FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 19875/13 Marie Izabella ZAMOYSKI-BRISSON against Poland and 3 other applications (see list appended)

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 12 September 2017 as a Chamber composed of:

Kristina Pardalos, President, Aleš Pejchal, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Armen Harutyunyan, Pauliine Koskelo, Tim Eicke, Jovan Ilievski, judges, and Abel Campos, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above applications lodged on 4 March 2013,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

1. Background

3. On 6 September 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation ( Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego ) issued the Decree on agrarian reform ( dekret o reformie rolnej ). The decree provided that properties of an agricultural nature, owned or co-owned by natural or legal persons, with an area exceeding 100 hectares (ha) in total or 50 ha of agricultural land, would be allocated for agrarian reform (section 2(1)(e)). It further prescribed that such properties would be transferred to the State Treasury immediately and without any compensation.

4. On 12 December 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation issued the Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests ( dekret o przej ę ciu niekt ó rych las ó w na w ł asno ść Skarbu Pa ń stwa ). The decree provided that forests and forest land, owned or co-owned by natural and legal persons, with an area exceeding 25 ha, would be transferred to the State Treasury.

2. Events before 10 October 1994

5. Mr Aleksander Zamoyski, the applicants ’ father and grandfather respectively, was the owner of the Dobra Ordynackie Koz łó wka estate, which included a large area of forest land (3,844.61 ha). The property was taken over by the State Treasury for the purposes of agrarian reform pursuant to section 2(1)(e) of the Decree on agrarian reform. On 9 December 1946 an entry was made in the land register.

6. The applicants are the legal heirs of Mr Zamoyski.

3. Events after 10 October 1994

7. On 23 February 2010 the applicants brought a claim against the State Treasury in the Lublin Regional Court. They each sought 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN  approximately 20,000 euros) in partial compensation for the nationalisation of the forest land which had been owned by their legal predecessor. They relied on section 7 of the Act of 6 July 2001 on the preservation of the national character of the country ’ s strategic natural resources ( ustawa o zachowaniu narodowego charakteru strategicznych zasob ó w naturalnych kraju – “the 2001 Act”).

8. In the alternative, if the court ruled that they could not seek indemnity under section 7 of the 2001 Act on account of a lack of separate provisions determining the rules of indemnification, the applicants sought compensation for legislative omission ( zaniechanie legislacyjne ). In respect of the latter, they relied on Article 417 ¹ § 4 and subsequently Article 417 of the Civil Code. In their subsequent pleadings, the applicants noted that they were seeking compensation equal to 0.001% of the amount due and wished to determine the principle of compensation for the nationalised forest.

9. On an unspecified date the applicants ’ case was transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court.

10. On 17 January 2011 the court dismissed the applicants ’ claim. It found it unnecessary to take evidence with a view to determining the size and value of the various plots making up the estate, since the claim was in principle unfounded. The court acknowledged that the applicants ’ predecessor in title had owned the Dobra Ordynackie Koz łó wka estate, that at least part of it was forest, and that it had been nationalised pursuant to the Decree on agrarian reform.

11. With regard to the compensation claim for legislative omission, the court held that the applicants could not rely on Article 417¹ § 4 of the Civil Code since that provision had only entered into force on 1 September 2004, while their claim concerned the 2001 Act. However, the State Treasury was liable for damage caused by legislative omission which had occurred after the entry into force of the Constitution on 17 October 1997. The 2001 Act had entered into force after the latter date and, accordingly, the applicants ’ claim for legislative omission could be based on Article 417 of the Civil Code (in the version applicable prior to 1 September 2004) in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution.

12. The court held that section 7 of the 2001 Act could not constitute the basis of a compensation claim for legislative omission. It held that the provision was of a declaratory nature, in which the legislature had announced that persons who had been wronged in connection with the taking away of their property should have received some indemnity. That declaration had to be fulfilled in a separate statute specifying the amount of indemnity, the manner of calculation and the possible limitations. According to the court, the principal purpose of the 2001 Act was to preserve the national character of the country ’ s strategic natural resources, including those which in the past had been taken by the State to the detriment of the owners. The 2001 Act signalled the need to regulate the question of indemnities to former owners, but did not regulate it itself and left it to the legislature to decide subsequently. Furthermore, section 7 of the 2001 Act was of a very general nature. It did not specify the manner of calculating an indemnity, the amount, the possible limitations or the conditions to be fulfilled by claimants. In this connection the court held that it could not replace the legislature and encroach on its competences.

13. The court also noted that there were various groups of persons whose properties had been nationalised without just or any compensation during the period of the Polish People ’ s Republic. The legislature had decided to establish the rules and procedure for the payment of compensation to some of those groups, while in respect of others it had enacted no such regulations. An example of the first was the Act of 8 July 2005 on the realisation of the right to indemnity for property left beyond the present borders of the Polish State (“the 2005 Act”) , which provided that Bug River claimants were entitled to compensation set at 20% of the value of their original Bug River property. The legislature had entitled that group of persons to compensation and specified the procedure applicable to such claims.

14. The court noted, however, that the legislature had not to date enacted any rules on indemnifying persons who had been wronged on account of the Decree on agrarian reform or the Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests. It emphasised that, in accordance with section 2(1) of the Decree on agrarian reform, ownership of all the property referred to in subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) had been immediately transferred to the State Treasury without any compensation. The Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests did not provide for any compensation either. Consequently, there remained many groups of persons who had been wronged by the taking away of their property and the question of compensating them remained unresolved.

15. The court held that section 7 of the 2001 Act contained the legislature ’ s declaration that it intended to regulate the question of indemnities, inter alia , to persons who had lost their forests. In the 2001 Act the legislature had only determined that there would be no restitution in natura of, inter alia , lost forests. However, the question of indemnities remained to be determined by the legislatu re. The court held that section 7 of the 2001 Act could not be interpreted as a basis of a direct claim for indemnity. The provision did not specify the amount of indemnity or the applicable conditions, and in that respect the court could not substitute the legislature, who had the exclusive competence to create legal norms.

16. The applicants appealed. They argued, inter alia , that the first ‑ instance court had erroneously interpreted section 7 of the 2001 Act by holding that the provision could not constitute the basis of a claim for indemnity. They further maintained that the court had wrongly interpreted the same provision in conjunction with Article 417 of the Civil Code and Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution by holding that the legislature had not perpetrated a legislative omission consisting of a failure to enact provisions regulating the payment of indemnities. The applicants invoked the Court ’ s judgment in the case of Broniowski v. Poland ([GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004 ‑ V).

17. On 22 September 2011 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants ’ appeal, concurring with the Regional Court ’ s interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act.

18. The Court of Appeal noted that a claim ( roszczenie ) was a right, based in law, to demand that a particular person act in a specific manner. Section 7 of the 2001 Act did not contain sufficient normative content to consider that it established a claim in that sense. Nor did it specify the subjective and objective scope of the rights of former owners, the specific nature of the claim, the exact meaning of the term “loss of property” or whether indemnity should be equal to whole or part of the value of the nationalised property. Accordingly, it could not be considered that section 7 of the 2001 Act constituted a norm imposing an absolute obligation on the State Treasury to act in a specific manner, namely to pay a specific amount of money to an individually designated subject. The Court of Appeal considered that determination of the rules concerning the State ’ s liability required further statutory specification of the conditions for an effective claim than that which had been stipulated in section 7 of the 2001 Act.

19. The Court of Appeal concurred with the Regional Court that section 7 of the 2001 Act was a declaratory provision ( przepis o charakterze blankietowym ), reflecting the legislature ’ s general assumptions. The provision did not specify the amount of indemnity or the eligibility conditions, and a court could not substitute the legislature in that respect. In the Court of Appeal ’ s view, a certain confirmation of the State ’ s liability towards former owners who had lost ownership of the properties referred to in section 1 of the 2001 Act, without specifying the essential elements of that liability, was devoid of any protective significance ( znaczenie gwarancyjne ) and, as such, did not have legal effect.

