Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 27788/95

by Basoodeo SUJEEUN

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 18 January 1996, the following members being present:

Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

E. KONSTANTINOV

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 30 September 1992

by Basoodeo SUJEEUN against the United Kingdom and registered on

5 July 1995 under file No. 27788/95;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1950. He lives in

Tupsley, in Hereford. The facts of the case, as submitted by the

applicant in his various application forms, may be summarised as

follows.

I. In an application form submitted on 7 August 1993, the applicant

complained inter alia that he had been denied legal aid to defend the

petition for divorce brought by his wife. From the documents attached

to the application form, it appears that legal aid for proceedings

before the Commission was twice refused by the Legal Aid Area Office

in Bristol in 1992, and that three applications for leave to apply for

judicial review of decisions of the South Glamorgan County Council and

the "U.K. Government and Crown" were refused on 12 February 1993. No

further details were submitted.

II. In an application form submitted on 12 April 1994, the applicant

complained inter alia of a prohibition order made against him on

26 October 1993. The prohibition order took the form of a direction

by the Legal Aid Board to Area Committees that the applicant had been

abusing legal aid facilities and that exceptional circumstances

existed, and that for five years, no civil legal aid application from

the applicant should be considered. On 25 February 1994, the Legal Aid

Head Office informed the applicant that his request for complete or

partial revocation (in connection with specific proceedings) of the

prohibition order had been put to the Legal Aid Board on 22 February

1994, and that the Board had declined to revoke or vary the order. The

Board continued that if the Board's legal director was of the opinion

that further representations did not disclose sufficient information

to justify the matter being put before the Board again, the matter

would not go to the Board.

From papers submitted by the applicant, it appears that between

1984 and 1987, the applicant applied for legal aid on 48 occasions.

A prohibition order was made on 8 December 1987, relating to six

specified civil matters in respect of which the applicant had made

applications for legal aid. That order, which was valid for five

years, expressly excluded six particular sets of pending proceedings.

The 1987 prohibition order was amended on 22 May 1990 to permit an

application for legal aid in connection with one specific matter, and

on 28 July 1992 it was again amended to permit an application in

connection with a separate matter.

A report by the secretary to the Area Committee in (apparently)

late 1992 noted that the applicant had made 38 applications for legal

aid since 8 December 1987. The report set out the various

applications, noting that of the 38, eight had been covered by the

existing prohibitory direction, 16 had been refused on substantive

grounds and appeals had been dismissed; two had been refused as

duplication; one had been refused as legal aid was not available, one

had been adjourned, and ten had been granted, of which two had since

been discharged. The report appears to have formed the basis of the

prohibition order of 26 October 1993.

III. In an application form submitted on 14 July 1994, the applicant

claimed that he was entitled under the Convention to the same treatment

as the Queen, and in particular to her income of £10,700,000.00 p.a.

IV. In a second application form dated 14 July 1994, the applicant

made further complaints that he was not being treated in the same way

as the Queen, in particular with respect to taxation.

V. In an application form dated 21 November 1994, the applicant

complained about criminal proceedings in which he had been convicted

of driving without due care and attention. He stated that he had been

convicted on 22 November 1993, that on appeal to the Crown Court his

conviction was confirmed on 1 July 1994, that he applied for a case to

be stated, but that the Crown Court judge refused to state a case on

27 September 1994. The applicant complained in particular that he had

been denied full transcripts of the hearing on 1 July 1994, that the

Crown Court judge refused to transfer the applicant's legal aid to

another solicitor, that he had been refused an appeal, and that he was

innocent. He also claimed that the police perjured themselves and that

he had been discriminated against. He regarded himself as innocent.

VI. In a second application form dated 21 November 1994, the

applicant complained about two sets of civil proceedings before the

Court of Appeal. He submitted an ex parte application to the Court of

Appeal in an action in which he was the appellant and his former wife

was the respondent, and an ex parte application in a case involving two

individuals.

VII. In an application form dated 18 May 1995, the applicant

complained about a refusal by the Legal Aid Board of 28 April 1995 to

grant legal aid for proceedings before the Commission, and about a

refusal by the police (confirmed by the Deputy Clerk to the Justices

by letter of 31 October 1994) to bring a number of prosecutions on the

applicant's behalf. The letter of 31 October 1994 noted that the

applicant was entitled to bring private prosecutions.

COMPLAINTS

I, II, III, IV. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3,

5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, and of Article 2

of Protocol No. 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.

V. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8,

10, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention.

VI. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9,

10, 12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, and of Article 2 of Protocol

No. 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.

VII. The applicant alleges violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10,

12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention, and of Article 2 of Protocol No.

1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains of the making of a prohibition order

against him.

The Commission notes that the prohibition order stated that no

civil legal aid application was to be considered from the applicant for

a period of five years from 26 October 1993. It will consider this

complaint in the context of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows.

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of

any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair

and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law."

The Commission next notes that the prohibition order was an order

which related only to civil legal aid: the right to free legal

assistance in criminal cases, guaranteed by Article 6 para. 3 (c)

(Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, is not at issue. In the context of

civil proceedings, the Commission recalls that the State is not

required to provide free legal aid for every dispute relating to a

"civil right", but must nevertheless guarantee to litigants an

effective right of access to the courts for the determination their

"civil rights and obligations" (see Eur. Court H.R., Airey judgment of

9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 15, para. 26).

In the present case, the legal aid board made an order that no

application for civil legal aid from the applicant was to be

entertained for a period of five years. The background was that the

applicant had made a remarkable number of applications for legal aid

in the past, which had led to an earlier, limited prohibition order for

five years. Notwithstanding that earlier order, the applicant

continued to make large numbers of applications for legal aid.

The Commission has previously recalled that access to court is

frequently regulated in respect of minors, vexatious litigants, persons

of unsound mind and persons declared bankrupt, and that such regulation

is compatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention where the aim

pursued is legitimate and the means employed to achieve it are

proportionate (No. 12040/86, Dec. 4.5.87, D.R. 52, p. 269). The

prohibition order in the present case is of a similar nature, save that

it affects the applicant's dealings not with the courts as such, but

his ability - in the bulk of cases, before the courts ever become aware

of a potential action - to apply for legal aid in civil proceedings he

wishes to bring.

The aim of the prohibition order of 26 October 1993 was to

prevent the abuse of legal aid facilities found by the Legal Aid Board.

Such an aim is, in itself, compatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

As to proportionality, the Commission considers that an absolute,

rigorously enforced prohibition on applications for legal aid from a

particular person would raise serious problems of access to court under

the Convention - however much an individual has abused the system in

the past, it is impossible to discount the possibility that he may in

the future have a claim with merit in respect of which the requirements

of Article 6 (Art. 6) call for legal aid to be available.

The prohibition order made against the applicant was not, in

fact, as absolute as it appeared. In particular, he was able to apply

for a revocation of the order, and that application was considered by

the Legal Aid Board on its merits. At the same time as refusing the

revocation requested, the Legal Aid Board stated that further

applications would only be put to it if the Board's legal director was

of the opinion that such action was justified. Even in refusing the

request for revocation, therefore, the Board was leaving open the

possibility of an application for legal aid being considered and

granted.

Given that the Convention does not contain an express right to

legal aid in civil cases, that the applicant remains free to pursue

cases before the civil courts without the benefit of legal aid, and

that the prohibition order leaves open the possibility of a grant of

legal aid, the Commission finds that the prohibition order in the

present cases did not limit the applicant's access to court in a way

incompatible with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

2. In connection with the criminal proceedings in which the

applicant was convicted of driving without due care and attention, the

Commission notes that the applicant claims that he applied for a case

to be stated to the High Court, but that the Crown Court judge refused

to state a case.

The Commission finds that if the Crown Court judge refused to

state a case for consideration by the High Court, the applicant could

have applied to the High Court for judicial review of that refusal.

In connection with this part of the application, the applicant has

therefore failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible and

must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

3. The Commission has also examined the applicant's other complaints

as they have been submitted by him. However, after considering them

as a whole, the Commission finds that they do not generally disclose

any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention.

It follows that the remainder of the application must be rejected

as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber

(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)

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SUJEEUN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

SUJEEUN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI