JOHANSSON AND OTHERS v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 21608/93 • ECHR ID: 001-2040
Document date: February 22, 1995
- 1 Inbound citations:
- •
- 0 Cited paragraphs:
- •
- 1 Outbound citations:
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 21608/93
by Anita JOHANSSON and Others
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 22 February 1995, the following members being present:
Mrs. G.H. THUNE, Acting President
MM. H. DANELIUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
F. MARTINEZ
J.-C. GEUS
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 6 March 1993 by
Anita Johansson and others against Sweden and registered on
31 March 1993 under file No. 21608/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
a. The particular circumstances of the case
The applicants are Anita Johansson, her daughter Jessica
Johansson and her parents Gustaf and Greta Johansson, all Swedish
citizens. They were born in 1955, 1981, 1914 and 1930, respectively.
Gustaf Johansson died in May 1994. Anita and Greta Johansson reside
at Kalmar, while Jessica Johansson lives at Karlskrona. Before the
Commission they are represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a lawyer
practising in Gothenburg.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
Between 1961 and 1977 Anita Johansson was registered by the Care
Council (Omsorgsstyrelsen) as being in need of special assistance owing
to a minor mental retardation.
By decisions of 2 April and 19 May 1981 the Social Council
(Socialnämnden) of Karlskrona ("the Council") took Jessica, one month
old at the time of the first decision, into public care. The decisions
were later confirmed by the County Administrative Court (Länsrätten)
of the County of Blekinge and the Administrative Court of Appeal
(Kammarrätten) of Jönköping on the grounds that Anita Johansson was
unable to rear Jessica and that, due to the conditions in the home,
there was a risk of impairment of Jessica's health and development.
On 7 October 1982 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten)
refused leave to appeal. At regular intervals thereafter, the Council
re-examined the situation and decided not to terminate the public care.
These decisions were either not appealed or upheld on appeal by the
administrative courts.
By a Council decision of 20 July 1981, Jessica was placed with
foster parents and her mother was granted access to her once every five
weeks. Also this decision was reviewed at regular intervals by the
Council and, on appeal, by the courts. Thus, by a Council decision of
13 September 1982, Greta Johansson was granted a right to be present
every fourth time Anita Johansson visited Jessica. This right was,
however, revoked by a Council decision of 12 November 1984, after which
date Greta Johansson has met Jessica only once, in January 1993. The
decision of 12 November 1984 also limited Anita Johansson's right of
access to two visits in the foster-home per year. In this respect the
decision was overturned by the County Administrative Court which
decided, on 5 March 1985, to grant Anita Johansson access to her
daughter every four weeks for five hours at a time in the foster-home.
This was to be the extent of her access for several years thereafter.
In February 1992, Anita Johansson requested that the public care
be terminated or, in the second place, that she be granted a right to
meet Jessica for longer periods of time and at her own home. Her
request was refused by the Council on 6 April 1992. After she had
appealed against this decision on behalf of herself and her daughter,
the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal,
in decisions of 12 May 1992 and 10 July 1992 respectively, refused to
appoint her representative, Mrs. Siv Westerberg, as public counsel.
Although invited to propose another lawyer to be her public counsel,
Anita Johansson apparently did not do so, nor did she appeal against
the appellate court's decision to the Supreme Administrative Court.
Instead, Mrs. Westerberg represented her as privately appointed
counsel.
By judgment of 30 June 1992, the County Administrative Court
rejected the appeal against the Council's decision of 6 April 1992 not
to terminate care. It stated that, although Anita Johansson's social
situation had somewhat improved, this did not give cause for the Court
to change the opinion it had expressed in previous judgments on the
matter. Noting that Jessica had a minor mental retardation and thus
special needs, the Court concluded that Anita Johansson, who was also
slightly mentally retarded, was unable to take care of her. As
concerns the question of access, the Court, noting that Anita Johansson
had never had the sole responsibility for her daughter and that there
was no person who could support her in taking care of her daughter,
considered that overnight stays at Anita Johansson's home could not be
permitted since Jessica's security could not be guaranteed. Taking
into account Jessica's age, the Court, nevertheless, found that Anita
Johansson's access to her daughter should be extended to six hours on
both Saturday and Sunday every fourth weekend and should not be
confined to the foster-home. Before deciding on the case, the Court
had held an oral hearing at which Anita Johansson and her counsel,
Jessica's public counsel and representatives of the Council had been
present and heard. The Court also had at its disposal the parties'
written submissions, including a report by the Council.