20. There was no doubt for the Court of Appeal that, prior to the entry into force of section 7 of the 2001 Act, persons who had lost property pursuant to the Decree on agrarian reform or on the basis of section 1 § 2 of the Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests, had had no right to compensation in respect of the loss of t heir property because the above ‑ mentioned decrees did not establish that right. Nor did they establish the right to be compensated for the loss of property in any other form. Furthermore, the decrees at issue had not been declared unconstitutional. Thus, the taking of property by the State on the basis of the impugned decrees was not unlawful and could not be considered a tort.

21. The Court of Appeal further concurred with the Regional Court that the principal purpose of the 2001 Act was to prevent privatisation of the strategic resources of the country (section 2) and not establish claims for the loss of property.

22. The Court of Appeal further held that there had been no legislative omission in the applicants ’ case. In its view, section 7 of the 2001 Act did not contain even a promise of conferring a right to claim for indemnity on specific categories of subjects, including those wh o had lost forest land as a result of the operation of the Decree on agrarian reform. The provision was an expression of political premise, and its purpose was not to confer rights on specifically designated persons in a clear and unconditional manner. A simple declaration that a certain regulation would be enacted on an unspecified future date was not sufficient to conclude that the obligation to legislate had been breached. The Court of Appeal noted that the legislature ’ s obligation to enact a statute had to be expressed in another statute in an unequivocal manner, excluding the possibility of this being the result of judicial interpretation. Having regard to the purpose of the 2001 Act, the Court of Appeal noted that the legislature had had no intention of creating an obligation to enact a statute on the indemnification of persons who had lost property as a result of the nationalisation decrees. The legislature simply provided for such a possibility in a statute to be enacted on an unspecified future date.

23. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal. Firstly, they argued that the Court of Appeal had wrongly interpreted section 7 of the 2001 Act in conjunction with section 13(2) of the 2005 Act. They submitted that the two provisions constituted the basis of the State Treasury ’ s obligation to compensate for the loss of forest land. Secondly, they argued that the court had erroneously interpreted section 7 of the 2001 Act in conjunction with Article 417 of the Civil Code and Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution by holding that the legislature had not perpetrated a legislative omission.

25. The relevant part of the Supreme Court ’ s judgment reads:

“With regard to the first of the appellants ’ arguments, it should be pointed out that in legal science a claim ( roszczenie ) is regarded as one of the normative forms of a subjective right ( prawo podmiotowe ), consisting of the possibility of demanding a specific act from a specific person. A claim is characterised, on the one hand, by the existence of an entitlement specified with regard to its content and subject and, on the other hand, by the directly assigned to it obligation of another subject. In other words, the equivalent of an entitlement is an obligation of a specific person to act in a specific manner, i.e. to undertake a specific action or to refrain from it ...

The appellants ... are aiming to demonstrate that the regulation contained in section 7 of the 2001 Act create for them, as successors of the former owner of forests ..., claims for indemnity. Section 1 of the 2001 Act recognises inter alia , State forests as the country ’ s strategic national resources, and section 2 stipulates that the national resources listed in section 1 and owned by the State Treasury are not subject to change of ownership, with the exception of provisions contained in particular statutes. Section 7 of the 2001 Act stipulates that claims of natural persons, former owners or their successors, in respect of loss of ownership of the resources listed in section 1, shall be satisfied in the form of indemnities ( rekompensaty ) paid from the State budget on the basis of separate provisions.

As has been already noted by the Supreme Court ... it is apparent from the above ‑ mentioned 2001 Act and the reasons for the relevant bill that the legislature ’ s general premise was not to effect ( niedokonywanie ) changes of ownership in respect of the country ’ s strategic national resources. When interpreting the purpose of the 2001 Act, it should be remembered that the relevant bill was being prepared in parallel with the Restitution Bill of 7 March 2001, which was [successfully] vetoed by the President of the Republic ....

Having regard to the commonly accepted understanding of a claim in legal science, it is necessary to agree with the Court of Appeal ’ s assessment that the regulation contained in section 7 of the 2001 Act does not entitle former owners or their successors to claim for indemnity in respect of loss of ownership of the resources listed in section 1 of the Act ... [The appellants] correctly point out that one legal provision may contain one, two or more norms, but it may also contain only part of a norm. Such a specific relationship between a legal provision and a legal norm does not, however, result in it being possible to derive f rom section 7 of the 2001 Act a claim for indemnity, by supplementing this legal provision, by analogy, with the regulation contained in the Act on the realisation of the right to indemnity for property left beyond the present borders of the Polish State, which concerns an entirely different matter. The appellants have omitted to note that the legislature, while referring in section 7 of the 2001 Act to the satisfying of claims of former owners or their successors, has expressly stipulated that this would be done on the basis of separate provisions, i.e. provisions which were yet to be enacted. In addition, neither the content of the former owners or their successors ’ entitlement nor the content of the State Treasury ’ s (the debtor ’ s) obligation was sufficiently specified in section 7 of the Act. The Supreme Court has already adopted an analogous position in this regard in its judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no. I CSK 547/11), stating that section 7 of the 2001 Act does not allow for such a specification of the norm of substantive law contained in it, which would determine in detail the content of a specific addressee ’ s entitlements and obligations. Such a position was also approved by the Supreme Administrative Court in the course of examining cassation appeals in cases concerning claims for compensation under section 7 of the 2001 Act initiated in administrative proceedings (judgments of 6 May 2010, case no. I OSK 935/09; 6 August 2010, case no. I OSK 1377/09; 17 March 2011, case no. I OSK 718/10 and 4 October 2011, case no. I OSK 245/11).

The arguments drawn by the appellants from the Supreme Court ’ s rulings ... do not lead to opposite conclusions ... In the rulings referred to, the Supreme Court emphasised that the conferring of a [right to] claim by the legislature does not have to be formulated expressis verbis in a legal provision; however, it is necessary to indicate [there] the essential elements indispensable for con structing a claim. Therefore, a claim could be derived from a given norm if it appears from its content that a specific obligation imposed on one party corresponds to an entitlement of another party to demand its implementation.

Such essential elements, allowing a claim for indemnity to be constructed, are missing from the content of section 7 of the 2001 Act.

With regard to the second of the appellants ’ arguments, it should be noted that in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of seven judges, of 19 May 2009 [case no.] III CZP 139/08 ..., the State Treasury is liable for damage caused by non-enactment of a normative act, when a duty to enact it arose after the entry into force of the Constitution. Article 417 of the Civil Code in the version [applicable] prior to 1 September 2004 ... constitutes the basis of civil liability for legislative omissions, which began after the Constitution ’ s entry into force [17 October 1997], but before 1 September 2004, i.e. before the entry into force of the statute amending [the Civil Code] of 17 June 2004. Article 417 of the Civil Code in the current version and Article 417 ¹ of the Civil Code are not applicable to a situation where the state of legislative omission arose before 1 September 2004, even if the damage caused by this omission was sustained after that date. ... A detailed regulation governing the State ’ s liability for its law-making activit ies was only enacted in Article 417¹ of the Civil Code, but these rules could already be considered to be relevant from the date of the Constitution ’ s entry into force, since from that moment the State ’ s liability for legislative omission had been recognised.

In its resolution of 6 July 2006 (case no. III CZP 37/06), the Supreme Court explained that the State Treasury ’ s civil liability for legislative omission would only arise when a normative act, whose enactment was obligatory under the law, i.e. the Constitution or a statute, was not enacted. The non-enactment of a statute where another statute provides for its enactment could also be regarded as [legislative] omission, since the legislature can undertake in one statute to enact another statute. However, in order to assume that the legislature made such an undertaking, and not only provided for the possibility of regulating a certain matter in another statute, the obligation to enact that statute has to be expressed in an explicit manner, excluding the possibility of it only being deduced by means of judicial interpretation; [such a course of action] would have constituted an encroachment by the judiciary on the competences reserved to the legislature.

