B. v. GERMANY
Doc ref: 15720/89 • ECHR ID: 001-1212
Document date: December 9, 1991
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 15720/89
by K.B.
against the Federal Republic of Germany
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 9 December 1991, the following members being present:
MM. F. ERMACORA, Acting President of the First Chamber
J.A. FROWEIN
E. BUSUTTIL
A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
H. DANELIUS
Sir Basil HALL
MM. C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO
B. MARXER
Mr. M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber.
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 19 July 1989 by
K.B. against the Federal Republic of Germany and registered on 30
October 1989 under file No. 15720/89;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant, born in 1936, is a German national and resident
in Munich. He is an engineer by profession.
In 1979 a dispute arose between the applicant and his employer,
a company producing motors and turbines, concerning the compensation
due for the invention of a steering mechanism which was patented in the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Great Britain.
On 18 May 1979 the applicant instituted proceedings before the
Arbitration Committee (Schiedsstelle) of the German Patent Office
(Patentamt) under the Employees' Invention Act (Arbeitnehmererfindungs-
gesetz). The arbitration proceedings, including a proposal for
settlement made by the Arbitration Committee on 26 March 1980, which
was served upon the applicant in April 1980, were to no avail.
On 23 December 1980 the applicant, represented by counsel, filed
an action for compensation with the Munich I Regional Court (Land-
gericht). He requested the Court to fix the appropriate amount of
compensation which he considered should be DM 1.8 million minimum and
DM 3 million maximum.
On 10 March 1981 the defendant filed submissions in reply to the
action.
On 18 September 1981 the Regional Court, following further
written submissions by the parties, held an oral hearing. A further
hearing took place on 13 November 1981.
On 19 January 1982 the Regional Court decided to take extensive
expert evidence, and invited the parties to propose appropriate
experts. On 28 April 1982 the Regional Court appointed the experts
Prof. G. and Prof. W., with whose appointments both parties agreed.
The expert G. delivered his opinion on 8 December 1982.
On 21 January 1983 the applicant requested the Regional Court to
expedite the proceedings.
On 18 February 1983 the expert W., upon a reminder by the
Regional Court, stated that due to health problems the termination of
his opinion would be delayed. He delivered his opinion on
30 June 1983.
On 27 September 1983 the Munich I Regional Court, upon the
defendant's request, decided to hear both experts in court, and fixed
13 December 1983 as date for the hearing.
Following further submissions by the parties in October and
November 1983, the expert opinions were amended on 10 and 17 November
and 7 December 1983.
On 13 December 1983 the Regional Court heard the parties and the
two experts.
On 13 March 1984 the Regional Court ordered the defendant company
to pay the applicant DM 1,381,403 with interest. Furthermore it
declared that the defendant was obliged to pay compensation for the
future use of the applicant's invention. The remainder of the
applicant's action, which had been amended several times and in
particular increased to a compensation claim of some DM 18 million with
interest, was dismissed. The Regional Court, in its judgment
comprising 63 pages, found in particular that the applicant was
entitled to compensation for his invention under S. 9 of the Employees'
Invention Act. The amount of compensation was fixed with regard to the
value of the applicant's invention in relation to the defendant's sales
in this respect.
In April 1984 both parties lodged appeals (Berufungen) with the
Munich Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).
On 22 May 1984 the 6th Chamber of the Court of Appeal fixed a
hearing for 7 March 1985. In May and June 1984 the parties filed the
reasons for their respective appeals, and they made further submissions
in the period between November 1984 and February 1985. In particular,
the applicant amended his appeal on 6 February 1985.
On 12 February 1985 the Deputy of the Presiding Judge declared
that there were grounds for bias, and that he was excluded from the
proceedings. On 27 February 1985 the Court of Appeal accepted his
declaration.
At the hearing on 7 March 1985 the Court of Appeal fixed 25 April
1985 as date for the next hearing and passing of a decision.
Furthermore, it fixed the value in dispute (Streitwert) relevant for
the calculation of the cost of the proceedings at DM 37.5 million;
however, having regard to the applicant's financial situation his
obligation to contribute to the court fees was to be calculated on the
basis of DM 400,000.
On 7 March 1985 the applicant again amended his appeal.
On 25 March 1985 the Court of Appeal inquired with the parties
whether or not, having regard to the increasing cost of the proceedings
and the constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) envisaged by
the defendant, the proceedings should be continued. The hearing was
postponed until 23 May 1985. The parties subsequently informed the
Court that they wished to continue the proceedings.
On 25 April 1985 the defendant filed objections against the Court
of Appeal's decision of 7 March 1985 fixing the value in dispute.
At the hearing on 23 May 1985 the Court of Appeal ordered that
expert evidence be taken as regards the parties' submissions upon
appeal. Prof. W. and Prof. G. were again appointed.
On 30 May 1985 the applicant requested the Presiding Judge at the
Court of Appeal to further the proceedings.
On 19 June 1985 the files were sent to the expert W. On 5 August
1985 the Court of Appeal asked the expert W. about the cost of his
opinion and when he would deliver it. W. informed the Court about his
fees on 15 August 1985. On 18 September 1985 the Court of A
the
requested W. to start preparing his expert opinion. On 12 December
1985 the Court of Appeal again sent him a reminder.
In the meantime the parties had made further submissions on the
question whether the expert G. should deliver a second opinion, or
whether a supplementary expert should be appointed.
On 17 December 1985 the defendant also requested the Court of
Appeal to quash the decision of 7 March 1985 as regards the
preferential treatment of the applicant in fixing the value in dispute.
The defendant submitted that, following execution proceedings upon the
first instance judgment, the applicant had been paid more than DM one
million. On 27 February 1986 the Court of Appeal postponed a decision
on this matter until the main files were returned by the expert W.
On 12 March 1986 the expert W. informed the Court that he was
seriously ill. It appears that he also stated that, having regard to
the defendant's submissions, he saw no reason to amend his opinion
given at first instance.
On 20 March 1986 the Court of Appeal informed the parties that
it intended to instruct the expert G. to deliver his opinion first. On
26 March 1986 the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's request of
17 December 1985 concerning the value in dispute.
On 4 April 1986 the applicant proposed to stop the taking of
evidence and to fix a hearing. On 21 April 1986 the defendant opposed
an expertise by G. and proposed another expert.
On 15 September 1986 the applicant again requested the Court to
expedite the proceedings. On 17 October 1986 he was informed that due
to illness of one judge no date for a hearing could be fixed.
On 21 January 1987 the Court of Appeal proposed a settlement of
the case on the basis of DM 1.5 million. If the parties should not
agree, further extensive evidence would have to be taken. The decision
on the taking of evidence of 23 May 1985 would have to be set aside.
The appeal proceedings could not be terminated in the near future;
already the appointment of appropriate experts would be considerably
time-consuming. The Court fixed 14 May 1987 as next date for a
hearing.
Subsequently the parties filed numerous further submissions, the
defendant inter alia a private expert opinion of the expert Prof. B.
dated 15 April 1987.
On 14 May 1987 the Court of Appeal held a second hearing. The
proposal for a settlement was not accepted.
On 19 May 1985 the Court of Appeal asked the expert W. whether
he would again deliver an opinion. W. refused for health reasons on
28 May 1987.
On 1 June 1987 the applicant again urged the Court of Appeal to
render a judgment soon.
On 25 June 1987 the Court of Appeal set aside its decision on the
taking of evidence of 23 May 1985. It ordered that further expert
evidence be taken and appointed the expert F.
On 3 July 1987 the applicant objected to the appointment of the
expert F., and requested his statement in how far he had contacts with
the defendant.
On 28 August 1987 the files were submitted to the expert F. He
delivered his opinion on 12 November 1987.
On 24 November 1987 the applicant challenged the expert F. for
bias. The expert F. submitted further explanations on 17 December
1987. On 21 January 1988 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
motion of challenge. The applicant objected to that decision on
26 February, and filed further reasons on 15 March 1988. The Court of
Appeal dismissed these motions on 4 April 1988. The expert F. gave
further explanations on 18 May 1988. The applicant's third motion to
challenge F. was dismissed on 1 July 1988.
On 22 September 1988 the Court of Appeal, having heard the expert
F. in presence of the parties on 7 July 1988, ordered another expert
opinion and invited the parties to propose an expert to be appointed.
The defendant proposed four experts on 20 October 1988. It appears that
the parties eventually agreed on two possible experts.
On 29 November 1988 the Court of Appeal proposed a friendly
settlement of the case on the basis of the payments made by the
defendant so far, i.e. about DM 1.5 million.
On 6 February 1989 the Court of Appeal informed the parties that
another expert, namely Dr. S., had been asked to deliver the expert
opinion. The applicant objected to the appointment of Dr. S. and
challenged the judges of the 6th Chamber for bias. His motion was
dismissed by the 29th Chamber at the Court of Appeal on 22 March 1989.
On 6 April 1989 the applicant challenged the judges of the 6th
and 29th Chamber for bias. His motions were dismissed on 10 and 29 May
1989, respectively. His further objections were to no avail.
On 7 June 1989 the Court of Appeal appointed Prof. M., one of the
two experts agreed by the parties. On 2 July 1989 Prof. M. refused to
deliver an expert opinion.
On 11 July 1989 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgericht) refused to admit the applicant's constitutional
complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) dated 28 December 1988 concerning the
length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court found that for the
time being the conduct of the proceedings by the Court of Appeal could
not be objected to, although it had not yet rendered a judgment.
The Constitutional Court recalled its jurisprudence according to
which there was a right to have court proceedings terminated within a
reasonable time. However, in examining the reasonableness of the
length in the particular circumstances of the case, the Constitutional
Court could not examine each procedural step, as every court had to
deal with numerous cases, and this necessarily resulted in delays of
the separate proceedings.
In the applicant's case the Constitutional Court considered that
it was not required to examine the delay before the hearing in March
1985, which had been due to the Appellate Court's workload, because the
applicant had not expressly raised this issue. In any case, the Chamber
concerned had in the meantime been unburdened. Furthermore, the late
statement of the Presiding Judge's Deputy about his being biased had
not resulted in any delays. The length of the proceedings was
essentially due to the fact that the Court of Appeal considered
extensive taking of evidence necessary, which did not appear arbitrary.
The taking of evidence in successive steps could not be objected to on
the ground that the necessity of further evidence in some respects
depended upon the outcome of an earlier taking of evidence. Moreover,
the renewed recourse to expert evidence could not be objected to. The
delays in taking the expert evidence could not be avoided, or were
partly caused by the conduct of the parties.
Finally, the Constitutional Court held that, though a violation
of constitutional law could not be found for the time being, the
proceedings before the Court of Appeal, which had already lasted five
years, had attained an unusual and, as a rule, unacceptable length.
Having regard to the length of the proceedings at first instance,
namely more than three years, this was even less acceptable. The Court
of Appeal would have to ensure that these proceedings be terminated
soon and, if necessary, give them precedence.
On 18 August 1989 the Munich Court of Appeal again appointed
Dr. S. as expert. Thereupon, the applicant again challenged the judges
of the 6th Chamber for bias, objected to the decision of 18 August 1989
and challenged the expert S. for bias.
On 18 October 1989 his motion to challenge the judges was
dismissed.
On 19 October 1989 the applicant filed a hierarchical complaint
as regards the length of the proceedings.
On 16 November 1989 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
challenge of the expert S. On 23 November 1989 it dismissed the
applicant's request of 9 November to set the decision of 22 September
1988 on the taking of expert evidence aside. His further objections
were dismissed on 30 November 1989.
On 25 January 1990 the applicant announced settlement
negotiations with the defendant. On 12 February 1990 the defendant
requested that the files be sent to the expert S.
At a hearing on 4 May 1990 the parties agreed on a friendly
settlement of the dispute, which provided in particular for a payment
of DM 1.8 million in view of the applicant's compensation claim and the
termination of his employment.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
about the length of the proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 19 July 1989 and registered on
30 October 1989.
On 7 January 1991 the Commission decided that notice should be
given to the respondent Government of the application and that the
Government should be invited to submit written observations on the
admissibility and merits of the case.
The Government's observations were submitted on 3 May 1991. The
applicant's submissions in reply were submitted on 12 June 1991.
On 27 May 1991 the Commission decided that the application should
be referred to the First Chamber.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention that he did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) provides, inter alia, that in the
determination of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is entitled
to a hearing within a reasonable time.
The respondent Government do not contest the admissibility of the
application. In particular, they agree that the applicant,
notwithstanding the settlement reached in the civil proceedings at
issue, can claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 para.
1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention. However, having regard to the
relevant criteria established by the Convention organs, they consider
that the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time was
not violated. They refer in particular to the findings of the Federal
Constitutional Court in its decision of 11 July 1989.
The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint about the
length of the civil proceedings concerning his compensation claims for
an invention raises questions of facts and of law, which can only be
determined upon an examination of the merits. The application cannot,
therefore, be declared manifestly ill-founded under Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for inadmissibility
have been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE
without prejudging the merits of the case.
Secretary to Acting President of
the First Chamber the First Chamber
(M. de SALVIA) (F. ERMACORA)
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