AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 21009/92

                      by Ove, Bengt, Bertil and Inkeri GUSTAVSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 5 April 1995, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, Acting President

           MM.   G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 16 November 1992

by Ove, Bengt, Bertil and Inkeri GUSTAVSSON against Sweden and

registered on 30 November 1992 under file No. 21009/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant, Mr. Ove Gustavsson, is a technician born in

1960 and resident at Partille. He is the father and sole guardian of

the second applicant, Bengt Gustavsson, born in 1984 and also resident

at Partille. The third and the fourth applicant, Mr. and Mrs. Bertil

and Inkeri Gustavsson, are the first applicant's parents, born in 1933

and 1932, respectively. The third applicant is an industrial supervisor

and the fourth applicant is a child nurse. They are both resident at

Landvetter. All applicants are Swedish citizens, but the fourth

applicant is of Finnish origin. They are all represented by Mrs. Siv

Westerberg, a lawyer in Gothenburg.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants or apparent

from the documents, may be summarised as follows.

I.    Particular circumstances of the case

      1.   Background

      In September 1986 S., the wife of the first applicant and the

mother of the second applicant, died of cancer. Prior to S.'s death and

also subsequently the second applicant was to a significant extent

cared for by the third and the fourth applicant.

      In August 1989 the second applicant was enrolled at a day

nursery. It appears that towards the end of 1990 he was observed

playing sexually explicit games with other children in his day nursery.

It further appears that he stated in an interview in private with the

nursery manager that he had played similar "games" also with his

father. On 20 December 1990 the nursery manager informed the Social

Office (socialkontoret) of Partille of her suspicions that the second

applicant had been sexually abused by the first applicant.

      According to the applicants, the second applicant had been led

by the nursery manager to state that "games" had taken place together

with the first applicant. Allegedly, the second applicant subsequently

asserted that he had only played the "games" with his friend at school

and never with the first applicant. Certain allegations made by the

nursery manager concerning the second applicant's behaviour in the

nursery were said to be based on second-hand or third-hand information

from other children in the nursery.

      2.   The criminal proceedings against the first applicant

      On 9 January 1991 the Social Office lodged a complaint with the

police suspecting the first applicant of having sexually abused the

second applicant. On 21 January 1991 the first applicant was

interrogated by the police on this suspicion. He was arrested and on

22 January 1991 detained, but was released on 28 January 1991. He was

further ordered to refrain from contacting his son during the pre-trial

investigation.

      On 21 January 1991 a police officer interviewed the second

applicant on videotape. Meanwhile, during a search carried out in the

first applicant's home some pornographic magazines and video cassettes

were seized.     On 21 January 1991 the fourth applicant was informed

by social welfare officials of the suspicions against the first

applicant. She was prohibited from taking the second applicant to her

home. Instead he was taken to the home of the nursery manager. On

28 January 1991 he was placed in public care in a so-called "family

home" (familjehem). During this period he was not allowed to see any

of the other applicants.

      On 4 February 1991 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Mölndal

ordered that the second applicant should undergo a psychiatric

examination by Ms. Monica Ekberg, a psychologist and psychotherapist

specialised in child and witness psychology and whom the Court itself

had called as an expert. On 23 February and 2 March 1991 Ms. Ekberg

interviewed him in the "family home". In her report of 4 April 1991

Ms. Ekberg considered the boy to be credible and his account of sexual

acts together with his father to be trustworthy, although with a

certain reservation.

      In a report of 15 May 1991 Dr. Mats Pihlgren, a psychologist of

the Child and Youth Psychiatric Centre (barn- och ungdomspsykiatriska

mottagningen) of Partille recommended that the second applicant should

undergo individual therapy. In a report of 19 June 1991 Mr. Robert S.

Jerdén, a psychologist and psychotherapist, refuted the conclusions of

Ms. Ekberg of 4 April 1991 on the ground that her investigation

material had been insufficient. For instance, no interviews had been

carried out with part of the nursery staff and the second applicant's

day carer at the time of the suspected offences. Mr. Jerdén concluded

that the first applicant could not have - and had not - committed the

offences with which he had been charged.

      On 19 July 1991 the District Court held an oral hearing. In the

prosecution's written indictment the first applicant had been charged

with having sexually abused the second applicant "on several occasions

during 1990, [the second applicant] being 5-6 years old". At the main

hearing before the District Court the indictment was amended, the first

applicant now being charged with having sexually abused the second

applicant "on several occasions during the years 1987-90, [the second

applicant] being 3-6 years old".

      Before the District Court the prosecution invoked the videotape

of the interview with the second applicant on 21 January 1991 which was

apparently shown to the Court. On the prosecution's request the nursery

manager was heard as a witness. Ms. Ekberg was heard as an expert. The

prosecution further invoked the report of 4 April 1991 by Ms. Ekberg,

a report by Mr. Pihlgren as well as a report by Dr. Margit Möller, a

physician specialised in child and youth psychiatry, of the Child and

Youth Psychiatric Centre. Finally, the prosecution invoked photographs

of the material seized in the first applicant's home.

      On the first applicant's request Mr. Jerdén was heard as an

expert. The first applicant also invoked a written report submitted by

Mr. Jerdén. Three staff members of the nursery, a nurse at the Child

and Youth Psychiatric Clinic as well as the fourth applicant were heard

as witnesses. The first applicant's request that the second applicant's

day carer be heard as a witness was apparently rejected.

