AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 12323/86

by Thomas CAMPBELL

against the United Kingdom

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

13 July 1988, the following members being present:

                MM.  C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                     S. TRECHSEL

                     F. ERMACORA

                     E. BUSUTTIL

                     G. JÖRUNDSSON

                     A. WEITZEL

                     J.C. SOYER

                     H.G. SCHERMERS

                     H. DANELIUS

                     G. BATLINER

                Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

                Sir  Basil HALL

                M.   C.L. ROZAKIS

                Mrs.  J. LIDDY

                Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 5 July 1985

by Thomas CAMPBELL against the United Kingdom and registered on

8 August 1986 under file No. 12323/86;

        Having regard to:

     -  the report provided for by Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure

        of the Commission;

     -  the Government's observations of 2 June 1987;

     -  the applicant's observations of 6 August 1987;

- ii -

     -  the second report provided for by Rule 40 of the Rules of

        Procedure;

     -  the submissions of the parties at the hearing on 13 July 1988;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The applicant is a British citizen born in 1952 and resident

in Glasgow.  He is currently serving a life sentence.  He is

represented before the Commission by John Carroll, a solicitor.  The

facts as agreed by the parties may be summarised as follows.

        On 16 April 1984, a fire occurred in a house in Glasgow in

which six persons died.  This was an incident in a spate of violence

and vandalism occurring between rivals in the ice-cream trade.

        The applicant, who had relations in the ice-cream trade and a

record of violent offences was arrested and appeared in Court on

16 May 1984 charged with conspiracy.  On 22 May, the applicant was

brought back to Court and served with a fresh petition charging murder

in respect of the fire on 16 April 1984.  During the judicial

examination of the applicant, the Procurator Fiscal Depute conducting

the case, questioned him on the basis that the applicant was present

at the house and was involved in starting the fire.  The applicant in

reply specified in detail an alibi for that time.

        The applicant was subsequently indicted to the High Court in

Glasgow on charges of conspiracy to commit robbery, wilful

fire-raising, murder, assault and instigation of others to commit

assault and murder.  The applicant was found guilty of assault and

murder on 10 October 1984 and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment

and life imprisonment, with a recommendation that he serve not less

than twenty years.

        The applicant applied for legal aid to appeal his conviction:

he had already been legally-aided during the trial.  It appears

however that the applicant's counsel indicated that they would not be

prepared to argue his appeal as he wished.  The applicant therefore

prepared and lodged his own grounds of appeal and with the aid of a

solicitor, prepared his submissions on appeal, copies of which were

provided for the Appeal Court judges.  The applicant applied under

Section 274 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) 1975 Act to have the

shorthand notes of the trial but this request was refused both by the

Clerk of the Justiciary and the Secretary of State.

        The applicant presented his appeal on 16 and 17 June 1985 and

was kept in manacles throughout the proceedings.  The applicant

requested the Lord Justice Clerk to have the manacles removed so that

he could reach and refer to his papers but this request was denied and

the applicant was kept handcuffed to one prison officer while before

the Court.  The prosecution was represented by a senior Advocate

Depute, a Q.C., who was assisted by junior counsel and members of the

Procurator Fiscal service.  On page 2 of the Court's Opinion the Lord

Justice Clerk states:

        "When he was called upon to make his submissions in support

        of his grounds of appeal the appellant stated that they

        were all included in the said summary and asked the Court's

        leave simply to read that document to the Court.  Such

        leave was granted and he read the document to the Court.

        When he had done so he was asked if he wished to add

        anything to what he had already submitted and he replied

        in the negative.  The learned Advocate Depute replied,

        and the appellant then sought leave to answer some of the

        points made by the Advocate Depute.  Although this further

        speech is contrary to normal procedure in criminal appeals

        we granted the appellant the indulgence."

        The Appeal Court dismissed the appeal and refused his

application to receive "new evidence".

        On 18 November 1985, the applicant petitioned the Secretary of

State under Section 263 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975

to remit the matter back to the Appeal Court.  This petition was

refused by letter dated 19 March 1986.

        On 7 June 1985, the applicant had been transferred from

Glasgow to Peterhead Prison over 200 miles away.  The applicant wished

to pursue his petition and an application before the European

Commission of Human Rights, and expressed the desire to be allowed to

work full-time in his cell.  In particular, he asked if he could be

allowed to remain in his cell or be transferred to the Special Unit of

Barlinnie Prison.  An Assistant Governor of the prison indicated to the

applicant that none of these options would be appropriate but

explained that the applicant could be placed in a separate cell under

Rule 36(1) of the Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952.

        On 24 June 1985 the applicant petitioned the Secretary of

State complaining about the Rule 36 conditions and requesting

permission to be employed in his own cell "to study law and

procedures" in pursuit of his case.  He commented that at Peterhead

the only way he could pursue his various appeals was "on Rule 36 in

the separate cell area, otherwise I have to be employed full-time on a

sewing machine making £3.20 a week" and that he would have to be

exposed to "the bombardment of the games room for the rest of the

evening".  The applicant indicated that he had "opted for Rule 36"

because this appeared to be the only way he could spend more time with

his files and books.  The applicant asked for "exemption from

employment in the prison industries" and repeated his request for a

transfer to Barlinnie Special Unit "or to the nearest mental

institution".  In their reply of 12 July the Department replied that

the applicant was on Rule 36 conditions at his own insistence, that

the Rule 36 conditions had been explained to him fully in an effort to

encourage him to follow normal prison routine and that he could be

removed from these conditons if he so wished.

        On 2 November 1985, an incident occurred in the solitary

confinement block and a number of prisoners were investigated as to

their alleged involvement.  On 3 November, the applicant was visited

in his cell by a number of prison officers.  An incident then occurred

and the applicant was removed to hospital, where he underwent a

life-saving operation and a rupture to the small bowel was repaired.

        On 10 November 1985, the applicant's solicitor arrived at the

hospital to discuss with the applicant the circumstances which led to

his admission to hospital.  He had previously been told by the Prison

Division that the applicant was in hospital for an appendix operation.

The visit had been arranged by the solicitor with the sanction of the

prison and hospital staff, and the police who were helping in

supervision.  On arrival at the hospital however, the solicitor was

told that he had to submit his person and luggage (consisting of the

applicant's files and a camera) to a search and that police and prison

officers would have to be present at the interview for reasons of

security.  The solicitor phoned the Assistant Governor of the prison

and explained that the meeting concerned possible Court proceedings

but was told that the police were in charge.  The solicitor therefore

submitted to the search during which he handed over a small pocket

knife with a blade of 2 inches.  The interview was conducted in the

presence of police and prison officers, one of whom had been present

during the incident of which the applicant was complaining.  The

solicitor took pictures of the applicant's injuries with his camera.

