AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 26280/95

                      by Henry BATES

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 16 January 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 22 December 1994

by Henry BATES against the United Kingdom and registered on

24 January 1995 under file No. 26280/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as

follows. The applicant is an British citizen, born in 1955 and is

resident in London. He is represented before the Commission by Susan

Booth, a solicitor practising in London.

Particular circumstances of the case

     On 30 November 1991 the applicant was stopped by a policeman and

warned of his potential criminal liability in relation to his dog (it

appearing to the policeman that the dog was a pit bull terrier)

pursuant to recent legislation in relation to dangerous dogs. The

applicant submits that he accordingly took steps to register his dog.

On 4 December 1991 the applicant was again stopped by the police while

driving with his dog in the car unmuzzled and without a lead and he was

charged with an offence under section 1(2)(d) of the Dangerous Dogs Act

1991 ("the 1991 Act"). The dog was seized and remains in police custody

to date.

     At his trial on 29 July 1992 the applicant's legal representative

submitted that there was no case to answer as the applicant's car was

not a "public place" within the meaning of the legislation. Since the

applicant was not aware of the actual breed of his dog, no submission

was made on his behalf challenging the assertion of the prosecution

that his dog was "of the type known as the pit bull terrier". After

hearing submissions from the prosecution and defence the Magistrate

concluded that the interior of the car was a public place and the

applicant was convicted. The applicant was fined £100 and it was

ordered that the dog be destroyed.

     The applicant successfully applied to the Magistrates' Court to

state a case to the High Court on the question of whether the interior

of his car constituted a "public place" within the meaning of the 1991

Act and the High Court, after an expedited hearing, found against the

applicant on 25 February 1993. Mr. Justice Waller described the 1991

Act as follows:

     "This statute is a Draconian statute. ...  The statute is

     ultimately aimed to exclude these types

     type known as a pit bull terrier> of dog from the country in

     toto. It is certainly aimed at keeping the public as secure as

     is conceivably possible and relieving the public from any

     possible apprehension that it may have in relation to these types

     of dogs. The legislation puts these types of dogs higher than

     other specially dangerous dogs."

     The High Court and, subsequently, the House of Lords refused

leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

     The applicant submits that he was informed in August 1993 by the

Police that they had not, prior to or during the hearing before the

Magistrates' Court, caused the dog to be seen by an expert to give an

opinion on whether he was "of the type known as the pit bull terrier"

and that this was not done because of the provisions of section 5(5)

of the 1991 Act. The applicant subsequently caused the dog to be

examined, initially on 8 September 1993 by one expert and thereafter

by three additional experts, each of whom concluded immediately that

the dog was not "of the type known as the pit bull terrier" but rather

a Great Dane cross-breed.

     Since the applicant had already applied to the Magistrates' Court

to state a case to the High Court, he had no right of appeal to the

Crown Court (which would have consisted of a full rehearing). Therefore

the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review of his

conviction and for an order of certiorari to quash his conviction. The

grounds for his application were his new evidence as to the dog's

breeding and the failure of the prosecution to have the dog examined

by an expert prior to the hearing as a result of the presumption of

fact contained in section 5(5) of the 1991 Act. On 22 December 1993 the

High Court granted leave to so apply.

     On 29 June 1994 the applicant's judicial review application was

dismissed by the High Court. That court noted that not only had the

applicant failed to adduce any evidence as to the breed of the dog

before the Magistrates' Court, but that the Magistrate had found that

the applicant had admitted that the dog was of a type known as a pit

bull terrier. The High Court went on to find that the prosecution had

not conducted such tests because it correctly relied on section 5(5)

of the 1991 Act which placed the burden of proving this matter on the

defendant and thus concluded that there was no failing in the conduct

of the prosecution and, therefore, clearly no grounds for an order of

certiorari. However, the court also considered arguments raised by the

applicant as to the compliance of section 5(5) of the 1991 Act with

Article 6 para. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and ruled

that, even if it was necessary to rule on this matter in an English

court, section 5(5) of the 1991 Act would not be open to criticism in

any way.

     On 13 July 1994 the High Court also dismissed the applicant's

application to certify a point of law of general public importance and

for leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

     The destruction order was stayed pending the above proceedings

and the dog remains in kennels away from the applicant. Since 28 July

1994 the applicant has been obliged to pay £8.81 per day for the

kennelling of the dog. The applicant has confirmed that his dog was

approximately five years old in December 1994.

Relevant domestic law and practice

     Section 111(4) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 states that

the right of appeal against conviction to the Crown Court (normally

available pursuant to section 108 of that Act) ceases once an

application is made to state a case to the High Court.

