AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 22172/93

                      by Georgi Lukov ROMANOV

                      against Hungary

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 13 April 1993 by

Georgi Lukov ROMANOV against Hungary and registered on 6 July 1993

under file No. 22172/93;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the Commission's decision of 13 April 1994 to request specific

     information from the Government;

-    the information submitted by the respondent Government on

     20 May 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 31 July 1994;

-    the Commission's decision of 6 April 1995 to communicate the

     application;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     1 August 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 8 February 1995;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Bulgarian citizen born in 1958 and living in

Bulgaria.  He is a car-dealer by profession.  In the proceedings before

the Commission, he was represented by his wife, Mrs. T.Y. Romanova.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

     On 27 February 1992 the applicant and other Bulgarian citizens

were arrested at the Hungarian-Romanian border.  The Békés Regional

Police (Megyei Rendorfokapitányság) found that there was a strong

suspicion that the applicant, acting as accomplice, had attempted

illegally to export a car, a Lancia Delta, from Hungary and thereby

committed a currency offence within the meaning of S. 309 para. 4 (a)

of the Hungarian Penal Code (1978. évi IV. Törvény a Bünteto

Törvénykönyvrol)).   Moreover, taking into account that he was a

foreigner and not resident in Hungary, the Police found that, in

accordance with S. 91 para. 1 and S. 92 para. 1 (a) - (b) of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (1973. évi I.Törvény a Büntetoeljárásról), there

was a risk of the applicant's absconding or of collusion, if he were

left at large.

     On 28 February 1992 the applicant was questioned on the above

charge against him, however, he chose to remain silent.

     At the same day, the Investigation Department (Vizsgálati

Osztály) of the Békés Regional Police opened preliminary investigations

against the applicant and other suspects on the suspicion of having

been involved in numerous offences, namely taking over cars in Budapest

from at that time unknown persons and exporting them illegally with

presumably forged documents.  According to the results of the police

investigations, one of the seized cars had been stolen in Italy.

Moreover, forged banknotes had been found with the other suspects.

     On 2 March 1992 the Békéscsaba District Court (Városi Bíróság)

ordered the applicant's detention on remand until 2 April 1992.

     The District Court found that the applicant was suspected of a

currency offence under S. 309 of the Penal Code.  The Court considered

that, should the applicant be left at large, there was a serious risk

that he would hide from the authorities, abscond or obstruct the

proceedings by cooperating with his accomplices, within the meaning of

S. 92 para. 1 (a) and (b) and S. 379/A para. 1 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

     The District Court, referring to the investigations carried out

so far, stated that the applicant had travelled to Hungary by car on

23 February 1992 and had spent some time on a Budapest camping place,

where also two other Bulgarian citizens had stayed.  The two latter had

come to Hungary in order to take over, from a third person, a car, and

to pay this person DM 9,000 and US$ 2,700.  The District Court

continued that this third person, whose identity could not yet be

established, had come to Hungary in the applicant's car, therefore they

had presumably known each other closely.  Upon delivery of the car

concerned, which according to its papers belonged to a person residing

in Germany, the applicant had received the above foreign currencies.

The two other suspects had intended to leave the territory of Hungary

at the Romanian-Hungarian border without possessing the necessary

export permission for the car.  The applicant had intended to cross the

border at the same time.

     On 5 March 1992 the Békéscsaba District Prosecutor's Office

(Varosi Ügyészség) dismissed the applicant's complaint against the

police.  In its comments on the applicant's complaint, the

Investigation Department of the Békés Regional Police noted that the

suspicion against the applicant had been confirmed by the statements

of two of the other suspects.

     Moreover, in March 1992 the Hungarian investigation authorities

obtained further information, inter alia, about the origin of the

above-mentioned Lancia Delta car as well as a further car, which had

been seized in the context of the proceedings.  Furthermore, at the

Békéscsaba Police Station, letters were discovered, some addressed to

the applicant by one of the other detainees and one drafted by the

applicant, which contained  information and advice with a view to

coordinating the statements of all suspects.