In the above-mentioned judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no. I CSK 547/11), the Supreme Court did not agree with that suggestion, emphasising that the interpretation of legal norms by the courts was one of the basic functions bestowed on the judiciary. Accordingly, it accepted that a court could assess, applying the necessary means of interpretation, whether a statute contained an explicit obligation to enact another statute. A contrary proposition ... would have amounted to approval of the legislature ’ s method of conferring virtual entitl ements on citizens, even with a premise accepted in advance that it would be impossible to realise those entitlements, while approving, at the same time, the lack of legal basis for civil liability related to damage caused by such acts of the legislature.

There is no doubt that a court of law, in carrying out its adjudicatory functions, interprets provisions of the law; however, the issue is that this cannot be a law-making interpretation. In the process of interpretation a court has to respect the principle, expressed in Article 10 of the Constitution, of separation of and balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers on which the system of government of the Republic of Poland is based. According to the adjudicating bench of the Supreme Court, it is the only manner ... of reading the assertion in the reasoning for the [Supreme Court ’ s] resolution of 6 July 2006 (case no. III CZP 37/06) that the obligation to enact a statute has to be expressed in an explicit manner, excluding the possibility of it being deduced by means of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court in the present composition shares the view that for liability for legislative omission to arise, it is first necessary to establish that an obligation ... to enact a normative act was formulated in an explicit and specific manner. The contrary perspective on this issue could lead to an inadmissible interference by the judiciary with the competences reserved to the legislature. The Supreme Court took the same view, inter alia , in the judgments of 4 August 2006, case no. III CSK 138/05 ... , 7 November 2006, case no. I CSK 159/06 ... and 15 February 2007, case no. II CSK 483/06 ..., and [this view] was also approved by legal science.

There is also agreement in legal science that a provision of the law containing an obligation to enact a normative act has to specify the essential content of such an act in such a way to allow the existence and scope of damage caused by an omission to be determined. In other words, it should be possible to establish the content of a non ‑ enacted normative act without encroaching on the other State organs ’ legislative powers. A court of law cannot make suppositions as t o the possible content of a non ‑ enacted normative act, being guided by its own axiological assumptions. ...

Section 7 of the 2001 Act, prescribing that claims of former owners or their successors shall be satisfied in the form of indemnities ( rekompensata ) paid from the State budget on the basis of separate provisions, does not stipulate to a sufficient degree the content of the said “separate provisions”. The legislature did not indicate the subjective scope of the normative act, which were to prescribe the rules of indemnification, the conditions to be fulfilled by persons eligible to receive an indemnity, or the manner of determining the amount of those benefits. These shortcomings cannot be – as asserted by the appellants – complemented by the application of Article 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because it is not in the court ’ s sphere of activity to independently indicate the object and scope of what should have been found in a non-enacted normative act.

Therefore, it has to be accepted that section 7 of the 2001 Act is a declaratory provision ( przepis blankietowy ), which contains only the legislature ’ s declaration concerning the future regulation of indemnities in a statute to be enacted later, without being bound by the date of its enactment. Accordingly, non-enactment of a normative act, referred to in this provision, does not warrant the State Treasury ’ s liability for legislative omission ...”

26. The applicants lodged a constitutional complaint. On 13 February 2013 the Constitutional Court refused to consider it as it had been lodged out of time. On 29 July 2013 the court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicants.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. The State ’ s liability in tort

(a) Provisions of the Civil Code applicable from 10 October 1994 to 1 September 2004

27. Articles 417 et seq . of the Civil Code provide for the State ’ s liability in tort.

In the version applicable until 1 September 2004, Article 417 § 1, which lays down a general rule, read as follows:

“1. The State Treasury shall be liable for damage caused by a State official in the performance of the duties entrusted to him.”

(b) Provisions of the Civil Code applicable from 1 September 2004

28. On 1 September 2004 the Law of 17 June 2004 on amendments to the Civil Code and other statutes ( Ustawa o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks cywilny oraz niektórych innych ustaw – “the 2004 Amendment”) entered into force. The relevant amendments were in essence aimed at enlarging the scope of the State Treasury ’ s liability in tort under Article 417 of the Civil Code – including the addition of a new Article 417 1 and provision being made for the State ’ s tortious liability for failure to enact legislation, a concept known as “legislative omission” ( zaniechanie legislacyjne ).

29. Following the 2004 Amendment, Article 417 1 , in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“4. If damage has been caused by failure to enact a law [ akt normatywny ] where there is a statutory duty to do so, the incompatibility of the failure to enact that law shall be established by the court dealing with the claim for damages.”

However, under the transitional provisions of section 5 of the 2004 Amendment, Article 417 as applicable before 1 September 2004 applies to all events and legal situations that subsisted before that date.

(c) Constitutional tort

30. The concept of the State ’ s civil liability for a constitutional tort was introduced into the Polish legal order on 17 October 1997, the date of entry into force of the 1997 Polish Constitution.

Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution states as follows:

“Everyone shall have the right to compensation for any harm done to him by any act of a public authority in breach of the law.”

2. Decree on agrarian reform

31. On 6 September 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation issued the Decree on agrarian reform. The decree provided that properties of an agricultural nature, owned or co-owned by natural or legal persons, with an area exceeding 100 ha in total or 50 ha of agricultural land, would be allocated for agrarian reform (section 2(1)(e)).

With regard to properties in the Pomeranian, Poznan or Silesian regions the area was set at 100 ha, regardless of the size of the agricultural property.

32. The decree further prescribed that properties would be transferred to the State Treasury immediately and without any compensation.

3. Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests

33. On 12 December 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation issued the Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests. The decree provided that forests and forest land, owned or co-owned by natural and legal persons, with an area exceeding 25 ha, would be transferred to the State Treasury.

4. Restitution Bill

34. In September 1999 the government introduced in Parliament the Bill on the restitution of immovable property and certain kinds of movable property taken from natural persons by the State or by the Warsaw Municipality, and on indemnities ( projekt ustawy o reprywatyzacji nieruchomości i niektórych ruchomości osób fizycznych przejętych przez Państwo lub gminę miasta stołecznego Warszawy oraz o rekompensatach ).

35. It provided for two forms of restitution, namely restitution in natura or indemnity in the form of securities, with regard to property that had been taken over by the State or by the Warsaw Municipality by virtue of certain laws passed under the communist regime, including the Decree on agrarian reform and the Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests. The bill prescribed the eligibility conditions for restitution. It further stipulated that restitution would be equal to 50% of the actual value of the lost property.

36. The bill provoked a heated debate involving all sections of society, the media and all the political parties and factions. It was enacted by Parliament on 7 March 2001. The relevant Bill was subsequently transmitted for the President of the Republic for signature. However, exercising his right of veto, the President refused to sign it.

37. Ultimately, the Sejm (first house of the Polish Parliament) failed to gather the three-fifths majority required under Article 122 § 5 of the Constitution to override the President ’ s veto during a vote on 25 May 2001. As a consequence, the Restitution Bill did not enter into force.

38. Subsequent attempts to enact restitution law were unsuccessful.

5. Act of 6 July 2001 on the preservation of the national character of the country ’ s strategic natural resources (“the 2001 Act”)

40. The relevant part of section 1 provides:

“The country ’ s strategic natural resources include:

...

(3) State forests,

....”

41. Section 2 provides:

“The natural resources listed in section 1 which constitute the State Treasury ’ s property are not subject to change of ownership, with the exception of provisions contained in particular statutes.”

“Claims of natural persons, former owners or their successors, in respect of loss of ownership of the resources listed in section 1, shall be satisfied in the form of indemnities ( rekompensaty ) paid from the State budget on the basis of separate provisions.”