      The District Court, by a majority, convicted the first applicant

of, inter alia, sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced him to one year's

imprisonment. It noted that the indictment had been exclusively based

on information given by the second applicant and considered, inter

alia, that the evidential value of the police interview with the second

applicant on 21 January 1991 was diminished by leading questions. The

District Court had not listened to the tape from Ms. Ekberg's first

interview with the second applicant. It found no reason, however, to

question Ms. Ekberg's report and further noted that in a further

interview on 29 April 1991 conducted by Mr. Pihlgren the second

applicant had again referred to sexual contacts between him and the

first applicant. For the Court, it was beyond reasonable doubt that the

first applicant had "at least on some occasions" abused the second

applicant sexually. One lay judge dissented.

      In his appeal the applicant challenged the accuracy of

Ms. Ekberg's report from which the District Court had allegedly drawn

incorrect conclusions. He further complained that Ms. Ekberg had failed

to record her interviews with the second applicant and repeated his

request that the second applicant's day carer at the time of the

suspected offences be heard as witness.

      On 22 October 1991 a report on a psychiatric examination of the

first applicant was received by the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) of

Western Sweden. On 30 January 1992 the Court of Appeal heard experts

Ekberg and Jerdén as well as all witnesses heard by the District Court

except the nurse at the Child and Youth Psychiatric Centre. The Court

of Appeal also viewed the videotape of the police interview with the

applicant on 21 January 1991. As further evidence the prosecution

invoked a report of 11 December 1991 by Mr. Pihlgren, whom the second

applicant had visited once a week as from June 1991 for therapy. Mr.

Pihlgren concluded that the second applicant was entirely fixated on

sexual acts, in particular between a child and its father. On the first

applicant's request the second applicant's day carer at the time of the

suspected offences was heard as a new witness before the Court of

Appeal. She had not noticed any disturbances in the second applicant's

behaviour until the middle of 1991.

      In its judgment of 30 January 1992 the Court of Appeal confirmed

the first applicant's conviction. It found Mr. Pihlgren's report of

December 1991 not decisive, since it was impossible to distinguish

between acts experienced by the second applicant and imaginative acts

provoked by his therapy.

      In his request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta

domstolen) the applicant complained that his conviction was mainly

based on Ms. Ekberg's expert report, although this report had been

challenged by the other expert Mr. Jerdén. Moreover, as pressure had

been put on the second applicant during the interviews conducted by the

nursery manager and the police officer, these interviews could not be

decisive either. The first applicant further referred to the testimony

by the second applicant's day carer and finally recalled the Court of

Appeal's disregard of Mr. Pihlgren's report of December 1991.

      On 2 June 1992 the Supreme Court refused the first applicant

leave to appeal.

      On 15 September 1994 the first applicant requested a re-opening

of the criminal proceedings, arguing that he had not been provided with

an opportunity to challenge the videotaped police interview with the

second applicant by questioning him at the hearings before the District

Court and the Court of Appeal. On 14 November 1994 the Supreme Court

refused to re-open the case.

      Before the Commission the applicants invoke a report and appendix

of 5 and 21 January 1993, respectively, by Dr. Rudolf Schlaug, a

specialist in general psychiatry, finding it unlikely that the second

applicant has been sexually abused.

      3.   The second applicant's placement in public care and the

           conditions in the "family homes"

      On 21 January 1991 the Chairman of the Social Council

(socialnämnden) of Partille decided in pursuance of Section 6 of the

1990 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lag

1990:52 med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga; hereinafter "the

1990 Act") to place the second applicant in provisional public care.

This order was revoked on 25 January 1991, when the second applicant

was placed in a "family home" at Hällingsjö with the first applicant's

consent in pursuance of Section 6 and 22 of the 1980 Social Services

Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620). It appears that he subsequently

withdrew his consent, objecting to the manner in which the public care

was being implemented.

      On 14 May 1991 Dr. Möller requested the Social Council to

urgently investigate whether it would be preferable to implement the

public care in the third and the fourth applicant's home rather than

in a "family home".

      On 16 May 1991 the Social Council decided in pursuance of Section

1, subsection 2, Section 2 and Section 11 of the 1990 Act to request

the second applicant's placement in compulsory public care and to

maintain his placement in the "family home" at Hällingsjö.

      On 20 June 1991 the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of

Gothenburg and Bohus held an oral hearing and granted the request with

immediate effect. The Court took account of, inter alia, the indictment

against the first applicant. The first applicant appealed to the

Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Gothenburg.

      On 25 July 1991 the Social Council decided to transfer the second

applicant to another "family home" at Partille.

      On 20 September 1991 the Administrative Court of Appeal struck

the first applicant's appeal off its list of cases after he had

withdrawn it. According to the applicants, the appeal was withdrawn

after counsel had stated that it lacked any prospect of success.

      On 17 October 1991 the Care Subcommittee (vårdutskottet) of the

Social Council rejected the third and the fourth applicant's request

under Section 25 of the Social Services Act that they be allowed to

permanently care for the second applicant in their home. One member

dissented, noting that the third and the fourth applicant had cared for

the second applicant to up to 70 per cent of his time after he had

reached the age of eight months. The investigating official of the

Committee had not visited the third and the fourth applicant in their

home. The third and the fourth applicant did not appeal against this

decision.

      On 30 December 1991 the Social Council considered that the second

applicant was still in need of public care and approved a care plan for

the period from 1 January to 30 June 1992. On 21 May 1992 the Social

Council maintained his public care and approved a care plan for the

period 1 July to 31 December 1992.

      On 5 October 1992 the first applicant requested that the second

applicant's care be terminated and that he be cared for by the third

and the fourth applicant in their home, alternatively that the public

care be implemented in the third and the fourth applicant's home. On

7 October 1992 the Social Council adjourned its decision until it had

reviewed the second applicant's care need ex officio in pursuance of

Section 13 of the 1990 Act.

