The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 3 March

1986, the following members being present:

              MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  J. A. FROWEIN

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  B. KIERNAN

                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J. C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  G. BATLINER

                  J. CAMPINOS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

              Mr.  H. C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art. 25);

Having regard to the application introduced on 31 January 1985 by

J.O. against Ireland and registered on 18 March 1985 under

file N° 11446/85;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows:

The applicant, Mr.  James O'Callaghan, a citizen of Ireland born in

1923 is a farmer by profession.  He is married to Rosaleen O'Callaghan

and they have six children.  His eldest son James is totally dependent

on his parents and resides with them in Listowel, County Kerry.  The

applicant is represented in proceedings before the Commission by

Messrs.  Corrigan and Corrigan, Solicitors, Dublin and Mr.  James

O'Reilly, Barrister-at-law, of counsel.

On 1 March 1977, the applicant entered into a contract to purchase a

holding of around 46 acres (18.68 hectares) for £115,000 from

Mr. McGuinness.  The holding is situated in the townland of Drumanagh,

in County Dublin on the east coast of Ireland, an area where the

climate is frost-free and therefore ideal for intense cultivation,

particularly market gardening, as crops can be produced all year

round.  The applicant bought the land with a view to building a family

residence, producing crops and breeding horses, as two of his children

wished to pursue equestrian careers - one son was a junior

international rider.

Drumanagh is the only land in the immediate area that is not tilled

and apparently it has long been used only for grazing purposes. Around

39 acres (15.78 hectares) of the land form a peninsula, projecting

into the sea, distinguished by a Martello tower near the end of the

headland, and also some earthworks.  These earthworks are the remains

of a "promontory fort", defined as "a large defensive encampment

situated on a headland, where the neck of the promontory had been

defended by the construction of banks and ditches."  Such forts date

back over 1000 years and the fort at Drumanagh is considered the best

example of its kind.

The fort had been listed as a national monument in 1970, in accordance

with the National Monuments Act 1930 and the National Monuments

(Amendment) Act 1954 (1).  These Acts empower the Commissioners of

Public Works to list any monument they consider to be of national

importance, make preservation orders and, inter alia, to purchase

monuments compulsorily, subject to payment of compensation.  Section 8

of the 1954 Act requires the Commissioners to publish a list of such

monuments, the preservation of which they consider to be of national

importance.  When it is intended to include a monument in a list the

Commissioners must notify the owner of the monument of that intention.

Section 8(3) of the 1954 Act provides as follows:

_______________

(1) Section 2 of the 1930 Act which defines a "national monument"

states that the expression shall be construed as "including, in

addition to the monument itself, the site of the monument and the

means of access thereto and also such portion of land adjoining such

site as may be required to fence, cover in, or otherwise preserve from

injury the monument or to preserve the amenities thereof ..."

_______________

"Where the owner of the monument which is included in a list ...

proposes to demolish or remove in whole or in part, alter structurally

or make additions to the monument, or make excavations in the

neighbourhood thereof, he shall give notice of his intention to the

Commissioners and shall not, except in the case of urgent necessity

and with the consent of the Commissioners, commence any work of

demolition, removal, alteration, addition or excavation for a period

of two months after having given such notice."

On 18 December 1970, the Commissioners served a notice on

Mr. McGuinness, declaring their intention of listing the monument

in accordance with Section 8.  The notice cited the monument as

"Loughshinny Promontory Fort" situated in the townland of Drumanagh,

Co. Dublin.  In an accompanying letter they included  the definition

of promontory forts as set out above.  The listing which contained a

reference to an ordinance survey map was then duly published in the

"Iris Oifigiúil" (Official Gazette) on 8 October 1971.

During negotiations to buy the land, the applicant was personally

informed by the vendor that the fort was listed as a national

monument.  The applicant states, however, that he had been told by the

vendor that the notice only applied to earthworks at the base of the

headland.  In subsequent proceedings before the courts, it was found

that the notice of listing served on the vendor made it reasonably

clear to anyone living in the district that the Commissioners were

referring to the entire (area) of the headland enclosed by the banks.

