SUR LA RECEVABILITÉ

                      Application No. 16115/90

                      by Alice DANIELSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 5 April 1995, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, Acting President

           MM.   G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 24 July 1989 by

Alice DANIELSSON against Sweden and registered on 1 February 1990 under

file No. 16115/90;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 16 February 1993 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicant on 17 December 1993;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1908. At the time of

the flooding of her house in 1979 described below, she was living in

Borgholm, Sweden. Awaiting the outcome of the ensuing damage

proceedings she has since been living with her son in Stockholm. Before

the Commission the applicant is represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a

lawyer practising in Göteborg.

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      On 10 August 1979 the applicant's house in Borgholm was flooded

and damaged. The applicant ordered an expert opinion on the origins of

the flooding. In his report, dated 25 September 1979, the expert,

Mr. H, stated that the flooding was caused by a faulty construction of

a neighbouring rain draining pipe of the municipal sewer system as a

result of which tree roots had been able to penetrate and block the

pipe.

Proceedings before the State Water Board (Statens va-nämnd)

      On 28 October 1981 the applicant instituted proceedings before

the State Water Board against the Municipality of Borgholm through her

first representative. However, due to problems of cooperation she

decided to appoint another representative and filed an additional writ

on 6 November 1981. She maintained that her house had been flooded as

a result of the deficiencies in the municipal sewer system observed by

Mr. H. In her submissions to the Water Board the applicant left open

the question whether the system's general design might also have been

wrong. The flooding had caused damage to the wooden beams of the

basement floor and also the basement's wooden walls. She claimed

compensation for the repair costs and for the reduced possibility to

use the house awaiting repairs.

      On 23 December 1981 the Municipality acknowledged in a submission

to the Water Board that it was responsible for the damage caused by the

flooding. It argued, however, that certain acts on the part of the

applicant had worsened the damages.

      During January and February 1982 the parties' observations were

exchanged following which the applicant, on 11 March 1982, requested

a preparatory meeting as soon as possible.

      On 11 August 1982 the applicant was informed that the preparatory

meeting requested was scheduled for 15 September 1982.

      On 2 September 1982 the applicant submitted a new expert opinion,

dated 12 August 1982 and signed by A.E. and J.W. (two real estate

valuers), which confirmed the damage to the basement floor and walls

but which in addition referred to damage to the structure of the house

in the form of cracks in the walls. The opinion stated that it was

likely that the cracks were a result of the house having been lifted

by the rising of the ground water.

      On 15 September 1982 the Water Board held the preparatory meeting

and the applicant was requested to finalise her claims and to submit

her evidence not later than 1 November 1982. Following an extension of

this time-limit the applicant submitted certain information on

16 November 1982 and, upon request, further information on

9 December 1982. The Municipality's observations in reply were

submitted on 10 February 1983, following which the parties were

summoned to a hearing on 14 April 1983.

      On 23 March 1983, however, the hearing was cancelled due to the

fact that the Municipality's lawyer had fallen ill.

      On 6 and 12 July 1983 the applicant was again requested to

specify her claims and the evidence invoked. She submitted her reply

on 2 August 1983.

      As finally defined the applicant's claims were as follows. Repair

costs were claimed in the amount of 100,000 SEK. Her own costs for

having the repairs done were estimated at 15,000 SEK. The estate's loss

of value was to be compensated in the amount of 20,000 SEK. The

reduction of her possibilities of using the house was to be compensated

as from 10 August 1979 with a yearly sum equivalent to 18% of the

estate's market value in undamaged condition, i.e. for 1979 2,400 SEK

a month, until 4 months after the Water Board's decision became final.

In addition she claimed reimbursement for her legal costs and expenses.

      The Municipality accepted to pay 40,000 SEK for repair costs and

to reimburse the applicant for the reduction of her use of her property

at a rate of 2,000 SEK per year for the period from 10 August until

31 December 1979. It also accepted part of the claims for legal costs

and expenses.

      On 31 August 1983 the Water Board held a hearing including an on

site investigation of the applicant's property. During the hearing the

Board heard three witnesses.

      On 7 October 1983 the Water Board rendered its judgment. It

awarded 90,000 SEK for repair costs and for the applicant's costs to

have the repairs carried out. However, the Water Board did not find it

established that the cracks in the walls were caused by the flooding.

Accordingly, it rejected the applicant's claims to the extent that

these related to the repair of these cracks. It also rejected the

applicant's claims for compensation for loss of value as it had not

been established that there had been any such loss. On the other hand

the Water Board found that although the applicant was in principle

under a duty to carry out repairs quickly in order to minimise her

losses she had, in the circumstances of the case, been entitled to wait

therewith for a certain time, approximated at 14 months. Her losses on

this point were estimated at 600 SEK per month. The Water Board

rejected both parties' claims for legal costs and expenses.

Proceedings before the Water Court of Appeal (vattenöverdomstolen)

      On 3 November 1983 the applicant appealed against the judgment

to the Water Court of Appeal requesting full compensation in accordance

with her claims before the Water Board.

      On 29 November 1983 the applicant submitted that no supplementary

observations were needed at that moment. The Municipality was then

requested to submit its reply within three weeks. Following a reminder

the Municipality replied on 13 January 1984.

      In reply to the appeal court's request the applicant declared,

on 12 March 1984, that the case could be determined on the basis of the

case-file.  On 12 April 1984 the Municipality agreed and the applicant

was requested to conclude her presentation within three weeks.

      However, by 14 May 1984 the applicant had changed her mind and

now requested a hearing in so far as the Court would find it necessary

in order to prove the cause of some cracks in the walls of her house.

The Municipality contested that the cracks were caused by the flooding.

Additional submissions concerning this followed in the light of which

the applicant, on 23 November 1984, requested that a hearing be held.

She furthermore requested the hearing of an expert witness. The

applicant was hereafter granted the time until 7 December 1984 to

submit the name of her expert.

      Hereafter the applicant requested and was granted several

extensions. On 10 May 1985 she submitted an expert opinion from a

geologist, Mr. L. On 13 May 1985 the applicant requested an additional

extension until 24 May in order to submit photos and other

documentation.

      On 14 May 1985 the applicant's house was flooded again. On

26 June 1985 the applicant notified the Court about the flooding and

requested an additional extension of the time-limit as she intended to

submit her documentation as promised not later than 12 July 1985.

      On 26 August 1985 the applicant was given the opportunity to

conclude her presentation within ten days. However, on 3 September 1985

the applicant informed the Court that she had changed counsel and

therefore requested an extension of the time-limit. The extension was

granted until 18 October 1985 and subsequently until 15 November 1985.

      On 11 November 1985 the applicant submitted an amendment to her

initial claims as a result of the new flooding of her house on

14 May 1985. Her claims now also included a duty for the Municipality

to redeem the house as she now considered that the sewer system was so

inappropriate as to make it unreasonable to repair the house. In case

the Court would not accept this new claim, the applicant increased her

claims for repair costs to 181,800 SEK and her claim for loss of value

to 125,000 SEK. The applicant also increased certain other claims, in

particular her claim as to compensation for the loss of possibility to

use her house. She furthermore requested the production of certain new

written evidence and the hearing of Mr. H as a witness in order to

prove, inter alia, that the cracks in the house structure were caused

by the flooding as a result of the deficient sewer system. Finally, she

asked for an on site investigation to be held in conjunction with the

hearing of the case.

      On 18 November 1985 the applicant's new claims and observations

were communicated to the Municipality which replied on 20 January 1986.

The applicant hereafter stated and specified her evidence which was

communicated to the Municipality. On 20 March 1986 the Municipality

both objected to the changes in the applicant's claims and requested

the Court to reject the new evidence proposed.