The door of the room in which the applicant was kept remained open

throughout.

        Following the meeting, the applicant and his solicitor made a

formal complaint of assault by the prison officers.  The applicant was

later charged with crimes of rioting and assault in respect of the

incidents on 2 and 3 November 1985.

        By letter to the Chief Constable of Grampian Police dated

14 November 1985, the applicant's solicitor complained of the

conditions imposed on his visit to the applicant and stated that:

        "The meeting with became protracted by virtue

        of the fact that it was not possible to conduct it in normal

        conversational tones and we were compelled to discuss the

        matter in hushed whispers for the sake of preserving some

        degree of confidentiality."

        On return from hospital to Peterhead Prison on 12 November

1985, the applicant was kept apart from the other prisoners under Rule

39 and then Rule 36 of the Prison Rules.  The applicant commenced a

hunger-strike in January 1986 in protest over his confinement in

Peterhead - he had made several unsuccessful requests to be

transferred to Barlinnie in Glasgow to facilitate the communication

with his legal advisers.

        On 23 January 1986, he was transferred on health grounds to

the hospital at Barlinnie.  On 14 February 1986, he was returned to

Peterhead where he was again placed on Rule 36 conditions, awaiting

the outcome of the criminal charges against him.

        The prosecutor withdrew the charges connected with rioting in

May 1986 and on 24 June 1986, the applicant was acquitted of the

assault charge.

        On 14 July 1986 the Governor of Peterhead Prison spoke to the

applicant about the continued use of Rule 36 in his case.  The

applicant had indicated that if he were removed from Rule 36 and

returned to normal conditions he would not expect to be employed in

prison work but to continue with his "appeal" full-time.  The Governor

had told the applicant that such a situation would not be acceptable

and the applicant had replied that he would prefer to remain on Rule

36 conditions.

        By reply dated 29 July 1986 to one of the applicant's

petitions the Scottish Home and Health Department stated inter alia

"the prisoner can however be assured that it is understood that he

objects to being held under Rule 36 Conditions.  Equally, the prisoner

will understand that his continued detention under Rule 36 is a

consequence of his own refusal to return to normal circulation and the

general prison regime, to enable him to concentrate on possible

remedies for his conviction and sentence.  It is of course open to the

prisoner to seek return to normal circulation at any time."

        In September 1986, the applicant began another hunger-strike

and he was transferred to the hospital at Barlinnie Prison on 18

September.  After treatment at Barlinnie for the effects of refusing

food the prisoner returned to Peterhead for the second time on 26

September.  After refusing to take food on his return to Peterhead the

applicant was again transferred to the hospital at Barlinnie on 6

October.  On 8 October he was transferred to D Hall of Barlinnie

Prison.  At Barlinnie the applicant agreed to work and therefore

remained in D Hall although still subject to security precautions as a

category A prisoner.  He now enjoyed limited association with other

prisoners.

        The applicant has been granted legal aid in order to pursue an

action for damages for assault against the Secretary of State for

Scotland and it appears that a summons has now been issued instituting

proceedings in respect of the incident on 3 November 1985.

        Domestic law and practice

        Security categories

        Under Rule 7 of the Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952 convicted

prisoners are classified in accordance with instructions given to the

Secretary of State.  Standing Order Fb10 of the Prisons (Scotland)

Standing Orders sets out the security categories and how prisoners

shall be allocated to them.  All inmates in Scottish penal

establishments are placed in one of four security categories A, B, C

or D.  Prisoners placed in security category D are those who may

reasonably be trusted to serve their sentences in open conditions.

Prisoners in category A are those requiring the highest degree of

security, who must in no circumstances be allowed to escape because of

considerations of public safety or national security.  The number of

category A prisoners held at any one time in penal establishments in

Scotland is no more than 15 on average (out of a current population of

about 5,500 prisoners).  Those in security classification B are those

who ought to be kept in very secure conditions.

        In addition the Governor of a prison must assess which

prisoners need be subject to special precautions having regard inter

alia to the potential risk of escape.  Prisoners placed on strict

escape precautions (SEP) are subject to special conditions affecting

inter alia their location and movement within an establishment.

Each case is reviewed by the Governor not less than once every three

months and no prisoner may be removed from the SEP list without the

authority of the Scottish Home and Health Department.

        Handcuffing of prisoners

        Under Section 242 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act

1975 (as amended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980) the

Secretary of State has the responsibility for arranging that

appellants are transmitted to and from an appeal hearing.  Section 243

of that Act, as amended, states that the Secretary of State shall call

sufficient numbers of male and female prison officers to attend the

court as, having regard to the list of cases he considers necessary,

Section 10 of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952 provides that Rules

under Section 35 of that Act may provide for the manner in which an

appellant when in custody is to be taken to, kept in custody at, and

brought back from, the appeal hearing.

        Rule 23 of the Rules further provides for such prisoners while

outside the prison to be kept in the custody of the officers directed

by the Governor to convey him to the appeal hearing and Standing Order

Fb11 provides that where an inmate who is regarded as being

particularly dangerous is to appear at the Appeal Court in Edinburgh

it will be for Governors to make special security arrangements.

Standing Order Fc10 makes specific provisions regarding the

handcuffing of prisoners.  No prisoner produced for any reason to any

court of law may be handcuffed while in court except with the

permission of the judge.  Handcuffing in courts is an exceptional

measure which should normally be considered only if there are

reasonable grounds to expect that if unrestrained the inmate would

commit an assault in the courtroom and or attempt to escape from it.

        Visiting conditions

        Section 10(2) of the 1952 Act provides that where a prisoner

is taken to a hospital for medical or surgical treatment he shall,

unless the Secretary of State otherwise directs, be kept in custody

while being so taken, while at that place, and while being taken back

to prison.  By virtue of Rule 1, the Rules extend where appropriate to

prisoners in hospital as they do to prisoners in prison.  Rule 74(2)

of the Rules covers visits to convicted prisoners and Standing Order

Mb sets out detailed provision for visits.  Visits by legal advisers

are provided for in Rules 76 and 77 and Standing Orders Mf7 and Mb20.

Applications by prisoners to the Commission are covered by Standing

Order Mf.  Rule 76 of the 1952 Rules provides that the legal adviser

of a prisoner shall be given reasonable facilities to consult him on

any legal business.  In particular, the interview shall take place in

the sight but not in the hearing of an officer.  Standing Order Mf7

provides that in relation to a petition to the Commission a legal

adviser may visit an inmate without first obtaining a visiting order

and that visits between an inmate and his legal adviser for this

purpose should be in sight, but not in the hearing of, a prison

officer.

