AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25290/94

                      by Mandy MALONE

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 28 February 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 13 June 1994 by

Mandy MALONE against the United Kingdom and registered on

23 September 1994 under file No. 25290/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as

follows. The applicant is 27 years old, is wheelchair bound, suffers

from rheumatoid arthritis, is a registered disabled person and resides

in Lincolnshire.

     Prior to 1991 the applicant and others had rented a council house

in London from London Borough Council ("the Council"). Those persons

attempted to purchase the house from the Council as part of a council

house purchase scheme. In December 1991, and prior to the purchase

completing, the Council issued possession proceedings on the basis of

perceived fraud on the part of the potential purchasers. Woolwich

County Court in London was seised of the case and there were, in all,

eleven defendants including the applicant.

     On 19 February 1992 judgment was given against the defendants but

this judgment was set aside on 14 April 1992. The applicant claims that

she had to attend the latter hearing because the prosecution refused

to accept affidavit evidence, that she had to leave home at 4.30 am to

get to court at 10.30 am, that it involved a 950 kilometre round trip,

that her case was not heard until 1.00 pm and that due to her

disablement the court appearance caused her significant hardship.

     In June 1992 the applicant wrote to Woolwich County Court clerk

requesting that the case be transferred from London on the basis that

she was concerned that the relevant judge and certain persons in the

Council were freemasons which would lead to political interference with

the court by the Council. She also asked that her disability be taken

into account and that it would make her life much easier if the case

was heard in a court nearer her home.

     On 2 September 1993 Woolwich County Court made a number of

directions in relation to the proceedings and ordered that the case had

to be set down for trial within eight weeks. The applicant was present

and was legally represented at this hearing. She claims that her

journey by car to London for that hearing caused her severe discomfort

and that she was confined to bed for four days thereafter and required

medical assistance.

     On 10 September 1993 the applicant issued an application for the

transfer of these proceedings to Grimsby County Court. On

10 September 1993 she also wrote to Woolwich County Court clerk

requesting, inter alia, the transfer of the case and a jury trial. On

17 September 1993 the applicant also communicated by letter with the

judge of Woolwich County Court making various complaints about the

Council and the location of the proceedings. On 23 September 1993 the

applicant issued another application in Woolwich County Court again

requesting the transfer of the case and various orders in relation to

a jury trial, her previous solicitors and other procedural matters.

     The applicant also filed an affidavit dated 19 October 1993

referring, inter alia, to her difficulty in attending hearings in

London and exhibiting medical evidence (as to her severe rheumatoid

arthritis, as to her being largely wheelchair bound and about the pain

a long journey would involve). She also claimed that she had "no idea"

whether Woolwich County Court had facilities for wheelchairs but that

Grimsby County Court which was near to her home had such facilities.

     On 26 October 1993 the applicant's application, to transfer the

proceedings to Grimsby County Court, was refused. The recorder who

heard the application referred to the medical evidence before him, the

earliest of which was dated January 1992, and concluded that the

applicant had been living in Lincolnshire since that date. He noted

that no application had been made to transfer the case until September

1993 and on that ground alone he could have refused the application.

     The recorder also noted that the applicant failed to make any

mention of a transfer on 2 September 1993 when "final directions" had

been given, at which hearing the applicant was legally represented and

present in person. The recorder indicated that he was satisfied that

a transfer would place the Council at intolerable expense and that the

same did not apply to the applicant. Since the balance of convenience

favoured a trial in London the recorder refused the application. The

applicant was represented by a friend at this hearing and attended the

hearing. She submits that on that day she again suffered greatly due

to the lack of lifts and toilet facilities for the disabled.

     The applicant appealed, inter alia, the recorder's decision of

26 October 1993 to the Court of Appeal.

      On 26 January 1994 Woolwich County Court heard an application

of the applicant to dismiss the Council's proceedings (at which hearing

the applicant appeared in person). The application was dismissed. The

applicant was attended by a carer and claims that her carer had to

enlist the help of two court officials to lift her up the steps of the

court and up further steps to the waiting room. The hearing, which was

due to take place on the second floor, was changed to the ground floor

to accommodate the applicant and did not begin until 2.00 pm. During

the time she had to wait the applicant claims that, due to the lack of

toilet facilities for the disabled, she endured excruciating

discomfort. She also claims that the hearing was a source of additional

distress, the applicant having had to present her case from her

wheelchair.

     On 4 February 1994 the applicant's appeal to the Court of Appeal

was heard and dismissed. The applicant was legally represented and was

present at the hearing. The court noted the reasons expressed by the

recorder on 26 October 1993 for rejecting the application to transfer

and further noted that no approach had been made to the Council or the

other defendants to make arrangements to accommodate the applicant when

she gave evidence so that she need not spend a night away from home.

He further noted a conflict of fact, as to the existence or not of

disabled facilities at Woolwich County Court, and the arrangements made

for a ground floor hearing the previous time the applicant was in

court. The Court of Appeal concluded as follows:

     "It is always difficult to accommodate the interests and

     considerations of all those involved. We would expect and hope

     that any judge would pay considerable attention to an application

     made by someone who is disabled and who found it difficult to

     travel to a particular court, but it is quite another matter to

     say that no judge in the circumstances of this case, bearing in

     mind the lateness of the application and the other interests

     involved, could have reached the conclusion that the recorder

     did."

     The applicant also claims that her appeals before the Court of

Appeal were the last in a list of five before the court that day and

that, though the case was listed for 10.30 am, it was not held until

4.00 pm causing the applicant hours of suffering while waiting having

already travelled to get to court. The path to the court was described

by the applicant's carer as "a somewhat hazardous ten minute round-

about obstacle course". The applicant claims that she was "manhandled"

into an upper floor court and that there were no lifts.

     On 20 April 1994 the applicant wrote to the civil appeals officer

at the Court of Appeal complaining that her applications to the Court

of Appeal had been made ex parte and that, since she was only notified

three days before the hearing of those applications that they were to

be heard inter partes, she had no opportunity to withdraw the

applications - which she would have done as an inter partes hearing

indicated to the applicant that the court had already decided the

appeals against her. The civil appeals officer responded on 5 May 1994

explaining that appeals which include a stay of execution (as hers did)

are not ever listed ex parte.

     On 17 and 18 May 1994 the main hearing in the proceedings began

and it ran at Woolwich County Court over two days before Judge Harris

but it was adjourned as Judge Harris was not available to finish the

case the following day. On 14 September 1994 Judge Harris set the

remainder of the case down for hearing but this time at a crown court

in London. It was explained, by letter dated 21 September 1994 to the

applicant's legal representatives from the judges' clerk, that the case

was to be heard in a crown court because Judge Harris had been

transferred to that new court.

     On 28 November the applicant issued three applications for

judicial review of numerous decisions of the courts to date.

     In December 1994 Judge Harris heard the remainder of the action

and held in favour of the Council. On 12 December 1994 a single judge

of the Court of Appeal refused leave to apply for judicial review and

on 19 January 1995 the full Court of Appeal also refused leave to so

apply (having before it, it appears, amended applications for judicial

review dated 16 January 1995).

     The applicant was granted legal aid but in or around January 1994

legal aid was discharged. The applicant appears to have encountered

difficulties with numerous solicitors firms. She was legally

represented for the proposed purchase of the house, she briefed another

firm of solicitors for the possession proceedings, she then left that

firm and briefed another firm in January 1993 (with whom she stayed for

approximately six to eight months) and had briefed another firm by

February 1994 which firm no longer acts for her.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant has numerous complaints under Article 6 of the

Convention in relation to the fairness of the proceedings and the

decisions against her. She invokes, in particular, Article 6 paras. 2

and 3 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention.

     The applicant also complains under Article 7 of the Convention

that she was found guilty of a criminal offence without being charged

with any such offence, under Article 8 of the Convention about

interception of her mail and about the interference by a public

authority with her right to buy the council house she had rented with

others, under Article 14 of the Convention that she was discriminated

against as a litigant on grounds of her disablement, under Article 3

of the Convention about the effect on her of all of the above matters

and about, in particular, the impact on her of the courts' handling of

her disability and under Article 13 of the Convention that she had no

effective domestic remedy.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that the proceedings and decisions against her were unfair.

She submits, inter alia, that the courts' alleged failure to deal

properly with her disability put her at a material disadvantage in the

defence of the case, that the hearings were arranged and conducted

unfairly (in that, inter alia, she did not receive appropriate notice

of various hearings and that there was collusion between the Council

and the courts) and that she was denied a right to a jury. The

applicant invokes, in particular, Article 6 paras. 2 and 3 (a), (b),

(c) and (d) (Art. 6-2, 6-3-a, 6-3-b, 6-3-c, 6-3-d) of the Convention.