After Anita Johansson had appealed on behalf of herself and
Jessica, the Administrative Court of Appeal held a further hearing in
the case. The persons present and heard were the same as at the
hearing at first instance. On 29 September 1992, the appellate court
confirmed the evaluation of the County Administrative Court and thus
rejected the appeal. However, as far as access was concerned, the
appellate court stated that, if the extended meetings went well, it did
not rule out the possibility of overnight stays in Anita Johansson's
home in the near future. On 6 November 1992 the Supreme Administrative
Court refused leave to appeal.
In response to Anita Johansson's complaints about the conditions
in the foster-home, the Council carried out an investigation, during
which it heard the foster-mother, her former husband, her present
cohabitee and Jessica and also contacted the local police station. It
further had regard to a statement from a children's psychiatric clinic
and to previous investigations, during which, inter alia, Jessica's
school teachers had been heard. Concluding that the complaints were
groundless, the Council decided, on 28 September 1992, that Jessica
should stay in the foster-home. In an appeal lodged on behalf of
herself and Jessica, Anita Johansson requested that the public care be
terminated. On 9 February 1993 the County Administrative Court found
that the Council's decision did not concern the question of termination
of care, for which reason the Court could not examine the request. The
Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal. Anita Johansson did not appeal
against the Court's decision.
After the Supreme Administrative Court's refusal of leave to
appeal on 6 November 1992 Anita Johansson's right of access to her
daughter was fixed at six hours on both Saturday and Sunday every
fourth weekend without restrictions as to the place of the meetings.
After this date, several letters were exchanged between Anita
Johansson, her representative and the Council concerning the dates,
places and other details of the planned meetings. Apparently, however,
Anita Johansson and Jessica have met only three times since November
1992, twice (in November and December 1992) in the foster-home and once
(in January 1993) in Anita and Greta Johansson's home in the presence
of two social workers. According to the Council, Jessica, who was now
almost twelve years old, subsequently refused to make any further
visits to Anita Johansson's home. Instead, she wanted future meetings
to take place in the foster-home. She further stated that she did not
want to see her grandmother at all. Thereafter, the Council,
accordingly, suggested that meetings take place at the foster-home or
at other places. These proposals were, however, refused by Anita
Johansson and her representative, who claimed that Anita Johansson had
a right of access at her own home. Alleging, inter alia, that the
Council had refused to abide by the courts' judgments and that the
social workers and the foster-mother had put pressure on Jessica to
refuse visits to Anita Johansson's home, they requested the regional
public prosecutor to indict four social workers with official
misconduct and reported the Council's handling of the matter to the
Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen). In a letter to the
Ombudsman, they further claimed that the two social workers had been
present at the meeting at Anita Johansson's home in contravention of
the courts' judgments and that they had sabotaged the meeting.
Allegedly, the social workers had broken in on Jessica's and Anita
Johansson's activities to discuss future access arrangements and had,
furthermore, put questions to Jessica concerning Anita Johansson's
allegation that a former cohabitee of the foster-mother had sexually
offended Jessica. On 25 May 1993 the prosecutor decided not to
institute an investigation and on 23 September 1993 the Ombudsman
decided not to take any action. In her decision the Ombudsman stated
that the Council had made several attempts to bring about meetings
between Anita Johansson and Jessica in accordance with the courts'
judgments and that there was no reason to blame the Council for the
failure of these attempts.
By decisions of 10 May and 17 June 1993, the Council rejected a
request by Gustaf and Greta Johansson for a right of access to their
granddaughter. The Council stated, inter alia, that Jessica had not
met her grandfather for eight years, that she was afraid of both her
grandparents and did not want to meet them, neither at their respective
homes nor in the foster-home, and that it was inappropriate that
Jessica meet them, as they spoke badly of the foster-mother and opposed
Jessica's continued placement in the foster-home. Apparently, Anita
Johansson and the grandparents had gone to the bank where the
foster-mother worked and told the bank's employees and customers that
the foster-mother had abducted and maltreated Jessica. On
27 September 1993, the County Administrative Court dismissed the
appeal, noting that the grandparents did not have custody of Jessica
and that, according to Sections 14 and 41 of the Act with Special
Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (Lagen med särskilda
bestämmelser om vård av unga, 1990:52 - "the 1990 Act"), only access
decisions concerning custodians could be appealed. On 20 October 1993
the dismissal was confirmed by the Administrative Court of Appeal and
on 21 December 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to
appeal.
