the President of the Wrocław Regional Court advised the applicant that the trial court could not be blamed for the delay in the proceedings. He pointed out that the court had fixed numerous hearings, which had been adjourned because of the absence of defendants who had been ill.

In a letter of 25 October 1996 the Director of a Complaint Unit of the Central Prison Service Board ( Centralny Zarząd Służby Więziennej ) informed the applicant that his claim that his complaints submitted to the prison service had been considered with delay was unsubstantiated. He recalled that all of the applicant’s complaints submitted in 1996, concerning inter alia the allegedly inadequate medical treatment, had been dealt with diligently and within a reasonable time. The director also informed the applicant that the inspection of records had showed that his complaint concerning smoking inmates allegedly submitted on 20 May 1996 had never been in fact received by the prison service. He further advised the applicant that the prison regulations did not give the inmates a right to choose a single cell. Such a request could be granted only if facilities available in a prison made it possible.

On 14 November 1996 the Ombudsman replied to the applicant’s several complaints and informed him that, according to the information obtained from the Wrocław Regional Court, it had not prohibited the applicant from participating in religious services taking place in the prison and that on numerous occasions the applicant had been allowed to consult the case file. The Ombudsman saw no grounds to question the statements of the court.

On 12 December 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request to release him from detention.

On 31 December 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court decided to request the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy ) to extend the applicant’s detention on remand.

On 7 January 1997 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 12 December 1996. The appellate court recalled that during the preceding 10 months it had been considering on monthly basis the applicant’s appeals against the trial court’s refusals to release him. It considered that the factual and legal circumstances concerning the applicant’s detention had not changed.

On 24 January 1997 the Supreme Court allowed the Regional Court’s request and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 24 July 1997. The Supreme Court observed that the Regional Court had transmitted its request on 13 January 1997 and it was allowed on 24 January 1997. Therefore, as no legal grounds existed for the applicants detention between 1 January 1997, when domestic legislation required his release, and 24 January 1997, when the Supreme Court decided to extend his detention on remand, the applicant was detained during that period unlawfully. Furthermore, the court considered that the prolongation of the applicant’s detention was justified by the evidence, the possibility that he could go into hiding and the complexity of the case. It also observed that the delay in the proceedings was caused by the behaviour of defendants who had failed to attend hearings.

In a letter of 29 January 1997 the President of the Criminal Section of the Supreme Court advised the applicant that he had no right to appeal either against the Regional Court’s decision to request the Supreme Court to extend his detention or the latter court’s decision prolonging it.

On 10 February 1997 the President of the Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the applicant that his complaints about his unjustified detention on remand were unsubstantiated. The President also recalled that on 24 January 1997 the Supreme Court had prolonged the applicant’s detention and that no hearings could be held in his case at the time when the Supreme Court had been considering the request to extend his detention. In addition, he observed that the next hearing was scheduled for 17 March 1997.

On 24 February 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s challenge to one of the judges considering his case.

During the hearings held on 17 April and 28 May 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s requests to release him from detention.

In the meantime, on 8 May 1997 the President of the Criminal Section of the Wrocław Regional Court informed the applicant that his claim for compensation for unjustified detention on remand had been registered by the court and would be decided after the criminal proceedings against the applicant were finished.

During the hearing held on 8 September 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court decided to severe the charges laid against 2 co-defendants and to consider them in separate proceedings because the co-defendants’ numerous failures to attend hearings resulted in the delay in deciding the applicant’s case. Thereafter, the proceedings were continued against the applicant and 9 co-defendants.

On 19 December 1997 the hearing was held before the Regional Court. It decided to request the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand.

On 8 January 1998 the judge of the Wrocław Regional Court advised the applicant that his claim for compensation for unjustified detention on remand would be decided after the end of the criminal proceedings in his case.

During the hearing held on 30 January 1998 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s requests that the charges against him be decided in separate proceedings and that he be released from detention.

On 15 January 1998 the Supreme Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 March 1998.

On 20 March 1998 the applicant was released from detention.

It appears from the applicant’s submissions that the proceedings against him are pending.

1. Preventive measures

At the material time, the 1969 Code of Criminal Procedure listed as preventive measures, inter alia , detention on remand, bail and police supervision. Section 209 of the Code, which set out general grounds justifying the imposition of preventive measures, provided as follows:

“Preventive measures may be imposed in order to secure the proper course of proceedings if the evidence against the accused sufficiently justifies the opinion that he has committed a criminal offence.”