6. Act of 8 July 2005 on the realisation of the right to indemnity for property left beyond the present borders of the Polish State (“the 2005 Act”)

43. The 2005 Act entered into force on 7 October 2005. Under section 13, the right to indemnity ( prawo do rekompensaty ) for Bug River property can be realised in one of two ways, to be chosen by the claimant: either by offsetting the indexed value of the original property against the sale price of State property acquired by means of a competitive bidding procedure, or by receiving a pecuniary benefit ( świadczenie pieniężne ), that is to say a cash payment secured by the Indemnity Fund ( Fundusz Rekompensacyjny ). The amount of compensation available to Bug River claimants is subject to a statutory ceiling of 20% of the current value of the original property.

44. A more detailed description of the relevant provisions of the 2005 Act appears in the Broniowski (friendly settlement ) judgment (see Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement) [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 14-30, ECHR 2005 ‑ IX).

7. Supreme Court case-law regarding the interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act

(a) Judgment of 29 June 2012, case no. I CSK 547/11

“... section 7 of the 2001 Act, in the current formulation, does not constitute an independent legal basis for the payment of a benefit [indemnity], since it refers to separate provisions, which were to prescribe which funds of the State budget would be used to satisfy, in the form of indemnities, claims of natural persons indicated in this provision. In section 7 of the 2001 Act, the legislature did not give statutory authorisation to the Council of Ministers to adopt a regulation ..., and thus it should be accepted that the term “separate provisions” in section 7 refers to the enactment of a statute. This statute should indicate the body ... responsible for indemnification, and specify the State budget ’ s funds to be used for the payment of indemnities and other essential elements (the amount [of indemnity], the limitations and the procedure). The use in section 7 of the 2001 Act of the word “paid” with regard to indemnities presupposes that the benefit would be in a pecuniary form ...

However, the formulation of section 7 of the 200 1 Act does not allow for such a specification of the norm of substantive law contained in it, which would determine in detail the content of a specific addressee ’ s entitlements and obligations ... This provision is thus of a declaratory nature ( przepis blankietowy ) ...”

46. With regard to a claim for compensation in respect of legislative omission, the Supreme Court held:

“... Section 7 of the 2001 Act does not contain expressis verbis an obligation to enact separate provisions, but such a conclusion does n ot exclude the possibility of a court ’ s interpreting the legal norm contained in this provision to the effect that the interpreted norm contained the legislature ’ s obligation to enact separate provisions.

It has been correctly accepted in case-law that non-enactment of a statute where another statute provides for its enactment could also be regarded as legislative omission leading to the State Treasury ’ s civil liability (the Supreme Court ’ s resolution of 6 July 2006, case no. III CZP 37/06). It was stated in the reasoning of that resolution that the obligation to enact another statute had to be expressed in an explicit manner, excluding the possibility of it only being deduced by means of judicial interpretation, because this would constitute an encroachment by the judiciary on the competences reserved to the legislature. The court adjudicating in the instant case does not share that view .... The interpretation of legal norms by the courts is one of the basic functions bestowed on the judiciary, and it does not constitute an encroachment by [it] on the competences reserved to the legislature ... ”

47. The Supreme Court noted that the textual interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act resulted in the finding that this provision did not expressly contain the legislature ’ s obligation to enact separate provisions. It held, in this regard, as follows:

“Sole reliance on the textual interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act leads to the conclusion that this provision does not unequivocally oblige the legislature to enact separate provisions. However, if the result of the textual interpretation is obviously irrational or unsustainable, it is not possible to stop [the a nalysis] at such a result. In a situation like the one at hand, it is necessary to have recourse to other methods of interpretation. It would be difficult to accept the impugned result of the textual interpretation (i.e. a lack of obligation to enact separate provisions), since this would mean that the legislature bestows on specific natural persons a subjective right consisting of an unequivocal conferment of claims, which would be satisfied in the form of paid indemnities, and at the same time prevents the entitled claimants from asserting those claims as a result of its failure to enact separate provisions, a legislative omission which would not result in any civil law sanction, not least in the form of civil liability of the State Treasury ...

In this situation it is necessary to have recourse to a functional and teleological interpretation. Since the legislature ’ s purpose was to satisfy, in the form of indemnities, claims of specific natural persons in respect [of the events] indicated in section 7 of the 2001 Act, while the procedure for the payment of indemnities was to be regulated in separate provisions, then it should be held that the enactment of these separate provisions was the legislature ’ s obligation stipulated in section 7 of the 2001 Act ...

A contrary proposition would lead to the acceptance of an absurd conclusion that the legislature can confer rights in a statute, with a premise accepted in advance that those rights cannot be realised by the addressees as a result of the legislature ’ s inaction, and this [inaction] would not then lead to any sanctions, and in particular [to] civil liability.”

(b) Resolution of 20 December 2012 (case no. III CZP 94/12)

48. In its resolution of 20 December 2012, the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, dealt with the following legal questions submitted to it by the Cracow Court of Appeal on 21 September 2012:

“1. Does section 7 of the 2001 Act constitute the basis of the subjective right conferred on natural persons, who are referred to in this provision?

2. and, if so, does the situation of awarding satisfaction, in the form of indemnification, in respect of claims of specified natural persons in respect [of the events] indicated in section 7 of the 2001 Act, while at the same time leaving the questions of procedure for the payment of indemnities and the determination of their amount to be regulated in separate provisions, give rise to the legislature ’ s obligation to enact separate provisions, and, in consequence – does their non-enactment amount to legislative omission?”

49. The Supreme Court adopted the following resolution:

“Section 7 of the 2001 Act does not constitute the basis of the subjective right for natural persons specified in this provision or for the obligation to enact separate provisions, referred to in this provision.”

50. The resolution ’ s reasoning, in so far as relevant, reads:

“The analysis of section 7 of the 2001 Act ... warrants the conclusion that it does not comprise all necessary elements for the creation of a su bjective right in the form of a claim. This provision indicates precisely the subject of an obligation, i.e. the State Treasury, but does not prescribe the addressees of an entitlement. Prima facie , it seems that section 7 expressly prescribes that a possible [right to] claim for indemnity was conferred on the persons referred to in this provision, i.e. natural persons, former owners, or their successors, of resources comprising lost State forests. However, the legislature did not specify more precisely the category of entitled persons, in particular, by stipulating whether it concerns all owners of the forests and their successors, which, regardless of the moment in time, of the legal basis and other circumstances (e.g. the size of the property, the nationality of the owners, etc.) were transferred to the State. It was not specified whether it concerns an unlawful or lawful taking of these resources, and then, in respect of the latter category of persons, this provision would be of a quasi-restitution nature.

The concept of a claim ... concerns a situation in which a norm, arising from binding legal provisions, confers on an entitled subject the right to demand a specific act from the obliged subject, [which is] secured by the possibility of it being enforced. Consequently, it should be accepted that the concept of a claim of natural persons, former owners, or their successors, in respect of loss of the resources listed in section 1 [of the 2001 Act] could only encompass only those, who, on the date of the statute ’ s entry into force, had the right to claim in respect of the loss of those resources. This means that, in fact, this provision merely changes the content of previous claims of former owners or their successors, in that it replaces the previous compensation claims against the State Treasury by a claim for indemnity. However, such a purpose of the regulation should be excluded, since the 2001 Act was enacted at a time when [Parliament] was working in parallel on the Restitution Bill. The beneficiaries of the indemnity referred to in section 7 of the 2001 Act were to be persons, who in the period preceding the enactment of the 2001 Act, asserted their restitution demands vis-à-vis the State Treasury in respect of the State ’ s taking away – including by lawful means – of forests, [demands] which could not have been satisfied in the framework of the existing provisions. The t erm “claim” employed in section 7 of the 2001 Act does not then fully correspond to the accepted meaning of that term, because it comprises in fact, without further specification, a category of natural persons asserting vis-à-vis the legislature their demands in respect of loss of ownership of the resources prescribed in section 1 [of the 2001 Act], and not persons who were conferred specific claims by the legal system subsisting previously.