Because of Anita Johansson's refusal to accept Jessica's
expressed wish for future meetings to take place in the foster-home and
the consequent failure to come to any agreements concerning these
meetings, the Council decided, on 11 October 1993, as part of its
obligation under Section 14 of the 1990 Act to review access decisions
every third month, to restrict Anita Johansson's access to her daughter
to five hours in the foster-home every fourth Saturday or Sunday, i.e.
the same extent as before November 1992.
On 5 November 1993, Anita Johansson appealed against the
Council's decision on behalf of herself and her daughter to the County
Administrative Court which, by decision of 16 December 1993, refused
their request for a stay of execution and ordered that a psychiatric
examination of Jessica be carried out at the Children's Psychiatric
Clinic (Barn- och ungdomspsykiatriska mottagningen) at Karlskrona. The
object of the examination was to assess Jessica's maturity, development
and attitude to meetings with her natural mother as well as whether
extended access would endanger Jessica's health and development. The
date of 20 February 1994 was set as the deadline for submission of the
clinic's report. The decision not to stay execution was confirmed by
the Administrative Court of Appeal on 28 December 1993 and leave to
appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court on
24 February 1994.
The psychiatric examination of Jessica was delayed. In
January 1994 Anita Johansson was informed that it could not be carried
out before March 1994. Thus, she requested the County Administrative
Court either to dispense with the examination or to request another
clinic to examine Jessica. This request was, however, refused by the
Court on 21 January 1994. After having met Jessica three times, the
foster-mother twice and Anita Johansson once, the clinic, on
15 July 1994, submitted its report to the Court. After having held an
oral hearing on 19 September 1994, the Court, by judgment of
5 October 1994, rejected the appeal. After a further appeal lodged by
Anita Johansson on behalf of herself and Jessica on 13 October 1994,
the case is apparently pending in the Administrative Court of Appeal.
At the request of the Council, the District Court (Tingsrätten)
of Karlskrona, on 8 November 1994, appointed a guardian ad litem (god
man) to represent Jessica in the access proceedings. Anita Johansson
has appealed against this decision on behalf of herself and Jessica,
and the matter is presently pending in the Court of Appeal (Hovrätten)
of Skåne and Blekinge.
b. Relevant domestic law
The taking of children into public care without the consent of
the parents is governed by the 1990 Act with Special Provisions on the
Care of Young Persons, which entered into force on 1 July 1990.
Section 2 of the 1990 Act provides that care is to be provided if there
is a clear risk of impairment of the health or development of a person
under eighteen years of age due to ill-treatment, exploitation, lack
of care or any other condition in the home.
Once public care has been ordered, it is executed by the
Social Council, which decides on the particular details of the care.
Section 11 of the 1990 Act provides that the Council shall decide on
how the care should be arranged and where the child should live. It
may also decide on questions concerning the child's personal
conditions. With respect to parents' or other custodians' access, the
Council may, pursuant to Section 14, decide on how this access should
be arranged. Swedish law does not afford grandparents any rights over
their grandchildren.
Section 41 of the 1990 Act determines the right of appeal. It
reads, in relevant parts, as follows:
(translation)
"The Council's decisions may be appealed to the County
Administrative Court, if the Council has
1. decided where the care of the young person is to begin
or decided on the removal of the young person from the home
where he or she is living,
2. decided on the continuation of care in accordance with
the Act,
3. decided on access in accordance with Section 14 ...
..."
The decisions of the County Administrative Court may, pursuant
to Section 33 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Förvaltnings-
processlagen, 1971:291), be appealed to the Administrative Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain of a lack of respect for their family
life in violation of Article 8 of the Convention as a result of
a) the refusal to terminate the public care of Jessica and the
restrictions on Anita, Gustaf and Greta Johansson's access to
her; and
b) the placement of Jessica in an unsuitable foster-home and her
visits to a former cohabitee of the foster-mother.
2. Under Article 6 of the Convention Anita Johansson makes the
following complaints:
a) the Council did not inform her of its decisions in 1981 to
take Jessica into care;
b) she has been denied a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal
in that, because of the previous registration by the Care
Council, the courts have had preconceived ideas about her and
have treated her in a condescending way, e.g., by calling her by
her first name;
c) she has been denied a fair hearing also because of the
courts' refusal to appoint her representative, Mrs. Westerberg,
as public counsel;
d) the courts have not taken into account the change of
circumstances since the initial care decision; and
e) the length of the court proceedings concerning the Council's
decision of 11 October 1993 is unacceptable.