Furthermore, the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed authorities a margin of discretion as to whether to continue the enforcement of preventive measures. Detention on remand was regarded as the most severe preventive measure. Section 213 of the Code provided as follows:

“A preventive measure shall be immediately quashed or changed if the grounds therefor have ceased to exist or if new circumstances have arisen, which justify quashing a given measure or replacing it with one that is either more or less severe.”

Section 225 of the Code provided:

“Detention on remand shall be imposed only when it is mandatory; this measure shall not be imposed if bail or police supervision, or both of these measures, are considered adequate.”

Section 217 of the Code, before it was amended on 1 January 1996, provided insofar as relevant:

“Detention on remand may be imposed if:

1. there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding, in particular when his identity cannot be established or he has no permanent domicile, or

2. there is a reasonable risk that he will attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means, or

3. the accused was charged with a commission of a criminal offence or acted as a habitual offender, as provided for by the Criminal Code, or

4. the accused was charged with the commission of an act which constituted significant danger to society.”

Section 218 provided:

“If there are no special reasons to the contrary, detention on remand should be quashed, in particular, when:

(1) it may seriously jeopardise the life or health of the accused; or

(2) it would entail excessively burdensome effects for the accused or his family.”

Until 4 August 1996, when the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended, Polish law did not set out any statutory time-limits concerning detention on remand in court proceedings but only in respect of the investigative stage.

Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applicable after 4 August 1996, provided insofar as relevant:

“3. The whole period of detention on remand until the date on which the court of first instance gives judgment may not exceed one year and six months in cases concerning ordinary offences. In cases concerning serious offences this period may not exceed two years.

4. In particularly justified cases the Supreme Court may, upon the request of the court competent to deal with the case (...) prolong detention on remand for a further fixed period exceeding the periods referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, when it is necessary in connection with a suspension of the proceedings, a prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused, when evidence needs to be obtained from abroad or when the accused has deliberately obstructed the termination of the proceedings in the terms referred to in paragraph 3.”

Subsequently, paragraph 4 was extended to include also “other significant circumstances, which could not be overcome by the organs conducting the proceedings”.

Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in the version applicable at the material time), insofar as relevant, provided:

“1. The court competent to deal with the charges laid against a principal offender shall be competent to determine the charges laid against all his accessories and/or other persons, if the offence[s] committed by the latter are closely related to that [or those] committed by a principal offender [and] if the criminal proceedings against [all of them] are pending simultaneously.

2. The cases of persons referred to in § 1 shall be joined in the same proceedings; (…)

3. In cases where circumstances have rendered a joint determination of all the charges referred to in §§ 1 and 2 difficult [the court] may sever a specified charge [or charges] from the case (...).

A court of first instance could order that charges be severed from a given case at any time; either ex officio or on a request from any of the parties.

3. Request for compensation for unjustified detention.

At the material time, Chapter 50 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Compensation for unjustified conviction, detention on remand or arrest", provided that the State was liable for wrongful convictions or for unjustified deprivations of liberty of individuals in the course of criminal proceedings against them.

Section 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as amended) provided, insofar as relevant:

"1. An accused who, as a result of the reopening of the criminal proceedings against him or of lodging a cassation appeal, has been acquitted or resentenced under a more lenient substantive provision, shall be entitled to compensation from the State Treasury for the damage which he has suffered in consequence of having served the whole or a part of the sentence imposed on him.

...

4. The provisions of the present chapter shall be applied by analogy to manifestly unjustified arrest or detention on remand."

According to Section 489 of the Code, a request for compensation for manifestly unjustified detention on remand must have been lodged within one year from the date on which the final decision terminating the criminal proceedings in question had become final and valid in law.

After 1 September 1998, when the New Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force, the regulation of compensation for unjustified detention has been covered by Chapter 58 of the New Code.

4. Offence of aggravated fraud

This offence, until 1 September 1998, was outlawed by Section 205 § 2 (1) of the Criminal Code, which provided: “Anyone who has committed aggravated fraud shall be liable to a sentence ranging from one to ten years’ imprisonment.”

On 1 September 1998 the Criminal Code was repealed by the New Criminal Code of 6 June 1997 and, from that date onwards, the offence of aggravated fraud has been defined by Section 294 § 1 read together with Section 286 § 1 of the New Criminal Code. The sentence imposed for this offence can be between one and ten years’ imprisonment.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant claims that the fact that he was detained together with smoking inmates resulted in a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. He also complains that he was allowed to spend only 1 hour every day in an exercise yard and that there was only 1 TV set and facilities to play table tennis in a common room. In addition, the applicant complains about the overcrowding in his cell, submitting that during the first 15 months he was detained on 16 square meters with 6 inmates and subsequently with 5. He also complains that the toilet in his cell was old and filthy.