      On 17 December 1992 the Social Council maintained the second

applicant's public care. The first applicant's appeal to the County

Administrative Court was rejected on 13 May 1993 following an oral

hearing at which the third and the fourth applicant as well as the

first applicant's two sisters were heard as witnesses. The witnesses

stated that following his taking into public care the second

applicant's development had slowed down and he had become introvert.

Furthermore he had not been properly washed and dressed by his

substitute parents. On one occasion his substitute father had lost him

in a crowd.

      In its judgment the County Administrative Court noted a report

by Mr. Pihlgren of 26 November 1992, according to which the second

applicant was still in need of therapy. The other applicants opposed

the therapy provided by Mr. Pihlgren. The Court considered that, while

the third and the fourth applicant were generally suitable as carers,

the implementation of the second applicant's public care in their home

could lead to a conflict of interests, given their objections to the

therapy provided as well as their belief that the first applicant had

not committed the offences of which he had been convicted. The Court

further found that the criticism of the conditions in the second

applicant's "family home" was not corroborated by the witness

statements nor by the investigation by the Social Council.

      In his appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammar-

rätten) of Gothenburg the first applicant criticised, inter alia, the

second applicant's hygiene and clothing in the "family home".

      The appeal was rejected on 15 September 1993. The Administrative

Court of Appeal noted a report by Mr. Pihlgren of 23 August 1993,

according to which the second applicant was still in need of therapy.

The criticism of the conditions in the "family home" had been refuted

by the Social Council and the second applicant's official counsel.

      Leave to appeal was refused to the first applicant on 26 May 1994

by the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten).

      Throughout the care proceedings the second applicant was

represented by his official counsel, who supported the Social Council's

view that public care away from the second applicant's biological

family was still needed. According to the applicants, however, it has

been the second applicant's consistent wish to live either with the

first applicant or with the third and the fourth applicant.

      4.   Access to the second applicant

      Having been released from detention on 28 January 1991, the first

applicant was prohibited by a social welfare official from taking the

second applicant home. His request that the second applicant be allowed

to stay with the third and the fourth applicant was also refused.

      It appears from a report by officials of the Social Council of

11 April 1991 that during the first two months following the second

applicant's placement in public care in the first "family home" the

third and the fourth applicant visited him there at least every

weekend. As from 18 March 1991 they were allowed to bring him to their

home to spend the weekends there. On 18 March 1991 the first applicant

visited the second applicant in the "family home" for the first time

after his release. Subsequently the two met in the third and the fourth

applicant's home. They were not allowed, however, to meet in private

either there or elsewhere.

      According to the care plan approved by the Social Council on

21 May 1992, the first applicant was to spend one weekend a month with

the third and the fourth applicant and another weekend with his

maternal grandparents. The first applicant and other relatives of the

second applicant were allowed to visit the second applicant during

those weekends. The first applicant was not allowed to see the second

applicant in private on those occasions. He was, however, allowed to

visit the second applicant in the "family home" for two hours every

second week or a maximum of two to three visits a month. The third and

the fourth applicant could further see the second applicant outside the

"family home" one afternoon a month. If the second applicant's other

relatives would be unable to see him during the above weekends, they

could arrange other meetings either in or outside the "family home" in

agreement with the substitute parents. On special holidays the second

applicant was allowed to see the first applicant and other relatives

subject to consultation with the social welfare officer in charge. The

second applicant was to continue his weekly therapy for another year.

The care plan was to be revised in six months. The first applicant was

notified of his right of appeal to the County Administrative Court

against the restrictions on his access to the second applicant as

indicated in the care plan. He did not avail himself of this

possibility. Nor has he challenged the subsequent care plans, allegedly

fearing retaliation measures by the Social Council such as further

access restrictions. The third and the fourth applicant have no legal

standing for the purpose of requesting access.

      It appears that presently the second applicant is allowed to see

the first applicant for two hours every second week in the "family

home". The second applicant is allowed to spend one weekend a month in

the third and the fourth applicant's home and another weekend in the

home of his maternal grandparents.

      5.   The first and the second applicant's obligation to

           participate in the costs incurred by the public care of the

           second applicant

      On 23 August 1991 the Guardianship Board (överförmyndarnämnden)

of Partille requested that the first applicant generally authorise, in

his capacity as the second applicant's guardian, the substitute parents

to withdraw money from an account opened by the Board for the purpose

of collecting the second applicant's national supplementary insurance

(allmän tilläggspension). Subject to the Board's approval, such

withdrawals could be made for purchases for the second applicant. The

first applicant signed such an authority, allegedly fearing further

access restrictions.

      According to the applicants, the furniture in the second

applicant's room in the present "family home" has de facto been paid

for by the second applicant himself by virtue of the collection of his

various pension benefits. The same is allegedly true for clothing and

other necessities, although such expenses are to be covered by a

monthly compensatory lump sum paid by the Social Council to the

substitute parents.

      6.   The education provided to the second applicant

      At the time of his placement in public care the second applicant

was entitled to attend so-called preschool (förskola) for three hours

a day. After the placement the first applicant requested that the

second applicant be allowed to attend such classes, but this was

allegedly refused by the social authorities and the substitute parents.

As from the autumn of 1991 the second applicant is attending elementary

school.

      7.   The courts' refusals to communicate documents to the first

           applicant

      On 24 September 1992 the first applicant requested access to the

District Court's confidential documents in the criminal proceedings

against him, including the videotape and the audiotape from the

hearing. The request was granted on 16 October 1992 on condition that

the material only be used in domestic proceedings. The first applicant

appealed, invoking his intention to use the requested documents and

material before the Convention organs. The District Court's decision

was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 11 December 1992. On 29 October

1993, however, the Supreme Court granted the first applicant's further

appeal.

