O'NEILL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 17441/90 • ECHR ID: 001-1363
Document date: September 4, 1992
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 17441/90
by Anne-Marie O'NEILL
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
4 September 1992, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 10 September 1990
by Anne-Marie O'NEILL against the United Kingdom and registered on
19 November 1990 under file No. 17441/90;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the written observations submitted by the respondent Government
on 15 October 1991 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 31 January 1992;
- the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 4 September 1992;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1969 and resident in
Belfast. The applicant is a single parent with custody of her two
children, twin girls, whose date of birth is 13 September 1988.
She is represented before the Commission by Ms. M. Sheehan, a
Solicitor with Messrs. Nurse & Jones, Solicitors, Belfast.
The facts of the present case, as submitted by the parties, may
be summarised as follows:
On 18 June 1990 the applicant took up occupation of the house
where she now lives. At 07.10 hours on 26 June 1990, two police
officers, accompanied by an army search team, undertook a search of the
applicant's house. The statutory authority for the search was section
15(2) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, and the
search was authorised by a Chief Inspector of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC). The Government stated that the search was carried
out because it was suspected that there were munitions unlawfully on
the premises. The reason it was believed that there were munitions on
the premises was because the RUC had received information from a
reliable source that a prisoner, who had failed to return to Magillagan
Prison after a 48 hour parole and while serving a four year prison
sentence for armed burglary and who was suspected of being involved in
acts of terrorism, was staying at the premises with his estranged wife
and using them to conceal munitions.
The applicant stated that she was asked if she was Mrs. W (Mr.
and Mrs. W were the previous occupants of the house). She gave her
name and explained that she was living alone in the house with her baby
daughters who were asleep in their cots upstairs. The applicant was
asked if there were any men living in the house and she said that there
were not. The applicant was told by the police that they had a warrant
for Mr. W. She explained that Mr. W no longer lived in the house.
However the police officer who appeared to be in charge told her to
take her children from their cots because they were going to carry out
the search anyway. The applicant alleged that she was not shown any
warrant and was not given any further reasons for the search. The
Government denied this, stating that the applicant was shown the
authorisation for the search signed by the Chief Inspector and was told
why the search was taking place. A police officer accompanied the
applicant upstairs and she took her children from their cots. When she
came downstairs again about ten uniformed soldiers were in the house
and had started the search. They had a bag of tools with them.
The applicant stated that she was extremely distressed and
frightened by what was going on. She asked the police officer who
remained in the house if she could telephone her mother. The police
officer refused to let the applicant do so. There was no telephone in
the house and so acceding to this request would have meant permitting
the applicant to leave the premises before the search had been
completed.
The applicant was not arrested. Although she was required to
remain on the premises during the search in the exercise of powers
conferred by section 21(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989, she was informed that she could go anywhere in
the house provided that she did not hinder the progress of the search.
In practice, this meant that she had access at any particular time to
any room in the house other than the one which was being searched.
The applicant stated that she was refused access to the kitchen
to prepare breakfast for her children until the search of the kitchen
had been completed at approximately 09.30 hours. According to the
Government this was because the kitchen was the first room to be
searched so as to allow breakfast to be prepared as early as possible.
The search of the kitchen was however completed at 08.40 hours at which
time the applicant was permitted access there.
The applicant also asserted that her mother and father came to
the house and that her mother wanted to join her but was refused entry
and that a request to allow the applicant's children to leave with the
applicant's mother was refused. According to the Government, although
a woman, who was never identified by those carrying out the search as
the applicant's mother, called at the house during the search she did
not request to enter and no request was ever made that the applicant's
children be permitted to leave the premises with her. The Government
stated that, bearing in mind that the applicant's children were under
the age of two years at the time of the search, such a request would,
if it had been made, almost certainly have been granted.
Each room in the house was searched systematically by the search
party and the applicant alleged that she was confined in a restricted
area within the house depending on where the search party was
operating. In the kitchen the search party ripped the new floor
covering and drilled holes in the floor. They also dug up the floor
in the living room. They bored holes in the walls and in the stairs.
Furniture was damaged and carpets were pulled up.
The applicant made no complaint during the search and
subsequently signed the police search record to the effect that she had
no complaint to make.