     On 27 March 1992 the Békéscsaba District Court decided to extend

the duration of the applicant's detention until 2 June 1992, at the

latest.  The Court, referring to the relevant provisions of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, considered that the reasons which had initially

necessitated the order of detention on remand persisted.  On 14 April

1992 the Békés Regional Court (Megyei Bíróság) dismissed the

applicant's appeal against the decision of 27 March 1992, finding that

the District Court's reasoning was correct.

     Between 13 April and 5 May 1992 the Investigation Department

heard various witnesses and suspects and also arranged for several

confrontations, inter alia, between the applicant and two further

suspects.  The Department communicated with Interpol Rome and Wiesbaden

regarding the persons suspected of being involved in the above

offences, or about the cars concerned.  The Department further

cooperated with the Bulgarian authorities.

     At a hearing on 12 May 1992, the applicant was informed that,

according to the results of the investigations at that stage, the above

cars type Lancia Delta and a further car seized in the context of the

proceedings, respectively, had presumably been stolen and that there

was a strong suspicion that he had participated in two counts of

receiving of stolen goods.  The applicant protested his innocence.

     On 27 May 1992 a single judge at the Békés Regional Court

extended the duration of the applicant's detention on remand until

2 August 1992, at the latest.  The Regional Court, referring to the

relevant legal provisions, stated that the reasons for detaining the

applicant on remand persisted.  The applicant's appeal was dismissed

by a Chamber of the Regional Court on 11 June 1992.

     On 3 June 1992 the Investigation Department of the Békés Regional

Police ordered the search of the applicant's personal belongings which

were deposited at the Police Station where he was detained on remand.

The search was carried out by a police officer in the presence of the

applicant, an interpreter and two witnesses. 9,000 DM and 2,700 US$

were found and seized.  According to the reasons of the seizure order,

there was a strong suspicion that the above sums had been given to the

applicant in Budapest on 26 February 1992.  The applicant refused to

sign the protocol concerning the search and lodged a complaint about

the seizure, stating that the money was his own and that he had an

official permission for exporting it.  His complaint was dismissed by

the Békés Regional Prosecutor's Office on 16 June 1992.

     On 24 July 1992 a single judge at the Békés Regional Court

extended the duration of the applicant's detention on remand until

2 October 1992, at the latest.  The decision again referred to the

relevant legal provisions and stated that the initial reasons for

detaining the applicant on remand persisted.  The applicant's appeal

was dismissed by a Chamber of the Regional Court on 4 August 1992.

     On 30 September 1992 the Hungarian Supreme Court (Magyar

Köztársaság Legfelsöbb Bírósága) extended the duration of the

applicant's detention on remand until 2 March 1993.  The Supreme Court

found in particular that there was a strong suspicion that the

applicant, together with an accomplice prosecuted in the same set of

proceedings, had sold about sixty-eight cars, partly stolen, which they

had imported from Italy and exported to Bulgaria.  It also stated that

the investigations, in particular in cooperation with Interpol, could

not yet be terminated.  The Supreme Court noted that in the course of

his detention on remand the applicant had attempted to establish

contact with other detainees with a view to harmonise their statements

on the charges against them.  The Court considered that, having regard

to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant, there was a

serious risk of his absconding or obstructing the investigations.

     On 16 October 1992 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Head

of the Investigation Department of the Békés Regional Police that no

decision prolonging the applicant's detention had been served on him

or on the applicant, and he applied for the applicant's release.  In

his submissions, the lawyer stated that he had only been orally

informed by the Békés Regional Prosecutor's Office about such a

decision.  The applicant's lawyer subsequently also raised this

complaint with the Prosecutor General of the Region of Békés (Megye

Foügyésze) and the Regional Prosecutor's Office.  Moreover, he informed

the authorities about the applicant's poor health and apparently also

raised the question of the applicant's release on bail.  He further

complained about the delay of the investigations.