        Restriction of association: Rule 36

        Rule 36 of the Rules provides as follows:

        "(1)  If at any time it appears to the Visiting Committee

        or the Secretary of State that it is desirable for the

        maintenance of good order or discipline, or in the

        interests of a prisoner, that he should not be employed

        in association with others, the Visiting Committee or

        the Secretary of State may authorise the Governor to

        arrange for him to work in a cell, and not in association,

        for a period not exceeding one month from the date of

        each authorisation.

        (2)  The Governor may arrange for any such prisoner to

        be employed in association again whenever he considers

        this desirable, and he shall so arrange if in any case

        the Medical Officer so advise on medical grounds."

        Rule 36 does not require any placement to be at the request of

the prisoner.  The judgment rests with the Secretary of State (or

Visiting Committee).  However, removal from association at work under

Rule 36 is normally applied at a prisoner's own request when the

individual prisoner is seeking protection from other inmates (because

of his offence, previous associations etc).  The use of Rule 36 at a

prisoner's own request is not, however, confined to "protection".

Rule 36 does not exclude removal from association at work at a

prisoner's own request for other reasons.  Rule 36 is not a punishment

for a disciplinary offence.  Disciplinary offences are punished in

accordance with Rules 42 to 47 inclusive.

COMPLAINTS

1.      The applicant contends that he suffered inhuman and degrading

treatment through being manacled throughout his appeal hearing.  He

invokes Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

2.      The applicant complains that the conditions imposed on his

solicitor on his visit to the applicant while in hospital (in

particular the presence of police and prison officers, one of whom

took part in the incident in which the applicant received his injury)

attempted to intimidate him and in effect impeded the exercise of his

right of access to Court.  The presence of the police and prison

officers throughout the interview also interfered with his right to

receive and impart information.  The applicant invokes in this respect

Articles 6 para. 1 and 10 (Art. 6-1, Art. 10) of the Convention.

3.      He also complains that as a result of a desire to work on his

petition and application to the European Commission of Human Rights he

has been placed in solitary confinement.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 5 July 1985 and registered

on 8 August 1986.

        On 6 March 1987, the Commission decided to bring the

application to the notice of the respondent Government in relation to

the applicant's complaints concerning access to solicitor, being

manacled in court and being kept in solitary confinement because of

his intention to pursue his application to the Commission.  The

respondent Government was invited to submit written observations on

admissibility and merits pursuant to Rule 42(2)b of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission.  The Government was also invited for an

explanation of the applicant's complaints of solitary confinement in

the context of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) in fine of the

Convention.  The applicant's remaining complaints were held

inadmissible in a partial decision on admissibility dated 6 March

1987.        Observations from the respondent Government were submitted on

2 June 1987 and observations in reply submitted by the applicant on

6 August 1987.

        On 16 October 1987, the Commission decided to grant legal aid

to the applicant in respect of his application.

        On 9 March 1988, the Commission decided to invite the parties

to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application

concerning the issues arising under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention in relation to the handcuffing and the applicant's access

to his solicitor.

        At the hearing which was held on 13 July 1988, the parties

were represented as follows:

        The respondent Government

        Mr.  M.C.Wood,        Agent

        Mr.  G.W. Penrose,    Q.C.

        Mrs.  M. Macdonald,   Scottish Office, Adviser

        Mr.  C. Reeves,       Scottish Home and Health Department, Adviser

        Miss L. Cumming,     Crown Office, Adviser

        Mr.  C. McLean,       United Kingdom Permanent Representative

                             to the Council of Europe

        The applicant

        Mr.  J. Carroll,      Solicitor

        Mr.  D. Small,        Advocate

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

        A. THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT

        1. The facts

        The applicant was convicted of crimes which involved extreme

violence, were carefully planned and carried out as part of a

protracted and violent confrontation between rivals in the ice-cream

war in Glasgow.

        While in custody on remand from 14 May 1984, the applicant was

under strict escape precautions (SEP).  Upon his conviction on

10 October 1984 he was classified in security category B, and remained

on the SEP list.  Upon his transfer from Barlinnie to Peterhead Prison

on 7 June 1985 the applicant remained as a category B prisoner and on

the SEP list.  On 4 November 1985, following a serious escape attempt

by a number of prisoners and the taking of hostages, the applicant and

a number of others were reclassified as category A prisoners.  He has

remained in this category and on the SEP list since then.

        Category B prisoners are those who do not require maximum

security but who ought to be kept in very secure conditions.  The

classification of the applicant as category A reflected the view of

the prison authorities that he should be regarded as a prisoner

requiring the highest degree of security.  Classification in category

A is appropriate among other circumstances where the prisoner's

violent behaviour is such that members of the public or the police

would be in danger of their lives if he were at liberty.

        The appeal

        On the calling of his appeal on 16 May 1985 the applicant

entered the Court with a cardboard box or carton full of papers.  As

is customary with an appellant in custody he was flanked on either

side by a prison officer.  During the hearing he remained handcuffed

to one prison officer, his other hand remaining free.  Because of the

potential security risk, in addition to the larger than usual number

of prison officers in the building, police officers were also present

in the court during the hearing of the appeal.

        At the start of his submissions the applicant asked the Lord

Justice Clerk, who presided, if he would order that the handcuffs be

removed but this request was refused.  It is, however, understood that

the Lord Justice Clerk suggested that the prison officer to whom the

applicant was handcuffed should assist as much as he could with regard

to access to the applicant's papers.

        In the event, as the Court's Opinion bears out, the applicant

did not require to consult his papers regularly during the

presentation of his appeal.  All the papers which he had lodged with

the Clerk of Justiciary prior to the hearing had been copied for each

of the three judges and the Crown were also in possession of copies.

Further, the applicant had prepared a written "summary of his grounds

of appeal", copies of which he produced at the hearing for each of the

judges and for the Crown.

        Owing to an increased concern regarding a possible security

risk in the event that the applicant's appeal was refused, there was

a police presence at court on 4 June when the Court's Opinion was

delivered and a police escort was provided for the prison in which the

applicant was conveyed to and from prison.

        Peterhead Prison, 7 June - 4 November 1985

        The Government explain that at Peterhead Prison most inmates

are required to go to workshops, where appropriate work is provided,

for approximately four hours per day.  This requirement ensures a

period of time out of cell in association with other prisoners as well

as constructive activity for the individual.  Inmates are only excused

work, and allowed to remain in their cells, for medical reasons on the

advice of the Medical Office.  Some inmates, engaged on domestic

duties, do not go to workshops but are still required to work on

specified duties under supervision at other locations in the prison.

At Peterhead Prison, the normal weekday régime centres on periods of

employment in the workshops or on specific domestic duties during the

day.  Apart from those under medical observation (who have to remain

in their cells) all other prisoners are taken from the main halls (A

and D Halls) to place of work elsewhere in the prison.  Refusal to work

is a disciplinary offence under Rule 42(3).  Any prisoner who refuses

to work after a disciplinary adjudication may be punished, in

accordance with Rule 43, with punishments such as loss of privileges.