3. Also under Article 6 of the Convention the applicants submit the
following complaints as to the impossibility of bringing certain issues
before a court:
a) All applicants claim to have been unable to challenge in a
court the social authorities' alleged refusal to comply with the
access judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal. Anita
Johansson maintains that she could not, on behalf of Jessica,
bring before a court the question whether Jessica should visit
the foster-mother's former cohabitee, nor could she, on her own
behalf, obtain a court review of the social workers' behaviour
in connection with Jessica's visit to Anita Johansson's home in
January 1993.
b) Gustaf and Greta Johansson and Anita Johansson on behalf of
Jessica allege that they could not bring before a court the
question of the grandparents' access to Jessica.
c) Anita Johansson contends, on behalf of herself and Jessica,
that they were denied the possibility to appeal against the
conclusions of the Council's investigation of the conditions in
the foster-home.
d) All applicants claim that they had no access to a court where
they could challenge the length of the court proceedings
following the Council's decision of 11 October 1993 to restrict
Anita Johansson's access.
4. With regard to the complaints under 3) above, the applicants also
allege violations of Article 13 of the Convention.
5. Anita, Gustaf and Greta Johansson maintain that their right to
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention has been
violated in that the grandparents have been denied access to Jessica
Johansson owing to statements Anita, Gustaf and Greta Johansson have
made about the foster-mother.
6. Anita Johansson contends that the registration by the Care
Council and the consequential derogatory treatment of her by Swedish
authorities and courts constitute a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention.
7. Without invoking any Article of the Convention, Anita Johansson,
on behalf of herself and Jessica, further complains of the District
Court's decision to appoint a guardian ad litem for Jessica.
THE LAW
The Commission first observes that Gustaf Johansson died in
May 1994. The Commission has not obtained a statement from his legal
successor or successors whether they wish to pursue the application on
his behalf. However, as complaints identical to his have been
submitted by Greta Johansson, the Commission considers that it is not
necessary to take a separate decision, under Article 25 (Art. 25) of
the Convention, as to whether or not to examine his complaints.
Therefore, the Commission will deal with his complaints in the same way
as if they had been maintained by his legal successor or successors
(cf. No. 6166/73, Dec. 30.5.75, D.R. 2 p. 58 at p. 66).
1. The applicants complain of a lack of respect for their family
life as a result of
a) the refusal to terminate the public care of Jessica and the
restrictions on Anita, Gustaf and Greta Johansson's access to
her; and
b) the placement of Jessica in an unsuitable foster-home and her
visits to a former cohabitee of the foster-mother.
They invoke Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
The Commission has examined the respective complaints separately.
a) The Commission, recalling that the present application was
introduced on 6 March 1993, first notes that, in accordance with
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only examine the
proceedings starting with the Council's decisions of 6 April 1992
concerning termination of care and Anita Johansson's access and of
10 May 1993 concerning the grandparents' access as well as the
subsequent court proceedings, as earlier proceedings concerning care
and access have been concluded by decisions taken more than six months
before the introduction of the present application. Furthermore, the
access proceedings starting with the Council's decision of 11 October
1993 are still pending in the Administrative Court of Appeal, for which
reason domestic remedies have not been exhausted.
As regards the refusal to terminate the public care the
applicants submit that since the initial decision to take Jessica into
care Anita Johansson's situation has changed; while the initial
decision concerned a single mother and a new-born child, the present
situation involves a mother who, helped by the child's grandmother, is
going to take care of her 13-year-old daughter. As concerns the
restrictions on access, the applicants maintain that they have been
punished for negative remarks they have made about the foster-mother
and the conditions in the foster-home. The applicants also allege that
the social authorities have refused to comply with the judgment of the
Administrative Court of Appeal concerning Anita Johansson's right of
access to her daughter in Anita Johansson's home.
As regards Jessica and Anita Johansson, the Commission finds that
the refusal to terminate care and the restrictions on access interfered
with their right to respect for their family life as ensured by Article
8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. It must therefore be examined
whether these interferences were justified under the terms of Article
8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2). In this respect the Commission recalls that
three conditions must be satisfied: the interferences must be "in
accordance with the law", they must pursue one or more of the
legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2 and they must be "necessary in
a democratic society" for these aims.
As to the first condition, the Commission finds that the
administrative courts' decisions concerning care and access were in
conformity with Swedish law, namely Sections 2 and 14 of the 1990 Act.
The Commission further finds that the interferences had a
legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests
of the child, which in this case fall under the expressions "for the
protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of
24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 31, paras. 64-65).
It thus remains to be determined whether the interferences with
Jessica and Anita Johansson's rights were "necessary in a democratic
society" in the interests of the child.
According to the established case-law of the Commission and the
European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that
the interferences correspond to a pressing social need and, in
particular, that they are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
In determining whether interferences are "necessary in a democratic
society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a
margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States. That does
not mean, however, that the Commission's review is limited to
ascertaining whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion
reasonably, carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, it cannot
confine itself to considering the relevant decisions in isolation but
must look at them in the light of the case as a whole. It must
determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interferences at
issue are "relevant and sufficient" (cf. above-mentioned Olsson
judgment, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68).
In so far as the refusal to terminate care is concerned, the
Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court and the
Administrative Court of Appeal, in their respective decisions of
30 June and 29 September 1992, stated that Anita Johansson's social
situation had somewhat improved since the taking of Jessica into care,
but that, because of their respective mental handicaps, Anita Johansson
was still unable to take care of her daughter. This evaluation was
made on the basis not only of written material but also of statements
made at two oral hearings where Jessica's public counsel,
Anita Johansson and her counsel were present and heard.
In the light of the foregoing the Commission finds that the
refusal to terminate care was supported by relevant and sufficient
reasons and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the
Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think that is was
necessary for the care decision to remain in force. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that the decisions not to terminate care can
reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within
the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
With regard to the restrictions on Anita Johansson's access to
Jessica, the Commission recalls that for several years Anita Johansson
had access to her daughter once every four weeks in the foster-home.
Because of Jessica's age and improvements of Anita Johansson's social
situation, the courts decided to extend access to six hours on both
Saturday and Sunday every fourth weekend without restrictions as to the
meeting-place. The Commission further recalls that several attempts
were made by the Council after November 1992 to arrange meetings
between Anita Johansson and her daughter. Because of Jessica's refusal
to accept such meetings outside the foster-home, it proved to be
impossible to arrange any meetings in Anita Johansson's home. Instead,
the Council suggested that meetings take place in the foster-home or
at other places. These suggestions were, however, not accepted by
Anita Johansson, for which reason no meetings have taken place since
January 1993. The Parliamentary Ombudsman found in September 1993 that
the Council could not be blamed for the failure of its attempts to
bring about meetings.
The Commission, noting that the restrictions on Anita Johansson's
access were based on careful examination by the Council, the County
Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal, finds the
restrictions to be justifiable, taking into account that Jessica had
been placed with foster-parents since 1981 and that Anita Johansson had
had access to a lesser extent before 1992. If the improvement of
Anita Johansson's social situation allowed for increased access to her
daughter, it was reasonable, in the interests of the daughter, to
increase access gradually. In this connection, the Commission recalls
that the Administrative Court of Appeal did not rule out the
possibility of overnight stays in Anita Johansson's home in the near
future, if the extended meetings went well. As to the alleged refusal
of the Council to comply with the courts' decisions, the Commission
considers that the Council made sufficient attempts to bring about
meetings and had regard to the wishes of both Anita Johansson and
Jessica. The Commission agrees with the Parliamentary Ombudsman that
the failure of these attempts cannot be blamed on the Council.
For these reasons, the Commission finds that the restrictions on
access were supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and that,
having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish authorities
were reasonably entitled to think that is was necessary to restrict
Anita Johansson's access. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that
the restriction can reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a
democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2)
of the Convention.
Gustaf and Greta Johansson also allege that the refusal to
terminate care and the restrictions on their access have violated their
right to respect for their family life. However, leaving aside the
question whether they can be regarded as "victims" within the meaning
of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention of the decision not to
terminate care although they were not parties to the domestic
proceedings, the Commission considers that, even assuming that their
relation to Jessica constitutes "family life" which has been interfered
with within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the
Convention, the interferences were permissible under para. 2 of this
provision. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission considers that
the Council's decision to refuse access was in conformity with Swedish
law, namely Section 11 of the 1990 Act. The Commission further takes
into account the above conclusions concerning Jessica and Anita
Johansson and the fact that since November 1984 Gustaf Johansson had
never met Jessica and Greta Johansson had met her only once.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
b) As concerns the allegation that the foster-home is unsuitable,
the applicants submit, inter alia, that the foster-mother has
promiscuous sexual relations, that she and her present cohabitee are
often drunk and that Jessica is left alone when the foster-mother is
at work. The applicants further allege that the Council forces Jessica
to visit the foster-mother's former cohabitee, who sexually abuses her.