     On 26 February 1993 the Supreme Court decided to extend the

duration of the applicant's detention on remand until 24 July 1993.

The Supreme Court found that the reasons justifying the applicant's

detention on remand persisted.  In particular, taking into account the

result of the investigations, the applicant could reasonably be

suspected of having committed the criminal offence of receiving stolen

goods of an important value as well as of other offences.  Moreover,

considering the conduct of the applicant and of further suspects in the

course of the investigations, there was a danger of the applicant's

absconding or obstructing the investigations.

     At that stage of the proceedings, the investigation authorities

continued hearing numerous witnesses and also obtained expert evidence.

     On 2 March 1993 the applicant's lawyer was informed orally that

the Supreme Court had further prolonged the applicant's detention on

remand.

     On 30 March 1993 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian

Republic informed the Bulgarian Embassy in Budapest about the

applicant's case and also explained that the investigations had been

delayed due to the late replies by foreign investigation authorities.

     On 6 May 1993 the Békéscsaba District Court dismissed the

applicant's request for release.  The District Court referred to the

Supreme Court's decision of 26 February 1993, prolonging the

applicant's detention on remand.  The District Court noted the

applicant's complaint about the length of his detention on remand, and

his submissions that he was seriously suffering from his detention.

Referring to the relevant legal provisions, the Court considered that

the reasons which had necessitated the order and the prolongation of

his detention on remand persisted.  In this respect, the District Court

stated that, taking into account the severity of the criminal offences

committed by the applicant and his foreign nationality, there was a

serious risk of his absconding or obstructing the proceedings.

     On 12 May 1993 the preliminary investigations against the

applicant were closed.  The charges against him were amended to the

effect that he had participated in two counts of receiving stolen cars.

     On 26 May 1993 the Békéscsaba District Court rejected the

applicant's renewed request for release on the ground that he had not

presented any new arguments.

     In his letter of 1 July 1993, the Deputy of the Prosecutor

General (Legfobb Ügyéesz Helyettese) "offered" (felajánlás) the

criminal proceedings against inter alia the applicant to the Prosecutor

General of the Republic of Bulgaria, i.e. the latter was requested to

initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant, pursuant to S. 80

para. 1 of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance on Civil, Family and

Criminal Matters of 1966.  The Bulgarian authorities were informed

about the charges against the applicant, and they were asked to inform

the Hungarian authorities about the outcome of their proceedings.

     On 21 July 1993 the Békés Regional Prosecutor's Office terminated

the applicant's detention on remand on the ground that the criminal

proceedings against him had been "offered" to the Prosecutor General

of the Republic of Bulgaria.  On the same day the Hungarian police

authorities issued a decision on the transfer (kiutasítás) of the

applicant to Bulgaria as well as a prohibition of entry into the

territory of Hungary until 2003.  Furthermore, they ordered the

applicant's detention with a view to his transfer to Bulgaria.  The

transfer was effected either on 21 or 22 July 1993.

     It appears that the applicant was subsequently released by the

Bulgarian authorities, and he was allegedly not prosecuted for the

above-mentioned offences.  The Hungarian authorities have not been

informed by the Bulgarian authorities about the outcome of the

proceedings against the applicant.

     On 22 June 1995 the Department Supervising Criminal

Investigations (Nyomozásfelügyeleti Foosztálya) at the Prosecutor

General's Office quashed the decision of the Békés Regional

Prosecutor's Office of 16 June 1992 which had confirmed the seizure of

DM 9,000 and US$ 2,700  belonging to the applicant.  The Department

ordered that these sums, deposited with the Hungarian National Bank,

be paid back to the applicant.

B. Relevant domestic law

1.   Detention on remand

     Detention on remand is governed by SS. 92 to 97 and SS. 379/A

to 380 of the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure (1973. évi I.

Törvény a Büntetoeljárásról).