The search terminated at 10.45 hours on the same day. The search
therefore lasted a total of three hours and 35 minutes. Nothing was
taken by the search team. The extent of the damage caused to the
applicant's property was recorded in a Search Damage Report Form which
the applicant signed. A civil representative visited the applicant on
27 June 1991, the day after the search, and on 28 June 1991 recommended
that a payment of £414 be made to the applicant by way of compensation
under section 28 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1978 for the damage caused. The applicant agreed to accept the amount
in question as a full and final settlement of her claim for
compensation for the damage caused and payment was approved by the
Northern Ireland Office on 20 July 1991.
On 3 June 1991 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against
the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ministry
of Defence in the Northern Ireland High Court:
"The plaintiff's claim is for damages including aggravated and
exemplary damages for personal injuries, mental anxiety and
distress, physical discomfort and inconvenience, loss and damage
sustained by reason of the assault, battery, false imprisonment,
breach of duty, negligence, nuisance, trespass to goods, trespass
to the person and trespass to land by the defendants, their
respective servants and agents and each of them in and about the
conduct, supervision and control of security operations and in
and about the entry onto and search of the plaintiff's premises."
A hearing in the case is not expected for several months yet.
The applicant is in receipt of legal aid for these proceedings.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleged that all the five paragraphs of Article 5
of the Convention were violated, as well as Article 8 of the
Convention.
The applicant stated that Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention was
violated in that she was deprived of her liberty by a de facto arrest,
even though she was not formally told that she was under arrest, and
that she was thereafter detained against her will for a specified
period. The applicant maintained that none of the justifiable
circumstances set out in Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention applied
in her case.
The applicant invoked Article 5 para. 2 of the Convention on the
basis that she was not informed either properly, or at all, of the
reasons for her arrest or of any charge against her.
The applicant further alleged a violation of Article 5 para. 3
of the Convention in that she was not brought promptly, or at all,
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power. She also invoked Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention on the
ground that she was denied access to a solicitor and was thereby denied
an opportunity to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of her
detention could be decided speedily by a court.
She further complained of a breach of Article 5 para. 5 of the
Convention in that she does not have an enforceable right to
compensation because in the domestic law of Northern Ireland the
provisions of section 15 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1978, as amended by section 21 (2) of the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, confer powers upon soldiers and police
officers to require persons to remain in, or in a specified part of,
a house which is being searched, or to refrain from entering a
specified part of it and to prevent any person who is not resident in
the house from entering it.
Finally, the applicant alleged that Article 8 of the Convention
was violated in that the conduct complained of constituted an
unjustified interference with her right to respect for her private and
family life and her home.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 10 September 1990 and
registered on 19 November 1990.
After a preliminary examination of the case by the Rapporteur,
the Commission considered the admissibility of the application on
2 July 1991. It decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules
of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent
Government and to invite the parties to submit their written
observations on admissibility and merits. The Government's
observations were submitted on 15 October 1991, to which the applicant
replied on 31 January 1992 after a one month extension of the time
limit fixed for that purpose. The President of the Commission had
granted the applicant legal aid on 29 October 1991.
On 18 May 1992 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of the
application on the same day as a similar case of Kelly v. the United
Kingdom, application No. 17711/91. The hearing was held on 4 September
1992. The applicant, who attended, was represented by Mr. B.
Macdonald, BL, Counsel, and Ms. M. Sheehan, Solicitor, Messrs. Nurse
and Jones. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. H.
Llewellyn, Mr. N. Bratza, QC, Counsel, Mr. R. Weatherup, Counsel, and
three advisers.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that various aspects of her right to
liberty and security of person ensured by Article 5 (Art. 5) of the
Convention were violated, as well as her right under Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention to respect for private and family life and
her home, when the police and army searched her house on 26 June 1990.
She alleged, inter alia, that keeping her on the premises during the
search with her two daughters, even though there was no formal arrest,
constituted an unjustifiable deprivation of her liberty which did not
fall within any of the categories of lawful detention in Article 5
para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention.