     Pit bull terriers were bred as fighting dogs. When dog fighting

was banned in the United Kingdom, this breed died out but was re-

imported back into the United Kingdom from the United States in the

1970's.

     Dogs generally have breed standards which are laid down and

recognised by different associations of dog breeders. The English

Kennel Club has no standards in relation to pit bull terriers because

of the long period when those dogs were not bred in the United Kingdom.

The United States, on the other hand, has two associations setting down

such standards - the American Dog Breeders Association ("ADBA") and the

United Kennel Club ("UKC").

     The ADBA exists for pit bull terriers alone, its standards are

widely used and referred to in the United Kingdom, it is concerned to

take into account fighting standards and the dogs imported into the

United Kingdom in the 1970's were registered with the ADBA. Its breed

standards mainly relate to the physical characteristics of a pit bull

terrier but also refer to the dog's "gameness and aggressiveness". The

UKC provides standards for many breeds of dog registered with it

(including pit bull terriers) but is mainly concerned with show dogs.

     In 1991, pursuant to considerable public concern about recent

attacks on persons by, inter alia, pit bull terriers, parliament

enacted the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act") and, pursuant

thereto, the Secretary of State made the Dangerous Dogs Compensation

and Exemption Schemes Order 1991 ("the 1991 Order").

     Section 1(2)(d) of the 1991 Act provides that no person shall

allow, inter alia, "any dog of the type known as the pit bull terrier"

of which he is the owner or of which he is for the time being in charge

to be in a public place without being muzzled and kept on a lead.

Contravention of this section is an offence carrying a potential

punishment of imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a

fine (section 1 (7)). Such contravention requires the court to make a

destruction order in relation to the relevant dog (section 4).

     While section 1(3) of the 1991 Act also went on to prohibit

having, inter alia, a dog of a type known as a pit bull terrier at all

in one's possession or custody after the 30 November 1991, the

Secretary of State could make certain exemptions. The Secretary of

State provided for, inter alia, compensation and exemption schemes by

way of the 1991 Order.

     In particular, the 1991 Order provided, inter alia, for an

exemption scheme for those who wished to maintain ownership of their

dogs. In order to be so exempted the dog had to be, inter alia,

registered with the police (prior to the 12 October 1991 for an adult

dog and prior to 30 November 1991 for a puppy), neutered, permanently

marked as a dog of the relevant type and insured. A fee was also

payable.

     Section 5(5) of the 1991 Act, insofar as relevant, reads as

follows:

     "If in any proceedings it is alleged by the prosecution that a

     dog is one to which section 1 ... applies it shall be presumed

     that it is such a dog unless the contrary is shown by the accused

     by such evidence as the court considers fit; and the accused

     shall not be permitted to adduce such evidence unless he has

     given the prosecution notice of his intention to do so not later

     than the fourteenth day before that on which the evidence is to

     be adduced".

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant invokes Article 6 of the Convention. He submits

that the presumption as to fact contained in section 5(5) of the 1991

Act is in violation of Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention. He further

complains that his inability to appeal against his conviction to the

Crown Court, due to section 111(4) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980,

was in violation of his right of effective access to court guaranteed

by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

2.   The applicant further argues that his keeping of a dog or,

alternatively, his relationship with that dog falls within the concept

of private life in Article 8 of the Convention and that his conviction

and the mandatory destruction order constituted a disproportionate

interference with his right to respect for his private life in a manner

which did not correspond to any social need.

3.   The applicant also claims that his property has been controlled

or, alternatively, that he has been deprived of his property in

violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 as the measures in question were

disproportionate and vague.

4.   Finally, the applicant complains under Article 14 of the

Convention together with each of Article 6, Article 8 and Article 1

Protocol 1 arguing that there is no reasonable justification for the

different treatment of pit bull terrier dog owners by the 1991 Act

because the means employed by that Act to control dangerous dogs are

disproportionate and single out dogs on the basis of breed rather than

dangerous behaviour.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant mainly complains about the presumption as to fact

contained in section 5(5) of the 1991 Act, maintaining that it is not

within the reasonable limits allowed under Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) of the Convention. He also complains under section 6 para.

1 of the Convention that, despite the finding of new and cogent

evidence, he was unable to appeal to the Crown Court against his

conviction (which would have been a full rehearing) because of section

111(4) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. He submits that he was

thereby denied effective access to court in violation of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention,

insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

     him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law. ...

     2.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

     innocent until proved guilty according to law."