     S. 92 para. 1 provides as follows:

     "Detention on remand of a person charged with a criminal offence

      can take place for crimes punishable with imprisonment, if

     a.    the person absconded, hid from the authorities, or, because

           of the severity of the crime or for other reasons there is

           a risk of his or her absconding;

     b.    there is a serious risk that the person would obstruct or

           render more difficult or endanger the proceedings if

           released;

     c.    the person committed a further crime, also punishable with

           imprisonment, during the proceedings, or there is a serious

           risk that he or she might complete the crime which he or

           she prepared or attempted to commit or that the person

           would commit another crime."

     According to S. 93 para. 1 detention on remand is ordered by a

court.  As regards the competence of the different levels of courts to

decide on prolongations of detention on remand, S. 95 provides that

detention on remand, when ordered prior to the indictment, may last

until the decision of the court in the preliminary proceedings before

trial, up to a maximum of one month.  Detention on remand can be

prolonged by the District Court on one occasion, for two months at the

most.  After three months, detention on remand can be prolonged by a

single judge of the Regional Court, on up to two occasions, but may not

continue beyond one year after the remand order.  Thereafter, the

duration of detention on remand can only be extended by the Supreme

Court.

     S. 96 para. 1 provides that the authorities must aim at keeping

the length of detention on remand as short as possible.  If the person

charged with a criminal offence is detained on remand the proceedings

have priority.   According to S. 96 para. 2, detention on remand must

be immediately terminated when the reasons for it are no longer valid

or if the period of it expires without extension.

     S. 379/A provides that the court orders detention on remand upon

the request of the prosecutor.  The latter brings the suspect before

the court and informs the defence counsel.  The court then holds a

hearing at which the prosecutor presents the evidence supporting the

motion in writing or orally.  The suspect and the defence counsel may

make oral statements.  The hearing can take place in the absence of the

defense counsel.  The prosecutor may make a motion to the court for the

extension of the detention on remand five days before the expiry of the

deadline of the current detention order.  A suspect's motion for

release is sent to the court via the prosecutor.  The court holds a

hearing when there are new circumstances necessitating it; otherwise

decides without a hearing.

     S. 379/B para. 1 states that the general rules on appeals against

court decisions apply to appeals against court decisions ordering

coercive measures unless provided otherwise in paragraphs 2 - 6.

According to paragraph 2, the prosecutor, the suspect and the defence

counsel may appeal against the decision of the court.  If counsel was

not present at the hearing, he may announce the appeal within three

days as from the hearing.  If the decision was taken in camera, there

is a time-limit of three days as from the service of the decision

concerned.   Furthermore, S. 379/B para. 6 provides that the decision

on the appeal is taken, within a period of five days, by a single judge

at the Regional Court, if a District Court decision is concerned, and

by a chamber of the Regional Court, if a decision taken by a single

judge of the Regional Court is at issue.

     According to S. 380 para. 2, if the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to S. 95 para. 1 to decide on the prolongation

of the detention on remand ordered prior to the indictment, the

Prosecutor General applies for the prolongation.  Paragraph 2 provides

that if the period of detention on remand as fixed by the Supreme Court

has expired without and indictment having been filed, the Prosecutor

General lodges a further application for prolongation of the detention

on remand.

     S. 393/A para. 1 provides that, if an accused resides abroad, the

court, or, at the early stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor may,

on the accused's request, authorise the proceedings to continue in the

accused's absence on payment of a security.

     At all stages of the proceedings, the accused is entitled to

lodge any requests and comments, to request information from the

authorities about his rights and obligations as under criminal

procedure law, and to ask questions from any person heard at a court

session, in accordance with S. 44 para. 5.

2.   Seizure

     According to S. 101 para. 1 the authority can seize any item

which is a material evidence or which can be confiscated under the law

or the possession of which is unlawful.  S. 102 para. 1 provides that

the seizure must be terminated immediately if it is no longer necessary

in the interest of the proceedings.  Paragraph 5 provides that the

object which should otherwise be returned to the person charged with

a criminal offence can be withheld for securing a monetary order.