The applicant further complains that services provided by the prison medical service were inadequate as no doctor was available in the second ward of the Wrocław Prison in the afternoons and during holidays.

Furthermore, the applicant alleges that on 24 July 1996 he was assaulted by prison officers.

The applicant also submits that his detention on remand between 1 and 24 January 1997 was unlawful.

He further complains under Article 5 § 3 that he was not tried within a reasonable time and that his requests for release from detention, including release on bail, were refused.

The applicant submits that his case discloses a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of unreasonable delay in the criminal proceedings. He also appears to complain under that provision about a breach of his right to a fair trial as a result of corruption and collusion in the criminal justice system. The applicant invokes in this connection Article 6 § 3 (b) and (c) and Article 13.

Furthermore, the applicant complains about the restriction of the number of phone calls he could make while in detention. The applicant submits that during the first year of detention he could not make any phone calls and subsequently only one phone call every month. In addition, he complains that he was allowed to see members of his family four times every month and each meeting could last no longer than 1 hour.

Finally, the applicant complains about the restriction of his right to take part in religious services.

THE LAW [Note1]

1 . The applicant claims that the fact that he was detained together with smoking inmates resulted in a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. He also complains that he was allowed to spend only 1 hour every day in an exercise yard and that there was only 1 TV set and facilities to play table tennis in a common room. In addition, the applicant complains about the overcrowding in his cell, submitting that during the first 15 months he was detained on 16 square meters with 6 inmates and subsequently with 5. He also complains that the toilet in his cell was old and filthy.

The Court has examined the applicant’s complaints relating to the conditions of his detention as they have been submitted by him. However, after considering the case as the whole, and assuming that the applicant exhausted domestic remedies, the Court finds in the particular circumstances of the case that they have not been substantiated and do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, among other authorities, Carless v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Comm. HR, Dec. 1.5.1987, not published).

2. The applicant further complains that services provided by the prison medical service were inadequate as no doctor was available in the second ward of the Wrocław Prison in the afternoons and during holidays.

The Court notes that the applicant did not provide any prima facie evidence showing that those circumstances resulted in a violation of any of his rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

3. Furthermore, the applicant alleges that on 24 July 1996 he was assaulted by prison officers. However, the Court is not required to decide whether or not the facts submitted by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention as the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, he neither requested the prosecuting authorities to institute criminal proceedings against the prison officers nor brought private prosecution against them (see, mutatis mutandis , Perlejewski v. Poland, Dec. 13.7.1999, not published).

4. The applicant also complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about a violation of his right to a fair trial as a result of corruption and collusion in the criminal justice system. He invokes in this connection Article 6 § 3 (b) and (c) and Article 13.

The Court is of the view that the applicant did not submit any prima facie evidence pointing towards the violation of the invoked provisions of the Convention. It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

5. Furthermore, the applicant complains about the restriction of the number of phone calls he could make while in detention. The applicant submits that during the first year of detention he could not make any phone calls and subsequently only one phone call every month. In addition, he complains that he was allowed to see members of his family four times every month and each meeting could last no longer than 1 hour.

The Court will examine these complaints under Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life). However, after considering the case as a whole, and assuming that the applicant exhausted domestic remedies, the Court finds in the particular circumstances of the case that they have not been substantiated and do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that the complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

6. The applicant also complains about the restriction of his right to take part in religious services. The Court considers that this complaint falls under Article 9 of the Convention (freedom of thought, conscience and religion).  However, it is of the view that the applicant failed to submit any evidence in support of this complaint. It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

7. Finally, the applicant submits that his detention on remand between 1 and 24 January 1997 was unlawful. The Court considers that this complaint falls under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In addition, he complains under Article 5 § 3 that he was not tried within a reasonable time and that his requests for release from detention, including release on bail, were refused. The applicant also complains that his case discloses a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of unreasonable delay in the criminal proceedings.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

For these reasons, the Court,

unanimously,

DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicant ’s complaints that his detention on remand between 1 and 24 January 1997 was unlawful (Article 5 § 1); that he was not tried within a reasonable time and that his requests for release from detention were refused (Article 5 § 3); and that the criminal proceedings disclose unreasonable delay (Article 6 § 1);

by a majority,

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Vincent Berger Matti Pellonpää Registrar President

[Note1] In your reasoning specify: Complaint / Article of the Convention [/ Succinct summary of Government’s submissions / Succinct summary of applicant’s submissions in communicated case] / Court’s [Commission’s] case-law, if any / Application of case-law to facts of particular case or considerations for specific facts of case.

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