Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY

Application No. 12040/86

by G.M.

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

4 May 1987, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

S. TRECHSEL

B. KIERNAN

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J.C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Mrs G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. F. MARTINEZ

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 20 February

1984 by G.M. against the United Kingdom and registered

on 4 March 1986 under file No. 12040/86;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1939 and resident

in W..

The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as

follows.

The Inland Revenue obtained judgment against the applicant for

the sum of £246.81 on 12 December 1977 in respect of taxes owed on

past earnings. The applicant had unsuccessfully appealed the tax

assessment in issue before the General Commissioners on 17 March and

24 November 1982. The applicant had requested that the Inland Revenue

provide him with copies of the capital statements prepared by his tax

inspector which he alleged would assist him to challenge the tax

assessments in issue but none had been provided. Following request

for further information by the Commission's Secretariat, the applicant

asked the Inland Revenue for explanation of this. A letter from the

Inland Revenue in response to the applicant's further enquiry dated

30 December 1986 however states that such capital statements are only

prepared in a small number of cases and that none had been prepared in

his particular case. On 23 December 1982 the applicant submitted an

application for a case to be stated to the High Court in respect of

his unsuccessful appeal. He was informed that he had failed to comply

with the appropriate time-limits and that no case could be stated. The

Inland Revenue proceeded to serve a bankruptcy notice on the applicant

on 15 March 1983 and after a hearing before the Registrar of the

Bankruptcy Court on 19 October 1983, a receiving order was made

against the applicant.

On 20 October 1983 the applicant attended the Official

Receiver's office for oral examination. On that occasion, he informed

the Official Receiver of County Court proceedings in which he was

involved against the company which had been repairing a road on which

the applicant had been driving. The applicant's windscreen had been

broken by loose chippings, and he was claiming some £58.58 from the

private company, who had been carrying out road-repairs. The Receiver

stopped and adjourned indefinitely the County Court proceedings,

apparently on the grounds that even if the applicant were to win, the

costs involved would be likely to make the action as a whole a

liability.

A notice of first creditors meeting was sent out in February

1984, but it seems that it was sent to the wrong address and the

applicant could not therefore attend or be represented at that

meeting. There was no quorum at the meeting and it was adjourned to

24 February 1984. There was again no quorum and the meeting was

concluded. On 16 March 1984, the applicant attended W.

County Court, when he was adjudicated bankrupt.

A trustee in bankruptcy was appointed and, by letter of 2 July

1984, the applicant was told that, as regards the claim against the

road repairing contractors, the trustee had no objection to a

reassignment of the right of action to the applicant, who would then

have been entitled to pursue the claim, with the possibility of being

granted legal aid. Any money received would have to be paid to the

trustee for the benefit of creditors generally. The applicant does

not appear to have taken any further steps in regard to this aspect of

his claim.

The applicant subsequently applied for legal aid in order to

appeal against his bankruptcy. Counsel's opinion of 22 October 1986

however stated that there were no grounds on which the bankruptcy

could be challenged and the applicant's legal aid certificate was

discharged.

The applicant alleges that following the commencement of the

bankruptcy proceedings he received three visits from an official from

the Receiver's Office enquiring as to the content of his 86 year old

mother's will. The official requested the applicant to make enquiries

of his mother on this subject. The applicant did so and his mother

was distressed that such enquiries should be made.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of violations of Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention in that, first, he was unable to have a case stated in

connection with his appeal against an income tax assessment; secondly,

the Receiver's decision to adjourn the civil proceedings against the

road repairing contractor denied him the opportunity of a fair public

hearing of his case; and, thirdly, he did not receive any notice of

the first creditors' meeting because the notice was incorrectly

addressed, and he was therefore denied a fair and public hearing in

respect of the meeting.

The applicant also alleges violations of Article 10 of the

Convention in connection with the refusal of the Inland Revenue to

provide him with capital statements prepared by his tax inspector

which he alleges would have enabled him to challenge the various

assessments in issue before the General Commissioners and secondly in

that, because he was unable to attend the first creditors' meeting

referred to above, he was denied the right to freedom of expression at

the meeting.

Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 of the

Convention because inquiries were made by the Official Receiver's

Office as to the contents of the applicant's mother's will, in

particular as regards the property which had been transferred by the

applicant and in a part of which the applicant was living and for

which he was paying rent.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains of violations of his rights under

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides that:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

i. The applicant complains firstly that he was denied the

opportunity to have the dispute concerning income tax assessment dealt

with by case stated before the High Court.