        At Peterhead Prison, prisoners who have to be held out of

normal association are located in the separate cells block (which has

15 cells).  The separate cells are used for prisoners who have been

removed from association at work, in accordance with Rule 36, at their

own request or at the Governor's initiative in the interests of good

order and discipline.  They are also used for prisoners who have

received punishments of cellular confinement.  While in the separate

cells at Peterhead the applicant was in the cell for between 22 and 23

hours per day, with the remainder of the time outside his cell for

exercise and ablutions.  He was not, however, denied access to and use

of personal property, including his radio, nor to facilities for the

preparation of his Strasbourg case.  In particular, his location in

the separate cells in no way affected his entitlement to visit from

family and friends or from his solicitor.

        Subsequently, on or about 16 August 1985, the Assistant

Governor discussed the situation with the applicant and sought to

persuade him to return to the normal routine of the prison.  The

applicant refused since he considered that he would not receive

adequate provision for study.

        On 9 August 1985 the Governor of Peterhead Prison requested

authority for the applicant to continue to be placed on Rule 36

conditions for one month from 11 August 1985.  The request indicated

that the applicant continued to be busily engaged with legal

correspondence and that he still did not wish to return to normal

circulation, although free to do so.  In giving authority for the

continued use of Rule 36 the Department asked whether the prisoner

could not be persuaded to return to normal circulation.

        On 16 August 1985, following discussion with the applicant, an

Assistant Governor at Peterhead reported to the Department that the

applicant could not be persuaded to return to normal circulation and

would not consider such a move to be in his best interests while he

had to "concentrate on his appeal".  The applicant had indicated that

he accepted the likelihood of punishment following such a refusal but

suggested the "absolute remedy" - a transfer to the Barlinnie Special

Unit.

        The applicant remained on Rule 36 conditions until a serious

incident took place in the separate cells in Peterhead Prison on

2 November 1985.  Following the incident the applicant was relocated

in B Hall of the prison.  There was a further incident in B Hall on

3 November, and in the early morning of 4 November the applicant was

transferred to Aberdeen Royal Infirmary after complaining of abdominal

pains.

        Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, 4 - 12 November 1985

        In the interests of security the cooperation of the local

(Grampian) police was requested in respect of the applicant's

detention at Aberdeen Royal Infirmary.  In hospital the applicant was

attended at all times by two prison officers.

        The applicant's solicitor, Mr.  Carroll, arrived at Aberdeen

Royal Infirmary to see his client at about 13.30 on 10 November 1985.

He refused to be searched by the uniformed police officers on duty and

insisted on the attendance of CID officers.  Not more than 40 minutes

later three CID officers arrived.  Mr.  Carroll was informed that he

could visit the applicant only if he consented to being searched.  The

visit started at about 14.15 and finished at about 16.00.  The room in

which the visit took place was a single room, located several storeys

from the ground, which the applicant occupied as the only patient.

For the duration of the interview the two prison officers and three

police officers withdrew from the room to the corridor leaving the

door open.  They remained some ten feet away from the solicitor and

his client.

        Peterhead and Barlinnie prison, November 1985 - 1987

        Following an incident at Barlinnie Prison on 1 January 1987

the applicant was placed in solitary confinement under Rule 36.  In

May 1987, the applicant was returned to Peterhead but was again

transferred to Barlinnie following a hunger-strike.  He apparently has

been since kept in the prison hospital at Barlinnie in the interests

of good order and discipline in the prison.

        2. Admissibility and merits

        Interference with access to solicitor: Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1)

        The Government do not accept that the prison authorities or

the police refused to allow the applicant to have a consultation with

his solicitor out of the hearing of prison or police officers.  It was

in the circumstances perfectly feasible for the applicant and the

solicitor to talk without being overheard by the officers, who were

outside the room in a hospital corridor and remained some ten feet

distant.

        The Government would further recall that in paragraph 113 of

the Campbell and Fell judgment (Eur.  Court H.R., Campbell and Fell

judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A No. 80), the Court indicated that,

as was pointed out by the Commission, "there may well be security

considerations which would justify some restriction on the conditions

for visits by a lawyer to a prisoner".  And paragraph 159 of the

Commission's report in Campbell and Fell reads:

        "The Commission recognises that there may be specific

        circumstances in which some interference in the contact

        between a lawyer and other persons may be justified (see

        e.g.  Application No. 8290/78, A, B, C and D v. the Federal

        Republic of Germany, Decisions and Reports No. 18 p. 176;

        Application No. 8463/78, Kröcher and Möller v.  Switzerland,

        Decision of 9 July 1983)."

        Thus it is not every interference with access to legal advice

that hinders the effective exercise of the right of access to court.

Further those cases where the Convention organs previously considered

temporary hindrance of access involved being substantial delays of

months or even years.

        In the Government's submission, any restrictions placed on the

conditions for Mr.  Carroll's visit on 10 November 1985 were amply

justified by security considerations.  The applicant was a category A

prisoner, that is to say, one who ought to be kept in very secure

conditions and was temporarily in a civilian hospital, the Aberdeen

Royal Infirmary, where the normal facilities for prison visits were

not available.  While there was a sealed observation window giving a

view into the room from the corridor, the door was also kept open as

it was considered that direct access into the room was required to

enable immediate response to any situation requiring police

intervention.  For the reasons given above, the Government submit that

there was, in the circumstances of this case, no interference with the

applicant's right of access to a court.  In the alternative, the

Government submit that any interference was clearly justified by

security considerations.

        Handcuffing before the Appeal Court: Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1)

        The Government would first recall that the fact that an

accused appears in court in handcuffs is less significant in appeal

proceedings (where the accused has already been convicted and where no

jury is present) than in the trial itself.  In any event, the

applicant's complaint appears to be essentially that the handcuffs

prevented him from consulting his papers properly.  The Government

submit that this complaint is unsupported by the facts.  In the

Government's submission, the fact of the applicant being handcuffed by

one hand during his appeal did not in practice impede his ability to

consult his papers.  Moreover, it is difficult to see how the

applicant can claim that he was "considerably hampered" in presenting

his appeal when the Court's Opinion discloses that he made his

submissions by reading from a document which had been prepared in

advance and which he himself described as "summary of his grounds of

appeal".  The applicant also stated that his submissions were all

included in the summary and he asked and was given permission to read

this document to the court.  When he was finished he was asked if he

wished to add anything to what he had already said and he replied in

the negative.  He indicated at no time that he was in any way

prevented from having access to any document.