      8.   The courts' refusals to accept the applicants' present

           counsel as the first applicant's official counsel

      On 20 October 1992 the County Administrative Court refused the

first applicant's request that his counsel before the Commission be

appointed official counsel in proceedings with a view to having the

second applicant's public care terminated. The Court considered that

she did not fulfil the requirements of suitability in Section 44 of the

1972 Legal Aid Act (rättshjälpslag 1972:429). The first applicant

appealed, invoking, inter alia, Article 25 para. 1 of the Convention

and stated his unwillingness to be represented by any other counsel.

The appeal was rejected on 2 December 1992. Leave to appeal was refused

by the Supreme Administrative Court on 26 May 1994.

II.   Relevant domestic law

      A young person may be placed in public care inter alia if, due

to physical abuse, exploitation, deficiencies of care or some other

circumstances in his or her home, there is a clear risk of the young

person's health and development being impaired (Section 1, subsection

2 as well as Section 2 of the 1990 Act). In certain situations a

provisional care order may be issued (Section 6). The care order does

not imply a transfer of custody or guardianship to the Social Council,

such a transfer requiring specific court decisions (see Chapters 6 and

10 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken)).

      The Social Council decides how the public care of the young

person is to be implemented and where he or she is to reside during the

care period. The Council may consent to the young person residing in

his or her own home, if this may be presumed to be the most appropriate

way of arranging public care, but such care is always to commence away

from home (Section 11). An appeal may be lodged against a decision of

the Social Council if it has, inter alia, decided where the care of the

young person is to commence, if it has transferred him or her to

another home or if it has decided a question relating to continued care

(Section 41). A decision not to transfer a child from a "family home"

is also appealable (Government Bill 1989/90:28, p. 125).

      Under the 1980 Social Services Act the Social Council may also

consent to a child's placement in a private home other than that of one

or both of its parents or another custodian. A refusal of such consent

may be appealed to the administrative courts (Sections 25 and 73).

      According to the 1981 Social Services Ordinance (social-

tjänstförordning 1981:750), the Social Council shall carefully monitor

the young person's development in the "family home" where it has been

placed (Section 39). This monitoring shall be carried out through

regular visits in the "family home" and by hearing the child. Telephone

calls to the substitute parents are deemed unsatisfactory in order to

comply with this responsibility (Government Bill 1989/90:28, p. 113).

If care has been provided under Section 2, the Council must at least

every six months review whether care is still necessary (Section 13 of

the 1990 Act).

       It is primarily for the parents to ensure that their child's

need of access to a person who is particularly close to it is satisfied

to the utmost possible extent (Chapter 6, Section 15, subsection 1 of

the Parental Code). If a young person is placed in public care the

Social Council shall ensure, as far as possible, his or her access to

parents or other custodians. If necessary in view of the purpose of the

public care the Council may decide, inter alia, how access may be

exercised (Section 14 of the 1990 Act). The contacts between the child

and its parents should not be completely cut off and the public care

should not continue for any longer than necessary. The Council shall

promote contacts between the child and others who are close to it. The

Council may not restrict access between the child and its parents

without there being strong reasons therefor, e.g., when the parents

interfere with the care or when their personal conditions are such that

they should not have access. Restrictions on access shall be lifted

immediately when they are no longer needed and shall be re-examined by

the Council every three months (cf. Government Bill 1989/90:28, pp. 72

et seq.).  Under Swedish law grandparents have no right of access to

a grandchild.

      The individual concerned shall be informed of the notes

concerning him or her kept by the Social Council (Section 52 of the

Social Services Act). In proceedings before the administrative courts

the parties shall normally be heard in regard to submissions by another

party (Section 18 of the 1971 Code of Administrative Procedure

(förvaltningsprocesslag 1971:291)).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The first applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention

that the criminal proceedings leading to his conviction were not

conducted before an impartial District Court and Court of Appeal and

that the proceedings were unfair and contrary to the presumption of

innocence. The following is alleged:

      (a) the nursery manager's interview with the second applicant was

not conducted by professionals especially trained to handle incest

suspicions;

      (b) the interview was carried out in the absence of the first

applicant;

      (c) the second applicant should have been assisted by a legal

representative during the interview;

      (d) the police interview with the second applicant was not

attended by the first applicant himself or his lawyer;

      (e) at this interview the police officer used terms which the

second applicant was unfamiliar with and, moreover, asked him leading

questions;

      (f) following the interview the second applicant was kept by the

nursery manager for seven days during which period he was not allowed

to see any of the other applicants, this being likely to influence his

account of the suspected sexual abuse;

      (g) the audio tape from Ms. Ekberg's interview with the second

applicant on 23 February 1991 was destroyed before the first applicant

found out about its existence, thus preventing him from challenging its

contents;

      (h) Ms. Ekberg's interviews were conducted long after the second

applicant had been separated from the other applicants and thus had

been subjected to influence by the nursery manager;

      (i) the District Court's acceptance of the amendment of the

indictment at the main hearing did not afford the first applicant

adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

      (j) the first applicant remained unaware of a significant number

of relevant documents submitted to the District Court by the

prosecution (i.e. records from interrogations with nursery staff

refuting the incest suspicions, interrogation records showing

discrepancies in some of the witness statements, a medical report

finding no physical injuries on the second applicant, etc.);

      (k) the District Court did not ex officio communicate the above

documents to the first applicant for comments;

      (l) the videotape from the police interview with the second

applicant was viewed at the District Court's and the Court of Appeal's

hearings, but the first applicant had not been provided with a copy in

advance and was thus denied adequate time and facilities for the

preparation of his defence;

      (m) the second applicant was not heard by the District Court;

      (n) Mr. Pihlgren was partial in the criminal proceedings, since

it was in his pecuniary interests to secure the first applicant's

conviction in order to be able to pursue his therapy sessions with the

second applicant;

      (o) the first applicant's conviction was not based on any

forensic or "impartial" evidence; and

      (p) the first applicant was not informed about the report on his

psychiatric examination until the Court of Appeal's hearing.