      The Water Court of Appeal did not accept the applicant's requests

for a main hearing and an on site investigation and by judgment of

3 July 1986 the Court furthermore refused to accept the amended claims.

The Court also refused to hear Mr. H as it found it clear that the

cracks in the house structure were not caused by the flooding and that,

accordingly, the evidence proposed was unnecessary. On the merits the

Water Court of Appeal found no reason to deviate from the conclusions

reached by the Water Board, the decision of which it confirmed. The

applicant was ordered to pay the Municipality's costs and expenses in

the appeal proceedings.

Proceedings before the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen)

      On 14 July 1986 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for

leave to appeal. She maintained that the Water Court of Appeal had

committed grave procedural errors by deciding her case without an oral

hearing, by refusing her amended claims and by refusing to call new

witnesses and to accept other evidence. As to the merits she reiterated

her claims as amended before the Water Court of Appeal.

      On 28 July 1986 the applicant requested a further month to file

additional observations. On 4 August 1986 the Supreme Court granted her

an extension until 29 August for this purpose.

      On 25 August 1986 the applicant informed the Supreme Court that

she did not at that moment in time wish to submit further observations

but wished to be kept informed whether or not the Supreme Court

intended to refer her case back to the Water Court of Appeal. She was

requested to submit further observations before 5 September 1986.

      On 18 May 1987 the Supreme Court requested the Water Court of

Appeal to submit information as to its refusal of an oral hearing. The

Water Court of Appeal replied on 22 June 1987.

      On 19 August 1987 the applicant was granted leave to appeal.

      From August to December 1987 the parties submitted their

observations and the case-file was completed by 29 December 1987.

      On 2 March 1988 the Supreme Court quashed the appeal court's

judgment as it found it tainted with grave procedural errors on account

of the refusals to hold a public hearing and to hear further witnesses.

The case was referred back to the Water Court of Appeal for a new

examination.

      On 2 July 1988 the applicant's house was flooded again.

Proceedings before the Water Court of Appeal

      On 4 July 1988 the Water Court of Appeal summoned the parties to

appear before it at an oral hearing to be held on 15 September 1988.

They were also requested to submit information with regard to written

evidence not later than 8 August 1988.

      On 5 July 1988 the applicant's insurance company examined the

house concluding that there were big cracks in the walls and that

several parts of the house had been damaged by moist which, having

regard to the nature of the damage caused, appeared to have been

present for a long time. It concluded that the damage was not covered

by the applicant's insurance.

      On 25 July 1988 the applicant's house was flooded anew.

      On 1 August 1988 the applicant's insurance company made a new

examination of the house which confirmed that water had again

penetrated the basement. On 2 August 1988 the applicant informed the

Court that there had been new damage to her property. She requested an

extension of the time-limit fixed for the submission of written

evidence until 10 August.

      On 17 August 1988 the Municipality decided to indemnify all

property owners affected by the last flooding to the extent that the

damage caused was not covered by insurance. It also requested the

Construction Office (byggnadskontoret) to find a final solution to the

flooding problems in the area.

      On 1 September 1988 the applicant's insurance company informed

the applicant that the damage caused by the latest flooding was not

covered by her insurance.

      On 6 September 1988 the applicant reiterated her claims as

amended in the previous proceedings before the Water Court of Appeal

with certain minor changes. She also reiterated her submission that the

two new floodings of the house on 2 and 25 July 1988 showed that it

would be more costly to repair the house after each flooding than to

have the house redeemed by the Municipality at market price. In support

of these claims she lodged a new expert opinion, dated 4 September 1988

and signed by a geologist, Mr. L, according to which the house had

again been lifted by the rising ground water in July 1988 and that this

was a result of the insufficient rain draining capacity of the

municipal sewer system. The opinion also stated that it would be

meaningless to repair the house before the sewer system had been

appropriately amended.

      On 15 September 1988 the Water Court of Appeal held an oral

hearing. The applicant claimed in the first place that the Municipality

should be ordered to redeem the house and that she should be

compensated for her loss of use of the house in accordance with her

previous claims before the Water Court of Appeal. In the alternative

she claimed compensation in the amount of 181,800 SEK for repair costs,

487,961 SEK to cover the loss of value and also compensation for loss

of use on the same terms as before. She furthermore requested that

Mr. H should be heard as a witness in order to prove that the sewer

system was in such condition that it would be unreasonable to carry out

further repairs. The Municipality objected to any change of the Water

Board's judgment of 7 October 1983 and asked the Court to refuse any

amendments to the original claims as well as the hearing of Mr. H.

      On the day of the hearing the Water Court of Appeal decided to

accept part of the amendments to the applicant's claims for repair

costs and to allow the applicant to add her claim that the Municipality

should redeem the estate and compensate her for the loss of value. The

Court, however, decided to refuse the hearing of Mr. H as his testimony

was deemed unnecessary. The Court went on to hear three witnesses.

These witnesses were the same as those heard by the Water Board.

Thereafter, the Court made an on site investigation of the house.

      By judgment of 14 October 1988 the Water Court of Appeal

confirmed the Water Board's judgment.Proceedings before the Supreme

Court

      On 4 November 1988 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for

leave to appeal and requested permission to file her grounds of appeal

within a period of two months.

      On 23 November 1988 the applicant's representative withdrew from

the case and on 19 December the applicant requested, and was granted,

an additional extension until 15 March 1989 to file the grounds of

appeal. On 9 March 1989 the applicant requested, and was granted, a

further extension until 16 May 1989.

      On 8 May 1989 the applicant lodged, through her new counsel, her

grounds of appeal. These reiterated her submissions before the Water

Court of Appeal. In addition, the applicant maintained that the Water

Court of Appeal's refusal to hear Mr. H constituted a procedural error

of importance for the outcome of the case.

      On 10 May 1989 the applicant wrote to the Supreme Court stating

that she considered that her case had been severely mismanaged by her

counsel, the courts, the defendant party and the insurance companies

and that she wished to file additional observations which would be

submitted before the 15 June 1989.

      On 15 June 1989 she was informed by her counsel that the Supreme

Court had indicated that the question of leave to appeal would be

decided in the course of the autumn.

      On 5 December 1989 the Supreme Court decided to grant leave to

appeal in respect of the question of compensation for repair costs. It

refused leave to appeal in respect of the question of alleged

procedural errors committed by the Water Court of Appeal and in respect

of the question of redemption of the estate. It decided to suspend, for

the time being, its examination of the questions of compensation for

loss of value and for loss of use of the property and the question of

reimbursement of costs and expenses.

      On 12 February 1990 the applicant asked for an extension of the

time-limit for the submission of her observations to the Supreme Court

until the case had been subject to "a different legal examination".

      On 28 February 1990 the Supreme Court refused to grant any

extension of the time-limit for the filing of the applicant's

observations. Due to this the applicant submitted, by letters of 16 and

19 March 1990, that she had revoked her counsel's power of attorney and

declared that the case before it was terminated as a result of all

errors committed in the course of the proceedings.

      By letter of 20 March 1990 the Supreme Court requested the

applicant to state whether she withdrew her appeal. On 21 March 1990

the applicant replied that she did not withdraw her appeal but she

maintained that the examination of the case should be suspended pending

the outcome of the examination of the present application by the

European Commission of Human Rights.

      On 30 August 1990 the Supreme Court requested the applicant to

submit, within two weeks, her opinion as to the need for an oral

hearing. In her reply of 12 September 1990 the applicant maintained

that she considered the examination of the case to be temporarily

suspended since leave to appeal had only partially been granted and

since several violations of Swedish law and of her human rights had

taken place in the course of the proceedings. She stated that she would

consider how the case was to be dealt with by the Supreme Court after

the European Commission of Human Rights had examined her complaints.

      On 19 September 1990 the Supreme Court informed the applicant

that it had decided to hold a hearing and requested her to provide a

list of the evidence she wished to rely on.

      In her reply of 21 September 1990 the applicant reiterated what

she had stated in her reply of 12 September 1990.