        The Government would recall that the applicant was given a

second opportunity to address the court: he requested and was given

permission to answer some of the points made by the Advocate Depute.

As the Court's Opinion explains a second or further speech is contrary

to the normal procedure in criminal appeals but nevertheless the

permission was granted.  The applicant had been legally represented at

his trial and received the assistance of his solicitors in preparation

of his appeal.  It was as a result of his own decision that he

presented his own appeal.

        The Government stress that the applicant was afforded every

opportunity to present his submissions on his grounds of appeal and

was shown considerable indulgence by the court at the hearing.  The

handcuffing may have amounted to an inconvenience but it is submitted

that mere inconvenience does not constitute a breach of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1).  In conclusion, the Government would recall the

constant case-law of the Convention organs whereby the fairness of

proceedings for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) "must be

decided on basis of a consideration of the trial as a whole, and not

on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect of

the trial or one particular incident" and would submit that, in the

circumstances, the applicant was afforded a fair hearing and that no

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) occurred.

Article 25 para. 1 in fine (Art. 25-1)

        There is no factual basis for the assertion that by placing of

the applicant on Rule 36 conditions the authorities hindered the

effective exercise of the applicant's right to apply to the Commission.

The placing of the applicant on Rule 36 conditions was in no sense

aimed at deterring the applicant from making such an application or

punishing him.  On the contrary, as is explained above, the measure

was taken, at the applicant's option, so as to enable him to devote

more of his time to his application than would have been possible

under the ordinary prison régime.

        While Rule 36 covers a removal from association at work, and

normally also has the effect of removal from recreation and

association, it is not a punishment and does not involve the removal

of other privileges.  The applicant had explained to him the

consequences of his wanting to pursue his application full-time (in

the separate cells at Peterhead) as opposed to part-time (in the time

available to him in the evenings and weekends) and opted of his own

volition to be placed on Rule 36 conditions.  His being on Rule 36

conditions resulted from his own wish to pursue his Strasbourg

application full-time.  Prison management might have disregarded this

wish and insisted that the applicant participate in the normal prison

régime and face the disciplinary consequences of refusal to work.

        Repeated efforts were made to persuade the applicant to return

to normal circulation at Peterhead but did not succeed because of his

preference to work full-time on his case.

        The Government submit that it is clear that the applicant's

placement on Rule 36 conditions in no way hindered the exercise of his

right to petition the Commission but was in fact the result of his

insistence that he had to work on his application full-time.  Thus

placement on Rule 36 facilitated the applicant's application.  Had he

taken part in the normal régime at Peterhead the applicant would have

worked in prison industry leaving him evenings and weekends for the

preparation of his case.

        Finally, the Government would recall that some of the periods

which the applicant spent on Rule 36 conditions had no connection with

the preparation of his case in Strasbourg.

        B. THE APPLICANT

        1. The facts

        The applicant does not admit that he was under "short escape

precautions" while a remand prisoner.  He contends that he has never

been involved in any attempt or escape and that there is no reason to

believe that he was likely to become so involved.  The applicant notes

that he was classified as category B following conviction.

        The appeal

        The applicant states that he was at all times handcuffed by

his right hand to a prison officer.  He is right-handed.  The

applicant has no knowledge of the "security risk" or "increased

concern" over security to which the respondent Government refer as

justification for their actions.

        The applicant denies that any suggestion was even made to the

effect that any prison officer should assist him with his papers.  The

applicant notes that at his trial neither he nor his co-accused were

required to remain in handcuffs.  He is also ignorant of the reasons

for the decision to classify him as category A in November 1985.

        Peterhead Prison, 7 June - 4 November 1985

        On transfer to Peterhead on 7 June 1985 the applicant was

informed that the only facility that could be made available, if he

persisted in his appeal and application to the Commission, would be

under Rule 36 of the Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952.  This rule provides

for withdrawal of association at work and allows for a prisoner, where

it is in his interests, to carry out work in his cell.  It does not

provide for cellular confinement, which is provided for elsewhere in

the Rules as a punishment in itself.  The applicant was told that the

invoking of Rule 36 would involve him being in a cell in the separate

cell block of the prison.  Since then the applicant has made repeated

requests to be allowed the normal facility of association and

recreation albeit accepting that he would not be employed in

association with other prisoners as clearly stated in the Prison

(Scotland) Rules.

        The respondent Government states that refusal to work is a

disciplinary offence subject to punishment under Rule 43.  This rule

provides for cellular confinement, i.e. solitary confinement, as a

distinct and separate punishment in itself.  If it is the Respondent's

argument that the applicant was placed on Rule 36 at his own

insistence and in regard to his own interests then it seems remarkable

that the separate and distinct punishment of cellular confinement

should be imposed in addition thereto.  Accordingly, the applicant is

driven to the conclusion that Rule 36 as it is applied to him is a

form of punishment for which no provision is made under the specific

provision.  In addition, the sworn testimony of a prison officer,

during the trial in the High Court at Peterhead, made it plain that

the applicant was being kept in solitary confinement because of his

complaint to the European Commission of Human Rights.  The applicant

also submits that the Secretary of State's reply of 12 July 1985 to

his petition makes it clear that Rule 36 is regarded as punishment or

a form of coercion, given that Rule 36 provides only for withdrawal of

association at work.

        In discussion with the Governor's assistant the applicant

recalls that he was prevailed upon to enter into the normal routine of

the prison, but on questioning was clearly given to understand that

normal routine meant that no provision for study would be given; and

normal routine did not accommodate those prisoners who would not

accept without protest their conviction or sentence.  The applicant's

"wish" was not for Rule 36 but to continue his appeal and complaint to

the Commission.

        Aberdeen Royal Infirmary

        On arrival at the hospital on 10 November 1985, the

applicant's solicitor was met by police officers and obliged to wait

40 minutes to speak to CID officers.  The applicant's solicitor was

then required to submit to a search before he was allowed to visit the

applicant.  The room in which the applicant was a patient was at the

end of a corridor in the ward of a modern hospital.  There was a large

observation window on the wall giving on to the corridor and the whole

interior of the room was capable of view from any part of the adjacent

corridor.  The opaque glass in the top half of the door to the room

could also be slid back to allow observation into the room.  The

applicant notes that during the interview a number of hospital staff,

including a cleaner, came into the room but there was no interference

made with their rights of movement.  Members of the public visiting

other patients in rooms very nearby were also allowed free movement.

For the duration of the applicant's meeting with Mr.  Carroll there was

always at least one of the two prison officers seated at the open door

of the room with his feet not less than eighteen inches from the

threshold.  Whilst the prison officers tended to respect the "barrier"

of the threshold, the police did not.  Throughout the interview the

police would come to the door of the room and stand leaning against

the door post.  There were three police officers from the Criminal

Investigation Department and they took it in irregular turns to come

to the room and stand in the doorway.  The doorway was about six feet

from the head of the applicant as he sat in his bed and was well

within earshot for conversation even in subdued tones.  It was the

stated intention of Detective Sergeant Duncan that the police would at

all times be within the hearing of the interview.  The presence of the

prison officers and police clearly caused distress to the applicant.