2.    The first applicant further complains that his conviction also

violated Article 3 of the Convention in that it led to the maintaining

of the second applicant's placement in public care.

3.    The first and the second applicant complain that the first

applicant was prohibited from taking the second applicant home on his

release from his pre-trial detention, this prohibition violating the

first applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention as

well both applicants' rights under Article 8.

4.    The third and the fourth applicant complain under Articles 6 and

13 of the Convention about lack of a court remedy enabling them to

challenge the refusal to allow them to care for the second applicant

during the pre-trial investigation. The second applicant also complains

that the refusal violated his rights under Article 10 of the Convention

to receive information, while the third and the fourth applicant

complain that the refusal violated their rights under Article 10 of the

Convention to freedom of expression.

5.    The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 6 of

the Convention that they were unable to refute the suspicions expressed

by an official of the Social Council that they might sexually abuse the

second applicant.

6.    The second applicant complains under Article 7 of the Convention

that his placement in public care amounts to a punishment without any

legal basis.

7.    All applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that

the second applicant's public care, in particular in a "family home",

has not been and is not justified, given the ability of the third and

the fourth applicant to care for the second applicant, should his

public care be terminated or implemented in their home. They invoke

Article 8 of the Convention. In their submission of 15 March 1994 the

third and the fourth applicant also complain under Article 9 of the

Convention that the decisions complained of were taken in view of their

opinion that the first applicant is innocent.8.   The second applicant

complains under Article 3 of the Convention of the conditions in the

first "family home". Moreover, contrary to Articles 6 and 13 of the

Convention, he had no court remedy whereby he could have challenged

these conditions.

Convention of his placement in public care in the second "family home",

given the restrictions on his right to see the other applicants.

10.   The first applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention

that his request of 5 October 1992 for a termination of the second

applicant's public care, alternatively that the care be implemented in

the third and the fourth applicant's home, was not examined by a court

within a reasonable time because the Social Council adjourned its

examination of this request.

11.   The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 13 of

the Convention about lack of a court remedy against the refusal to

allow them to become the second applicant's foster parents pursuant to

the Social Services Act.

12.   In the submissions of 15 March 1994 the first applicant complains

under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that he has no court remedy

at his disposal against the implementation of the second applicant's

public care.

13.   The first and the second applicant complain under Article 8 of

the Convention that the access restrictions concerning them have no

basis in domestic law and are not necessary.

14.   The second, the third and the fourth applicant complain that

their rights under Article 8 of the Convention have been violated in

that the access restrictions concerning them have no basis in domestic

law and are not necessary.

15.   The second, the third and the fourth applicant complain under

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.that they had no court remedy

against the access restrictions concerning them.

16.   The second applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention

that the restrictions on his other relatives' access to him have no

basis in domestic law and are not necessary. He claims unrestricted

contact with his maternal grandparents.

17.   The second applicant complains that the withdrawals from his

national supplementary insurance account with a view to covering

running expenses incurred on account of his placement in the "family

home" violate his property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to

the Convention. He submits that the withdrawals constituted a de facto

deprivation of his possessions to which the first applicant has been

forced to consent under threat of having his access rights further

restricted.

18.   The first and the second applicant complain under Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention that they had no court remedy at their

disposal against the above-mentioned withdrawals.

19.   The second applicant complains that he was denied his right to

attend preschool. He invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

20.   The first applicant complains under Article 25 of the Convention

about the refusal to accept his counsel before the Commission as his

official counsel in the proceedings under the 1990 Act which he

initiated in October 1992. He considers that the refusal limits his

possibilities effectively to pursue his complaint with the Commission

in respect of the second applicant's placement in public care.

21.   The first and the fourth applicant complain that they have been

discriminated against, the first one on account of being a single

parent and the fourth one on account of her Finnish origin.

22.   In the submission of 22 December 1994 the first applicant

complains that except on one occasion he has not been informed by the

Social Council of its notes concerning the second applicant's "family

home", although this is required by Section 52 of the Social Services

Act. No express Convention provision is invoked.

THE LAW

1.    The first applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that the criminal proceedings leading to his conviction were

not conducted before an impartial District Court and Court of Appeal.

They were, moreover, unfair and contrary to the presumption of

innocence.

      Article 6 (Art. 6) reads, as far as it is relevant to the present

case, as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights and

      obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone

      is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time

      by an independent and impartial tribunal established by

      law. ...

      2.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be

      presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

      3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the

      following minimum rights:

      ...

      b.   to have adequate time and facilities for the

      preparation of his defence;

      c.   to defend himself in person or through legal

      assistance of his own choosing ...;

      d.   to examine or have examined witnesses against him and

      to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on

      his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against

      him; ..."

      The Commission first recalls that the guarantees in paras. 2 and

3 (Art. 6-2, 6-3)are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial set

forth in para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (cf. e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Unterpertinger

judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 110, p. 14, para. 29).

Accordingly, the Commission will have regard to them when examining the

facts under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). The Commission's task is to

ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety were fair (cf.,

e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Stanford judgment of 23 February 1994, Series

A no. 280-A, para. 24). As a general rule, however, it is for the

domestic courts to assess the evidence before them, in particular since

they have the benefit of hearing witnesses and assessing their

credibility (Eur. Court H.R., Klaas judgment of 22 September 1993,

Series A no. 269-A, pp. 17-18, paras. 29-30). The Commission is

normally not competent to deal with a complaint alleging that errors

of law and fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where

it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation

of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or one of

its Protocols, for instance in that a judgment has no legal

justification and thereby violates a party's right to receive a fair

trial (cf. No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45). It follows

that it cannot examine whether or not the first applicant was guilty

or innocent.

      The Commission also recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of

the Convention it may only deal with a complaint after all domestic

remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised

rules under international law. A complaint to the Commission must

therefore have been made at least in substance in the proceedings

before the competent domestic organs (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Cardot

judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, p. 18, para. 34).

      In the present case that the Commission finds that the first

applicant has not shown that complaints 1(a) to (g), (i) to (n) and (p)

were raised at least in substance before the domestic courts. He has

not therefore exhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law

in respect of these complaints. Moreover, the Commission finds no

special circumstance which might have absolved this applicant,

according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from

exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal. It follows that these

complaints must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies

under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

      Limiting its examination of the fairness of the proceedings to

the first applicant's complaints 1 (h) and (o), the Commission observes

that he availed himself of his right to challenge Ms. Ekberg's report

by making a request to hear another expert. There is thus no indication

that there was in this respect a lack of "equality of arms" between the

first applicant and the prosecution. The material submitted to the

Commission does not call the findings of the domestic courts into

question. In conclusion, there is no indication that the first

applicant was denied a fair trial in this respect. Accordingly, as

there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1), these complaints must be rejected as being manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The first applicant complains that his conviction violated

Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in that, as a result, the second

applicant was kept in public care. The Commission finds no appearance

of such a violation. It follows that this complaint must be rejected

as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The first and the second applicant complain that the first

applicant was prohibited from taking the second applicant home on his

release from his pre-trial detention, this prohibition violating the

first applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the

Convention as well as both applicants' rights under Article 8 (Art. 8).

      The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention it may only deal with a complaint within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken. It observes

that the prohibition complained of was issued on 28 January 1991 and

became obsolete at the latest on 20 June 1991, when the County

Administrative Court ordered the second applicant's placement in public

care. The present application, however, was lodged on 16 November 1992,

that is more than six months later. Furthermore, an examination of the

case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which

might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period. It

follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must

be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

4.    The third and the fourth applicant complain under Articles 6 and

13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention about lack of a court remedy against

the refusal to allow them to care for the second applicant during the

investigation of the suspicions against the first applicant. The second

applicant also complains that the refusal violated his rights under

Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention to receive information, while

the third and the fourth applicant complain that the refusal violated

their rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention to freedom

of expression.

      The Commission observes that the refusal at issue dates back to

28 January 1991. Reiterating its conclusion with regard to complaint

no. 3, the Commission considers that these complaints have also been

introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article

27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3)of the Convention.

5.    The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention that they have been unable to refute the

suspicions expressed by a social welfare official that they might

sexually abuse the second applicant.

      Examining the complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the

Convention, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of these

applicants' rights. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.    The second applicant complains under Article 7 (Art. 7) of the

Convention that his placement in public care amounts to a punishment

without any legal basis. The Commission finds this complaint

unsubstantiated. It follows that it must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

7.    All applicants complain under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention that the second applicant's placement in public care, in

particular in a "family home", has not been and is not justified, given

the ability of the third and the fourth applicant to care for the

second applicant, should his public care be terminated or implemented

in their home. They invoke Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. In

their submission of 15 March 1994 the third and the fourth applicant

also complain under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention that the

decisions complained of were made in view of their opinion that the

first applicant is innocent.

      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads, as far as relevant,

as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life [and] his home ...

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      The Commission recalls that "family life" within the meaning of

Article 8 (Art. 8) may include at least the ties between near relatives

such as grandparents and grandchildren (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Marckx

judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 21, para. 45). However,

the existence of "family life" will depend on a number of factors and

on the particular circumstances of each case (cf., e.g., No. 12763/87,

Dec. 14.7.88, D.R. 57 p. 216).

      The second applicant is the child of the first applicant in his

marriage to S. The first and the second applicant therefore constitute

a "family" ipso jure (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Hokkanen judgment of

23 September 1994, Series A no. 299-A, para. 54). Moreover, up to his

placement in public care the third and the fourth applicant were

significantly involved in the everyday upbringing of the second

applicant. In these circumstances the decision to place him in public

care constituted an interference with the applicants' right to respect

for their family life as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the

Convention.

      In order to be justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) such an interference must satisfy three conditions: it must

be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the

legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must

be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those legitimate

aims.

      The Commission recalls that the placement order was based on the

1990 Act and was, accordingly, made in accordance with the law. The

interference furthermore had the legitimate aims of protecting the

second applicant's "health or morals" as well as his "rights and

freedoms" in general.

      It remains hereafter to determine whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the second

applicant. The notion of necessity implies that the interference

corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, requires that

it be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Regard must also be

had to the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States (cf.

Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130,

pp. 31-32, para. 67). The Commission's review is not limited to

ascertaining whether the State has exercised its discretion reasonably,

carefully and in good faith. It cannot confine itself to considering

the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them in the light

of the case as a whole. It must determine whether the reasons adduced

to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient"

(cf. the above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p. 32, para. 68). In the

present case the Commission notes, in particular, the expert evidence

submitted by the second applicant's present therapist, recommending

that the therapy should continue. However, before the County

Administrative Court the other applicants gave reason to believe that

they would discontinue this therapy if the second applicant's public

care were to be revoked. The Court took this into account when

maintaining public care. It further considered that implementation of

the public care in the third and the fourth applicant's home could lead

to a conflict of interests jeopardising the care, given the other

applicants' objections to the therapy provided as well as the third and

the fourth applicant's belief that the first applicant was innocent.

      In the light of the above and having regard to the State's margin

of appreciation the Commission finds that the public care of the second

applicant has been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and that

the Swedish courts could reasonably find it necessary to maintain his

care. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the interference with

the applicants' rights under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) can

reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within

the meaning of para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of that provision in the interests

of the second applicant.