     The Commission recalls that the criteria to be applied in

determining whether proceedings involve the determination of a criminal

charge are the qualification of the offence in domestic law, the very

nature of the offence together with the nature and degree of severity

of the penalty which the accused risks incurring (see, for example, No.

13877/88, Dec. 17.5.90, D.R. 65 p. 279). Applying these criteria and

in view, in particular, of the penalty set out in section 1(7) of the

1991 Act for a contravention of section 1(2)(d) of that Act, the

Commission considers that the proceedings against the applicant

constituted the determination of a criminal charge.

     The applicant refers in detail to principles of domestic law, to

the Canadian Charter, to other Commonwealth jurisprudence and to the

Hong Kong Bill of Rights. He argues that these sources are of

persuasive value in terms of establishing the criteria which a

presumption as to fact or law must satisfy in order to fall within the

reasonable limits allowed under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the

Convention. He maintains that section 5(5) of the 1991 Act does not

comply with those criteria nor, therefore, with Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) of the Convention.

     However, in light of the clear guidance as to what is acceptable

in terms of presumptions of fact and law under Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) of the Convention given by the Court in the Salabiaku

judgment and recently confirmed in the Pham Hoang judgment (Eur. Court

H.R., Salabiaku judgment of 7 October 1988, Series A no. 141-A and Pham

Hoang judgment of 25 September 1992, Series A no. 243), the Commission

does not consider that it is necessary, in the circumstances of the

present case, to resort to any supplementary means of interpretation

of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention (Eur. Court H. R.,

Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 18, para. 36).

     The Commission recalls that the Court in the above-mentioned

Salabiaku and the Pham Hoang judgments stated that the Convention does

not prohibit presumptions of fact or law in principle, but does require

Contracting States to remain within certain reasonable limits as

regards criminal law which limits take into account the importance of

what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence. The Court also

went on to consider whether the application of the relevant

presumptions was compatible with the presumption of innocence

(Salabiaku judgment, loc. cit., pp. 14-18, paras. 26-30 and the Pham

Hoang judgment, loc. cit., pp. 21-22, para. 33).

     In the present case, the Commission recalls that the presumption

contained in section 5(5) of the 1991 Act is one as to fact namely, it

is presumed that a dog is "of the type known as the pit bull terrier".

     The Commission notes what was at stake for the applicant namely,

a possible criminal conviction together with a potential penalty of,

inter alia, six months imprisonment and the destruction of his dog.

However, the Commission finds that it is significant that section 5(5)

of the 1991 Act expressly provides an opportunity to the defendant to

adduce evidence at the initial hearing as to a dog's breeding and that,

despite this provision, the applicant (who was legally represented)

didnot adduce any such evidence. According to the applicant, his

experts would have had no difficulty in presenting strong evidence in

this respect. As regards the extent of the Magistrates' Court's

reliance on the presumption of fact, the Commission notes that there

was an express finding by the Magistrate that the applicant had

admitted that the dog was of a type known as a pit bull terrier.

     The applicant claims that he was not aware of his dog's breeding

at the time of the initial hearing and assumed that the police must

have performed some sort of examination prior to the hearing. However,

the Commission considers that the breed of the dog was evidently a

basic proof in the case, that the terms of section 5(5) of the 1991 Act

were clear and that it is not therefore tenable for the applicant to

submit that his mistaken assumption in such circumstances would render

the presumption of fact unreasonable. The applicant further submits

that once the dog was impounded he was not permitted access in order,

inter alia, to have it examined for evidentiary purposes. However, the

Commission notes that the applicant appeared to have had no difficulty

in 1993 gaining access to his dog for the expert examinations and has

not detailed to the Commission any requests for access made by him in

this respect nor any refusals by the police. Furthermore and insofar

as the applicant claims that it is unfair that he would be obliged to

definitively disprove the identity of his dog rather than simply cast

some doubt on this, the Commission again recalls that the applicant did

not even attempt any such evidential procedure and that, according to

the applicant, his various experts would have been in a position to

present strong evidence that his dog was not a pit bull terrier.