3.   Treaty on mutual legal assistance

     S. 80 para. 1 of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance on Civil, Family

and Criminal Matters between Hungary and Bulgaria provides that the

Contracting Parties shall institute, upon the offer or upon the request

of the other Contracting Party, criminal proceedings according to the

provisions of their own law against their citizens, if there is a

strong suspicion against them of having committed an offence in the

territory of the requesting Contracting Party.  S. 80/B of the Treaty

provides that, if at the time, when the criminal procedure was offered,

the suspect is held in custody or arrest, measures shall be taken for

his/her transfer to the territory of the requested Contracting Party.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the

Convention that his detention on remand was unlawful and not based on

any reasonable suspicion against him.

2.   Moreover, he complains under Article 5 para. 3 about the length

of his detention on remand.  He submits in particular that he was not

released on bail in spite of the existence of the Treaty on Mutual

Legal Assistance between Bulgaria and Hungary and in spite of his

requests to that effect.

3.   The applicant also submits that no court decision ordering his

continued detention on remand was served upon him or his counsel after

the expiry of the period of detention ordered by the Békés Regional

Court on 24 July 1992.  He does not invoke any particular provision of

the Convention.

4.   Furthermore, the applicant complains, without invoking a

provision of the Convention, that the money seized by the Hungarian

authorities during the criminal proceedings against him has not been

returned to him.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 21 June 1993 and registered on

6 January 1994.

     On 13 April 1994 the Commission decided to request specific

information from the Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2  (a) of

the Rules of Procedure.  This information was submitted by the

respondent Government on 20 May 1994 and the observations in reply

submitted by the applicant on 31 July 1994.

     On 6 April 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2

(b) of the Rules of Procedure.

     Following an extension of the time-limit, the Government's

written observations were received on 1 August 1996.

     Following reminders, observations in reply to the Government's

observations were submitted by the applicant's wife on 8 February 1996.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c)

of the Convention that his detention on remand was unlawful and not

based on any reasonable suspicion against him.

     Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1), as far as relevant, provides as

follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

     No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following

     cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

     ...

     c.    the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the

     purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on

     reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it

     is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an

     offence or fleeing after having done so;

     ..."

     The Commission notes that the applicant was arrested on

27 February 1992.  His detention on remand was ordered by the

Békéscsaba District Court on 2 March 1992, and prolonged on 27 March

1992.  The applicant's detention on remand was further prolonged by the

Békés Regional Court on 27 May and 24 July 1992, as well as by the

Supreme Court on 30 September 1992 and 26 February 1993.  Moreover, on

6 May 1993 the Békéscsaba District Court, referring to the Supreme

Court's decision of 26 February 1993, dismissed the applicant's request

for release.  The applicant's detention on remand terminated on 21 July

1993.a.   The Commission recalls that the Convention only governs, for each

Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry into force with

respect to that Party (cf. No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14 p. 146).

     The Commission observes that the applicant's complaint partly

relates to events, i.e. his arrest and the early period of his

detention on remand, which took place prior to 5 November 1992, which

is the date of the entry into force of the Convention and of Protocol

No. 1 with respect to Hungary.

     It follows that the Commission is not competent ratione temporis

to examine this part of the application.

b.   As regards the applicant's continued detention on remand

subsequent to 5 November 1992, the Commission recalls that, for

deprivation of liberty to be lawful under Article 5 para. 1

(Art. 5-1), it must at any given moment fall within the categories of

arrest or detention set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of that

Article (Eur. Court H.R. Winterwerp judgment of 24 October 1979,

Series A no. 33, p. 16, para. 37).

     As regards the conditions laid down in Article 5 para. 1 (c)

(Art. 5-1-c), the Government maintain that the applicant's continued

detention on remand was "lawful" and was ordered in accordance with the

procedure prescribed by Hungarian law.  Moreover, having regard to the

results of the police investigations and also the applicant's conduct

in the course of the proceedings, there were sufficient reasons

justifying the applicant's continued detention.