      The Commission finds no further issue under Article 9 (Art. 9)

of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

8.    The second applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention of the conditions in the first "family home". Moreover,

contrary to Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention, he had

no court remedy whereby he could have challenged these conditions.

      The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention it may only deal with the matter within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken. If the

object of a complaint is not a decision, but an ongoing situation, the

six months' period starts at the time when the situation ceases to

exist (see, e.g., No. 11123/84, Dec. 9.12.87, D.R. 54 p. 52).

      The Commission observes that the second applicant was transferred

from the first "family home" to his present "family home" on 25 July

1991, whereas the present application was lodged on 16 November 1992,

i.e. more than six months later. Furthermore, an examination of the

case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which

might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period. It

follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must

be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

9.    The second applicant complains under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the

Convention of his placement in public care in his present "family

home", given the restrictions on his right to see the other applicants.

      The Commission cannot find that the second applicant's placement

in the "family home" and the related access restrictions amount to a

deprivation of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 (Art. 5) of

the Convention. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

10.   The first applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that his request of October 1992 for a termination of the

second applicant's public care was not examined by a court within a

reasonable time because the Social Council adjourned its examination

of this request.

      The Commission has examined this complaint under the above-cited

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It reiterates that the

reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the

light of the circumstances of each case and having regard to the

following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the

parties and that of the authorities dealing with the case (e.g., Eur.

Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198,

p. 12, para. 30).

      The applicant's request was examined by the Social Council in

December 1992. The applicant's appeal to the County Administrative

Court was decided upon in May 1993 following an oral hearing. His

further appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal was decided upon

in September 1993, also after an oral hearing. Leave to appeal was

refused by decision of the Supreme Administrative Court on 26 May 1994.

      The court proceedings involving three courts and two oral

hearings thus lasted less than one and a half year. In the light of the

above criteria and having regard to the particular circumstances of the

case the Commission cannot find that this length exceeded a "reasonable

time". Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1). It follows that this complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

11.   The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention about lack of a court remedy against the

Social Council's refusal to allow them to become the second applicant's

foster parents pursuant to the Social Services Act.

      The Commission has considered this complaint under the

above-cited Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Assuming

that this provision applies, the Commission observes that under Section

73 of the Social Services Act the third and the fourth applicant had

a right to challenge the Social Council's refusal before the

administrative courts. They did not, however, avail themselves of this

opportunity. No further issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

12.   In the submissions of 15 March 1994 the first applicant complains

under Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention that he has no

court remedy at his disposal against the implementation of the second

applicant's public care.

      The Commission observes that according to the travaux

préparatoires to the 1990 Act a decision not to transfer a child from

a "family home" is appealable in administrative court proceedings. It

notes, in particular, that in its judgment of 15 September 1993  the

Administrative Court of Appeal examined the first applicant's criticism

of the conditions in the second applicant's "family home" in order to

assess whether his public care should be implemented somewhere else.

In these circumstances the first applicant had access to a court and

there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention. No separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13). It

follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

13.   The first and the second applicant complain that their rights

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention have been violated in that

the access restrictions concerning them have no basis in domestic law

and are not necessary.

      The Commission finds no indication that the first applicant has

challenged the access restrictions at issue by appealing against the

Social Council's care plan to the administrative courts. The applicants

have not therefore exhausted the remedies available to them under

Swedish law. Moreover, an examination of this complaint does not

disclose the existence of any special circumstance which might have

absolved the applicants, according to the generally recognised rules

of international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at their

disposal. It follows that this complaint must be rejected for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

14.   The second, the third and the fourth applicant complain under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention that the access restrictions

concerning them have no basis in domestic law and are not necessary.

(a)   In so far as the complaint has been lodged by the second

applicant the Commission, recalling its reasoning with regard to

complaint no. 13 above, considers that domestic remedies have not been

exhausted. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under

Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

(b)   In so far as the complaint has been lodged by the third and the

fourth applicant the Commission has found above (in para. 7) that also

these applicants' relationship with the second applicant constituted -

and constitutes - "family life" within the meaning of Article 8

(Art. 8). The Commission considers that the access restrictions now at

issue amounted - and amount - to an interference with the third and the

fourth applicant's "family life".

      In examining whether this interference is justified under para. 2

of Article 8 (Art. 8-2)) the Commission first recalls that the

requirement that the interference be "in accordance with the law"

relates to the quality of the law in question and implies, inter alia,

that the law should be accessible to the person concerned, who must

moreover be able to foresee its consequences for him. In a sphere

covered by written law, the "law" is the enactment in force as the

competent courts have interpreted it (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R.,

Kruslin judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A, pp. 21-22, para.

29). The Commission notes that under Section 11 of the 1990 Act the

Social Council may decide how the public care is to be implemented. The

Commission is further aware that this provision has been considered by

Swedish courts as constituting the legal basis for access restrictions

concerning, for instance, grandparents (see No. 21608/93, Dec. 22.2.95,

not published). It therefore concludes that the restrictions were

sufficiently foreseeable and thus "in accordance with the law" within

the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).

      The Commission accepts that the access restrictions had the same

legitimate aims as the public care of the second applicant as

implemented in a "family home" (see para. 7 above). As for the question

whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" in

pursuance of the above aims, the Commission observes that the second

applicant has been allowed to spend one weekend a month in the home of

the third and the fourth applicant, his paternal grandparents, while

being allowed to spend another weekend a month in the home of his

maternal grandparents. Special arrangements have apparently been made

for public holidays. Recalling its considerations in para. 7 above as

regards the necessity of the public care as implemented in a "family

home" and having regard to the State's margin of appreciation, the

Commission considers that also the access restrictions now complained

of have been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and that the

Social Council could reasonably find it necessary to order and maintain

them. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the interference with

the third and the fourth applicant's rights under Article 8 para. 1

(Art. 8-1) can reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a democratic

society" within the meaning of para. 2 (Art. 8-2)of that provision in

the interests of the second applicant. It follows that this aspect of

the complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

15.   The second, the third and the fourth applicant complain under

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that they had no court

remedy at their disposal against the access restrictions concerning

them.