Moreover, section 7 of the 2001 Act simply pres cribes that a claim comprises a benefit in a pecuniary form – an indemnity – which was to be paid from the State budget; however, the scope of this benefit has not been further specified. The 2001 Act does not contain a definition of the term “indemnity” ( rekompensata ), it only determines that it is a pecuniary benefit. The Civil Code does not define this term either. Its analysis in the previous regulations concerning indemnities – included in ... the Act of 8 July 2005 Act on the realisation of the right to indemnity for property left beyond the present borders of the Polish State – leads to the conclusion that the legislature, in conferring a subjective right of this kind, does so in a comprehensive manner, specifying precisely not only the category of entitled persons, but also the amount of indemnity due. With regard to this kind of benefits, the legislature had further prescribed a particular procedure for determining eligibility for indemnities, fixed their amount, [as well as set] time-limits for bringing claims, payment of indemnities, the statute of limitations and the extinguishment of such claims, and established a specific indemnity fund. An indemnity represented a fraction, determined arbitrarily by the legislature, of the full compensation. Section 7 of the 2001 Act does not comprise any of these elements.

[Legislative omission:]

The essence of the legal issue comes down, however, to ascertaining whether, despite these gaps in the construction of a claim, it c ould be considered that section 7 of the 2001 establishes a subjective right, in assuming that this provision also establishes the legislature ’ s obligation to enact separate provisions complementing the missing elements of the subjective right in issue. In such cases, a failure by the legislature to execute this obligation could give rise to the State Treasury ’ s liability for legislative omission, since it was accepted in the Supreme Court ’ s case-law that enactment of incomplete or fragmentary [legislative] solutions could give rise to a finding of legislative omission .... Where [the legislature] creates a subjective right with deficient characteristics, civil liability for legislative omission becomes a form of protecting this right, which cannot be fully or at all realised.

The State ’ s civil liability for legislative omission – both on the basis of the currently applicable Article 417 1 § 4 of the Civil Code and, on the basis of Article 417 of the [Civil Code] in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution ... applicable to the case in issue – can arise where there is a specific obligation to enact a normative act under [the legal] provisions. In such a case, it is also required that a legal provision imposing an obligation to enact an appropriate regulation indicated a certain minimal content of the subjective right, and in particular, persons entitled to bring a claim and persons obliged to execute a deed constituting the content of a claim, as well as its scope. The textual and logical interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act does not lead to the conclusion that this provision comprised an obligation to enact specific provisions concerning indemnities since it employed a formulation that claims of natural persons referred to in it were to be “satisfied in the form of indemnities paid from the State budget on the basis of separate provisions”. This provision does not contain either a statutory authorisation to enact appropriate executive regulations prescribing the scope of that regulation.

The Supreme Court ’ s case-law admitted the possibility of the State ’ s civil liability for legislative omission consisting of a failure to enact a statute where another statute provided for an obligation to this effect (resolution of 6 July 2006, case no. III CZP 37/06) ...

[With regard to the obligation to enact a specific statute] ... It cannot be accepted that such a situation arose with regard to an obligation to enact separate provisions, which are referred to in section 7 of the 2001 Act. As the Supreme Court held in its judgments of 6 September 2012 (I CSK 59/12 ... and I CSK 77/12 and I CSK 96/12), an interpretation in this context cannot be a law-making interpretation, since it has to respect the principle, expressed in Article 10 of the Constitution, of separation of and balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers on which the system of government of the Republic of Poland is based ... In cases concerning compensation for legislative omission the courts cannot ascertain the content of non-enacted provisions; in order to accept the existence of a l egislative obligation whose non ‑ execution would result in the State ’ s civil liability, it is necessary that the provision imposing an obligation to enact another legal regulation indicated its minimal content with such a degree to allow the scope of the State ’ s obligation to compensate to be determined. Such a situation does not arise in respect of section 7 of the 2001 Act, this provision stipulating that only separate provisions enacted at a future date were to determine the content of the su bjective right in the form of a claim for indemnity.

The possibility of ascertaining the existence of an obligation to enact a normative act was also accepted in the Supreme Court ’ s case-law, where such an obligation has not been formulated expressis verbis in the [legal] provisions, and where the rights of individuals – conferred in a self-evident and unconditional manner – could not be realised as a result of a failure to enact an appropriate normative act ... However, even in such cases provisions conferring those rights have to prescribe the essential characteristics of the latter. The acceptance of the State ’ s hypothetical legislative omission – concerning subjective rights with an undefined content or an unclearly determined category of entitled persons – would result in the State ’ s civil liability in respect of legislative omission also being illusory. The courts could not decide who was entitled to bring a claim for compensation or about the amount without entering into the law-making role. It should be remembered in this context that the rules concerning civil liability, including for legislative omission, serve to protect the existing subjective rights, and are not the basis for creating these rights or specifying their scope. From this standpoint too, section 7 of the 2 001 Act does not prescribe in a sufficient manner the content of a subjective right in the form of a claim, in particular with regard to the category of entitled persons and the amount of compensation.

The foregoing considerations warrant the conclusion that section 7 of the 2001 Act does not contain a legal norm giving rise to specific rights or obligations comprising the content of a subjective right in the form of a claim, nor does it contain a norm imposing an obligation to enact provisions, referred to in it, concerning indemnities. Therefore, it should be concurred that this provision is of a declaratory nature, it solely contains a proclamation of the legislature ’ s intention as to the means of satisfying in the future, on the basis of separate provisions, claims asserted against the State Treasury by owners (natural persons) of forests or their successors in respect of loss of ownership ... It should also be remembered that the provisions of the 2001 Act originated from a civic bill ( projekt obywatelski ), which was debated [in Parliament] in parallel with the Restitution Bill, and the latter were to prescribe the right to indemnity characterised as a subjective right in the form of a claim. The 2001 Act alone, without the Restitution Bill – as evidenced by the analysis of the legislative process – was not to give rise to any financial obligations [for the State] or to determine solutions concerning indemnities. The purpose of section 7 of the 2001 Act was only to express the legislature ’ s intention that the future realisation of restitution demands of former owners or their successors, accomplished on the basis of separate provisions, took the form of indemnities, and so that it was carried out while preserving the resources prescribed in section 1 of the 2001 Act, without effecting changes of ownership, as stated in section 2 of the same Act ... The object of the regulation in the 2001 Act also points out to a limited meaning of the provision in issue ...”

(c) Judgment of 26 June 2015 (case no. I CSK 316/14)

51. In this judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“The content of section 7 of the 2001 Act does not comprise formulations which could be regarded as grounds for the claimant ’ s claim for indemnity in respect of forest land taken over by the State Treasury. ...The textual, logical and systemic interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act leads to the conclusion that this provision does not confer a subjective right on the relevant persons, from which it would result an entitlement to demand from the State Treasury a specific act and the possibility of enforcing it. There is no regulation in the Civil Code on the right to indemnity. The formulations employed in section 7 of the 2001 Act are of a declaratory nature, since the claims referred to in it should be satisfied in the future, as is evidenced by the phrase “shall be satisfied”, and the form of satisfying them (those claims) are indemnities “to be paid” from the State budget, and the basis for their payment will be in separate provisions. Therefore, the term “claims” employed in this provision, cannot be equated with a “claim” as understood in the civil law. It should be pointed out that the purpose of the 2001 Act, as evidenced by the reasons for the bill, was to guarantee stability of ownership with regard to the country ’ s strategic natural resources. In parallel with this Act, a restitution bill was being prepared, the latter being prompted by the restitution demands of persons who lost their property in the process of nationalisation, including the property referred to in section 1 of the 2001 Act; [it] was to prescribe the right to indemnity. However, the Restitution Bill has not been enacted. It cannot be concluded that section 7 of the 2001 Act concerns solely the claims of those persons who asserted them prior to the enactment of the 2001 Act; the 2001 Act does not properly indicate the category of eligible persons. There are no grounds to equate indemnity with compensation ...