      On 3 October 1990 the Municipality lodged their list of evidence.

      On 10 October 1990 the applicant was summoned to appear before

the Supreme Court on 21 November 1990. The applicant replied on

14 October 1990 that the Supreme Court was biased in its handling of

the case and that she had now left the case with the European

Commission of Human Rights. The applicant did not appear at the hearing

on 21 November 1990. As the Supreme Court found no valid excuse for her

absence it decided on the same day to dismiss the appeal and ordered

the applicant to pay the Municipality's costs. It granted the applicant

until 5 December 1990 to justify her absence and to request the Court

to resume its examination of the case.

      No reply having been received from the applicant within the

prescribed time-limit, the Supreme Court decided on 18 December 1990

not to grant leave to appeal on the points which had remained pending.

As a result the judgment of the Water Court of Appeal became final.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      The Water Board is a national authority and not a court.

Provisions regulating the activities of the Board are found in the

State Water Board Act (Lag (1976:839) om statens va-nämnd), the

Instruction for the State Water Board (Kungl. Maj:ts Instruktion

(1970:350) för statens va-nämnd) and the Act concerning General Water

and Sewage Facilities (Lagen (1970:244) om allmänna vatten- och

avloppsomläggningar).

      Rules concerning the procedure before the Board are found in the

State Water Board Act of 1976 ("the 1976 Act"). The Board consists of

a chairman and five other members. The chairman shall be a lawyer, who

has experience from having served as a judge. The other members shall

have technical expertise of various kinds (cf. the 1976 Act Section 2).

      Proceedings before the Water Board are instituted by means of an

application in writing. If an application is not complete, the

applicant shall be requested to submit supplementary information

(Section 8). Unless the application is rejected on formal grounds, the

Board shall request the defendant to submit observations in writing.

There may also be a further exchange of writs (Section 9). There shall

be a hearing before the Board unless it is obvious that a hearing is

not necessary in order to determine the case (Section 10). The Board

is obliged to clarify the issues in dispute; its actions shall aim at

a proper investigation of the matter at stake and it shall attempt to

secure a friendly settlement (Section 11). The Board may also conduct

on site investigations and engage experts on particular topics (Section

12).

      The Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken) is not

generally applicable in matters concerning general water and sewage

facilities. The 1976 Act refers to the Code in only a few instances.

If a question as to procedure is not regulated anywhere else, the

Administrative Procedure Act (förvaltningslagen (1986:223)) is to be

applied.

      An appeal against the Board's decision on the merits may be

lodged with the Svea Court of Appeal and is examined by this Court in

its composition as the Water Court of Appeal. A judgment from the Water

Court of Appeal may, with leave, be appealed against to the Supreme

Court. The Code of Judicial Procedure is applicable to the proceedings

before these courts (Sections 19, 20, 21 and 23 of the 1976 Act).

      There is no equivalent in the 1976 Act to the provision in the

Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 49, Section 6 (now Chapter 49,

Section 7). According to the latter provision, a party who is of the

opinion that the proceedings have been delayed, without reason, by

means of a lower court order may appeal from that order separately

through a limited appeal. The 1976 Act, however, does not refer to the

Code, Chapter 49, Section 6. The latter provision is furthermore not

applicable to decisions made by a court of appeal or the Supreme Court.

There are no other provisions to the effect that a party may challenge

the length of the proceedings.

COMPLAINTS

      Under Article 3 of the Convention the applicant maintains that

she has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by all

authorities and courts involved.

      Under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention she maintains that her

dispute with the Municipality of Borgholm concerning the damage to her

house was not determined within a reasonable time. She also maintains

that the courts were partial and did not guarantee her a fair hearing.

In respect of this the applicant also invokes Article 6 para. 3 (c) and

(d) and Article 13 of the Convention.

      With reference to Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 to the Convention the applicant complains that the

authorities have made her house uninhabitable and thereby forced her

to live elsewhere. She also refers to the authorities' refusal to

redeem the house and thereby enable her to purchase a new home.

      With reference to the above alleged violations of the Convention

the applicant also invokes Article 17 of the Convention.

      Finally, in her observations submitted on 17 December 1993 the

applicant complains, under Article 13 of the Convention, that she did

not have, under domestic law, an effective remedy in respect of the

complaint concerning the length of the proceedings.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 24 July 1989 and registered on

1 February 1990.

      On 14 October 1992 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided that

notice should be given to the respondent Government and to invite them

to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits limited

to the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings.

      After an extension of the time-limit the Government submitted

their observations on 16 February 1993.

      On 8 March 1993 the Commission decided to grant legal aid to the

applicant.

      On 17 December 1993 the applicant submitted her observations in

reply to those of the Government.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that she has been subjected to inhuman

and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention in the course of the proceedings before the various national

authorities and courts. Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads as

follows:

      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

      degrading treatment or punishment."

      The Commission recalls that according to the interpretation of

the concept of inhuman and degrading treatment of both the Commission

and the Court, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity

if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3). The assessment

thereof depends on all the circumstances of a particular case,

including the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental

effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the

person concerned (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 162).

      In making an assessment in the present case the Commission finds

that the facts established do not disclose a treatment of the applicant

which according to the above case-law reaches the level of severity

required to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2a.   Under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) and (d)

(Art. 6-1, 6-3-c, 6-3-d) as well as Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention the applicant complains that she did not have a fair hearing

by an impartial tribunal when the dispute concerning the damage to her

house due to flooding was determined. The provisions invoked by the

applicant read in their relevant parts as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights ... everyone is

      entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by

      an ... impartial tribunal ...

      ...

      Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

      minimum rights:

      ...

      c.   to defend himself in person or through legal

      assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means

      to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the

      interests of justice so require;

      d.   to examine or have examined witnesses against him and

      to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his

      behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

      ..."

      The Commission finds that in the present case there is no

question of a determination of a "criminal charge" within the meaning

of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. Accordingly, Article 6 para.

3 (c) and (d) (Art. 6-3-c, 6-3-d) are not applicable. However, the

Commission has taken the applicant's allegations under these provisions

into account when considering the complaint of unfairness and

partiality as submitted under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      The Commission recalls that the question whether a hearing

conforms with the standard of fairness laid down by Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention must be decided on the basis of the court

proceedings as a whole and after they have been concluded. Furthermore,

as regards the question of impartiality the Commission recalls that the

existence of such impartiality must be determined according to a

subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction of a

particular judge in a given case, and also according to an objective

test, that is ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees

sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.

      When considering these elements in the circumstances of the

present case, and in the light of the applicant's submissions, the

Commission has not found any substantiated allegations which would

merit a further examination of these aspects of Article 6 para. 1 or

Article 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention.

      The Commission therefore concludes that the applicant's

allegations of unfairness and partiality are manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b.    Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the

applicant also complains that her case was not determined within a

reasonable time. She maintains that the proceedings commenced on

10 August 1979 when her house was flooded for the first time and ended

on 18 December 1990  when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal as

regards the remaining issues still pending before it. She considers

that in particular having regard to what was at stake and to her

advanced age such a period of time cannot be considered to be

reasonable.

      The Government do not dispute that "civil rights" within the

meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are at issue, nor do

they maintain that the applicant has not complied with the requirements

of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. However, they maintain that

the applicant's actions before the domestic instances were such that

she cannot claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25

(Art. 25) of the Convention of the alleged violation of her right to

a hearing within a reasonable time.

      In the alternative the Government maintain that the reasonable

time requirement in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention was not

exceeded. In this respect the Government submit, in particular, that

the relevant period to be taken into consideration runs from

28 October 1981 when the applicant instituted proceedings before the

Water Board until 14 October 1988 when the Water Court of Appeal

pronounced its last judgment. Furthermore, the Government contend that

the case was of considerable complexity and that the applicant, by her

own conduct, prolonged the  proceedings.

      As regards Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention the Commission

has no doubt that the applicant may claim to be a victim, within the

meaning of this provision, of the alleged violation at issue. The case

concerned the determination of her civil rights within the meaning of

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and required a determination

within a reasonable time. Whether her conduct before the various

authorities and courts contributed to the length of those proceedings

will be considered below but it did not affect her status as a victim

within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention because

she was both affected and aggrieved by the length of the proceedings

(cf. mutatis mutandis No. 11394/84, Dec. 5.3.86, D.R. 46 p. 214 at

p. 217).

      As regards the period to be taken into consideration the

Commission recalls that the period to which Article 6 (Art. 6) is

applicable in civil cases normally starts to run with the issuing of

the writ commencing proceedings before the court to which the plaintiff

submits the dispute. However, where such proceedings may only be

instituted after a determination of the same dispute by an

administrative authority the concept of "reasonable time" must be

applied so as to include both the administrative and the court

proceedings (cf. Eur. Court H.R., König judgment of 28 June 1978,

Series A no. 27, p. 33, para. 98).

      In the present case the Commission recalls that the problems

arose when the applicant's house was flooded in August 1979. However,

the applicant did not bring the dispute before the Water Board until

28 October 1981 and the Commission has not found it established that,

under domestic law, the applicant was prevented in any way from doing

so at an earlier date. On the other hand the Commission finds that,

although the Water Board is not a court, the applicant could not

commence proceedings in court until the Water Board had determined the

dispute. Accordingly, the Commission considers that the relevant period

under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention started to run on

28 October 1981.

      As regards the question of when the period in question came to

an end the Government maintain that the applicant's conduct in the

proceedings before the Supreme Court was such that it should not be

taken into account and that, therefore, the relevant period should be

considered as having ended with the pronouncement of judgment of the

Water Court of Appeal on 14 October 1988.

      The Commission does not agree. It may be that a litigant for

different reasons in the course of the dispute withdraws from a case

or otherwise decides not to pursue it. This may also be a relevant fact

in determining the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings.

However, in the present case the proceedings did not come to an end

until 18 December 1990 when the Supreme Court decided not to grant

leave to appeal in respect of the remaining issues still pending before

it. Therefore the Commission concludes that the relevant period lasted

from 28 October 1981 until 18 December 1990, i.e. approximately nine

years and two months.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria:

the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct

of the authorities dealing with the case (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo

judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).

      As regards the complexity of the case the Government submit that

the issue in question was of considerable complexity, necessitating

several expert opinions and the evaluation of technical evidence.

Furthermore, the applicant's claims were numerous and new floodings in

the course of the proceedings gave rise to new claims and

investigations of an even more complicated character.

      The applicant does not dispute that the case was complex. This

is evident in view of the fact that special boards and courts deal with

these matters. However, she maintains that as these authorities have

the appropriate knowledge in this field the complexity of the case is

no excuse for the length of the proceedings.

      The Commission finds that the case was of a complex nature

necessitating inter alia expert advice and on site investigations. The

unfortunate recurrences of the flooding of the house also added to the

complexity of the case and contributed to prolonging the proceedings.

      As regards the conduct of the parties the Government submit that

the length of the proceedings was mainly attributable to the applicant,

whereas they maintain that the Municipality did not contribute to any

delays of significance. The Government have not expressed any views on

the conduct of the authorities and courts involved in the determination

of the case.

      The applicant admits that she asked for certain extensions of

time-limits, but she maintains that this was due in particular to her

age and the need to change counsel. She maintains that, on the other

hand, the authorities and courts deliberately prolonged the case

because of her age in order to favour the defendant.