While proceeding with the purchase of the land, the applicant's

solicitors were not informed and did not make a specific inquiry from

the vendor's solicitors whether the property was affected by notices

made under the 1954 Act.  Thus no mention was made of the 1970 notice

of listing by the vendor's solicitors at the time of the contract for

sale.

In February/March 1977, before completion of the sale a narrow strip

of land, on the western side of the earthworks, was deeply ploughed by

a contractor on the applicant's behalf.  This ploughing came to the

notice of the Commissioners who carried out an inspection on

5 April 1977 and issued a Preservation Order on 13 April to prevent

further damage to the site.  Notice of the order was served on the

contractor, but the applicant was not living on the lands and

there was difficulty in finding his address, so he was not informed

of the Order until 15/16 May 1977.  The sale was, in the meantime,

completed on 26 April 1977.

The effect of a preservation order is to prevent any excavation,

digging, ploughing or other disturbance "within, around or in

proximity to a Monument" (Section 14(1)(b) of the 1930 Act). The order

affects 84.5% (39 acres; 15.78 hectares) of the applicant's land and

thus severely restricts the applicant's use of the land. He states

that he cannot till it, build a residence, equestrian centre or stud

farm on it, or otherwise use the land for the general agricultural

purposes for which he bought it.

The applicant's solicitors wrote to the Office of Public Works on 31

May 1977 appealing againt the order on the grounds that the land had

been dug and ploughed many times already.  But the Commissioners

refused to revoke the order in view of the archaeological importance

of the site, replying that ploughing in the past would not have caused

as much damage as modern deep ploughing had done.

The following year, on 28 July 1978, the applicant requested planning

permission to build a bungalow at Drumanagh which was refused, on the

grounds inter alia that the land was subject to a preservation order.

The applicant states that since the refusal of planning permission his

family have been forced to split up and live in separate houses,

causing distress and financial strain.  In addition, his younger son

and daughter have had to abandon their chosen careers in show jumping

for their employment.  On the farm where his family resided, which was

sold after the purchase of the lands at Drumanagh, he had constructed

an equestrian centre which had been used by his children.

Under the National Monuments Acts, there is no provision for payment

of compensation to owners of land subject to a preservation order.

The applicant has a gross income of £2,500 from the lands by letting

for grazing.  This is subject to income tax and Public Liability

Insurance, in respect of the members of the public who come to view

the Martello Tower, leaving the applicant with a net income of

approximately £1,100 p.a.

Section 11 of the 1930 Act empowers the Commissioners, with the

consent of the Minister for Finance, to acquire compulsorily or by

agreement any national monument which they consider it expedient to

acquire.  It is the policy of the Commissioners not to acquire

compulsorily national monuments and there appears to be only one

recorded example of such acquisition.  The Commissioners had no

intention of purchasing the applicant's lands.  According to evidence

given in proceedings before the High Court, the Promontory Fort at

Drumanagh is the largest and most important fort in the country.  In

the estimate of an expert witness, it would take approximately

£1,000,000 in 1981 to have excavated the site properly.  The witness

stated that there was no realistic prospect of this excavation taking

place in the foreseeable future.

Constitutional Proceedings before the Irish Courts

On 20 September 1979 the applicant issued High Court proceedings,

challenging the constitutional validity of Section 8 of the 1930 Act

as amended by Section 3 of the 1954 Act.  He submitted that the making

of a preservation order which deprived the applicant of all but

nominal use of the land without compensation constituted an unjust

attack upon his property rights contrary to Art. 40.3. of the

Irish Constitution (1).  He further claimed that the order had been

made in breach of the rules of natural and constitutional justice and

was thus ultra vires by virtue of the failure of the Commissioners

to afford sufficient notice of their intention to make an order and

sufficient opportunity of making objections and representations after

the order had been made.

The action was dismissed by the High Court in a decision dated

4 October 1982.  The applicant's appeal to the Supreme Court was

also rejected in a decision dated 31 July 1984.

The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered by Chief Justice O'Higgins,

found that it was not in dispute that the fort was correctly described

and declared to be a national monument.  Moreover, no question arose

concerning the validity of the 1970 notice of listing or the

applicant's awareness that he had bought land with a listed national

monument on it.  He had then created an "emergency situation" by

ploughing the land without prior notice or consent, and the

Commissioners had acted to protect the monument, as was their duty, by

making the preservation order.

The Court also found that the applicant had an opportunity of applying

for the cancellation of the order in his solicitor's letter of 31 May

1977 which had been treated as an application to revoke the order and

rejected by the Commissioners.  The court did not find such a

procedure to be contrary to requirements of natural justice.

As regards the applicant's constitutional claim, the Court stated that

Art. 40 had to be read in conjunction with Art. 43 which provides that

the right to "private ownership of external goods" ought to  be

"regulated by principles of social justice".  It held that the

legislation was neither arbitrary nor selective and that the State was

preserving the national interest by prohibiting any action which might

harm or destroy a national monument and thus acting in accordance with

the requirements of social justice.  As regards the failure to provide

compensation the Court noted that in certain cases social justice may

not require the payment of any compensation upon a compulsory

acquisition that can be justified by the State as being required by

the exigencies of the common good.  It then added as follows:

_______________

(1)  Article 40.3 provides as follows:

        1.  The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and,

        as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate,

        the personal rights of the citizens.

        2.  The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as

        best it may from unjust attack and in the case of

        injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and

        property rights of every citizen.

_______________

"... in the view of the Court the absence of such a provision for the

payment of compensation to him in respect of a limitation of use of

which he was substantially on notice before his purchase and which is

a requirement of what should be regarded as the common duty of all

citizens - to preserve such a monument, can be no ground for

suggesting that the prohibition or limitation is an unjust attack on

his property rights.  In short, by the impugned statute as the

occasion requires, the State, through Section 8, delimits by law, not

the right of private ownership or the general right to transfer etc.

but the exercise of those rights - in this instance the user of land -

so that user will be reconciled with the exigencies of the common good

..."

The applicant claims that since the determination of his case in the

Irish courts he has discovered that the listing procedures provided

for in the 1930 and 1954 Acts have been incorrectly carried out by the

Commissioners for Public Works.  He has discovered from Reports of the

National Institute of Planning and Research that the monument was also

listed in 1962 although this was not adverted to by either the

applicant or the Commissioners of Public Works in the proceedings.  It

appears that the references in these Reports describe the fort as

covering only the earthworks as opposed to the area of land covered by

the preservation order.  The Commissioners may only make a

preservation order in respect of an area of land included in a listing

order and subsequently published in the Official Gazette.

Moreover, whenever the Commissioners intend to make a listing order in

respect of a national monument which extends beyond a building or

other small area it has been their practice to use multiple

co-ordinates in delineating the area of land affected.  In the case of

the 1962 and 1971 listings of the promontory fort single pairs of

co-ordinates were used which, it is submitted, correspond, at most, to

the earthworks and not the entire promontory fort of 39 acres.

COMPLAINTS AND SUBMISSIONS

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

The applicant submits, with reference to the decision of the European

Court of Human Rights in the Sporrong case, that the preservation

order amounts, in reality, to an expropriation of his land.  He points

out that the effect of the order has been to deprive him of all but a

nominal use of his lands.  In particular he complains that:

-       in return for a purchase price of £115,000 in 1977 he

receives a net income of £1,100 per year;

-       84.5% of his holding has been effectively frozen.  There is no

time limit on the application of the preservation order which remains

in perpetuity until the Commissioners decide otherwise;

-       the re-sale value of the lands is substantially diminished.

The property would currently sell for approximately £1,000 an acre or

less, as land for light grazing;

-       he has been informed by his bankers that the lands are

practically valueless for the purposes of collateral;

-       he is obliged to maintain a public liability insurance on his

lands in respect of members of the public who enter his property;

-       the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland have erected

notices on his land informing the public of the existence of a

national monument.