He was asked what it was that caused him to be brought to the hospital

and leaned forward whispering that he dare not say because prison

officers had sought to make a deal with him that if he keep quiet they

will not have him charged with involvement in hostage taking and riot

in the prison, an incident referred to by the respondent Government as

having occurred on 2 November 1985.  In the event the applicant was

persuaded to speak and he related an account of an alleged attack on

him.  One detective constable and Detective Sergeant Duncan were

called right into the room.  Bruises were pointed out on the

applicant's left leg, his arms, back and the general area of the right

lower back.  In addition, the attention of the officers was drawn to

clearly visible marks of ratchet type handcuffs on the wrists.  The

police were told that the applicant was reporting an alleged assault

by prison officers on 3 November 1985 and wished the police to make

enquiry.

        It was later learned that the police failed to act on that

report and the applicant was to find himself charged with involvement

in riot and hostage-taking.  He was also charged with assaulting one

of the very officers named in the report to the police as having

assaulted him.

        2. Domestic law and practice

        Handcuffing of prisoners

        The applicant contends that handcuffing of prisoners is more

common than would appear from the respondent Government's observations.

Although it is said that the permission of the judge must be sought,

it does not appear that permission was sought in the case of the

applicant.

        Rule 36

        Rule 36 provides for withdrawal of association at work and

does not provide for denial of work or cellular confinement or denial

of any association with other prisoners.  Where the Secretary of State

chooses to exercise powers in Rule 36 it is plain that he must do so

outwith considerations of punishment.  In the applicant's case, he was

advised that Rule 36 would be applied to allow his request to look

after his own interests in preparing his appeal to the Secretary of

State and complaints to the Commission.  As the replies to the

applicant's various petitions to the Secretary of State and the

respondent Government's observations make it plain, Rule 36 has been

used as a guise or cover for conditions of punishment or coercion

directly related to the applicant's refusal to abandon his complaints

to the Commission.

        While Rule 36 is not designed to be a punishment, the

applicant submits that definite forms of punishment have been brought

to bear upon the applicant.  These forms of punishment are provided

for in Rules 42 to 47.  These, as applied to the applicant, include:

        a) forfeiture of "privileges" in the form of association

           with other prisoners in recreation or indeed any form

           of recreation;

        b) cellular confinement.

        Safeguards are built in to the Rules in respect of cellular

confinement.  These are that in the first instance it must not exceed

three days.  Where there are serious or repeated offences against the

Rules, cellular confinement is not to exceed fourteen days.  And, only

in the most grievous offence of mutiny or incitement to mutiny can

cellular confinement be extended to a maximum of twenty-eight days.

In addition to these safeguards, Rule 46 provides that cellular

confinement shall not be awarded unless the Medical Officer has

certified that the prisoner is in a fit condition to sustain it.  It

is implicit that this includes mental as well as physical condition

since it will doubtless be conceded that solitary confinement is a

danger to mental as well as physical wellbeing.  Further, Rule 46(2)

provides that the prisoner be visited at least once a day by the

Governor and by the Medical Officer and at intervals of not more than

three hours during the day by an officer detailed by the Governor.

        While purportedly subject to Rule 36 the applicant was offered

none of the safeguards provided for by statutory instruction and was

taken only once to see a psychiatrist some months into the period of

solitary confinement.

        3. Admissibility and merits

        Interference with access to solicitor: Article 6 (Art. 6) of

        the Convention

        The applicant submits that it is irrelevant that a complaint

was eventually made or that legal aid has been granted to pursue an

action for damages.  The right of unimpeded access to the court

carries with it the right to unimpeded access to a solicitor for the

purpose of receiving advice and assistance in connection with the

possible institution of civil proceedings.  It forms an inseparable

part of the right of access to the courts themselves (see Eur.  Court

H.R., Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A No. 18).

        The applicant, while in Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, was clearly

a possible suspect or witness in relation to the disturbance at

Peterhead Prison on 2 November 1985.  The prison authorities would

also have been contemplating inquiry or charges in respect of the

incident on 3 November 1985 when the applicant suffered injury.  In

the Prisons Register of Punishments there is an entry dated 3 November

1985 indicating that a prison officer Cormack was to charge the

applicant with assault.  Both prison staff and police would clearly be

keen to learn what the applicant had to say on these matters and the

prison authorities in particular would naturally be reluctant to have

the applicant level any accusation or charge against any prison

officer.

        The Prison (Scotland) Rules make it an offence against

discipline to make a false and malicious allegation against an

officer.  It is, in the Rules, for the Governor to decide whether an

allegation is false and malicious and he is authorised to punish the

prisoner in various ways defined in the regulations quite apart from

detention in solitary confinement while the matter is being

investigated.  Punishment can include loss of remission on sentence,

which is effectively the imposition of a custodial sentence on the

prisoner.  In knowledge of this provision the applicant was in fear of

making a full statement to his solicitor and of making his complaint

to the police.  In the event the applicant did make a full statement

to his solicitor and did report the matter to the police.

        The applicant submits imposing conditions such as the

requirement of the legal adviser to submit to assault of search and

invasion of privacy coupled with the requirement that prison and

police officers should be within hearing throughout consultation and

advising goes beyond what is permitted by law and was wholly

unnecessary in the circumstances.  It was not a foregone conclusion

that the solicitor would agree to a search and he could have left

without seeing the applicant.  He denies the assertion of the

Government that the prison and police officers were out of range of

hearing the interview.  Further the presence of the prison and police

officers caused distress to the applicant.  He had been told by the

prison officer that if he kept quiet he would not be charged with

involvement in the rioting on 2 November 1985.

        The applicant also submits that the respondent Government have

not substantiated their allusions to security considerations.  It has

not been alleged that the applicant's solicitor (an ex-police officer

and ex-procurator fiscal depute) has ever been considered as a danger

to security.  Further the room in which the applicant was held had far

greater opportunity for visual observation than the normal prison

interview room and was also at the end of a corridor several storeys

above the ground with no means of escape through the window.  The

applicant in any case was incapable of presenting any danger having

undergone laporotomy bowel re-section and appedectomy six days earlier.

        The applicant states that there was a clear, concerted and

unwarranted interference therefore with his right of unimpeded access

to the court by virtue of unimpeded access to his solicitor.  He

submits that this was a clear abuse of position by the authorities and

a clear attempt to intimidate or silence him in respect of his

complaints.