     Since paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-2, 6-3) of the

Convention refer to persons charged with criminal offences and since

the applicant was not so charged, the Commission has considered the

above complaints of the applicant within the context of Article 6 para.

1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which reads, insofar as relevant, as

follows:

     "1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...

     everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable

     time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by

     law."

     The Commission would, in the first place, note that the applicant

was legally aided for the most part of the proceedings and that, if she

was unrepresented at certain stages during the proceedings, it was as

a result of difficulties she encountered with a number of firms of

solicitors.

     Insofar as the applicant complains that the proceedings were

rendered unfair by the courts' treatment of her disability, the

Commission notes the reasons given by the recorder, and later by the

Court of Appeal, for refusing her application to transfer the case from

Woolwich County Court to a court nearer her home with disabled

facilities. In particular, both courts relied heavily on the

applicant's delay in bringing the application - the applicant was found

to be resident in Lincolnshire from at least January 1992, was legally

represented from then and did not make an application to transfer the

proceedings until September 1993 at which stage the court had already

made orders relating to the setting down of the action (which

proceedings involved, as well as the Council, ten other defendants).

     The recorder and the Court of Appeal also referred to the lack

of an application for such a transfer even during an appropriate

directions hearing (2 September 1993), to the failure by the applicant

to approach the Council and other defendants to see if appropriate

arrangements could be made for her as regards giving evidence and to

the interests of all others involved in the case.

     Other than those reasons expressed by the courts, the Commission

notes that the applicant has not demonstrated that she took any

practical steps towards alleviating any difficulties her disability may

have caused such as applying to the court to have interim applications

concerning her listed first or at least earlier on the courts' lists

or forewarning the relevant courts of her limitations due to her

disability with a view to making any practical arrangements with the

courts for her attendance.

     The Commission therefore considers that the applicant failed to

appropriately bring to the attention of the court her difficulties with

regard to attendance at court due to her disability and as such

considers that the State cannot be held responsible for those

difficulties (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., Stanford judgment

of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 282).

     The Commission also considers that the applicant has failed to

substantiate her complaint that there was collusion between the courts

and the Council or that the hearings were otherwise arranged or

conducted unfairly.

     As regards the applicant's complaint about the decisions against

her, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance

of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention.  In

accordance with its constant case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec.

29.3.60, Yearbook 3, pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection

43, pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18, pp. 31, 45) the

Commission also recalls that it is not competent to deal with an

application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by

domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out

in the Convention. The Commission's examination of the applicant's

complaints does not disclose any such issues.

     Accordingly, the Commission considers the complaints of the

applicant under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention to be manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention save for the applicant's complaint in relation to the denial

of a jury trial which is incompatible ratione materiae with the

provisions of the Convention, there being no right to a trial by jury

guaranteed by the Convention (No. 8288/78, Dec. 10.10.80, D.R. 22, p.

51).

2.   The applicant also complains under Article 7 (Art. 7) of the

Convention that she was found guilty of a criminal offence without

being charged with a criminal offence.

     There is no evidence that the applicant was either charged with

or found guilty of any criminal offence. However and insofar as the

applicant raises this matter because the remainder of the main hearing

was heard in December 1994 in a crown court (in which criminal cases

are normally heard), the Commission notes that the case was so

transferred in order to ensure that Judge Harris, who had already

presided over the first two days of the hearing, would so preside over

the remainder - a procedural matter which the Commission considers

would benefit the continuity of the proceedings.

     The Commission therefore considers this complaint also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains that her mail has been interfered

with and about a denial of her right to buy the council house which she

rented with others. She invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     1. Everyone has the right to respect for ... his home and his

     correspondence.

     2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the

     exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the

     law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

     ... the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention

     of disorder ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms

     of others.

     The Commission considers that the applicant has not substantiated

her complaint that her mail has been interfered with. In addition, the

right to respect for an applicant's home does not include the right to

be allowed to become the owner of that home.