There is reference in section 7 of the 2001 Act to future indemnification, but the indemnity is not specified with regard to an eligible subject, its nature or the amount. The plaintiff ’ s claim concerns compensation for damage caused by legislative omission, and thus the failure to have a claim due to her satisfied. Therefore, the lack of necessary elements of a claim in section 7 of the 2001 Act cannot be supplemented with reference to the amount of a benefit (indemnity), if a [right to] claim has not been conferred, regardless of the possibility that a court would determine the scope of indemnity on the basis of the rules laid down in the Civil Code and regardless of the defendant ’ s obligation to compensate ...

The content of section 7 of the 2001 Act, analysed in accordance with the rules of textual, logical and systemic interpretation leads to the conclusion that it does not contain an obligation to enact specific provisions concerning indemnities, the eligible subjects and the entity responsible for indemnification. It (section 7 of the 2001 Act) does not indicate the subjective scope of the future normative act, which was to prescribe the rules of indemnification, the criteria to be fulfilled by the eligible persons and the means of determining the amount of benefits. It is not feasible that these deficiencies would be fulfilled in by a court alone ... It should be emphasised that the rules of civil liability, including for legislative omission, were a means of protecting the existing subjective rights, and not the source of their creation.”

“The interpretation of the law should respect the protection of an individual ’ s interests ensured by the domestic law as well as by the Convention and the EU law. The appellant is not right [in saying] that the interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act and Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution does not respect the protection of property as provided by these regulations and the relevant case-law. Her allegation in this regard comes from an unfounded assertion that the plaintiff was conferred [a right to] claim by section 7 of the 2001 Act, from which also results a further obligation to enact a legal regulation ... A direct reliance on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and its interpretation in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights was not justified, since the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a [right to] claim asserted in the proceedings had been conferred on her.”

8. Decision of the Constitutional Court of 25 November 2015, case no. Ts 248/13

53. In its final decision on the admissibility of a constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, held in so far as relevant:

“The situation in issue is that the legislature had the intention of comprehensively regulating (in the Restitution Bill) the question of indemnities for property lost under the previous regime, but this has never been done. The Restitution Bill was enacted, but after the President exercised his right to veto it, the Sejm did not pass the Restitution Bill again by the majority required under Article 122 § 5 of the Constitution. It should then be stated that it was not the President ’ s action, but the lack of required majority in the Sejm for the Restitution Bill to be subsequently passed, which determined that the Bill did not enter into force.

However, section 7 of the 2001 Act remained in the legal system, and this provision, according to the claimant, constitutes the basis of a subjective right, conferred by the legislature, to satisfy the claims of former owners of land referred to in section 1 of the 2001 Act or their legal successors in the form of pecuniary indemnity ...

The Constitutional Court ... relied on the textual, systemic and teleological interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act. [It] shares the view expressed in the courts ’ case-law that a regulation of claims for indemnity for forest land and other natural resources taken over by the State Treasury does not result from the impugned provision (cf. the resolution of the Supreme Court of 20 December 2012, case no. III CZP 94/12; the Supreme Court ’ s judgments of 29 June 2012, case no. I CSK 547/11, 6 September 2012, case no. I CSK 96/12, 26 June 2015, case no. I CSK 316/14 and the Supreme Administrative Court ’ s judgments of 6 May 2010, case no. I OSK 935/09, 6 August 2010, case no. I OSK 1377/09, 17 March 2011, case no. I OSK 718/10 and 4 October 2011, case no. I OSK 245/11) ...

... it should also be taken into account that this provision (section 7) is an element of the Act, whose purpose is to guarantee stability of ownership with regard to the country ’ s strategic natural resources (section 2) ... . The purpose of the 2001 Act was not to comprehensively regulate the question of compensation for lost natural resources, including for forest land. It follows that the interpretation of the impugned provision (section 7) should be made in the context of the purpose of the 2001 Act and not in isolation from this purpose.

In the Constitutional Court ’ s assessment, the teleolo gical interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act leads to the conclusion that the formulation employed in it, [that] ‘ claims ... shall be satisfied in the form of indemnities [to be] paid from the State budget on the basis of separate provisions ’ , should be read in the light of section 2 of the 2001 Act as a prohibition on non-pecuniary forms of compensation (including restitution in natura ). Such an interpretation was also confirmed in the Supreme Court ’ s case-law ....

The textual, logical and systemic interpretation thus leads to the conclusion that the impugned provision (section 7) does not regulate the question of claims for indemnity in respect of forest land and other natural resources taken over by the State Treasury...

The key issue requiring explanation is, as challenged by the complainant, the lack of normative content in section 7 of the 2001 Act which would create an obligation for the legislature to enact separate provisions enabling the realisation of the right to indemnity ... The Constitutional Court ’ s interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act leads to the conclusion that the legislature did not regulate in it the entitlement to satisfy the claims of former owners. The legislature did not regulate in the challenged Act in a comprehensive, or even partial, manner the issue of indemnities for natural resources, including forest land, taken over by the State, in a way compatible with constitutional requirements. The construction of this provision leads to the acceptance that the legislature left the issue of indemnities to be regulated but has never done so ...

In a situation where section 7 of the 2001 Act does not constitute the basis of the right to indemnity, there is no issue of statutory omission ( pomini Ä™ cie legislacyjne ) consisting of a failure to include in this provision an obligation to enact separate provisions enabling the realisation of this entitlement. This conclusion simply confirms that the legislature deliberately omitted to regulate the question of indemnities for natural resources ... taken over by the State.

The Constitutional Court finds that a judgment in line with the claimant ’ s assertion would oblige the legislature to enact a restitution statute. This, however, is inadmissible, in the light of the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law and the Constitution itself ... The Constitutional Court, as a negative legislator, cannot “supplement” the law by regulations sought by a complainant. ... The question of restitution claims thus requires the enactment of a comprehensive statutory regulation ...

In its decision [of 28 October 2015] in the case no. P 6/13, the Constitutional Court ...held that ‘ there is no formal basis for restitution in the Constitution. The Constitution, in its ethical aspect, rejects the axiology and practices of the communist State, as is evidenced by a passage from its preamble (“Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and human rights were violated in our Homeland”), but approves the evolutionary continuity of the post-war legal order and has no retroactive effect ’ ...

... the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, u pheld the approach adopted in a resolution twenty years earlier and held that ‘ also under the current Constitution of 1997 the scope and forms of restitution are “a controversial issue and [the] solution depends to a large extent on political decisions”. Decisions of this kind definitely go beyond the Constitutional Court ’ s competences. This approach is compatible with the views expressed in earlier judgments, given under the current Constitution, in which the Constitutional Court disagreed with treating the constitutional provisions as a remedy for the legislature ’ s inaction, which would be aimed at the redressing of injustices resulting from nationalisation ’ , It further held that the redressing of these injustices was possible only by the legislature ’ s action (cf. judgment of 24 April 2014, case no. SK 56/12).”

9. The Supreme Administrative Court ’ s case-law

54. In a number of cases, the interested persons applied to the Minister of the State Treasury to be indemnified in respect of the loss of forests, relying on section 7 of the 2001 Act. The Minister refused to consider their applications and those decisions were subsequently challenged before the administrative courts.

