MOOSMANN v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 14093/88 • ECHR ID: 001-1162
Document date: October 15, 1991
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 14093/88
by Herbert MOOSMANN
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 15 October 1991, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 22 July 1988
by Herbert Moosmann against Austria and registered on 2 August 1988
under file No. 14093/88;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to :
- the Commission's decision of 7 January 1991 to bring
the application to the notice of the respondent Government
and invite them to submit written observations on its
admissibility and merits;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government
on 27 March 1991 and the observations in reply submitted
by the applicant on 21 May 1991;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Austrian citizen who resides at Lauterach,
Vorarlberg. He is represented by Mr. W.L. Weh, a lawyer practising in
Bregenz.
The facts as agreed between the parties may be summarised as
follows.
The applicant is a member of the "Action Committee Survival"
(Bürgerinitiative Überleben) which was founded to protest against a
road construction project connecting the motorways on the Swiss and
Austrian side of the Rhine valley. The projected road led through one
of the last natural habitats in the Rhine valley which the Action
Committee wished to see preserved. On 8 October 1986 wooden crosses
(symbolising death of nature) were erected along the most probable
line of the road on private properties whose owners had expressly or
tacitly agreed to the protest action.
The member of the Vorarlberg Provincial Government (Landes-
regierung) competent for the department of road construction arrived
on the spot and ordered the workmen of the department to remove the
crosses. The measure was carried out despite objections of the Action
Committee who claimed that it was unlawful for the workmen of the road
construction department to trespass on private property and that the
removal of the crosses amounted to theft. The crosses, some of which
were damaged during the action, were stored on the premises of the
road construction department and subsequently returned to the owners
under a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court
(Bezirksgericht) of Dornbirn.
The applicant and several other persons lodged a complaint
against the removal of the crosses with the Constitutional Court
(Verfassungsgerichtshof). They claimed that the Provincial Government
had ordered the removal in its official capacity, and that the
measure of immediate administrative compulsion unlawfully interfered
with their constitutional rights to freedom of expression and
unviolability of property.
On 13 December 1986 the Constitutional Court, in summary
proceedings under Article 144 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution,
refused to deal with the case which it referred to the Administrative
Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). It considered that the complaint
showed insufficient prospects of success, the alleged unconstitutionality
of the impugned measure being only a consequence of a possible
violation of the ordinary law the respect of which was to be
controlled by the Administrative Court.
The Administrative Court, in a decision of 18 December 1987
which was served on the applicant on 22 January 1988, declared the
complaint inadmissible on the ground that it was not competent to deal
with the matter. The impugned measure could not be regarded as an act
of administrative compulsion. Such an act presupposed the exercise of
public powers while the competence of the member of the Provincial
Government responsible for road construction was limited to acts iure
gestionis. Since the measure thus was not an administrative act
challengeable before the Administrative Court, it could be left open
whether or not it had been lawful.
Other members of the action group laid a criminal information
(Strafanzeige) against the member of the Provincial Government. The
public prosecutor having refused to bring a charge, they requested a
judicial decision on the institution of criminal proceedings. This
request was rejected by the Review Chamber (Ratskammer) of the
Regional Court (Landesgericht) of Feldkirch on 24 August 1987. This
Court, too, considered that the impugned act was one performed iure
gestionis, for which reason there could be no abuse of public powers
within the meaning of Section 302 of the Penal Code. Nor had the
offence of damaging property (Section 125 of the Penal Code) been
committed because an aggregate of things - i.e. the entirety of the
crosses erected on the land - could not be regarded as property within
the meaning of this provision, and because the damage done to some
crosses had only been caused by negligence. Nor was there a
deprivation of property within the meaning of Section 135 of the Penal
Code, because there had been no intent permanently to deprive the
owners of their property.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleges that the above measure unjustifiedly
interfered with his right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by
Article 10 of the Convention, and his right to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to
the Convention. He claims, in particular, that the erection of the
crosses for the purpose of a demonstration was an exercise of his
freedom of expression, and that the removal of and damage to the
crosses interfered with both this freedom and his property rights.
The measure was ordered by a member of the Provincial Government in
his official capacity and is therefore imputable to the Austrian State
under the Convention. Moreover, the measure was unlawful in two
respects: it was ordered by an incompetent organ and had no legal
basis. It was arbitrary and therefore also infringed Article 14 of
the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 22 July 1988 and registered
on 2 August 1988.
On 7 January 1991 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government for observations on its
admissibility and merits. These observations were submitted on
27 March 1991 and the applicant replied on 21 May 1991.
THE LAW
The applicant mainly invokes Article 10 (Art. 10) of the
Convention which guarantees the right to freedom of expression.
The Government submit that the removal of the crosses which
the applicant and others had erected as a protest against a road
construction project constituted an act of the administration in the
sphere of private law (Akt der Privatwirtschaftsverwaltung) and not an
act of sovereign power engaging the State's responsibility under the
Convention. They further argue, in eventu, that domestic remedies are
not exhausted.
The Commission first considers that a civil action for the
return of the crosses would not offer effective redress as it would
only determine the private law issue as to the right of ownership or
possession, not, however, whether the stifling of the purpose for
which the crosses had been erected was justified under Article 10
para. 2 (Art. 10-2) which lays down the conditions under which a State
may interfere with the right to freedom of expression.
The Commission further considers that the question whether the
act complained of constitutes an interference by a public authority
with the right to freedom of expression and if so whether it was
justified raises difficult questions of law which cannot be resolved
at this stage of the proceedings since they require a detailed
examination of the merits.
The Commission also notes that no other ground for
inadmissibility has been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, without in any way
prejudging the merits, unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)