        Handcuffing before the Appeal Court: Article 6 para. 1

        (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

        The applicant refers to his trial on May 1986, when he was

again manacled on appearance in court though the manacles were removed

after request by his counsel.  This incident also illustrated that the

authorities had failed to approach the court for consent to the

handcuffing in court.  It is submitted that this incident provides

corroboration for the applicant's assertion that the authorities fail

to have due regard to safeguards built into their own standing orders

for the protection of the interests of justice.  Despite anything that

may be said the applicant avers that there remains no legal authority

for manacling accused persons in the courts of Scotland and doubts

whether there is any legal authority elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

        The applicant did not say that his submissions were all

included in the summary but said: "Everything here is on my grounds,

yes".  The applicant had lodged a great number of grounds of appeal

and a vast quantity of material with the court and submits that it

would be impossible to seriously suggest that a paper providing notes

on a few of the points could be regarded as the sum total of his

submissions.  The applicant read the notes, after attempting to

address the court previously on other points of appeal.  He was asked

by the Lord Justice Clerk if he had anything more to add and replied:

"Not for now".  It was clear that the applicant was not finished and

a cursory examination of the grounds of appeal previously submitted

would have disclosed that.  If the court had thought the applicant was

finished at that or any other time it should, with an unrepresented

appellant, have taken the reasonable step of confirming whether or not

he was departing from any of the grounds of appeal.  Such a practice

is operated with represented appellants.  After the prosecutor's

submissions the applicant sought to reply.  This was the first time

the applicant had had disclosed to him the prosecution's grounds of

opposition to the appeal.

        Advocacy is regarded as one of the most difficult and

stressful aspects of legal practice, and that is for trained lawyers

not even closely connected with the matter before the court.  It

involves an attempt to persuade the court, by reference to fact and

law, to reach a particular conclusion.  In the Appeal Court advocacy

is taken to even greater heights since it involves seeking to persuade

the court to overturn the decision of another court, in this case a

Supreme Court.  Anything that undermines the concentration, self-esteem

or confidence of the pleader in his argument puts him at a

disadvantage.  Stripping the applicant of his dignity by shackling him

to a prison officer, preventing him taking notes and properly reaching

and referring to his papers was bound to so disadvantage and deprive

the applicant of a fair hearing.

        While accepting the decision of the Commission that manacling

in this case did not amount to degrading treatment within the meaning

of Article 3 (Art. 3) the applicant did, nonetheless, feel humiliated and

undermined and caused him to lose confidence and concentration.  He

was, through no fault of his own, without legal representation and the

nature of his case was such that he was deserving of better

consideration and facilities to argue it.  The facts disclose that the

applicant was at a considerable disadvantage and was accordingly

unable to plead his case.  In saying so the applicant does not think

that he would ever have been able to plead his case to the same

standard as the prosecutor but he would have done better than he did

and, importantly, would have been able to properly draw the attention

of the court to the error it made in misdirecting itself as to the

facts of one of his grounds of appeal.

        The applicant also submits that handcuffing of the applicant

throughout the whole of the hearings on the appeal cannot be regarded

merely as "one particular aspect" or "one particular incident".  The

applicant did not have legal representation, was not assisted in the

manner of contemporaneous research as the hearing progressed and the

prosecution's submissions were being made, was prevented from taking

notes for use throughout the hearing and could not properly refer to

his papers and books which were taken into court and left just out of

reach.  He was unable to properly reach for and refer to his papers or

to take notes during the various verbal exchanges or during the

submissions of the prosecutor.

        Article 25 para. 1 in fine (Art. 25-1)

        As regards his confinement under Rule 36, the applicant was

presented with no reasonable option.  The normal routine of Peterhead

Prison makes no facilities available to prepare a case for petition to

the Secretary of State under Section 263 of the Criminal Procedure

(Scotland) Act, 1975 nor for presentation to the Commission.  The

authorities appear to regard the matters to be dealt with as a hobby

or pastime to be indulged in during leisure moments.  The applicant

merely requested that he be allowed the time, in the daytime quiet of

a normal accommodation cell block, to prepare notes on his trial to

enable him to instruct his lawyer in the matter of further appeal and

an application to the Commission.  It would have been unreasonable to

expect the applicant to do this work in the ordinary accommodation

block after hours or in a recreation hall where the noise of other

prisoners and their radios would drown out proper thought.  Prisoners

are regularly left in their own cell block during working hours for

various reasons and one more would have made no difference.  Such

prisoners left in their own cell block may well even have been subject

to Rule 36 properly operated, simply withdrawn from association at

work.  The purported operation of Rule 36 in the applicant's case was

clearly a deterrent or impediment or punishment for making application

to the Commission and/or maintaining his demand for facilities to

further his petition to the Secretary of State under Section 263.  The

difficult and soul destroying conditions of solitary confinement are

wellknown to be a danger to good physical and mental wellbeing, and

were obviously a deterrent to the applicant to pursue his complaint.

The applicant contends that by choosing to refer to solitary

confinement as Rule 36 the prison authorities circumvent the legal and

medical safeguards built into the Prison (Scotland) Rules.  Solitary

confinement is one of the most serious punishments to be inflicted on

a prisoner and, accordingly, there is no practical distinction in Rule

36 as applied to the applicant and the serious punishment provisions

elsewhere in the Rules.

THE LAW

1.      The applicant complains that he was hampered in the

presentation of his appeal before the High Court of Justiciary as a

result of being handcuffed throughout the proceedings to a prison

officer.

        The applicant originally complained of the handcuffing in the

context of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.  The Commission

however found in its Partial Decision on Admissibility of 6 March 1987

that while no issue arose under this provision, an issue might arise

under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.  The Commission has

therefore examined the applicant's complaints in light of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which provides:

        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

        or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

        to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by

        an independent and impartial tribunal established by law..."

        The Commission notes first of all that although Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention does not guarantee an appeal in criminal

proceedings, where the opportunity to lodge an appeal in regard to the

determination of a criminal charge is provided under domestic law, as

in this case, the guarantees of Article 6 (Art. 6) continue to apply

to the appeal proceedings, since those proceedings form part of the

whole proceedings which determine the criminal charge at issue (see

e.g. Eur.  Court H.R., Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1970, Series A

No. 11 pp. 13-15 and Eur. Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2

March 1987, Series A No. 115, p. 21 para.54).

        The Commission also recalls that the question of whether a

hearing conforms to the standards laid down in Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) must be decided on the basis of an evaluation of the

proceedings in their entirety and not on the basis of an isolated

consideration of any one particular incident or aspect (see e.g.

Application Nos. 343/57, Dec. 2.5.59, Yearbook 4 p. 548; 5574/72, Dec.