The Government refuted the applicant's claims. They first
submitted that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies as is
required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. The treatment of
which the applicant now complains before the domestic courts is the
same of which complaint has been made to the Commission. Before the
Northern Ireland High Court the applicant contends that, as a matter
of domestic law, her treatment was unlawful, arbitrary, oppressive and
unconstitutional, and she claims aggravated and exemplary damages. If
the applicant is successful in these claims she will cease to be a
victim for the purposes of the Convention. Her domestic court claims
cannot be wholly without reasonable prospects of success otherwise she
would not have been granted legal aid. The substance of the wrong
alleged before the Commission could be remedied by the domestic courts,
if well-founded. It is therefore irrelevant that the Convention does
not form part of United Kingdom law.
The applicant contended that there is no domestic remedy capable
of providing redress for her complaints because section 21 of the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act 1989 expressly
authorises conduct in breach of the Convention. The powers of the
domestic courts in a claim for damages are limited to deciding whether
there has been compliance with section 21, not whether there has been
a breach of the Convention, which does not form part of domestic law.
Each year there are hundreds of searches of the kind in question, most
of which prove fruitless, yet the applicant believes that there has not
been a single reported decision in a Northern Ireland court in which
such a search or detention has been found unlawful. In any event, even
if she herself succeeds in her claim and is awarded damages, this would
still not constitute an effective remedy because the conduct of which
complaint is made is authorised by law and is an administrative
practice (Nos 5577-5583/72, Donnelly and six others v. the United
Kingdom, Dec. 15.12.75, D.R. 4 p. 4). The applicant noted that the
Government had not raised the question of exhaustion of domestic
remedies until a week before the hearing in the case before the
Commission. She considered that they could not do so at such a late
stage. The Government's earlier silence was, in her view, implicit
acceptance that no effective domestic remedy was available to her.
The Government also contended that, in any event, the applicant
had not been deprived of her liberty within the meaning of Article 5
para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention, or, if she had, the measures
taken were "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" and
constituted "the lawful arrest or detention of a person ... to secure
the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law", within the meaning
of Article 5 para. 1 (b) (Art. 5-1-b) the Convention. That obligation
was created by section 21 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989, ie an obligation to assist and not obstruct the
search for munitions. Furthermore any interference with the
applicant's rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention was, in
their view, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety and the prevention of disorder or
crime, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 8
(Art. 8).
The Commission must first examine whether the applicant has
exhausted domestic remedies in compliance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of
the Convention.
The Commission notes that while the applicant had indicated in
her application that she intended to bring domestic proceedings for
damages, she did not inform the Commission of the developments in her
case when she went ahead and instituted civil proceedings before the
Northern Ireland High Court against the Chief Constable of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence. Moreover these
matters, inexplicably, did not come to the attention of the Government
until shortly before the Commission's hearing in the present case when
their objection under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention was raised
for the first time. However, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention
precludes the Commission from dealing with any case where domestic
remedies have not been exhausted, and the Government cannot be estopped
from raising such a preliminary objection at any time prior to the
Commission's decision on the admissibility of the case.
Part of the task of the Convention organs in an examination of
complaints under Articles 5 and 8 (Art. 5, 8) of the Convention is to
determine whether the measures complained of by the applicant were
lawful, or in accordance with the law. This is a reference principally
to the domestic law. The Commission notes that in her claim before the
domestic courts the applicant is alleging that the search of her house
on 26 June 1990 and the restrictions on her movements during the search
were unlawful under domestic law (p. 5 above statement of claim). The
Commission cannot find it established that her claim is devoid of any
prospects of success. If the applicant's claim were to succeed before
the domestic courts, her Convention complaints would be wholly or
partly vindicated, which would affect her status as a victim under
Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.
The Commission cannot examine the present case as if section 21
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
authorised the treatment while the applicant is complaining about the
same treatment before the domestic courts. The very purpose of Article
26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is to provide the High Contracting Party
with an opportunity to remedy complaints of a breach of the Convention
in form or in substance, if well-founded. Accordingly it would be
premature for the Commission to deal with the applicant's case before
the domestic courts have determined her civil claims.
In the circumstances of the present case the Commission concludes
that the applicant has not yet exhausted the remedies available to her
under the law of Northern Ireland, in accordance with Article 26
(Art. 26) of the Convention.
It follows that the application must be rejected under Article
27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)