     The applicant contradicts this view and argues in particular that

there was no serious reason to suspect him of having committed any

criminal offence.  He claims that he did not commit any criminal

offence and, in support, he points out that he was not prosecuted

following his transfer to Bulgaria.

     The Commission recalls that although it is not normally the task

of the Convention organs to review the observance of domestic law by

the national authorities, it is otherwise in relation to matters where,

as here, the Convention refers directly back to that law; for, in such

matters, disregard of the domestic law entails breach of the Convention

with the consequence that the Convention organs can and should exercise

a certain power of review.  However, the logic of the system of

safeguard established by the Convention sets limits on the scope of

this review.  It is in the first place for the national authorities,

notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law, even in

those fields where the Convention "incorporates" the rules of that law:

the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly

qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Winterwerp judgment, 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33,

p. 20, para. 46, Kemmache (no. 3) judgment of 24 November 1994, Series

A no. 296-C, p. 87, para. 37).

     In the present case, the applicant was detained in accordance

with S. 92 para. 1 (a) and (b) and S. 379/A para. 1 of the Hungarian

Code of Criminal Procedure.  The deprivation of liberty in question

therefore had a legal basis under Hungarian law.

     Lawfulness further implies conformity with the substantive and

the procedural rules of domestic law and also with the purpose of

Article 5 (Art. 5), namely to protect individuals from arbitrariness

(cf., Eur. Court H.R., Winterwerp judgment, cited above, p. 18, para.

39).

     The Hungarian Supreme Court, when deciding to prolong the

applicant's detention on remand, considered that there was a strong

suspicion that the applicant had been involved in committing a currency

offence and also the offence of receiving stolen goods.  Furthermore,

the Supreme Court considered that, having regard to the seriousness of

the charges against the applicant, there was a serious risk of the

applicant's absconding or obstructing the investigations.  In this

respect, the Supreme Court had regard to the applicant's attempt, in

the course of his detention on remand, to establish contact with the

other suspects detained on remand with a view to harmonise their

statements.  The Commission finds that this reasoning disclose neither

abuse of authority nor arbitrariness.  Consequently, there is no

appearance that the applicant's detention on remand was not "lawful"

within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1).

     As a second condition, Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c)

requires that there was a reasonable suspicion of the arrested person

having committed the offence, or offences, in question.  The

persistence of reasonable suspicion is a conditio sine qua non for the

validity of the continued detention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Letellier

judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207, p. 18, para. 35).

     The Commission recalls that it is not necessary to justify

detention on remand that the reality and nature of the charges laid

against the prisoner should be definitely proved, since this is the

purpose of the official powers of investigation, and detention is

designed to allow this process to proceed unhindered (No. 8118/77,

Dec. 19.3.81, D.R. 25 p. 120; No. 10803/84, Dec. 16.12.87, D.R. 54

p. 38).

     In the present case, the Supreme Court, both in its decisions of

30 September 1992 and 26 February 1993, referred to the reasoning of

the earlier court decisions ordering the applicant's detention on

remand and its continuation, respectively.  In this respect, the

Commission notes that the District Court, in its decision of March

1992, had ordered the applicant's detention on remand pursuant to S. 92

para. 1 (a) and (b) and S. 379/A para. 1 of the Hungarian Code of

Criminal Procedure on the ground that, according to the police

investigation, the applicant was suspected of having been involved in

the attempted illegal export of a car from Hungary.  The Supreme Court

further took the results of the ensuing investigations into account,

according to which there was a strong suspicion that the applicant and

a further suspect had sold about sixty-eight cars which, partly stolen,

they had imported from Italy and exported to Bulgaria.  At an early

stage of these investigations, the suspicion against the applicant, who

had been arrested with the other suspects in the attempt of illegally

exporting a car, had been confirmed by the statements of two of the

other suspects.  The illegal origin of this as well as of other cars

as well as details regarding the identity of the suspects was

established in the ensuing proceedings, inter alia in cooperation with

Interpol Rome and Wiesbaden.

