KELLY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 17711/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1365
Document date: September 4, 1992
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 17711/91
by Gerard KELLY
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 4 September 1992, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 14 December
1990 by Gerard KELLY against the United Kingdom and registered
on 23 January 1991 under file No. 17711/91;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission;
- the written observations submitted by the respondent
Government on 30 October 1991 and the observations in reply
submitted by the applicant on 20 January 1992;
- the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 4 September
1992;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1957 and resident
in Belfast.
He is represented before the Commission by Mr. Francis
Keenan, Solicitor, Belfast.
The facts of the present case, as submitted by the parties,
may be summarised as follows:
At 14.50 hours on 27 August 1990, two police officers of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary stopped a BMW motor vehicle,
registration no. LIB 1256, driven by the applicant's brother on
the Sprucefield Interchange of the M1 motorway. The applicant
and two other persons were passengers in the vehicle. The
Government stated that the reason the vehicle was initially
stopped was because it appeared to be overladen at the rear and
information provided by a support vehicle revealed that the
vehicle was believed to have been used in terrorist incidents.
The applicant denied that the car appeared overladen except in
so far as it was weighed down by the two male passengers in the
back seat. He also disputed that the vehicle was believed to
have been used in terrorist incidents or that such information
was provided by a support vehicle.
The Government further stated that the police officer who
stopped the car recognised two of the passengers, one of whom was
the applicant, from that officer's previous service in West
Belfast. (The officer in question was aware that the applicant
had previously been convicted of possessing explosives with
intent to endanger life and of possessing explosives in
suspicious circumstances for which he was sentenced to nine years
imprisonment on 11 March 1982. He was released on 18 October
1985.) Not being satisfied with the explanation given by the
occupants of the vehicle as to why it was overladen at the rear,
the police officers briefly searched the vehicle by the roadside
and then, with the assistance of a support vehicle, escorted it
to the Maze Prison for a more thorough examination. The
occupants of the car were informed that they were being required
to accompany their vehicle to the designated search area at the
Maze Prison in the exercise of powers under section 21 of the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. The
escorted vehicle arrived at the Maze Prison at
15.20 hours and the vehicle and occupants were taken to the
designated search area by military personnel.
The applicant and the other occupants of the car were
required to remain at the Maze Prison during the search of the
vehicle. The applicant alleged that during this time he was
refused permission to go to the toilet. The Government denied
this. They stated that he was allowed to go to the toilet as
soon as his details had been recorded which was approximately two
to three minutes after he made his request. The applicant also
asked to see a solicitor. He was informed that he was not under
arrest, that his detention was merely a temporary precaution
while his vehicle was being searched and that he could contact
a solicitor on completion of the search which was being carried
out as expeditiously as possible.
The search of the vehicle terminated at 17.48 hours and the
applicant and the other occupants of the vehicle were then
informed that they were free to leave. They refused to do so and
made allegations that their vehicle had been damaged during the
search. The Government stated that no damage was caused to the
vehicle or to its contents during the search and neither the
applicant nor any of the
other occupants of the car made any claim for compensation for
damage as they were entitled to do under section 28 of the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978. The applicant
and the other occupants of the car eventually left with the
vehicle at approximately 18.30 hours. The total length of time,
however, from when the vehicle was stopped at the roadside to
when the occupants were told that they were free to go was just
under three hours.
The Government said that although an electronic vapour
detector found positive evidence of traces of explosive type
substances inside the boot and passenger compartment of the
vehicle, these were not considered sufficient to justify any
charges being brought. The applicant disputed that any traces
of explosive substances were found. It was not suggested at the
time and no questions were asked about such substances.
On 11 September 1991 the applicant instituted civil
proceedings against the Ministry of Defence in the Belfast County
Court:
"the plaintiff's claim (is) for £5000 damages including
aggravated and exemplary damages for personal injuries,
physical discomfort and inconvenience, mental anxiety and
distress, deprivation of liberty, loss and damage caused by
reason of the assault, battery, false imprisonment,
trespass to the person, nuisance and breach of duty of the
defendants, their respective servants and agents and police
officers under their direction and control in and about the
conduct of soldiers and police officers and in and about
the arrest and detention of the plaintiff on or about 27
August 1990 at or near M1 motorway and the Maze Search
Centre."
A hearing in the case is not expected for several months
yet. The applicant is in receipt of legal aid for these
proceedings.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained that all the five paragraphs of
Article 5 of the Convention have been violated in his case.
The applicant alleged that Article 5 para. 1 of the
Convention was violated as he was deprived of his liberty in that
he was, in fact, arrested by police officers even though they did
not formally tell him that he was under arrest, and he was
thereafter detained against his will for the specified period.
The applicant maintained that the measures taken by the police
officers and soldiers were not justified under paragraph 1 of
Article 5 of the Convention. He alleged that Article 5 para. 2
of the Convention was violated in that he was not informed
properly, or at all, of the reasons for his arrest or of any
charge against him. He further alleged that Article 5 para. 3
of the Convention was violated in that he was not brought
promptly, or at all,
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise
judicial power. The applicant complained that Article 5 para.
4 was breached as he was denied access to a solicitor and
consequently denied an opportunity to take proceedings whereby
the lawfulness of his detention could be decided speedily by a
court. Finally, the applicant complained that he suffered a
violation of Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention in that he did
not have any enforceable right to
compensation because the provisions of sections 15 and 20 of the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 and section 21
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
confer powers on soldiers and police to stop, detain and search
vehicles and their occupants and to require the occupants to go
to and remain at any place to where the vehicle is removed for
the purpose of a search.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 14 December 1990 and
registered on 23 January 1991.