     Insofar as the applicant complains about a lack of respect for

her home as a result of the issuance of possession proceedings by the

Council, the Commission recalls that any interference with the right

to respect for private life must be in accordance with the law, pursue

a legitimate aim and the means employed must be proportionate to that

aim (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Chappell judgment of

30 March 1989, Series A no. 152).

     The Commission notes that the house in question was rented by the

applicant and the other defendants to the proceedings from the Council,

that those persons proposed to purchase the house under a council house

purchase scheme, that the Council did not go through with the sale on

the basis of suspected fraud and that the Council subsequently issued

successful possession proceedings based upon fraud on the part of the

potential purchasers.

     In such circumstances, and even assuming that there was an

interference with the applicant's right to respect for her home by the

issuance of proceedings, the Commission considers that it was in

accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim (prevention of fraud

within a council house purchase scheme) and demonstrated a reasonable

relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim

sought to be realised (re-possession on finding against the

defendants).

     In such circumstances the Commission considers the applicant's

complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention manifestly ill-

founded save insofar as the applicant's complaints relate to a denial

of a right to buy the house she rented with others, which is

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

4.   The applicant also complains that she was discriminated against

as a disabled litigant and invokes Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as ... or other status."

     Since Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention protects individuals

in analogous situations from discriminatory treatment in the exercise

of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, the Commission

considers it appropriate to consider this complaint of the applicant

in the context of those complaints made by the applicant falling within

the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     However, such a difference in treatment will only be

discriminatory if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" and if there

is no "reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means

employed and the aim sought to be realised" (see, for example, Eur.

Court H.R., Darby judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 187, p. 12,

para. 31). Furthermore, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin

of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in

otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment; the scope

of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject

matter and the background (Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow judgment of

8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, para. 177).

     The matters effectively raised by this complaint relate to

various hearings in a court which was in London (and thus involved a

considerable amount of travelling and discomfort for the applicant) and

which, according to the applicant, had no facilities for the disabled.

     Even assuming that the refusal by the courts to transfer the

applicant's case to a court nearer to her home with facilities for the

disabled led to an effective difference in treatment between her and

able-bodied litigants, the Commission recalls in this context again the

reasons for the refusal by the courts of her application to transfer

the proceedings and the lack of any practical steps taken by the

applicant in this respect (as referred to at 1. above).

     Accordingly, the Commission considers that, in the circumstances

of the present case, the rejection by the courts of the applicant's

application to transfer the proceedings from Woolwich County Court had

a legitimate aim (the maintenance of the rights of other litigants

involved in the case) and that there was a reasonable relationship of

proportionality between the means employed and that aim (refusal of the

applicant's application to transfer the proceedings at an advanced

stage in the proceedings).

     The Commission therefore considers this complaint manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.   The applicant also complains that the effect on her of all of the

above matters (including the courts' failure to deal appropriately with

her disability) constituted treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3)

of the Convention, which Article reads as follows:

     "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

     treatment or punishment."

     The Commission recalls that the case-law of the Convention organs

establishes that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity

if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention. Further, the Court has held that the suffering occasioned

must attain a certain level before treatment can be classified as

inhuman. The assessment of that minimum is relative and depends on all

the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment

and its physical or mental effects (Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. the

United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25).

     Insofar as the applicant complains about physical discomfort and

mental anguish caused by her having to defend proceedings issued by the

Council as a disabled person (including attending a court a significant

distance from her home which allegedly had no facilities for the

disabled), the Commission again recalls in this context the reasons for

the refusal by the courts of her application to transfer the

proceedings together with the failure on the part of the applicant to

take any practical steps towards alleviating any difficulties her

disability may have caused (as outlined in para. 1 above). In such

circumstances, the Commission does not consider that the applicant was

subjected to any such treatment alleged by a public authority. In

addition, the Commission does not consider that the application

otherwise demonstrates treatment of the applicant reaching the minimum

level of severity which would fall within the scope of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention.

     Accordingly, the Commission considers this complaint manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.   Finally, the applicant complains under Article 13 (Art. 13) of

the Convention that she was denied an effective domestic remedy.

However, the case-law of the Convention organs establishes that Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not require a remedy in domestic

law for all claims alleging a breach of the Convention; the claim must

be an arguable one (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of

27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). In light of the

above conclusions of the Commission concerning the applicant's other

complaints, the Commission finds that the applicant does not have an

arguable claim of a breach of her rights and freedoms which warrants

a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

     It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

     (M. F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C. L. ROZAKIS)