     In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

Hungarian courts could reasonably suspect the applicant of having

committed the criminal offences in question.

     The applicant's submissions do not, therefore, disclose any

appearance of a violation of his right under Article 5 para. 1

(Art. 5-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2.   The applicant further complains under Article 5 para. 3

(Art. 5-3) of the Convention about the length of his detention on

remand.

     Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) provides as follows:

     "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions

     of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly

     before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise

     judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable

     time or to release pending trial.  Release may be conditioned by

     guarantees to appear for trial."

     The Commission notes that the applicant was arrested on

27 February 1992 and released on 21 July 1993.  His detention thus

lasted altogether almost one year and five months.   However, the

applicant spent a first period of eight and a half months in detention

on remand prior to the ratification of the Convention by Hungary on

5 November 1992.  This period would, if considered alone, fall outside

the scope of the Commission's considerations ratione temporis.

Nevertheless, it must be taken into account when assessing the

reasonableness of the subsequent period of the applicant's detention

on remand (cf. mutatis mutandis Eur. Court H.R., Neumeister judgment

of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, p. 37, para. 6;  Ringeisen judgment

of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, pp. 41-42, para. 101; Foti and others

judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, para. 53;  Pretto

and others judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A no. 71, p. 14,

para. 30).

     The Commission recalls that it falls in the first place to the

national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the

pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable

time.  To this end they must examine all the circumstances arguing for

and against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest

justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of

innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty

(Eur. Court H.R., Toth judgment of 12 December 1991, Series A no. 224,

p. 18, para. 67).

     The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person

arrested has committed an offence is a conditio sine qua non for the

validity of the continued detention, but, after a certain lapse of

time, it no longer suffices: the Convention Organs must then establish

whether the other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continued

to justify the deprivation of liberty.  Where such grounds were

"relevant" and "sufficient", the Convention Organs must also ascertain

whether the competent national authorities displayed "special

diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (Eur. Court H.R., Toth

judgment, loc. cit.).

     The Government submit that, considering the number of suspects,

witnesses and experts heard as well as the international implications

of the case which required the Hungarian authorities to obtain further

information from abroad, the length of the applicant's detention on

remand did not exceed a reasonable time.  In this respect, the

Government refers to the difficulties in combatting international,

organised crime, and in particular the illegal trade of stolen cars,

in Central and Eastern Europe.

     The applicant claims in particular that he should have been

released on bail.

     The Commission notes that the Hungarian courts, when ordering the

applicant's continued detention on remand, found that there was a risk

of his absconding and a danger of collusion.

     The competent courts, when considering the risk of the

applicant's evading trial, had regard to his situation as a foreigner

without residence in Hungary and the seriousness of the charges against

him.  The Commission finds that the applicant's submissions do not

contain any element to show that there was no danger of his absconding,

even if released on bail.

     As regards the danger of collusion, the Hungarian courts based

themselves not only on the severity of the charges against him, but in

particular on his conduct while detained on remand, namely his attempt

to contact other suspects involved in the investigations and detained

on remand (cf., Eur. Court H.R., Letellier judgment, loc. cit., p. 19,

para. 43).  The Commission considers that, while the particular event

referred to by the judicial authorities occurred in March 1992, i.e.

at the very early stage of the applicant's detention, there was

sufficient reason to assume that, given the complexity of the

investigations involving several persons suspected of being involved

in organised international crime, there was a danger of collusion

throughout the investigation proceedings, if the applicant were

released.