With reference to the above restrictions on his property he submits

that no reasonable relationship of proportionality exists between the

legitimate aim of protecting and preserving the promontory fort and

the preservation order.  He points out that the proper course for the

Commissioners to take when confronted with an emergency situation was

to make a temporary preservation order under the provisions of the

National Monuments Acts which would have remained in force for a

period of six months.  Furthermore, it would have been open to the

Commissioners to acquire the applicant's lands either by agreement

with the applicant or by availing of the compulsory purchase

procedures provided for by the Acts.

In the alternative the applicant complains that the preservation order

constitutes control of the use of his property within the meaning of

Art. 1, para. 2 (P1-1-2) which is disproportionate, for the above

reasons, to the general interest.  He states that the Commissioners

have acquired the benefits of compulsory acquisition of his property

without the necessity of paying any compensation.  In the applicant's

case 84.5% of his land has been declared a national monument.  This

cannot be justified as being in the general interest where no

compensation is paid and where the order affects such a large part of

his holding and interferes with his livelihood.

He further submits, in the alternative, that the making of the

preservation order without compensation constitutes an unlawful

interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his

possessions.  He refers to the above arguments.

Article 14 (Art. 14) in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1)

The applicant complains that he is the victim of discrimination in the

enjoyment of his right to property.  He points out with reference to

the case of Tormey v. Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland

(Decision of the Supreme Court, unreported, 21.12.71) that in certain

cases compensation has been paid in order to protect national

monuments.  The Commissioners of Public Works can

achieve the protection and preservation of national monuments by

compulsorily acquiring a sizeable area of land and compensating the

dispossessed landowner.

Article 8 (Art. 8) and Article 14 (Art. 14)

The applicant states that it was his intention to build a house and

develop his land in order to set up a new home for himself and his

family.  He has been prevented from doing this by the preservation

order.  As a result, his family, with the exception of his spouse and

eldest son, has been obliged to split up.  Accordingly, he submits

that the action of the authorities constitutes an unjustified

interference with his right to respect for family life in breach of

Art. 8 (Art. 8) and of Art. 14 (Art. 14) in conjunction with Art. 8

(Art. 8).

Object of the application

The applicant seeks a determination that his rights have been violated

by the respondent Government.  He also seeks compensation in respect

of the violation.

THE LAW

1.      The applicant complains that the effect of the preservation

order is to deprive him of his property without compensation.  In the

alternative he submits that it constitutes a control of the use of

property which is disproportionate to the aims pursued.  He invokes

Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), Art. 8 and Art. 14 of the Convention

(Art. 8, art. 14).

As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

2.      This provision states as follows:

Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of

his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except

in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by

law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the

right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control

the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to

secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

General principles of interpretation

3.      The Commission recalls its analysis of the structure of this

provision as developed in its report in the case of Lithgow and Others

against the United Kingdom (Nos. 9006/80, Comm. Report 7.3.84):

"In considering the justification for an interference with property in

the Sporrong and Lönnroth case the Court observed that Article 1

(P1-1) comprises 'three distinct rules'.  The first rule was of a

'general nature' and enounced the principle of 'peaceful enjoyment of

possessions'.  The second rule 'covers deprivation of possessions and

subjects it to certain conditions'.  The third rule was concerned with

control of use of property. The Court observed that before considering

whether the first rule had been complied with it must determine

whether the last two were applicable (Sporrong and Lönnroth Judgment,

Series A, Volume 52, para 61).

However the Commission observes that the three rules

referred to by the Court are not entirely separate or

watertight.  The first 'general' rule contains a general

guarantee of the right of property.  This general guarantee

is then qualified or limited by the second and third rules.

The second and third rules must be interpreted in their

context and in the light of the general guarantee contained

in the first sentence."

4.      The European Court of Human Rights has also stated in the

Sporrong and Lönnroth case that in the absence of a formal

expropriation the realities of the situation complained of must be

examined with a view to ascertaining whether a form of de facto

expropriation has taken place (judgment of 23.9.82, para. 64).

5.      As regards a control of the use of property within the meaning

of the second paragaraph of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2), the

Commission has noted in the case of Mr. and Mrs. Gillow v. the United

Kingdom as follows (Dec. No. 9063/80, Comm. Report. 3.10.84):

"In addition the Commission refers to its analysis in Applications

Nos. 9006/80 and others of the "deprivation rule" in the second

sentence of Article 1 (P1-1) which, like the control of use rule, is a

limitation on the general rule contained in the first sentence.  It

considers that the same considerations, requiring a narrow

construction of this restriction of the general rule must also apply

in respect of the control of property and it follows that, in

exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Commission is required to

consider two questions:  first whether the control legislation pursues

a legitimate aim "in the general interest" and secondly whether the

operation of the legislation and the control thereby exercised on the

applicants' use of the property is proportionate to the legitimate aim

pursued ...   Hence, in the Commission's opinion the control of the

use of property, albeit for a legitimate purpose "in accordance with

the general interest" will violate Article 1 (P1-1) if it is clearly

established that there is no reasonable relationship of

proportionality between the interference with the individual's rights

and the general interest which gives legitimacy to the aim pursued.

It follows that in assessing the necessity of a measure under Article 1

(P1-1) the Commission retains a limited review of the legitimacy of

the aim of the legislation and a fuller review of the proportionality

of the actual interference with the applicant's rights.  This approach

is reflected in the Commission's constant case-law (eg Application

No. 7287/75, X v. Austria, DR 13 p 27; Sporrong and Lönnroth cases,

Report of the Commission para 105) as also in the case-law of the

European Court of Justice (Hauer v. Rheinland Pfalz, Case No 44/79,

1979 ECR, p 3727 at 3747).

While therefore the Commission's approach under the deprivation rule

and the control of use rule is closely parallel, the measure of

proportionality clearly differs in the application of the two rules

since, when viewed in the light of the general rule contained in the

first sentence of Article 1 (P1-1), a deprivation of property is

inherently more serious than the control of its use, where full

ownership is retained.  The principal criterion for establishing

whether a fair balance has now been struck in the control of use of

personal property is therefore the use for which that property was

intended by the individual owner." (paras. 146-148)

Application of general principles to the facts of the case

6.      In the present case the applicant was aware, prior to his

purchase of the property, that the monument was listed and that there

was a clear risk that it might be subject to a preservation order.

Although he may have been under the impression that the monument only

concerned a limited portion of his land, the notice of listing to the

vendor and the subsequent publication of the listing in the Official

Gazette with reference to an ordinance survey map indicated the extent

to which the property was affected.  Furthermore, the courts have held

that the notice of listing made the extent of the land affected

reasonably clear and that the applicant was substantially on notice of

the limitation of use before his purchase of the land.

7.      The Commission considers that the applicant entered into a

contract of sale to buy property subject to the risk of substantial

restrictions on use of which he was or ought to have been aware.

Indeed by the time the property was actually conveyed to him a

preservation order had actually been made in respect of the land.  In

such circumstances it cannot be said that there was an interference

with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions since the

property right which he acquired was already subject to the

restrictions of which he complains.

8.      Nonetheless, even assuming that the continuing restrictions

on the use of his property constitute an interference with his rights

under the first sentence, the Commission does not consider, for the

following reasons, that such interference constitutes a violation of

Art. 1 (P1-1).

9.      The applicant's property is subject to a preservation order

which effectively limits his use of it to the purposes of grazing

cattle.  He is not able to build on it or develop it for agricultural

purposes.  However, he still remains the owner of it and receives an

income from it.  The Commission does not therefore consider that the

continuation of the restriction to which his land was subject when he

purchased it amounts to a deprivation of possessions within the

meaning of the second sentence in the first paragraph.

10.      The preservation order, however, does amount to a control of

the use of property under the second paragraph of Art. 1 (P1-1-2)) since

Section 14(1)(b) of the 1930 Act imposes specific prohibitions on his

use of the land in order to preserve and protect the national

monument.

11.      The Commission observes that the preservation and protection

of national monuments is provided for by law (1930 and 1954 Acts) and

is clearly a legitimate aim pursued in the general interest.  Such a

regulation of land in the interests of preserving the national

heritage is common in most countries.

12.      In addition, it is apparent from the nature of the monument

involved that its effective protection requires restrictions on use of

the breadth set out in Section 14(1)(b) of the 1930 Act.  Moreover

there is no indication that the decision to make a preservation order,

which was caused by the ploughing of the land and the consequent

endangering of the monument, was either arbitrary or selective.

13.      In determining whether a fair balance was struck between the

demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements

of the applicant's fundamental rights, the Commission must again take

into account the fact that the applicant was or ought to have been

aware of the restrictions affecting his property prior to becoming the

owner of it.

14.      The Commission concludes that in the circumstances of the

case the restrictions imposed on the applicant's use of his property

were proportionate to the aims pursued in the general interest and

that they do not constitute a breach of the applicant's property

rights under this provision.

15.      The applicant has also submitted that since the judgment of

the Supreme Court he has discovered that the national monument had

also been listed in 1962 and that various references suggest that the

listing only covered the earthworks as opposed to the entire headland.

This information, however, cannot be taken into account by the

Commission in its examination of the applicant's complaints since

its impact on the validity of the preservation order has not been

submitted to and considered by the Irish courts.

16.       Accordingly the Commission considers that this complaint

must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (Art. 27-2).

As regards Article 14 (Art. 14) in conjunction with Article 1

(P1-1)

17.      The applicant further complains that he is the victim of

discrimination in the enjoyment of his property rights since in

certain cases the Commissioners of Public Works have preserved

national monuments by compulsorily acquiring land and compensating the

landowners.

18.      Art. 14 (Art. 14) states as follows:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention

shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,

race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national

or social origin, association with a national minority, property,

birth or other status."

19.      The applicant's complaint of discrimination under this

provision is twofold:   firstly, that in certain cases the State

chooses to protect national monuments by way of expropriation;

secondly that where property is expropriated compensation is

payable.

20.      As regards the first complaint, the Commission considers that

it lies within the margin of appreciation of the State authorities

whether the achievement of a particular aim in the public interest

should be by way of a deprivation of property or by imposing

restrictions on use.  It is not the role of the Commission to

substitute its judgment in such matters for that of the national

authorities.  The Commission exercises its main control under the

second paragraph by considering the proportionality of the reasons

taken with particular regard to the rights of the individual.  In any

event, the Commission notes that the principal method of preserving

national monuments is by way of a preservation order and that

expropriation for this purpose is a very rare occurrence.  It cannot

be said, therefore, that the decision of the authorities to make a

preservation order was in any respect arbitrary.

21.      As regards the complaint that dispossessed owners are

entitled to compensation, the Commmission recalls its above conclusion

that the restrictions on the applicant's property amount to a control

of use as opposed to a deprivation.  Thus the applicant's situation is

not analogous to that of a person whose property has been

expropriated.  Accordingly, no question of discrimination under the

Convention arises.

22.     It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded under Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention

(Art. 27-2).

As regards Articles 8 and 14 (Art. 8, art. 14)

23.     Finally, the applicant complains that as a result of the

preservation order he has been unable to build a family home.  As a

consequence his family has been obliged to split up.  He invokes

Arts. 8 and 14 (Art. 8, art. 14) in this regard.

24.     However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or

not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of this provision as, under Art. 26 of the Convention

(Art. 26), it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies

have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of

international law.

25.     In the present case the applicant failed to raise the

complaints concerning the protection of his family rights before the

Irish courts, and has not, therefore, exhausted the remedy available

to him under Irish law.  Moreover, an examination of the case does not

disclose the existence of any special circumstances, which might have

absolved the applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of

international law, from exhausting the domestic remedy at his

disposal.

26.     It follows that the applicant has not complied with the

condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and his

application must in this respect be rejected under Art. 27, para. 3,

of the Convention (Art. 27-3).

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER)                       (C. A. NØRGAARD)