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PREISSLER v. GERMANY

Doc ref: 18337/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1396

Document date: October 20, 1992

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 2

PREISSLER v. GERMANY

Doc ref: 18337/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1396

Document date: October 20, 1992

Cited paragraphs only



       AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 18337/91

                      by Lothar PREISSLER

                      against the Federal Republic of Germany

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

20 October 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   F. ERMACORA, Acting President of the First Chamber

                 E. BUSUTTIL

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

           Mr.   M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 10 June 1991 by

Lothar Preissler against the Federal Republic of Germany and registered

on 24 June 1991 under file No. 18337/91;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a German citizen born in 1941 and detained in

prison in Willich.  He is represented by Mr. Hans-Otto Sieg, a lawyer

practising in Frankfurt-on-Main.

      It follows from the applicant's statements and the documents

submitted that on 2 November 1987 he was convicted by the Duisburg

Regional Court (Landgericht) of two counts of murder with aggravated

robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment.  The trial court's judgment

comprises 187 pages.

      According to the findings of the trial court which were mainly

based on the evidence given by the applicant's accomplice and

co-accused D., who was convicted of joint robbery and sentenced to

seven years' imprisonment, on the night of 2-3 January 1978 the

applicant had shot an American and a Spanish citizen in Torremolinos,

Spain.  The exact time of death of the victims could not be determined.

On the basis of a medical expert opinion the court stated that it could

only be ascertained that the deaths occurred after midnight on

2 January 1978.

      D. and the applicant had planned to rob someone as they were

short of money.  They went to have some drinks and D. met an American

citizen who was drunk.  D. suggested to the American that they go to

another bar to have a coffee.  On the way to this bar they were

followed by the applicant who eventually shot the American from behind.

The applicant then shot a Spaniard who had witnessed the first

shooting.

      D. and the applicant were denounced by a witness, Astrid L., who

informed the public prosecutor in Augsburg in a letter of

20 October 1978 that the applicant had boasted about having killed two

people in Spain.

      The trial court stated that D.'s confessions in his various

statements made before the police, the investigating judge and the

trial court were coherent and consistent in so far as the core of the

matter was concerned.  It points out that in the given circumstances

it nevertheless had to evaluate these statements with particular care.

In the opinion of the court D.'s statements were corroborated by

circumstantial evidence and the evidence given by various witnesses,

inter alia police officers who confirmed D.'s description of the place

where the crime had been committed and by one witness Sch., a co-

detainee, who stated that the applicant had told him that he had

committed the two murders.  The trial court further referred to the

evidence given by St., a former friend of the applicant, who likewise

confirmed that the applicant had told him that he had shot two people

in Spain.  Furthermore the court referred to evidence given to the

police by one M.  M. had likewise stated during a police interrogation

that the applicant had told him that he had killed someone in Spain.

Before the trial court he declared however that he could no longer

remember, which was considered to be a lie.

      Furthermore the trial court relied on the evidence given by the

public prosecutor U. who stated as a witness that the medical expert

Dr. K., who during the pre-trial proceedings had been given the task

of examining the applicant in order to determine whether or not he was

criminally responsible, had told him in the course of a telephone

conversation that the applicant had admitted having shot two men in

Spain.

      Dr. K. was also heard as a witness stating that he did  not

remember the applicant having told him anything about the murder.

      The trial court pointed out that Dr. K. had successfully been

challenged by the defence.  It considered that Dr. K.'s statement at

the trial was not credible.  Rather the expert had tried to cover up

the professional misconduct he had committed by revealing the

applicant's self-incriminating statements.

      Finally the court based its findings on a witness H., a police

officer who had interrogated the applicant and who stated that the

applicant had admitted to him that the crime had been committed by D.

and himself, alleging however that D. had shot the men.

      Corroborating evidence, which the trial court considered to be

of particular importance (von besonderem Gewicht), was given by a

ballistic expert who had examined the cartridge cases found near the

victims of the killings and a pistol which the applicant had stolen

during a previous burglary.  Two policemen had stated as witnesses that

the applicant, while in the police van, had himself indicated to them

the place where he had hidden further cartridges.  D., co-accused, and

witness Gr. had also confirmed that the applicant had been in

possession of the pistol.

      The exact time of the murder could not be determined.  According

to medical expert opinion the victims' bodies were examined on

4 January 1978 at 9.00 am.  The expert considered that the killing had

taken place approximately 24 to 30 hours previously.

      The co-accused D. had stated the killing took place at about

12.00 midnight.  He and the applicant had then returned to their hotel

to clean themselves.  Later they left for a drink and eventually

returned, the applicant accompanied by a prostitute.

      Witness B. who was staying in a nearby hotel on the night of the

killing had stated to the police that he heard shots being fired at

2.00 am.  At the trial he stated he had returned home at 1.00 am and

heard the shots about 30 to 60 minutes later.

      The trial court considered that these statements together with

the statements given by Spanish police officers who inspected the place

of the crime in the early hours of the morning, did not make it

possible to determine the exact time of the killing.

      As regards evidence proposed by the defence and rejected by the

trial court it is explained in the judgment

-     that it had not been necessary for the trial court to inspect the

      place of the crime given that photos and the description given

      by the police was sufficient.

-     that the proposed witness Pr., an interpreter who had assisted

      the wife of the murdered American when she contacted the Spanish

      police to report the disappearance of her husband, would

      certainly not be able to remember several years after the event

      at what time they had searched the beach.  It was even more

      unlikely that he would remember the exact time as he had never

      been heard in the investigation proceedings.  It was therefore

      considered unrealistic and impossible to expect this proposed

      witness to confirm that he had passed the place of the crime

      between exactly 1.55 and 2.00 am, as alleged by the defence.

-     that the allegation of the defence, according to which the

      medical expert having examined the victims on 3 January 1978 at

      5.30 am, had then said the killing was likely to have occurred

      about two hours ago, could be considered to be true;

      as well as the allegation of the defence, according to which B.,

      when interrogated for the first time by the Spanish policeman

      S. L., was sober and had stated that he had heard shots being

      fired after 2.00 am.

      In regard to these allegations the trial court proceeded on the

assumption that the proposed witnesses would confirm the applicant's

allegations.

      The court stated however that this did not prevent it from

finding that the applicant had committed the killing as described by

his accomplice D. and corroborated by various evidence.  It pointed out

in this context that according to the long experience of the

professional judges even the indications of the medical expert on the

estimated time of death were approximations only with a possible

fluctuation (Schwankungsbreite) of one hour both in regard to the

minimum and maximum figures indicated by the expert in his opinion

established after the autopsy.  The time-indications of other witnesses

were likewise open to doubt and furnished no reason to call into

question D.'s version of the event.

      The applicant's appeal on points of law (Revision) was rejected

by the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) on 14 March 1990.

      The applicant had complained that the judgment was contradictory

in that the trial court had assumed his allegation not to have spent

the evening of 2 January 1978 in the bar "Christina" but in another bar

to be true, and nevertheless believed D.'s version of the events

although D. had alleged they had been in the bar "Christina" and had

furthermore during various interrogations made contradictory statements

as to the time of the shooting.

      The Federal Court observed in this respect that the trial court

correctly based its findings on the premise that it was of no

importance in which of the various bars in Torremolinos the applicant

had spent the evening.  Therefore witness Christina S., the owner of

the bar, had not been suggested as an alibi but only as a means to

contradict D.'s statements and to show that D. had fabricated his whole

report on the events.  The Federal Court stressed however that the

proceedings had lasted for over four years and that the trial court

thereby had the occasion to examine the trustworthiness of D.'s

statements very carefully.  In this respect the trial court had applied

very strict standards and had only considered D.'s statements to be

proven in so far as they were confirmed or corroborated by other

evidence.

      Important supporting evidence was, so the Federal Court

underlined, given by the ballistic expert.  This evidence showed that

the pistol, which the applicant had stolen in December 1977, and had

subsequently in his possession until his arrest in January 1978, was

the one which had been used to fire the shots in Torremolinos.  This

followed from an examination of the pistol, the cartridge cases found

near the victims and the cartridges hidden by the applicant.

      The Federal Court also stated that the trial court could rightly

consider that D.'s statements were confirmed by several witnesses to

whom the applicant had himself insinuated having been responsible for

the killing of two people.

      The complaint that Spanish witnesses named by the defence were

not heard allegedly under the pretext that the trial court presumed

they would have given evidence supporting the applicant's version as

to the time of the killing, was likewise considered to be unfounded.

The Federal Court found that the trial court had in fact taken into

consideration the indications of these witnesses as to the time of the

murder but had rightly assumed that like the other evidence they

offered no reliable proof as to the exact time of the murder.

      The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint which was

rejected by a panel of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court

(Bundesverfassungsgericht) on 11 December 1990 as offering no prospect

of success.

      It is stated in the decision that the Federal Court's rejecting

the applicant's complaint about the refusal of the trial court to hear

certain witnesses was well-reasoned and in no way disclosed any

arbitrariness or violation of constitutional rights.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant maintains the complaints already raised before the

Constitutional Court, namely that he was denied a fair trial.

      In essence he points out that there was evidence that on

3 January 1978 he was in his hotel room together with a prostitute from

2 a.m. onwards.  Therefore it would have been important to take the

evidence offered by him relating to the question of the exact time of

the murder and his whereabouts on the night of 2 to 3 January 1978.

THE LAW

      The applicant complains that he was wrongly convicted and

sentenced on 2 November 1987 by the Duisburg Regional Court and also

of the court proceedings concerned.

        With regard to the judicial decisions of which the applicant

complains, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance

of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention.  In

particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where it considers that such errors might have involved a

possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention.  The Commission refers, on this point, to its established

case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236;

No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec.

13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).

        It is true that in this case the applicant also complains that

certain evidence proposed by the defence was disregarded by the court.

In this connection he alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        However, the Commission notes that the trial court carefully

examined all evidence available at the trial and refused to take the

evidence offered by the applicant considering it to be irrelevant or

assumed in the applicant's favour that the witnesses in question would

have testified in the manner indicated by the defence.  This reasoning

was held to be unobjectionable by the Federal Court which in detail

explains that all relevant evidence was considered by the trial court,

and that D.'s incriminating statements were confirmed by various other

evidence in particular the opinion of the ballistics expert.   In the

light of the particular circumstances of the case the Commission cannot

find that the reasons given by the domestic courts in this respect were

unfounded or arbitrary.  They do not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber    Acting President of the First Chamber

        (M. de SALVIA)                     (F. ERMACORA)

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