     With regard to the conduct of the competent national authorities,

the Commission observes that the applicant had been apprehended on the

occasion of one count of a currency offence.  However, the ensuing

investigations related to numerous suspects and other offences,

including receiving of stolen cars, committed on an international

level.  These investigations necessitated extensive taking of evidence

and also cooperation with foreign investigation authorities.  The

Commission recalls that the right of an accused in detention to have

his case examined with particular expedition must not unduly hinder the

efforts of the judicial authorities to carry out their tasks with

proper care (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Toth judgment, loc. cit., para. 77).

In the present case, there is no indication that the Hungarian

authorities did not act with all the necessary dispatch.

     The Commission, weighing all circumstances, finds no reason to

conclude that the length of the applicant's detention on remand

exceeded a reasonable time.  Accordingly, there is no appearance of a

violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

3.   The applicant also submits that no court decision ordering his

continued detention on remand was served upon him or his counsel after

the expiry of the period of detention ordered by the Békés Regional

Court on 24 July 1992.  He does not invoke any particular provision of

the Convention.

     This complaint might raise an issue under Article 5 para. 4

(Art. 5-4) of the Convention, according to which:

     "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention

     shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of

     his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his

     release ordered if the detention is not lawful."

     The Government submit that the provisions of Hungarian law are

in accordance with the requirements under Article 5 para. 4

(Art. 5-4), in particular that the applicant could, and in fact did,

apply for his release.

     The Commission notes that the Supreme Court decided to prolong

the applicant's detention on remand on two occasions, namely in its

decisions of 30 September 1992 and 26 February 1993.  Having regard to

the date of entry into force of the Convention with respect to Hungary,

the Commission is competent ratione temporis to examine the applicant's

complaint relating to the second of the above decisions.

     The Commission observes that the applicant availed himself of the

possibility, under the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure, to lodge,

at any stage, a request for his release from detention on remand.  This

request was decided upon by the Békéscsaba District Court on 6 May

1993, and the applicant could have lodged an appeal.  He was thus

"entitled to take proceedings" before a court in order to test the

lawfulness of his confinement within the meaning of Article 5 para. 4

(Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

     In the proceedings concerning the prolongation of the applicant's

detention, the Supreme Court determined the maximum possible period of

detention on remand.  In these proceedings, the Supreme Court rules on

a request from the Prosecutor General and confines itself to setting

out a framework regarding the accused's continued detention on remand.

It does not therefore itself decide on the appropriateness or the

necessity of keeping the accused in prison or releasing him, because

it does not substitute its own assessment for that of the authority

which has taken the decision.  Nor does it undertake a review of the

"lawfulness of the detention", in other words a review wide enough to

bear on each of those conditions which are essential for detention to

be lawful (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., Toth judgment, loc.

cit., p. 24, para. 87).  These proceedings were conducted separately

from and in addition to the proceedings which the applicant was

entitled to take within the meaning of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of

the Convention.

     The proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the

prolongation of the applicant's detention therefore fall outside the

scope of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4).

     It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

4.   Furthermore, the applicant complains, without invoking a

provision of the Convention, that the money seized by the Hungarian

authorities during the criminal proceedings against him has not been

returned to him.

     The Commission notes that on 3 June 1992 the Department of

Investigation of the Regional Police of Békés seized 9,000 DM and

2,700 US$ which were found with the applicant's personal belongings

deposited in the police station where he was detained.  On 22 June 1995

the Department Supervising Criminal Investigations at the Prosecutor

General's Office quashed the decision of the Békés Regional

Prosecutor's Office of 16 June 1992 which had confirmed the seizure of

9,000 DM and 2,700 US $ belonging to the applicant, and ordered that

these sums, deposited with the Hungarian National Bank, be paid back

to the applicant.  The applicant meanwhile obtained repayment of the

sums concerned.

     In these circumstances, assuming that continued seizure of the

money found with the applicant's belongings in June 1992 raised an

issue under the Convention or its Protocols which could be examined by

the Commission, the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of

such an alleged violation following the decision of 22 June 1995.

     It follows that this part of the application is also inadmissible

under Article 27 (Art. 27) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber       President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)