After a preliminary examination of the case by the
Rapporteur, the Commission considered the admissibility of the
application on
2 July 1991. It decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the
Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the
respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit their
written observations on admissibility and merits. The
Government's observations were submitted on 30 October 1991,
after a one week extension of the time limit fixed for this
purpose. The applicant replied on 20 January 1992, after a one
month extension of the time limit, legal aid having been granted
to the applicant by the Commission on 13 December 1991.
On 18 May 1992 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of
the application on the same day as a similar case of O'Neill v.
the United Kingdom, application No. 17441/90. The hearing was
held on 4 September 1992. The applicant, who attended, was
represented by Mr. B. Macdonald, BL, Counsel, Mr. F. Keenan and
Ms. C. Diamond, Solicitors, Messrs. Francis Keenan. The
Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. H. Llewellyn, Mr.
N. Bratza, QC, Counsel, Mr. R. Weatherup, Counsel, and three
advisers.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that various aspects of his right
to liberty and security of person ensured by Article 5 (Art. 5)
of the Convention were violated, when the police and army
searched the car in which he was travelling on 27 August 1990.
He alleged, inter alia, that making him wait in the Maze prison
during the search of the vehicle, even though there was no formal
arrest, constituted an unjustifiable deprivation of his liberty
which did not fall within any of the categories of lawful
detention in Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1).
The Government refuted the applicant's claims. They first
submitted that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies
as is required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. The
treatment of which the applicant now complains before the
domestic courts is the same of which complaint has been made to
the Commission. Before the Belfast County Court the applicant
contends that, as a matter of domestic law, his treatment was
unlawful, arbitrary, oppressive and unconstitutional, and he
claims aggravated and exemplary damages. If the applicant is
successful in these claims he will cease to be a victim for the
purposes of the Convention. His domestic court claims cannot be
wholly without reasonable prospects of success otherwise he would
not have been granted legal aid. The substance of the wrong
alleged before the Commission could be remedied by the domestic
courts, if well-founded. It is therefore irrelevant that the
Convention does not form part of United Kingdom law.
The applicant contended that there is no domestic remedy
capable of providing redress for his complaints because section
21 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act 1989
expressly authorises conduct in breach of the Convention. The
powers of the
domestic courts in a claim for damages are limited to deciding
whether there has been compliance with section 21, not whether
there has been a breach of the Convention, which does not form
part of domestic law. Each year there are hundreds of searches
of the kind in question, most of which prove fruitless, yet the
applicant believes that there has not been a single reported
decision in a Northern Ireland court in which such a search or
detention has been found unlawful. In any event, even if he
himself succeeds in his claim and is awarded damages, this would
still not constitute an effective remedy because the conduct of
which complaint is made is authorised by law and is an
administrative practice (Nos 5577-5583/72, Donnelly and six
others v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 15.12.75, D.R. 4 p. 4). The
applicant noted that the
Government had not raised the question of exhaustion of domestic
remedies until a week before the hearing in the case before the
Commission. He considered that they could not do so at such a
late stage. The Government's earlier silence was, in his view,
implicit acceptance that no effective domestic remedy was
available to him.
The Government also contended that, in any event, the
applicant had not been deprived of his liberty within the meaning
of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention, or, if he had,
the measures taken were "in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law" and constituted "the lawful arrest or
detention of a person ... to secure the fulfilment of an
obligation prescribed by law", within the meaning of Article 5
para. 1 (b) (Art. 5-1-b) the Convention. That obligation was
created by section 21 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989, ie an obligation to assist and not obstruct
the search for munitions. Furthermore such measures were
justified under Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the
Convention, being lawful detention, in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law, effected for the purpose of bringing
the applicant before the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence.
The Commission must first examine whether the applicant has
exhausted domestic remedies in compliance with Article 26
(Art. 26) of the Convention.
The Commission notes that the applicant did not inform the
Commission of the developments in his case when he instituted
civil proceedings before the Belfast County Court against the
Ministry of Defence. Moreover these matters, inexplicably, did
not come to the attention of the Government until shortly before
the Commission's hearing in the present case when their objection
under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention was raised for the
first time. However, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention
precludes the Commission from dealing with any case where
domestic remedies have not been exhausted, and the Government
cannot be estopped from raising such a preliminary objection at
any time prior to the Commission's decision on the admissibility
of the case.
Part of the task of the Convention organs in an examination
of complaints under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention is to
determine whether the measures complained of by the applicant
were lawful. This is a reference principally to the domestic
law. The Commission notes that in his claim before the domestic
courts the applicant is alleging that the restrictions on his
movements during the search of his brother's car were unlawful
under domestic law (p. 4 above statement of claim). The
Commission cannot find it established that the claim is devoid
of any prospects of success. If the applicant's claim were to
succeed before the domestic courts, his Convention complaints
would be wholly or partly vindicated, which would affect his
status as a victim under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.
The Commission cannot examine the present case as if section
21 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
authorised the treatment while the applicant is complaining about
the same treatment before the domestic courts. The very purpose
of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is to provide the High
Contracting Party with an opportunity to remedy complaints of a
breach of the Convention in form or in substance, if well-
founded. Accordingly it would be premature for the Commission
to deal with the applicant's case before the domestic courts have
determined his civil claims.
In the circumstances of the present case the Commission
concludes that the applicant has not yet exhausted the remedies
available to him under the law of Northern Ireland, in accordance
with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
It follows that the application must be rejected under
Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)