21.3.75, D.R. 3 p. 10; 7306/75, Dec. 6.10.76, D.R. 7 p. 115 and

8744/79, Dec. 2.3.83, D.R. 32 p. 141).

        The Commission has accordingly looked at the proceedings as a

whole on the basis of the parties' submissions.

        The Government have submitted that in light of crimes of which

the applicant had been convicted, the handcuffing of the applicant

while out of prison to attend the court was required in the interests

of security.  The Commission however is not called upon to decide

whether or not the handcuffing was justified by security

considerations though it would in this regard refer to its previous

case-law where it has stated that handcuffing of a prisoner in public

is an undesirable measure (see e.g.  Application No. 2291/64, Dec.

1.6.67).  The Commission's task is to determine whether the applicant

received a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        The Commission recalls that the applicant was legally

represented at his trial and that he received assistance from his

solicitors in preparing and submitting his grounds of appeal.  The

Commission notes that in presenting his appeal the applicant read out

prepared written submissions.  The Lord Justice Clerk in the Opinion

of the Court on the applicant's appeal stated:

        "When he was called upon to make his submissions in support

        of his grounds of appeal the appellant stated that they

        were all included in the said summary and asked the Court's

        leave simply to read that document to the Court.  Such

        leave was granted and he read the document to the Court.

        When he had done so he was asked if he wished to add

        anything to what he had already submitted and he replied

        in the negative.  The learned Advocate Depute replied,

        and the appellant then sought leave to answer some of the

        points made by the Advocate Depute.  Although this further

        speech is contrary to normal procedure in criminal appeals

        we granted the appellant the indulgence."

        The Commission further notes that the transcript of the

proceedings submitted by the applicant reveals no evidence that the

applicant expressed any difficulty in reaching for or referring to any

of his documents during the two day hearing.

        In light of these circumstances, the Commission finds no

indication that the applicant was prevented from adequately presenting

his appeal and that accordingly the Commission finds that the

applicant has failed to show that the handcuffing deprived him of a

fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

        It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      The applicant has also complained that the conditions imposed

on the visit of his solicitor at the hospital constituted an

unwarranted interference with his right of unimpeded access to court

contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        The case-law of the Court and the Commission has established

that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) guarantees to everyone an effective

right of access to the courts for the determination of his civil

rights and obligations (see e.g.  Eur. Court H.R., Golder judgment of

21 February 1975, Series A No. 18 para. 36).  The Commission recalls

that the applicant's solicitor visited the applicant in hospital

following an incident in which the applicant received injuries

necessitating a major operation to his abdomen.  Subsequent to the

visit, the applicant has instituted proceedings against the Secretary

of State seeking damages for these injuries.  The Commission is

satisfied in these circumstances that the visit of the solicitor

concerned potential civil litigation in respect of the applicant's

civil rights and that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable.  The

Commission must therefore determine whether there has been an

interference with the applicant's right of access to court in this

matter contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        The Commission notes that while in the hospital the applicant

was held in a room giving onto a hospital corridor.  There was an

observation window set into the wall between the room and the

corridor, and the opaque glass in the top half of the door to the room

could be adjusted to allow further observation.  The parties vary as

to several of the details concerning the solicitor's visit.  The

Commission finds it established however that following the solicitor's

arrival at the hospital at approximately 13h30 on 10 November 1985,

the police officers insisted for security reasons that he submit to a

search of his person and belongings before visiting the applicant.

During the search, a small pen knife was handed over to the police.

When the visit took place, two prison officers and at least two police

officers were present outside the room, the door to which remained

open throughout.  It appears from the submissions of the parties and

the dimensions of the room as indicated on the plan of the hospital,

that the police and prison officers when at the doorway to the room

would have been between 8-10 feet from the head of the bed in which

the applicant was lying.

        The Commission and the Court have already in several cases

considered the compatibility with the Convention of the restrictions

imposed on the visits of solicitors to prisoners.  In Campbell and

Fell, the Court found a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention, where Father Fell had, for two months, been refused

permission to consult his solicitors out of hearing of a prison

officer (Eur.  Court H.R., Campbell and Fell judgment of 28 June 1984,

Series A No. 80, paras. 111-113).  In Applications Nos. 7879/77,

7931/77, 7935/77 and 7930/77 (Comm. Report 3.12.85) the Commission

found a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) where four prisoners

were refused confidential consultation with their solicitors out of

hearing of any prison officer.  The Commission stated:

        "In the Campbell and Fell case, the Commission referred to

        the generally accepted principle in Contracting States of

        privileged communications between a lawyer and his client,

        enabling the latter to discuss his affairs in confidence

        and without fear of repercussions or prejudice to possible

        civil litigation he may pursue.  To prevent such

        confidential communications concerning possible litigation

        is to interfere with the right of access to court under

        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.  Although certain

        exceptions to this principle may be justified, a general

        prohibition on privileged lawyer/client consultations in

        prison is not compatible with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

        Convention (Comm.  Report 12.5.82 paras. 157-159).  The

        Commission also considered, having found a breach of

        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in the particular

        circumstances of Father Fell's case, that it was

        unnecessary to consider the same complaint under Article 8

        (Art. 8) of the Convention (ibid paras. 160 and 161)."

        The Commission notes however that the right of access to court

is not absolute and may be subject to legitimate limitations (Golder

loc. cit.).  In Campbell and Fell (loc. cit. para. 113), the Court

agreed with the Commission that "there may well be security

considerations which would justify some restriction on the conditions

for visits by a lawyer to a prisoner".

        The Commission recalls that in the present case the applicant

had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and that, according

to the Government's submissions, the applicant was a category A

prisoner as well as on the SEP list while at the hospital.  The

Commission notes that the police and prison officers were within very

close proximity during the interview and that the applicant's

solicitor in his letter of 14 November 1985 complained to the Chief

Constable that they were compelled to conduct their conversation in

hushed whispers to preserve some degree of confidentiality.  The

Commission notes in this regard the problems of security inevitably

caused by the presence of a prisoner of the applicant's classification

in a public hospital.  The solicitor was however able to take

photographs of the applicant's injuries for later use in litigation.

Though his interview with the applicant was not facilitated by the

close proximity of police and prison officers, the Commission notes

that the applicant's stay in the hospital was of short duration

(3-12 November) and that there is no indication that the applicant's

solicitor could not have visited the applicant in prison, where secure

visiting facilities would have enabled confidential consultations in

the customary manner.  Furthermore the applicant has since instituted

proceedings against the Secretary of State in relation to his

injuries.

        Consequently, the Commission finds that the facts of this case

fail to disclose any interference with the applicant's right of access

to court as guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.      The applicant complains that as a result of his application to

the European Commission of Human Rights he has been placed in solitary

confinement.  The Commission has examined this complaint in the