      The Commission recalls that the proceedings before the Water

Board lasted from 28 October 1981 until 7 October 1983, i.e.

approximately two years. The Commission finds that neither the

applicant nor the Municipality contributed to prolonging these

proceedings. The Commission has not overlooked that it apparently took

the Board from March to September 1982 to arrange the preparatory

session and that the hearing of the case had to be re-scheduled due to

illness on part of counsel for the defendant. However, the Commission

considers that the Water Board otherwise pursued the case by setting

time-limits and notifying the parties of the state of proceedings.

      The first set of proceedings before the Water Court of Appeal

lasted from 3 November 1983 until 3 July 1986, i.e. two years and eight

months. The Commission recalls that during this period the applicant

asked on ten occasions for an extension of the time-limits fixed and

failed to comply with others. In these circumstances the Commission

finds that the applicant's conduct prolonged the proceedings in the

Water Court of Appeal whereas it has not been established that either

the defendant or the Court contributed to delays of any significance.

      As regards the first set of proceedings before the Supreme Court

the Commission recalls that they lasted from 14 July 1986 until

2 March 1988, i.e. approximately one year and eight months. During this

period the Court obtained observations from the applicant and the Water

Court of Appeal (until 22 June 1987) on the basis of which leave to

appeal was granted on 19 August 1987. Subsequently, observations were

obtained from the applicant and the Municipality (until

29 December 1987) following which the Water Court of Appeal's judgment

was quashed by the Supreme Court on 2 March 1988.

      In the light of these facts the Commission does not consider that

this period of time was unreasonable or discloses periods of inactivity

of the Supreme Court which in the circumstances are unacceptable.

      Following the referral of the case to the Water Court of Appeal

it obtained new observations from the parties, held an oral hearing and

pronounced judgment all within a period of seven months (until

14 October 1988). This cannot give rise to any criticism either.

      The final proceedings before the Supreme Court lasted from

4 November 1988 until 18 December 1990, i.e. two years and one month.

Leave to appeal in respect of certain issues was granted on

5 December 1989 before which the applicant requested, and was granted

five extensions of the time-limits fixed. Furthermore, during the

subsequent proceedings before the Supreme Court the applicant on

several occasions refused to comply with the time-limits fixed and

maintained her view that the proceedings should be suspended. In these

circumstances the Commission finds that any delay during this period

is attributable to the conduct of the applicant.

      In its overall assessment the Commission recalls that the

proceedings lasted approximately nine years and two months which,

having regard to the importance of administering justice without

delays, as such may appear excessive. Furthermore, the Commission has

also noted the fact that a certain delay was caused by the fact that

the Supreme Court quashed the first judgment of the Water Court of

Appeal due to procedural errors committed by that court. However,

delays caused by such incidents must be seen in the light of the

necessity of securing to everyone a fair hearing which is one of the

fundamental elements in the administration of justice under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention, and in this case it has been established

that the Water Court of Appeal expeditiously proceeded with the case.

      In these circumstances, and given that the proceedings comprised

five instances and that the applicant's conduct caused considerable

delay, the Commission finds that the total period of time was not so

long as to warrant the conclusion that it was unreasonable.

Consequently, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    As regards the applicant's complaints under Articles 8 and 17

(Art. 8, 17) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention the Commission has examined these issues as

submitted by her. However, this examination has not disclosed any

appearance of a violation of these provisions.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    Finally, the applicant complained in her written observations

submitted on 17 December 1993 that she did not have, under Swedish law,

an effective remedy at her disposal in respect of the complaint

concerning the length of the proceedings. She referred in this respect

to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

      However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of this provision, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within

a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was

taken".

      In the present case the Commission recalls that the proceedings

in question came to an end on 18 December 1990 when the Supreme Court

refused to grant leave to appeal and the Commission considers this was

the final decision regarding the subject of this particular complaint.

The complaint in question, however, was not submitted to the Commission

until 17 December 1993, that is, more than six months after the date

of this decision. Furthermore, an examination of the case does not

disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have

interrupted or suspended the running of that period.

      It follows that this part of the application has been introduced

out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3)

of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber  Acting President of the Second Chamber

      (K. ROGGE)                             (G.H. THUNE)