The Commission, noting that the Council has carried out a
thorough investigation of these allegations, finds that the applicants'
submissions are not substantiated and therefore do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention in
respect of this complaint.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. Under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention Anita Johansson makes
the following complaints:
a) the Council did not inform her of its decisions in 1981 to
take Jessica into care;
b) she has been denied a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal
in that, because of the previous registration by the Care
Council, the courts have had preconceived ideas about her and
have treated her in a condescending way;
c) she has been denied a fair hearing also because of the
courts' refusal to appoint her representative, Mrs. Westerberg,
as public counsel;
d) the courts have not taken into account the change of
circumstances since the initial care decision; and
e) the length of the court proceedings concerning the Council's
decision of 11 October 1993 is unacceptable.
These complaints fall to be considered under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is
entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by
an independent and impartial tribunal ..."
The Commission has examined the respective complaints separately.
a) As regards the Council's alleged failure to inform about the
initial care decision, the Commission is not required to decide whether
or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of
a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, as Article 26
(Art. 26) of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal
with the matter ... within a period of six months ...". The alleged
violation concerns decisions given in 1981, which is more than six
months before the introduction of the present application.
It follows that this part of the application has been introduced
out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3)
of the Convention.
b) In support of her allegation that the courts have not been
impartial, Anita Johansson submits that the presiding judges and other
persons present at the hearings have called her by her first name
instead of her full name.
The Commission, noting that the applicant has not specified in
which proceedings these alleged violations have occurred, finds that
she has failed to substantiate that the courts have not been impartial
in her case.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
c) Anita Johansson claims that the refusal to appoint Mrs.
Westerberg as her public counsel has violated her right to a fair
hearing, as Mrs. Westerberg is the only lawyer who is able to give her
adequate assistance.
The Commission is, however, not required to decide whether or not
the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a
violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in respect of this
complaint as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) all domestic remedies have
been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law ...".
In regard to this complaint the applicant failed to appeal
against the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal of
10 July 1992 not to appoint Mrs. Westerberg as her public counsel, for
which reason she has not exhausted the remedies available under Swedish
law. Moreover, an examination of the case does not disclose the
existence of any special circumstance which might have absolved the
applicant from exhausting the remedies at her disposal.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
d) As concerns the courts' alleged refusal to take into account
changed circumstances, Anita Johansson submits that they have not had
regard to the fact that the initial decision to take Jessica into care
concerned a single mother and a new-born child, while the present
situation involves a mother who, helped by the child's grandmother, is
going to take care of her 13-year-old daughter.
The Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court, in
its judgment of 30 June 1992 which was upheld on appeal, noted that
Anita Johansson's social situation had somewhat improved and took into
account the age of Jessica when deciding to extend Anita Johansson's
access to her. It has, therefore, not been established that the courts
have failed to take into account the changed circumstances of the case.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
e) With regard to the complaint concerning the length of the court
proceedings following the Council's decision of 11 October 1993 to
reduce Anita Johansson's access to Jessica, the Commission recalls that
Anita Johansson appealed against the decision on behalf of herself and
her daughter on 5 November 1993. The proceedings have not yet ended,
and have to date lasted more than 15 months.
The Commission further recalls that, on 16 December 1993, the
County Administrative Court decided not to stay the execution of the
Council's decision and ordered a psychiatric examination of Jessica to
be carried out, that the psychiatric clinic's report was submitted to
the Court on 15 July 1994 and that the Court, after holding an oral
hearing on 19 September 1994, delivered its judgment on 5 October 1994.
Furthermore, on 13 October 1994 an appeal was lodged with the
Administrative Court of Appeal, where the case is apparently still
pending.
The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be
considered in the light of the criteria laid down in the case-law of
the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the relevant
authorities. On the latter point, the importance of what is at stake
for the applicant in the litigation has to be taken into account
(cf., e.g., Vallée v. France judgment of 26 April 1994, Series A
no. 289-A, p. 17, para. 34).
The applicant has not supplied any information on the proceedings
of the Administrative Court of Appeal, for which reason the Commission
sees no reason to criticise that part of the proceedings.
The Commission further finds the County Administrative Court's
decision to order a psychiatric examination of Jessica to be
justifiable. The examination was delayed and the report was submitted
seven months after the Court's order. However, the total length of the
proceedings in that Court was eleven months, which the Commission
considers not in itself to be excessive, although it is essential that
access cases are dealt with speedily. In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission takes into account that the case was rather complex due to
the disagreements between Anita Johansson and Jessica as to the access
arrangements and that Anita Johansson was not denied the right of
access during the proceedings, but that it was only limited in relation
to previous court judgments on the matter.
Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the
Commission finds that the length of the court proceedings following the
Council's decision of 11 October 1993 has not exceeded a "reasonable
time" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
It follows that also this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. Also under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the applicants
submit the following complaints as to the alleged impossibility of
bringing certain issues before a court:
a) All applicants claim to have been unable to challenge in a
court the social authorities' alleged refusal to comply with the
access judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal. Anita
Johansson maintains that she could not, on behalf of Jessica,
bring before a court the question whether Jessica should visit
the foster-mother's former cohabitee, nor could she, on her own
behalf, obtain a court review of the social workers' behaviour
in connection with Jessica's visit to Anita Johansson's home in
January 1993.
b) Gustaf and Greta Johansson and Anita Johansson on behalf of
Jessica allege that they could not bring before a court the
question of the grandparents' access to Jessica.
c) Anita Johansson contends, on behalf of herself and Jessica,
that they were denied the possibility to appeal against the
conclusions of the Council's investigation of the conditions in
the foster-home.
d) All applicants claim that they had no access to a court where
they could challenge the length of the court proceedings
following the Council's decision of 11 October 1993 to restrict
Anita Johansson's access.
The Commission has examined the respective complaints separately.
a) The Commission, noting that the complaints under a) above fall
to be considered under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,
recalls that the applicability of this provision depends on whether
there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least on
arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, and, if so,
whether this "right" was of a "civil" character within the meaning of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). In particular, the dispute must be
genuine and serious, it may relate not only to the actual existence of
a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise (cf.
Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series
A no. 163, p. 19, paras. 66-67).
The Commission further recalls that, although access to children
is an area in which it is essential to ensure that the rights of
individual parents are protected in accordance with Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1), this provision does not require that all access decisions
must be taken by the courts but only that they shall have the power to
determine any substantial disputes that may arise (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,
O v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120-A,
pp. 26-27, para. 60). In this connection, the Commission considers
that some discretion as to the implementation of access decisions must
be left to the competent administrative authorities. Unless the
implementing measures go beyond this discretion and circumscribe the
essence of the access rights, there is no dispute over "civil rights"
within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and thus no right
of access to court.
The Commission reiterates its conclusion under 1 a) above that
the Council, after the courts' access decisions in 1992, made
sufficient attempts to bring about meetings between Anita Johansson and
Jessica. In implementing these decisions, the Council had to consider
Jessica's wishes and that, in her interest, the extended access would
have to be realised gradually. Following Jessica's refusal to visit
Anita Johansson's home, the Council found it inappropriate to enforce
such visits and instead suggested that meetings take place at the
foster-home and at other places. The Commission finds that the
Council, in making these considerations, did not go beyond its proper
discretion as to the implementation of the courts' decisions. The
Commission further finds that also the decision that Jessica should
visit the foster-mother's former cohabitee and the particular
arrangements made in connection with Jessica's visit to Anita
Johansson's home fall under these discretionary powers.
For these reasons, the Commission, leaving aside the question
whether Gustaf and Greta Johansson can be regarded as "victims" of the
measures implementing Anita Johansson's access, considers that the
Council's conduct and decisions did not involve a determination of the
applicants' civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
b) As concerns the complaint that a court review could not be
obtained concerning the question of the grandparents' access to
Jessica, the Commission recalls that under Swedish law Gustaf and Greta
Johansson had no right of access to their granddaughter. Thus the
applicants cannot claim on any arguable ground that they had a right
under domestic law, for which reason Article 6 (Art. 6) is not
applicable.
It follows that this part of the application is also incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
c) With regard to the contention that Anita and Jessica Johansson
were denied the possibility to appeal against the Council's conclusions
as to the conditions in the foster-home, the Commissions recalls that
the Council, after a thorough investigation, found Anita Johansson's
complaints to be groundless and decided, on 28 September 1992,
that Jessica should stay in the foster-home. By decision
of 9 February 1993, the County Administrative Court dismissed Anita
Johansson's appeal, stating that it could not examine her request to
have the public care terminated, as the Council's decision did not
concern this issue. The applicants did not appeal against the Court's
decision.