COMPLAINT

56. The applicants complained that the courts ’ dismissal of their claim for indemnity for the nationalised forest or, in the alternative, for compensation in respect of legislative omission, amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

THE LAW

A. Joinder of the applications

57. In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides that the present applications should be joined.

B. Complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

58. The applicants complained about the courts ’ dismissal of their claim for indemnity for the nationalised forest or, in the alternative, for compensation in respect of legislative omis sion. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

59. The applicants asserted that they had had the right to indemnity ( rekompensata ) for the nationalised forest or, in the alternative, the right to receive compensation for legislative omission. In their view, this was an asset in the form of a claim protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which therefore could be regarded as “possessions” within the meaning of that provision. They considered themselves to have had a “legitimate expectation” in respect of that claim based on section 7 of the 2001 Act or, in the alternative, in respect of legislative omission based on Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution.

60. In the applicants ’ view, section 7 of the 2001 Act contained a clear obligation to indemnify those who, like the applicants, had fulfilled the statutory conditions of being (i) natural persons and (ii) former owners of strategic natural resources (or their legal successors). The other conditions, namely (iii) payment of indemnity from the State budget and (iv) on the basis of separate provisions, were attributable to the State and the failure to fulfi l l them could not have adversely affected them as persons eligible for indemnity.

61. The applicants contended that section 7 of the 2001 Act, properly interpreted, constituted the basis of a claim for indemnity for the nationalised forest. The fact that section 7 did not prescribe the amount of indemnity could not serve as an argument t o the contrary. Even if section 7 of the 2001 Act were to be considered an incomplete regulation, then it could have been supplemented by appropriate rules contained in other laws. Firstly, it was possible to have recourse to the provisions of the Civil Code, which included rules on setting the amount of compensation. Secondly, there was a possibility of applying by analogy the Act on the realisation of the right to indemnity for property left beyond the present borders of the Polish State.

62. With regard to compensation for legislative omission, the applicants submitted that section 7 included a reference to “separate provisions”. Accordingly, if the domestic courts had considered it necessary to enact these separate provisions, then it would be evident that a failure to do so had given rise to legislative omission causing damage to the applicants. In essence, they could not have realised their right to indemnity as a result of the State ’ s failure to act.

63. In support of their contention regarding legislative omission, the applicants invoked, in particular, the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no. I CSK 547/11; see paragraphs 45-47 above). In that judgment, the Supreme Court acknowledged th at there had been a legislative omission in a case similar to that of the applicants. The applicants maintained that in their case the Supreme Court ’ s unforeseeable interpretation of the conditions applicable to the State ’ s liability for legislative omission had arbitrarily exempted the State from that liability.

64. The applicants argued that attention had to be paid to the context in which the 2001 Act had been enacted, namely that of a debate on the possibility of restitution of property or compensation to former owners. The 2001 Act had been debated in Parliament in parallel with the Restitution Bill. The Restitution Bill had regulated the amount of indemnity and the procedure for payment. However, it had never entered into force due to the President ’ s veto and Parliament had not enacted any other statute in its place. The applicants argued that they had had a “legitimate expectation” to receive an indemnity or compensation for legislative omission since the “separate provisions” referred to in section 7 of the 2001 Act had been enacted, but had not entered into force following the President ’ s veto. In their view, the State had had the intention of regulating the issue of indemnities in a statute and its failure to do so had given rise to a legislative omission.

65. The applicants lastly pointed out that their case was similar to the case of Broniowski v. Poland ([GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004 ‑ V). Like in that case, the State had conferred on them a certain entitlement, namely the right to indemnity for the nationalised forest. However, it had hindered the effective exercise of that right by failing to enact separate provisions which would regulate the manner of indemnification. Furthermore, the courts had refrained from applying the 2001 Act in a manner permitting the effective exercise of the right to indemnity. Lastly, the courts had excluded the State ’ s liability for legislative omission in the case. The combination of the above factors rendered the right to indemnity an illusory right, and that situation was not compatible with the rule of law.

66. The Court notes that the applicants ’ constitutional complaint was rejected on formal grounds (see paragraph 26 above). However, in the circumstances of the case, the Court does not need to determine whether the applicants have complied with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies since the application is, in any event, inadmissible ratione materiae for the reasons set out below.

67. The Court reiterates the principles established under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, relevant for restitution cases, which were summarised in the case of Kopecký v. Slovakia ([GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX):

“(a) Deprivation of ownership or of another right in rem is in principle an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of “deprivation of a right” (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII, with further references).

(b) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee the right to acquire property (see Van der Mussele v. Belgium , judgment of 23 Novembe r 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, § 48, and Slivenko v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99, § 121, ECHR 2002-II).

(c) An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his “possessions” within the meaning of this provision. “Possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argu e that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a cond itional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfi l lment of the condition (see Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, §§ 82-83, ECHR 2001-VIII, and Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, § 69, ECHR 2002-VII).

(d) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the Contracting States to restore property which was transferred to them before they ratified the Convention. Nor does Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 impose any restrictions on the Contracting States ’ freedom to determine the scope of property restitution and to choose the conditions under which they agree to restore property rights of former owners (see Jantner v. Slovakia , no. 39050/97, § 34, 4 March 2003).

In particular, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the exclusion of certain categories of former owners from such entitlement. Where categories of owners are excluded in this way, their claims for restitution cannot provide the basis for a “legitimate expectation” attracting the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Gratzinger and Gratzingerova , cited above, §§ 70-74).

On the other hand, once a Contracting State, having ratified the Convention including Protocol No. 1, enacts legislation providing for the full or partial restoration of property confiscated under a previous regime, such legislation may be regarded as generating a new property right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying the requirements for entitlement. The same may apply in respect of arrangements for restitution or compensation established under pre-ratification legislation, if such legislation remained in force after the Contracting State ’ s ratification of Protocol No. 1 (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 125, ECHR 2004-V).”

68. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining an “asset” may also enjoy the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, where a proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim, the person in whom it is vested may be regarded as having a “legitimate expectation” if there is a sufficient basis for the interest in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming its existence (see Kopecký , cited above, § 52). However, no legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant ’ s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts (see Kopecký , cited above, § 50, and Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 65, ECHR 2007 ‑ I).

69. The Court observes that the applicants ’ complaint did not concern the nationalisation of their legal predecessor ’ s property effected in 1945 to 1946, and thus before the e ntry into force of Protocol No. 1 with regard to Poland on 10 October 1994. In the present proceedings, the applicants contest the domestic courts ’ decisions dismissing their claim of 23 February 2010 for indemnity or, in the alternative, for compensation in respect of legislative omission. The Court ’ s competence to deal with this application is therefore not excluded ratione temporis (see, among many other authorities, Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII).

70. The principal question for the Court is that of the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, namely whether there was a sufficient basis in domestic law, as interpreted by the domestic courts, for the applicants ’ claim to qualify as an “asset” for the purposes of this provision.

71. The Court notes that there were two aspects to the applicants ’ claim. Firstly, they sought indemnity for the nationalisation of their predecessor ’ s forest, relying on section 7 of the Act of 6 July 2001 on the preservation of the national character of the country ’ s strategic natural resources (“the 2001 Act”). In the alternative, they sought compensation for legislative omission consisting of a failure to enact the separate pr ovisions referred to in section 7 of the 2001 Act. With regard to the second aspect, the applicants relied on Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution.

72. With regard to the first aspect, the a pplicants asserted that section 7 of the 2001 Act constituted the basis of their claim for indemnity in respect of the nationalised forest. However, the domestic courts dismissed that contention. The Supreme Court found in the applicants ’ case that section 7 of the 2001 Act did not create for former own ers or their legal successors a claim for indemnity in respect of loss of ownership of the resources listed in section 1 of the 2001 Act, including forests (see paragraph 25 above). It further held that section 7 of the 2001 Act lacked a number of essential elements allowing such a claim to be constructed, including conditions to be fulfilled by persons eligible to be indemnified or the manner of determining the amount.