     Therefore the Commission considers that section 5(5) of the 1991

Act falls within reasonable limits, even in light of what was at stake

for the applicant, given the opportunity expressly provided to the

defence to rebut the presumption of fact and that that section 5(5) was

applied in a manner compatible with the presumption of innocence.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the applicant's complaint

under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     As regards the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission notes that it was the

applicant's own choice to state a case to the High Court which led to

his being unable to pursue a full rehearing before the Crown Court. In

any event, the Commission recalls that a right to an appeal or retrial

cannot be derived from the provisions of the Convention (see, for

example, No. 12323/86, Dec. 13.7.88, D.R. 57 p. 157 and No. 7761/77,

Dec. 8.5.78, D.R. 14 p. 171) and that the United Kingdom has not

ratified Protocol 7. The Commission therefore finds this complaint

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant further argues that his keeping of a dog or,

alternatively, his relationship with that dog fall within the concept

of private life in Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention and that the

measures taken against the applicant's dog constituted a

disproportionate and unlawful interference with his right to respect

for his private life as guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention in a manner which did not correspond to any social need.

     As to whether the applicant's complaint is within the scope of

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission recalls its

previous case-law in which it held that the keeping of a pet does not

fall within the sphere of the owner's private life for the purposes of

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (No. 6825/74, X v. Iceland, Dec.

18 May 1976, D.R. 5 p. 86). While the applicant argues to the contrary,

the Commission does not consider that, in the circumstances of the

present case, there exists any reason to depart from or to distinguish

the aforementioned case-law (cf., No. 25517/94, Dec. 3.4.95,

unpublished).

     Accordingly, the Commission finds this complaint incompatible

ratione materiae pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant also claims that his right to property, as

guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1), has been violated as the

measures in question, in particular sections 1 and 4 of the 1991 Act,

were disproportionate and vague.

     Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

     his possessions except in the public interest and subject

     to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

     principles of international law.

     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

     impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

     deems necessary to control the use of property in

     accordance with the general interest or to secure the

     payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

     The applicant submits that the measures taken under the 1991 Act

amount to a control of the use of property. However, the Commission

notes that the applicant's dog was impounded in December 1991, remains

so to date and is the subject of a destruction order and considers that

these measures amount to a deprivation of the applicant's property

which falls to be considered under the second sentence of the first

paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1).

     In order to be justified it must be shown that the deprivation

was in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and in the

public interest. Furthermore, the Commission notes that not only must

the aim of the deprivation of property be in the public interest, but

there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between

the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (cf., for example,

Eur. Court H.R. Holy Monasteries judgment of 9 December 1994, to be

published in Series A no. 301-A, para. 70). This implies that a fair

balance must be struck between the demands of the general interests of

the community and the requirement to protect the individual's

fundamental rights, which balance would not be found if the individual

was found to have borne an excessive burden (cf. Eur. Court  H.R.,

Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52,

pp. 26-28, paras. 69-73).

(a) Subject to the conditions provided for by law

     The Commission recalls that the term "law" in the Convention

refers not only to compliance with the domestic law but also to the

quality of that law requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law

so that, inter alia, the law in question must not be arbitrary and must

be formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate

their conduct (Eur. Court H.R., James and Others judgment of

21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 41, para. 67 and the Sunday Times

judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 20, p. 31, para. 49). The

Commission, having examined the applicant's submissions, finds no

evidence that his prosecution was other than in accordance with the

1991 Act or that his prosecution or conviction was arbitrary in its

effect.

     However, the applicant submits that the reference in section 1(1)

to "any dog of the type known as the pit bull terrier" is vague in that

identifying a dog of this nature is notoriously difficult. The

Commission does not consider, in view of the availability of objective

standards by which various characteristics of a dog can be assessed to

establish its identity, that the formulation of section 1(1) of the

1991 Act lacked sufficient precision to have enabled the applicant to

regulate his conduct as regards his dog to avoid prosecution under

section 1(2)(d) of the 1991 Act. The Commission is also cognisant, in

this respect, of the exemption scheme provided by the 1991 Order, by

which the applicant could have appropriately regulated his conduct, if

he was in any doubt as to his dog's breeding. The Commission therefore

concludes that the applicant has not demonstrated that the deprivation

of his property was other than "subject to the conditions provided for

by law".

(b) Public interest

     The applicant accepts that the State is entitled to enact

legislation to control dangerous dogs in the interests of public safety

and recognises that this was the aim of his prosecution.

(c) Proportionality of the deprivation

     However, the applicant argues that the 1991 Act, as it applied

to him and taken as a whole, did not strike a fair balance between the

public interest involved and his right to the protection of his

property in that he has borne an excessive burden. He also submits that

the mandatory destruction order is not proportionate and that the

immediate seizure of a suspected dog, the unavailability of "bail" for

a dog pending trial together with the extenuating circumstances in his

case (the dog having been in his car) demonstrate that the operation

of the provisions of the 1991 Act in his case were disproportionate.

     On the one hand, the Commission accepts that the conviction based

on breed rather than past behaviour and the consequent mandatory

destruction order, being provisions ultimately aimed at eradicating pit

bull terriers as a breed from the United Kingdom, are draconian

measures.

     However and on the other hand, the Commission notes that the

applicant was stopped on 30 November 1991 and warned of his potential

criminal liability in light of the new legislative regime in relation

to dangerous dogs. While the applicant claims that he paid heed to this

advice and took steps to register his dog, he did not have his dog

muzzled, on a lead or restrained in any way when he was again stopped

four days later. In addition, the Commission is cognisant of the fact

that the pit bull terrier breed was developed as a fighting animal

which, prior to the introduction of the 1991 Act, was known to have

attacked persons in the United Kingdom causing much public concern.

Furthermore, the Commission does not consider that participation in the

exemption scheme and the use of a muzzle and a lead (which would avoid

conviction under section 1(2)(d)) are onerous conditions. Moreover, the

Commission finds seizure pending determination of the charges to be a

reasonable measure bearing in mind the public safety goal of the

relevant legislation and the risk that owners, who in consequence of

their attachment to their pets, may not be sufficiently conscious of

the danger their pets may present to the public.

     Insofar as the applicant complains about section 1(3) of the 1991

Act, the Commission notes that the applicant was not charged

thereunder. In any event, the Commission notes that pursuant to the

1991 Order the applicant could have taken certain steps to qualify for

an exemption scheme which would have allowed him to retain his dog

despite the terms of section 1(3) of the Act. While the applicant

submits that he began this process, he claims he did so after

30 November 1991 which was after the registration time limit for adult

dogs set down by the 1991 Order.

     The Commission therefore considers that the operation of the 1991

Act in the applicant's case demonstrated a reasonable relationship of

proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be

realised in that a fair balance was struck between the exigencies of

maintaining public safety and the requirement to protect his rights

under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1).

     While the applicant also refers, in this context, to the

existence of the presumption of fact and his inability to appeal from

the Magistrates' Court's decision, the Commission notes its conclusions

above on these matters and considers that they do not alter the

Commission's view expressed above as to the proportionality of the

measures taken against the applicant.

     The Commission, for the above reasons, concludes that this

complaint of the applicant is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.   Finally, the applicant complains under Article 14 of the

Convention in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 14+6, 14+8) of

the Convention together with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (Art. 14+P1-1)

arguing that there is no reasonable justification for the difference

in treatment of pit bull terrier dog owners because the means employed

to control dangerous dogs are disproportionate and single out dogs on

the basis of breed rather than dangerous behaviour. Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as ...  political or other opinion, ... property or other

     status."

     The Commission recalls that this Article protects individuals in

analogous situations from a discriminatory difference in treatment in

the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention

and its Protocols. As such and in light of the Commission's findings

above as to the incompatibility of the applicant's complaint under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission has limited its

consideration below to the applicant's complaint under Article 14 of

the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 paras. 1 and 2

(Art. 14+6, 14+8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 1

(Art. 14+P1-1).

     In this respect, the Commission notes that such a difference in

treatment will only be discriminatory if it has "no objective and

reasonable justification" namely, if it does not pursue a "legitimate

aim" and if there is no "reasonable relationship of proportionality

between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised" (see, for

example, Eur. Court H.R., Darby judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A

no. 187, p. 12, para. 31). Furthermore, the Contracting States enjoy

a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what

extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different

treatment in law; the scope of this margin will vary according to the

circumstances, the subject matter and the background (Eur. Court H.R.,

Lithgow judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, para.

177).

     The Commission accepts that the 1991 Act provides for a different

treatment of owners of pit bull terriers and owners of other dogs who

by their behaviour show themselves to be dangerous. However, the

Commission finds that this difference in treatment has an objective and

reasonable justification given the fact that this type of dog is bred

for fighting and the experience of pit bull terriers in the United

Kingdom. The Commission further finds that such difference in treatment

pursues the legitimate aim of public safety and demonstrates a

reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed

and the aim sought to be realised in light, in particular, of the

existence of the exemption scheme in the 1991 Order together with the

relatively uncomplicated requirement to use a muzzle and lead in a

public place. Having regard, in addition, to the margin of appreciation

enjoyed by the Contracting States in this area, the Commission

considers that this difference in treatment is not discriminatory

within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

     Accordingly, the Commission finds this complaint manifestly ill-

founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

   (M. F. BUQUICCHIO)                          (C. L. ROZAKIS)