The Commission notes that, under Section 41 of the 1990 Act, a
Council decision regarding removal of a person from the home where he
is living may be appealed to the County Administrative Court. It thus
appears that the Council's decision - that Jessica should stay in the
foster-home - could have been appealed to that Court. In this
connection, the Commission recalls that the reason for the Court's
dismissal of Anita Johansson's appeal was not that the Council's
decision as such could not be appealed but that the appeal concerned
an issue which the Council had not decided on. The Commission,
therefore, concludes that it has not been shown that Anita and Jessica
Johansson were denied the possibility to appeal against the Council's
decision.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
d) As concerns the complaint concerning the impossibility to
challenge in a court the length of the court proceedings following the
Council's access decision of 11 October 1993, the Commission notes that
the right to a "hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal"
is guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in cases where, inter
alia, civil rights are determined. In the Commission's opinion, this
right cannot, however, as such be regarded as a civil right within the
meaning of this provision. Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
is not applicable to the present complaint.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. With regard to the complaints under 3 above, the applicants also
allege violations of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Commission recalls that this provision has been interpreted
by the European Court of Human Rights as requiring a remedy in domestic
law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as "arguable"
in terms of the Convention (cf., e.g., Boyle and Rice judgment of
27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).
The Commission, having regard to its above conclusions in respect
of the Convention complaints submitted, considers that the applicants
do not have any "arguable claims" of a violation of the provisions
invoked for these complaints.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
5. Anita, Gustaf and Greta Johansson maintain that their right to
freedom of expression under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention has
been violated in that the grandparents have been denied access to
Jessica Johansson owing to statements Anita, Gustaf and Greta Johansson
have made about the foster-mother.
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary."
The applicants submit that, after the authorities' alleged
refusal to deal with Anita Johansson's complaints concerning the
conditions in the foster-home, they went to the bank where the
foster-mother worked and exercised their Convention right to freedom
of expression by telling the bank's employees and customers that the
foster-mother had abducted and maltreated Jessica. They claim that
Gustaf and Greta Johansson were later punished for this action by the
Council, as they were denied access to Jessica.
The Commission recalls that by decisions of 10 May and
17 June 1993 from which no appeal lay, the Council rejected a request
by Gustaf and Greta Johansson for access to their granddaughter. As
grounds for its decision, the Council stated, inter alia, that Jessica
had not met her grandfather for eight years, that she was afraid of
both her grandparents and did not want to meet them, neither at their
respective homes nor in the foster-home, and that it was inappropriate
that Jessica meet them, as they spoke badly of the foster-mother and
opposed Jessica's continued placement in the foster-home. The
Commission further recalls that prior to this decision the grandparents
had not had any access to Jessica, except for a period between
September 1982 and November 1984, when Greta Johansson had limited
access to her granddaughter.
The Commission finds that the Council's decisions not to grant
Gustaf and Greta Johansson access to Jessica were taken after
considering what was in Jessica's best interests. It has not been
shown that the decisions were taken to punish the grandparents for
statements they and Anita Johansson had made. Accordingly, there has
been no interference with the applicants' rights as guaranteed by
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
6. Anita Johansson contends that the registration by the Care
Council and consequential derogatory treatment of her by Swedish
authorities and courts constitute a violation of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 6 (Art. 14+6) of the Convention.
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."
The Commission recalls that this provision has no independent
existence but prohibits discrimination only with respect to the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.
The Commission finds that an examination of this complaint as it
has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and in particular in
the Articles invoked.
It follows that also this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
7. Without invoking any Article of the Convention, Anita Johansson,
on behalf of herself and Jessica, further complains of the District
Court's decision to appoint a guardian ad litem for Jessica. She
submits, inter alia, that there was no need for a guardian and that the
Court did not give her an opportunity to express her opinion on the
matter.
The Commission recalls that the applicants have appealed against
the District Court's decision to the Court of Appeal, where the case
is presently pending. Thus, they have not exhausted the remedies
available to them under Swedish law. Moreover, an examination of the
case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstance which
might have absolved them from exhausting the remedies at their
disposal.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Second Chamber Acting President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (G.H. THUNE)