73. The Supreme Court further refuted the applicants ’ argument that section 7 of the 2001 Act could have been supplemented by the provisions of the Civil Code or the Act of 8 July 2005 on the realisation of the right to indemnity for property left beyond the present borders of the Polish State (“the 2005 Act”, see paragraph 25 above). In its resolution of 20 December 2012, it contrasted the general wording of s ection 7 of the 2001 Act with a detailed regulation on the indemnity for Bug River claimants as prescribed in the 2005 Act (see paragraph 50 above).

74. The Court notes that, beyond the applicants ’ case, the domestic courts consistently interpreted section 7 of the 2001 Act as excluding the possibility of it constituting an independent legal basis for a claim for indemnity. That approach was formulated in the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no. I CSK 547/11) and upheld in its resolution of 20 December 2012 (case no. III CZP 94/12) and the subsequent judgments of that court (see paragraphs 45, 49-50 and 51 above). It was further confirmed by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 53 above). Similarly, in the context of administrative proceedings, the Supreme Administrative Court excluded the possibility of section 7 of the 2001 Act being the basis of a claim for indemnity against the Minister of the State Treasury (see paragraph 55 above).

75. The applicants argued that their case was comparable to Broniowski v. Poland , in that the State had also conferred on them a certain entitlement, namely the right to indemnity for the nationalised forest.

However, the Court finds that the applicants ’ case is clearly distinguishable from the Broniowski case. In the latter case, the applicant ’ s entitlement, described as the “right to credit”, was acknowledged to be, inter alia , a “special property right of a public-law nature” and a “particular proprietary right” of a “pecuniary value” by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court respectively. Those findings of the highest domestic judicial authorities led the Court to conclude in Broniowski that the applicant ’ s entitlement constituted a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 131, ECHR 2004 ‑ V). By contrast, in the present case, the domestic courts consistently rejected the applicants ’ argument that section 7 of the 2001 Act conferred on them a right to indemnity. Furthermore, as observed by the Court of Appeal, the Decree on agrarian reform and the Decree on the nationalisation of certain forests did not establish rights to compensation in respect of property transferred to the State under them (see paragraph 20 above).

76. The Court also considers that the fact that a domestic statute confers a certain entitlement on one category of claimants (here Bug River claimants) does not require the State to provide compensation to a distinct category of potential claimants seeking restitution of their property. It reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not restrict the freedom of Contracting States to choose the conditions under which they agree to restore property rights to dispossessed persons or to determine the arrangements whereby they agree to indemnify or compensate the persons concerned (see Von Maltzan and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01 and 2 others, § 77 in fine , ECHR 2005 ‑ V).

77. It should also be noted that in a case similar to the applicants ’ , the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff ’ s failure to demonstrate that section 7 of the 2001 Act conferred on her a right to claim for indemnity resulted in the finding of an absence of “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 52 above).

78. With regard to the second aspect of the applicants ’ claim, namely compensation for legislative omission, the Court notes that it was also dismissed by the domestic courts. The Supreme Court found in the applicants ’ case that section 7 of the 2001 Act was a declaratory provision, which contained only the legislature ’ s announcement concerning a future statute on the question of indemnities and did not comprise an explicit obligation to enact another statute. In this connection the Supreme Court noted, inter alia , that section 7 of the 2001 Act did not sufficiently specify the content of the said “separate provisions”, with regard to the subjective scope of a future statute, the conditions of eligibility for indemnification and the rules of determining the amount.

79. The applicants relied, inter alia , on the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 29 June 2012 (case no. I CSK 547/11, see paragraph 46 above), claiming that the court had acknowledged that there had been a legislative omission in a case similar to theirs. The Court notes, however, that the Supreme Court ’ s position in the above-mentioned judgment appears to be an isolated example and has not been followed in its subsequent case-law. Moreover, the Supreme Court confirmed in that judgment that the textual interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act left no doubt that the provision did not establish any rights to compensation. The court ’ s conclusion was based on a systemic and functional interpretation of the re levant provision (see paragraph 47 above).

80. The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed its position, as taken in the applicants ’ case, that section 7 of the 2001 Act simply contained a proclamation of the legislature ’ s intention as to the manner of satisfying the future claims asserted by former owners of forests (see the Supreme Court ’ s resolution of 20 December 2012 and its judgment of 26 June 2015; see paragraphs 49-50 and 51 above). The Constitutional Court also endorsed that approach (see paragraph 53 above). This being so, the Court cannot agree with the applicants ’ assertion as to the alleged unforeseeable interpretation of the conditions relating to the State ’ s liability for legislative omission in their case.

81. The Court notes that the domestic courts had regard to two further elements in their interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act. Firstly, they observed that the 2001 Act alone, without the Restitution Bill, was not intended to give rise to any financial obligatio ns for the State (see paragraph 50 above). The Court would add that whatever Parliament ’ s intention, the latter did not pass the Restitution Bill in accordance with the constitutional requirements, following the President ’ s veto. Secondly, the domestic courts took into account the purpose of the 2001 Act which was, in their view, to guarantee stability of ownership with regard to the country ’ s strategic natural resources and implied that future compensation would take a form of pecuniary indemnity alone (see the Supreme Court ’ s resolution of 20 December 2012 and the Constitutional Court ’ s decision of 25 November 2015, paragraphs 49-50 and 55-56 above).

82. The Court notes that the domest ic courts, having carried out a thorough analysis of the case, dismissed the applicants ’ claim for indemnity in respect of the nationalised forest or, in the alternative, for compensation in respect of legislative omission. The applicants took issue with the interpretation and application of the domestic law in their case. However, the Court reiterates that its jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been correctly interpreted and applied is limited and that it is not its function to take the place of the national courts, its role being rather to ensure that their decisions are not flawed by arbitrariness or otherwise manifestly unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Anheuser ‑ Busch Inc , cited above, § 83).

83. In the present case, the Court cannot discern any arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness in the domestic courts ’ decisions. On the contrary, those decisions reveal a consistent thread that claims for indemnity under section 7 of the 2001 Act, or for legislative omission under Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution, as brought by the applicants, were unfounded in terms of domestic law. There are therefore no grounds on which the Court can reach a different conclusion as to the lack of basis for the applicants ’ claims in domestic law. Furthermore, seeing that there was a dispute as to the interpretation of section 7 of the 2001 Act as well as Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution, and that the applicants ’ arguments were rejected, the Court finds that the applicants cannot be regarded as having had a legitimate expectation, let alone any rights, with regard to the claims submitted by them in the domestic courts (see Kopecký , § 50, and Anheuser-Busch Inc. , § 65, both cited above).

84. The Court concludes that the applicants have not shown that they had claims that were sufficiently established to be enforceable, and they therefore cannot argue that they had “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

85. It follows that the applicants ’ complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

For these reas ons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to join the applications;

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 5 October 2017 .

Abel Campos Kristina Pardalos Registrar President

Appendix

No.

Application no.

Lodged on

Applicant

Date of birth

Place of residence

Represented by

19875/13

04/03/2013

Marie Izabella ZAMOYSKI-BRISSON

03/05/1937

Rawdon, Canada

Bogusław KOSMUS

Krzysztof

GOTKOWICZ

19906/13

04/03/2013

Andrzej Tomasz Jan ZAMOYSKI

03/11/1938

York, the USA; the applicant died on 8/10/2014; his sister and heir, Hedwige Marie Yolande Zamoyski wishes to pursue the application;

Bogusław KOSMUS

Krzysztof

GOTKOWICZ

19921/13

04/03/2013

Annette Maria ZAMOYSKI

27/05/1960

West Napanee, Canada

Bogusław KOSMUS

Krzysztof

GOTKOWICZ

19935/13

04/03/2013

Hedwige Marie Yolande ZAMOYSKI

08/05/1950

Carlsbad, the USA

Bogusław KOSMUS

Krzysztof

GOTKOWICZ