      In so far as the complaint has been lodged by the second

applicant the Commission, recalling its reasoning with regard to

complaint no. 13 above, considers it to be manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      In so far as the complaint has been lodged by the third and the

fourth applicant, the Commission recalls that in order for Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) to apply to the proceedings in question it must

first be ascertained whether there was a dispute over a "right" which

can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under

domestic law (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., W v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121-A, p. 32-33, para. 73). Under

Swedish law the third and the fourth applicant have no right of access

to the second applicant. Thus, they cannot, on arguable grounds, claim

to have a "right" under domestic law. Article 6 (Art. 6) does not

therefore apply in their case. It follows that in this respect the

complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

16.   The second applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention that the restrictions on his other relatives' access to him

have no basis in domestic law and are not necessary. He claims

unrestricted contact with his maternal grandparents.

      Recalling its reasoning with regard to complaint no. 13 above,

the Commission considers that domestic remedies have not been

exhausted. It follows that this complaint must also be rejected under

Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

17.   The second applicant complains that the withdrawals from his

national supplementary insurance account with a view to covering

running expenses incurred on account of his placement in the "family

home" violate his property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention. He submits that the withdrawals constitute

a de facto deprivation of his possessions to which the first applicant

has been forced to consent under threat of having his access rights

further restricted.

      The Commission considers that this complaint could be raised in

civil proceedings instituted by the first applicant for the purpose of

claiming the restoration of the money withdrawn (cf. No. 14451/88, Dec.

2.7.93, not published). No such action has been brought. The Commission

recalls that where doubts exist as to the effectiveness of a remedy

that remedy must be tried (e.g., No. 10148/82, Dec. 14.3.85, D.R. 42

p. 98).

      In the above circumstances the Commission finds that it has not

been shown that domestic remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, an

examination of the complaint does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstance which might have absolved the applicants,

according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from

exhausting the domestic remedy at their disposal. It follows that this

complaint must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies

under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

18.   The first and the second applicant complain under Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that they have no court remedy at

their disposal against the withdrawals from the second applicant's

national supplementary insurance account.

      Recalling its reasoning with regard to complaint no. 17 above,

the Commission considers that this complaint is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

19.   The second applicant complains that he was refused his right to

attend preschool. He invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2).

      Leaving aside the question of Sweden's reservation to this

provision, as valid at the relevant time, the Commission observes that

the situation complained of ceased to exist in 1991 when the second

applicant started attending elementary school. The application,

however, was lodged with the Commission on 16 November 1992.

Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence

of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended

the running of the six month period provided for in Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention. It follows that this complaint has been

introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article

27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

20.   The first applicant complains under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention about the refusal to accept his counsel before the

Commission as his official counsel in the proceedings under the 1990

Act which he initiated in October 1992. He considers that the refusal

limits his possibilities effectively to pursue his complaint with the

Commission in respect of the second applicant's placement in public

care.

      Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention reads, as far

as relevant, as follows:

      "The Commission may receive petitions ... from any person

      ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the

      High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this

      Convention, provided that the High Contracting Party

      against which the complaint has been lodged has declared

      that it recognises the competence of the Commission to

      receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting

      Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to

      hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."

      The Commission recalls that Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the

Convention imposes an obligation on the Contracting States not to

interfere with the right of the individual effectively to present and

pursue his application before the Commission. Such an obligation

confers upon the applicant a right of a procedural nature

distinguishable from the substantive rights set out under Section I of

the Convention or under its Protocols. It flows from the very essence

of this right that it must be open to individuals to complain of

alleged infringements of it in the proceedings before the Commission.

In this respect the Convention must be interpreted as guaranteeing

rights which are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and

illusory (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Cruz Varas and Others judgment of

20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, pp. 35-36, para. 99).

      In the case at issue the Commission observes that one of the

complaints lodged by the first applicant in the application now under

examination concerns precisely the question whether the second

applicant's continued placement in public care is justified under

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. In these circumstances

the Commission cannot find that the first applicant has up to this

stage of the proceedings been hindered in the exercise of his right of

petition (cf. ibid., p. 37, para. 104). No action is therefore called

for.

21.   The applicants complain that the first and the fourth applicant

have been discriminated against, the first applicant on account of

being a single parent and the fourth applicant on account of her

Finnish origin. The Commission finds this complaint unsubstantiated.

It follows that it is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

22.   In the submission of 22 December 1994 the first applicant

complains that except on one occasion he has not been informed by the

Social Council of its notes concerning the second applicant's "family

home", although this is required by Section 52 of the Social Services

Act.

      The Commission, examining this complaint in the light of the

above-cited Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, cannot find any

evidence that the first applicant has requested access to the notes

concerned. It has therefore not been shown that domestic remedies have

been exhausted. Moreover, an examination of the complaint does not

disclose the existence of any special circumstance which might have

absolved the applicants, according to the generally recognised rules

of international law, from exhausting the domestic remedy at their

disposal. It follows that this complaint must be rejected for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      1.   DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE; and

      2.   DECIDES TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION IN RESPECT OF THE

      ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE

      RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL PETITION.

      Secretary                                Acting

to the Second Chamber              President of the Second Chamber

      (K. ROGGE)                            (G. H. THUNE)