The Commission must first consider however whether the subject

matter of the proceedings of which the applicant complains concerns

the determination of civil rights or obligations within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

In previous cases, the Commission has already found that Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not applicable to proceedings regarding taxation or

related fiscal matters (see e.g. Applications Nos 2552/65, Dec. 15.12.67,

Collection 26 p. 1, and 8903/80, Dec. 8.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 246). The Commission

recalls that the subject matter of the proceedings in question was the

applicant's dispute as to the amount which he has to pay to the Inland Revenue

in respect of his past earnings. The Commission finds therefore that this is a

matter of a taxation which falls outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

ii. The applicant also complains that he has been denied access to

court by the action of the Official Receiver in stopping his claim for

damages in the County Court.

The Commission first of all notes that the subject matter of

the claim was the damage caused to applicant's car by allegedly

negligent road-repairers and that this would appear to fall within the scope of

the concept of "civil rights" set out in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

The Commission recalls however that the applicant had become

bankrupt in the early stages of this action and that the Official

Receiver had apparently exercised his right to interfere in the action

on the ground that the damages claimed (£58,58) were likely to be

outweighed by the legal costs to such an extent as to make the action

a liability.

The case-law of the Commission and of the European Court of

Human Rights has established that the right of access to the courts is

not absolute but may be subject to limitations (see e.g. Eur. Court

H.R., Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, No. 18 and Eur.

Court H.R., Ashingdane judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 93).

In the majority of the contracting states, the right of access

to court is regulated in respect of minors, vexatious litigants,

persons of unsound mind and persons declared bankrupt. Such

regulations are not in principle contrary to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention, where the aim pursued is legitimate and the means employed

to achieve the aim is proportionate. The Commission recalls that the

Official Receiver was of the view that the action was likely to be a

liability and was therefore acting in pursuance of his duty to protect

the rights of the applicant's creditors. The measure taken to stay

the proceedings could not be said to be disproportionate to this

legitimate aim of safeguarding the fair administration of the

applicant's estate. The Commission in any event recalls that the

trustee in bankruptcy who succeeded the Official Receiver as

administrator of the applicant's estate has subsequently agreed to

re-assign the right of action to the applicant, who however appears to

have taken no further steps in the matter. In these circumstances,

the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

iii. The applicant further complains that he did not receive any

notice of the first creditors' meeting because the notice was

incorrectly addressed, and that he was therefore denied a fair and

public hearing in respect of the meeting.

From the information supplied by the applicant it would appear

however that the meeting, to which the applicant complains that he was

denied access, never took place because of a lack of a quorum.

Therefore, even assuming the creditors' meeting, as an integral part

of the bankruptcy proceedings, could be said to involve the

applicant's civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article

6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission finds that no final

determination of such rights was reached, since the meeting was

adjourned for lack of quorum and no resolution was passed. In these

circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant's rights were

not substantially affected and that there is no appearance of a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

It follows therefore that this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2. The applicant also alleges violations of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention in that the Inland Revenue failed to provide him with

capital statements in respect of his assessments and in that he was

unable to attend the creditors' meeting referred to above and to

express his opinion in that meeting.

Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention provides that:

"Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This

right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive

and impart information and ideas without interference by

public authority and regardless of frontiers..."

Insofar as the applicant complains of being unable to exercise

his freedom of expression at the creditors' meeting due to lack of

notification, the Commission finds that Article 10 (Art. 10) does not

confer the right on every person to attend and take part in any

meeting which he may wish to. The Commission therefore considers that

this complaint fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of

Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. It follows that this

complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (27-2) of the Convention.

The applicant also complains that the Inland Revenue have

violated his right to receive information guaranteed under Article 10

(Art. 10) of the Convention by refusing to supply him with capital statements

prepared by his tax inspector which he alleged would have enabled him

to challenge the tax assessments before the Inland Revenue

Commissioners.

In this regard the Commission recalls that the Court has recently given

consideration to the scope of Article 10 (Art. 10) with regard to the freedom

to receive information. In Leander (Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26

March 1987, Series A no. 116, para. 74), the Court said:

"... that the right to freedom to receive information

basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person

from receiving information that others wish or may be willing

to impart to him. Article 10 (Art. 10) does not, in

circumstances such as those of the present case, confer

on the individual a right of access to a register containing

information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation

on the Government to impart such information to the individual."

In any event the Commission recalls that in the present case

it appears that the capital statements to which the applicant refers,

are only prepared in a small number of cases and that none appear to

have been prepared in connection with the applicant's case.

In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the

applicant has failed to substantiate this complaint and that

accordingly there is no appearance of an interference with the applicant's

rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention in this regard.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention as a result of the enquiries of the Official Receiver's

office into the contents of his mother's will.

Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention provides that:

"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

family life, his home and his correspondence."

However, the applicant has not shown that he was under any

obligation to answer the questions put to him concerning his mother's

will or that he was under any compulsion to put the same questions

himself to his mother. It also does not appear that if the applicant

had objected to these enquiries he would have been liable to any

penalty for failing to respond to them. In these circumstances, the

Commission finds that the facts as submitted by the applicant fail to

disclose any interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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M. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

M. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI